A partial resolution of the paradox of interference: The role of integrating knowledge

It has been noted that models of memory that posit retrieval interference imply that the more one knows about a topic, the harder it is to retrieve any one of these facts. Smith, Adams, and Schorr (Cognitive Psychology, 1978, 10, 438–464) regard this to be a paradox and postulate that people use world knowledge to integrate various facts about a concept and thereby avoid interference. Exploring this issue further in two experiments we discovered that integration of facts alleviates interference only when a person can perform his memory task by simply making a consistency judgment and can avoid the need to retrieve a specific fact. When foils force subjects to retrieve the specific assertion, the interference occurs among integrated facts as among unrelated facts. It appears that, when possible, subjects will judge whether they have seen a fact simply by judging if it is related to (consistent with) a theme they have studied. In other words, people judge themes rather than facts. Consistent with this interpretation, we found interference among themes; that is, the more themes were associated with a concept, the greater the interference.     

Memory retrieval and suppression: the inhibition of situation models

When people retrieve newly learned facts on a recognition test, they are often increasingly slowed by the number of other newly learned facts that have a concept in common with the probed fact. This is called the fan effect. Assuming that people are using situation models of the learned information, the author considers whether the inhibition of competing representations is one of the processes involved in the fan effect. Evidence was found for negative priming of related but irrelevant situation models, thus supporting the idea that the inhibition of highly related memory traces is used in long-term memory retrieval. As such, this is a form of retrieval-based inhibition.     

The organization of information retrieved from situation models

The organization of information when it is retrieved from situation models was explored using recognition and recall tests. A fan effect paradigm was used to assess organization in recognition and a clustering measure was used in recall. People memorized either object-location facts (e.g., “The pay phone is in the city hall”) or person/small location facts (e.g., “The banker is on the witness stand”). For object-location facts, a location-based organization was observed in both recall and recognition. However, for person/small location facts, a location-based organization was observed for recall, and a person-based organization was observed for recognition. Thus, the observed organization was flexible depending on the retrieval task.     

Forgetting our facts: the role of inhibitory processes in the loss of propositional knowledge

Seven experiments are reported that show that retrieving facts from long-term memory is accomplished, in part, by inhibitory processes that suppress interfering facts. When asked to repeatedly retrieve a recently learned proposition (e.g., recalling The actor is looking at the tulip, given cues such as Actor looking t__), subjects experienced a recall deficit for related facts (e.g., The actor is looking at the violin) on a recall test administered 15 min later. Importantly, this retrieval-induced forgetting was shown to generalize to other facts in which the inhibited concepts took part (e.g., The teacher is lifting the violin), replicating a finding observed by M. C. Anderson and B. A. Spellman (1995) with categorical stimuli. These findings suggest a critical role for suppression in models of propositional retrieval and implicate the mere retrieval of what we know as a source of forgetting of factual knowledge.     

Retrieval savings with nonidentical elements: The case of simple addition and subtraction

The identical elements (IE) theory of fact representation (Rickard, 2005) proposes that memorized facts that are composed of identical elements (e.g., 6 × 8 = 48 and 8 × 6 = 48) share a common representation in memory, whereas facts with nonidentical elements (e.g., 6 × 8 = 48 and 48 ÷ 8 = 6) are represented separately in memory. The IE model has been successfully applied to the transfer of practice in simple multiplication and division, in transition from procedure-based to retrieval-based performance, and in cued episodic recall. In the present article, we examined the effects of practicing simple addition problems (e.g., 3 + 6 = 9) on the performance of corresponding subtraction problems (9 − 6 = 3), and vice versa. According to IE theory, there should be no transfer of retrieval savings between addition and subtraction facts if performance is based on discrete IE fact representations. Cross-operation response time savings were observed, however, for both small, well-memorized problems (e.g., practice 3 + 2, test 5 − 2) and larger problems (6 + 8, 14 − 6), and they were statistically robust when trials that were self-reported as direct retrieval were analyzed. The transfer of retrieval practice savings between facts with nonidentical elements challenges IE theory as a comprehensive model of transfer in memory retrieval.     

Cognitive representations and processes in arithmetic: inferences from the performance of brain-damaged subjects.

