Scrutinizing science scrutinized

This essay argues that Laudan et al.’s (1986,1988) project of empirically testing philosophical models of scientific change was ill‐conceived, thus the data brought to light by the historians had little bearing upon the original problem: testing philosophical models of scientific change. The project is internally inconsistent and the procedure relating the theses under scrutiny to the models of change is so undefined that the corroboration or falsification of the theses teaches us nothing about the models. Serious anomalies in Laudan et al.’s (1988) report of experimental results are then shown to be related to already noticed methodological difficulties. I conclude that the project fails, contrary to its authors’ claim, to use historical evidence in a probative, rather than a simply illustrative, way.     

Pavlov's view of the inheritance of acquired characteristics as it relates to theses concerning scientific change

Pavlov's position on the inheritance of acquired characteristics was used to test selected theses of Laudan et al. (1986) concerning scientific change. It was determined that, despite negative experimental findings, Pavlov continued to accept the possibility of the inheritance of acquired habits. This confirms the main thesis I that, once accepted, theories persist despite negative experimental evidence. Pavolv's adherence to the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics might possibly be explained by his early experiences. Adolescent readings of a popularized version of Darwin's theory, which included the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics, profoundly influenced Pavlov's subsequent intellectual life. Overwhelmed by the theory, as originally presented, Pavlov was unable to alter his views in light of contrary findings.     

Normative naturalism and the challenge of relativism: Laudan versus Worrall on the justification of methodological principles

In Science and Values, Larry Laudan argues that rational scientific change is not restricted to scientific theory, but may also affect the methodology and axiology of science. In subsequent debate, John Worrall has raised the question of whether invariant principles of methodology are necessary in order to avoid epistemological relativism. Worrall argues that Laudan's denial of such principles leads straight to relativism. By contrast, Laudan claims that, rather than methodological invariance, what is required to escape relativism is a rational justification of such principles. In this paper, it will be argued that the normative naturalist meta‐methodology, which Laudan has developed in work subsequent to Science and Values, contains the resources needed to mount a satisfactory response to Worrall's charge of relativism.     

Reserve capacity of the elderly in aging sensitive tests of fluid intelligence: a reanalysis via a structural equation modelling approach

In the last decade there has been a growing interest among developmental psychologists to investigate whether the cognitive performance of older adults can be improved by means of training programs. A number of cognitive training studies involving aging sensitive abilities of fluid intelligence have been performed with healthy older adults (Willis et al. 1981; Baltes et al., 1984/1986). In this paper we reanalyse data from Baltes et al. (1986) concerning the ADEPT Induction, ADEPT Figural Relations, Induction Standard and the Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices Tests. In contrast to the above study, where the data analysis was based on a MANOVA approach, usually carried out when experimental data were gathered, this discussion implements an approach to change measurement for which the structural equation of different aspects of change in means as manifested in the moment matrices. The results here confirm these by Baltes et al. (1986), and suggest conclusions concerning change in means over time in the experimental and control groups, which are not implied by their study.     

Choosing Methods

This paper begins by adopting a broad criterion of scientific methods, in which a method is some practice in science designed to achieve the goals of science; this allows us to deal with a wider range of questions than has been common in much past philosophy of science, and to discuss some of the more detailed methodological questions of concern to scientists. On this definition, apriori approaches prove insufficient, since many methodological questions require some empirical input to be decided. Laudan has suggested that many such questions can be decided by testing methods empirically, but this encounters the problem that the empirical evidence is often indecisive. A more productive strategy is to utilise scientific theories: there are a wide range of these that are relevant to methodological questions and they are easier to validate. But this does not mean that empirical testing has no place. Instead, our experience with methods can be used to detect specific problems with the methods and to modify them accordingly.     

UNDERDETERMINATION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM INDIRECT CONFIRMATION

In this paper I criticize one of the most convincing recent attempts to resist the underdetermination thesis, Laudan’s argument from indirect confirmation. Laudan highlights and rejects a tacit assumption of the underdetermination theorist, namely that theories can be confirmed only by empirical evidence that follows from them. He shows that once we accept that theories can also be confirmed indirectly, by evidence not entailed by them, the skeptical conclusion does not follow. I agree that Laudan is right to reject this assumption, but I argue that his explanation of how the rejection of this assumption blocks the skeptical conclusion is flawed. I conclude that the argument from indirect confirmation is not effective against the underdetermination thesis.     

On structural models for analyzing change

The recommendation to base the analysis of multi-wave data upon explicit models for change is advocated. Several univariate and multivariate models are described, which emerge from an interaction between the classical test theory and the structural equation modeling approach. The resulting structural models for analyzing change reflect in some of their parameters substantively interesting aspects of intra- and interindividual change in follow-up studies. The models are viewed as an alternative to an ANOVA-based analysis of longitudinal data, and are illustrated on data from a cognitive intervention study of old adults (Bakes et al , 1986). The approach presents a useful means of analyzing change over time, and is applicable for purposes of (latent) growth curve analysis when analysis of variance assumptions are violated (e.g., Schaie & Hertzog, 1982; Morrison, 1976).     