In this article, we present data from two brain-damaged patients with calculation impairments in support of claims about the cognitive mechanisms underlying simple arithmetic performance. We first present a model of the functional architecture of the cognitive calculation system based on previous research. We then elaborate this architecture through detailed examination of the patterns of spared and impaired performance of the two patients. From the patients' performance we make the following theoretical claims: that some arithmetic facts are stored in the form of individual fact representations (e.g., 9 x 4 = 36), whereas other facts are stored in the form of a general rule (e.g., 0 x N = 0); that arithmetic fact retrieval is mediated by abstract internal representations that are independent of the form in which problems are presented or responses are given; that arithmetic facts and calculation procedures are functionally independent; and that calculation algorithms may include special-case procedures that function to increase the speed or efficiency of problem solving. We conclude with a discussion of several more general issues relevant to the reported research.     

How intention and monitoring your thoughts influence characteristics of autobiographical memories

Involuntary autobiographical memories come to mind effortlessly and unintended, but the mechanisms of their retrieval are not fully understood. We hypothesize that involuntary retrieval depends on memories that are highly accessible (e.g., intense, unusual, recent, rehearsed), while the elaborate search that characterizes voluntary retrieval also produces memories that are mundane, repeated or distant – memories with low accessibility. Previous research provides some evidence for this ‘threshold hypothesis’. However, in almost every prior study, participants have been instructed to report only memories while ignoring other thoughts. It is possible that such an instruction can modify the phenomenological characteristics of involuntary memories. This study aimed to investigate the effects of retrieval intentionality (i.e., wanting to retrieve a memory) and selective monitoring (i.e., instructions to report only memories) on the phenomenology of autobiographical memories. Participants were instructed to (1) intentionally retrieve autobiographical memories, (2) intentionally retrieve any type of thought (3) wait for an autobiographical memory to spontaneously appear, or (4) wait for any type of thought to spontaneously appear. They rated the mental content on a number of phenomenological characteristics both during retrieval and retrospectively following retrieval. The results support the prediction that highly accessible memories mostly enter awareness unintended and without selective monitoring, while memories with low accessibility rely on intention and selective monitoring. We discuss the implications of these effects.     

Retrieval of propositional information from long-term memory

Three experiments are reported in which subjects learn propositions like A hippie is in the park. The experiments manipulate the number of such propositions involving a particular person (e.g., hippie) or a particular location (e.g., park). After learning the material, subjects are asked to judge whether particular probe propositions are from the study set. Times to make these judgments about probe propositions increase with the number of study propositions involving the person or location used in the probe proposition. A model is presented which assumes a subject simultaneously accesses memory from all concepts in a probe proposition and serially searches through all study propositions involving each concept. Search of memory terminates as soon as one search process from a concept finds the probe proposition or exhausts the study propositions attached to that concept.     

Differential fan effect and attentional focus

As people study more facts about a concept, it takes longer to retrieve a particular fact about that concept. This fan effect (Anderson, 1974) has been attributed to competition among associations to a concept. Alternatively, the mental-model theory (Radvansky & Zacks, 1991) suggests that the fan effect disappears when the related concepts are organized into a single mental model. In the present study, attentional focus was manipulated to affect the mental model to be constructed. One group of participants focused on the person dimension of personlocation pairs, whereas the other group focused on the location dimension. The result showed that the fan effect with the focused dimension was greater than the fan effect with the nonfocused dimension, which is contrary to the mental-model theory. The number of associations with a concept is indeed crucial during retrieval, and the importance of the information seems to be accentuated with attentional focus.     

Altering access to autobiographical episodes with prior semantic knowledge

Within autobiographical knowledge, semantic and episodic memory are traditionally considered separate, but newer models place them along a continuum, which raises the possibility of an intermediate form of knowledge - personal semantics. This study tested how different types of semantics – general semantics and two forms of personal semantics – impact access to personal episodic memories. In two experiments, participants made a series of true/false judgments about a prime statement, which reflected a general semantic fact, a context-dependent (e.g., repeated event) or context-independent (e.g., trait), personal semantic fact and then retrieved a specific past episodic memory. There was a significantly stronger priming effect for accessing specific episodic memories after judging personal semantic facts versus general facts. We also found that context-dependent and -independent personal semantic facts had separable priming effects on episodic memory. These findings support a continuum model of memory and verifies that there are multiple forms of personal knowledge.     