Is It Justifiable to Abandon All Search for a Logic of Discovery?

In his influential paper, ‘Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?’, Laudan contends that there has been no philosophical rationale for a logic of discovery since the emergence of consequentialism in the 19th century. It is the purpose of this paper to show that consequentialism does not involve the rejection of all types of logic of discovery. Laudan goes too far in his interpretation of the historical shift from generativism to consequentialism, and his claim that the context of pursuit belongs to neither discovery nor justification is based on narrow interpretations of the contexts of discovery and justification. As a result, Laudan draws unwarranted conclusions concerning both the early and contemporary defenders of a logic of discovery. A methodological logic of discovery—which involves self‐corrective methods of hypothesis generation that promote the long‐term goals of science and which require consequential support for justification—is a type of logic of discovery that survives the shift to consequentialism.     

Learning from the past: Reflections on the role of history in the philosophy of science

In recent years philosophers of science have turned away from positivist programs for explicating scientific rationality through detailed accounts of scientific procedure and turned toward large-scale accounts of scientific change. One important motivation for this was better fit with the history of science. Paying particular attention to the large-scale theories of Lakatos and Laudan I argue that the history of science is no better accommodated by the new large-scale theories than it was by the earlier positivist philosophies of science; both are, in their different ways, parochial to our conception of rationality. I further argue that the goal of scientific methodology is not explaining the past but promoting good scientific practice, and on this the large-scale methodologies have no obvious a priori advantages over the positivist methodologies they have tried to replace.     

Modelling mechanisms with causal cycles

Mechanistic philosophy of science views a large part of scientific activity as engaged in modelling mechanisms. While science textbooks tend to offer qualitative models of mechanisms, there is increasing demand for models from which one can draw quantitative predictions and explanations. Casini et al. (Theoria 26(1):5–33, 2011) put forward the Recursive Bayesian Networks (RBN) formalism as well suited to this end. The RBN formalism is an extension of the standard Bayesian net formalism, an extension that allows for modelling the hierarchical nature of mechanisms. Like the standard Bayesian net formalism, it models causal relationships using directed acyclic graphs. Given this appeal to acyclicity, causal cycles pose a prima facie problem for the RBN approach. This paper argues that the problem is a significant one given the ubiquity of causal cycles in mechanisms, but that the problem can be solved by combining two sorts of solution strategy in a judicious way.     

Normative Naturalism and Epistemic Relativism

In previous work, I defended Larry Laudan against the criticism that the axiological component of his normative naturalism lacks a naturalistic justification. I argued that this criticism depends on an equivocation over the term ‘naturalism’ and that it begs the question against what we are entitled to include in our concept of nature. In this paper, I generalize that argument and explore its implications for Laudan and other proponents of epistemic naturalism. Here, I argue that a commitment to naturalism in the methods and aims of science inevitably entails a kind of epistemic relativism. However, I argue that this should not be interpreted as a reductio of naturalism, since the admission of contextually based standards and aims of science does not result in quietism when it comes to important questions concerning scientific rationality.     

Dynamics of scientific change and cognitive science. An epistemological update / Dinámica de cambio y ciencias cognitivas. Una puesta al día epistemológica

Abstract

I explore two proposals on the dynamics of scientific change in the general philosophy of science and I evaluate the extent to which they can be applied in the cognitive sciences. I do this by paying special attention to the youth and diversity which characterize this field of scientific research. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of uses of Kuhn’s work: direct but loose applications of Kuhnean concepts to the history of cognitive science, on the one hand, and indirect applications of certain aspects of Kuhnean ideas, on the other hand. Secondly, I criticize their pertinence on the basis of the secondary role which theories play in the field. Finally, I defend the fertility of the concept of ‘research tradition’ proposed by Laudan, by focusing on the previously highlighted set of idiosyncratic characteristics of the cognitive sciences.     

Scientific Foundation of Business Models Theory: Research Traditions Approach

During the last two decades, the literature in management studies has shown a significant increase in interest in the theory of business models, and there has been wide-ranging discussion about the definitions of those models. These studies and discussions have provoked questions about the scientific nature of the foundations of business models. This article attempts to verify whether the proposed constructions of business models meet the objectives of abduction, which is, according to the methodology of science, one of the recognised methods to verify the scientific nature of created theories. The verification was performed by using the method of the Scientific Research Tradition (ScRT) by Larry Laudan. The result unequivocally confirmed that the theory of business models that is created and defined based on management sciences falls under the scope of ScRT. It can be said that according to the methodology of science, the business models theory proposed on the basis of management science points to abduction as a tool that allows for a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of formation and opens a new way of interpretation than is the case when using deduction or induction.     

Can’t philosophers tell the difference between science and religion?: Demarcation revisited

In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible and that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism (MN) as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself.     

Reduction: the Cheshire cat problem and a return to roots

In this paper, I propose two theses, and then examine what the consequences of those theses are for discussions of reduction and emergence. The first thesis is that what have traditionally been seen as robust, reductions of one theory or one branch of science by another more fundamental one are a largely a myth. Although there are such reductions in the physical sciences, they are quite rare, and depend on special requirements. In the biological sciences, these prima facie sweeping reductions fade away, like the body of the famous Cheshire cat, leaving only a smile. ... The second thesis is that the “smiles” are fragmentary patchy explanations, and though patchy and fragmentary, they are very important, potentially Nobel-prize winning advances. To get the best grasp of these “smiles,” I want to argue that, we need to return to the roots of discussions and analyses of scientific explanation more generally, and not focus mainly on reduction models, though three conditions based on earlier reduction models are retained in the present analysis. I briefly review the scientific explanation literature as it relates to reduction, and then offer my account of explanation. The account of scientific explanation I present is one I have discussed before, but in this paper I try to simplify it, and characterize it as involving field elements (FE) and a preferred causal model system (PCMS) abbreviated as FE and PCMS. In an important sense, this FE and PCMS analysis locates an “explanation” in a typical scientific research article. This FE and PCMS account is illustrated using a recent set of neurogenetic papers on two kinds of worm foraging behaviors: solitary and social feeding. One of the preferred model systems from a 2002 Nature article in this set is used to exemplify the FE and PCMS analysis, which is shown to have both reductive and nonreductive aspects. The paper closes with a brief discussion of how this FE and PCMS approach differs from and is congruent with Bickle’s “ruthless reductionism” and the recently revived mechanistic philosophy of science of Machamer, Darden, and Craver.     

Tests of multiplicative models in psychology: a case study using the unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept

Theories that posit multiplicative relationships between variables are common in psychology. A. G. Greenwald et al. recently presented a theory that explicated relationships between group identification, group attitudes, and self-esteem. Their theory posits a multiplicative relationship between concepts when predicting a criterion variable. Greenwald et al. suggested analytic strategies to test their multiplicative model that researchers might assume are appropriate for testing multiplicative models more generally. The theory and analytic strategies of Greenwald et al. are used as a case study to show the strong measurement assumptions that underlie certain tests of multiplicative models. It is shown that the approach used by Greenwald et al. can lead to declarations of theoretical support when the theory is wrong as well as rejection of the theory when the theory is correct. A simple strategy for testing multiplicative models that makes weaker measurement assumptions than the strategy proposed by Greenwald et al. is suggested and discussed.     

Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail?

In his paper “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”, Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific realism. I defend here that although Laudan’s criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon’s statistical-relevance model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such success, even if it is accepted that there can be cases of unsuccessful (approximately) true theories and cases of successful false theories.     

The importance of shared environmental influences in explaining the overlap between mother's parenting and sibling relationships: reply to Neale (1999)

This article addresses concerns raised by M. C. Neale (1999) in his commentary on the D. A. Bussell et al. (1999) Nonshared Environment in Adolescent Development (NEAD) study. These concerns fall into two categories: (a) model assumptions and sample design and (b) testing of alternative models. The validity of the assumptions of quantitative genetic models is a concern for all researchers in this area. Discussion of those assumptions in this reply is brief and focuses on those most relevant to the NEAD sample. The two alternative models proposed by Neale were designed to provide alternatives to the large shared environmental effect found in the original report of Bussell et al. Because these alternative models did not provide a better fit, the appropriateness of Bussell et al.'s basic model and the importance of shared environmental influences for explaining the association among family subsystems are supported.     

Testing Stereotype Threat Theory Predictions for Math-Identified and Non-Math-Identified Students by Gender

This study follows in the tradition of Cullen, Hardison, and Sackett (2004) by testing the generalizability of stereotype threat theory findings from laboratory to applied settings. Like Cullen et al., the authors developed models of the pattern of relationships between Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) math scores and English grades that would be expected for math-identified and non-math-identified men and women if stereotype threat were operating to suppress the scores of math-identified women during SAT test administration. The study builds on Cullen et al. by creating an alternative measure of "identification" with the math domain that is premised on high school students' intention to major in math or a math-related discipline during college. Results using this alternative measure of identification were not supportive of predictions arising from stereotype threat theory, reinforcing Cullen et al.'s call for caution in generalizing stereotype threat theory lab findings to real-world testing environments.