Long-term negative priming: Support for retrieval of prior attentional processes

Negative priming reveals that participants respond slowly to a probe target that was a task-irrelevant distractor in the preceding prime display (e.g., Tipper, 1985) and is thought to reflect processes mediating short-term behaviour. However, since the first surprising reports that negative priming is found with meaningless stimuli across delays of 30 days (e.g., DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996), researchers have questioned the existence of long-term negative priming effects. Because long-term negative priming could indicate that task-irrelevant information leaves a memory trace that impacts performance over time, such a finding is of immense theoretical importance. Indeed, the current research finds support for the existence of long-term negative priming as well as its generality across different stimuli and conditions. The authors propose that the initial processes that prevent response to irrelevant stimuli may be stored in memory, where retrieval of these processes can mediate behaviour over time.     

Noncriterial recollection influences metacognitive monitoring and control processes

When retrieving information from memory, temporarily irrelevant material may influence future retrieval endeavours. According to an accessibility account, the amount and intensity of this information can be used to predict the availability of related material. A dual-source paradigm was used to investigate whether information that was not relevant (i.e., noncriterial recollection) to the current memory search would influence metacognitive judgements about a relevant, criterial dimension. In two experiments, participants gave higher feelings-of-knowing judgements for a weakly encoded source dimension when they could subsequently recall the other source dimension later. Furthermore, the influence of the noncriterial information appeared to be driven more so by the subjective state of remembering rather than knowing. Thus, strong memorial information that is temporarily irrelevant influences behaviour.     

SARA: a cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.     

Retrieval-induced forgetting of arithmetic facts but not rules

Retrieval of a multiplication fact (2×6 =12) can disrupt retrieval of its addition counterpart (2+6=8). We investigated whether this retrieval-induced forgetting effect applies to rule-governed arithmetic facts (i.e., 0×N=0, 1×N=N). Participants (n=40) practised rule-governed multiplication problems (e.g., 1×4, 0×5) and multiplication facts (e.g., 2×3, 4×5) for four blocks and then were tested on the addition counterparts (e.g., 1+4, 0+5, 2+3, 4+5) and control additions. Increased addition response times and errors relative to controls occurred only for problems corresponding to multiplication facts, with no problem-specific effects on addition counterparts of rule-governed multiplications. In contrast, the rule-governed 0+N problems provided evidence of generalisation of practice across items, whereas the fact-based 1+N problems did not. These findings support the theory that elementary arithmetic rules and facts involve distinct memory processes, and confirmed that previous, seemly inconsistent findings of RIF in arithmetic owed to the inclusion or exclusion of rule-governed problems.     

SARA: A cognitive process model to simulate the anchoring effect and hindsight bias

The cognitive process model "SARA" aims to explain the anchoring effect and hindsight bias by making detailed assumptions about the representation and alteration of item-specific knowledge. The model assumes that all processes, namely generating an estimate, encoding new information (i.e., the "anchor"), and reconstructing a previously generated estimate, are based on a probabilistic sampling process. Sampling probes long-term memory in order to retrieve information into working memory. Retrieval depends on the associative strength between this information and the currently active retrieval cues. Encoding the anchor may alter this associative pattern ("selective activation") or the anchor may serve as a retrieval cue, thus directing memory search ("biased reconstruction"). Both processes lead to systematically changed retrieval probabilities, thus causing the anchoring effect or hindsight bias. The model is completely formalised and implemented as a computer program. A series of simulations demonstrates the power of SARA to reproduce empirical findings and to predict new ones.     

A neuropsychological study of fact memory and source amnesia

We investigated the ability of amnesic patients to learn new facts (e.g., Angel Falls is located in Venezuela) and also to remember where and when the facts were learned (i.e., source memory). To assess the susceptibility of fact and source memory to retrograde amnesia, patients prescribed electroconvulsive therapy were presented facts prior to the first treatment and were tested after their second treatment. All amnesic patients exhibited marked fact memory impairment. In addition, some amnesic patients exhibited source amnesia (i.e., they recalled a few facts but then could not remember where or when those facts had been learned). Source amnesia was unrelated to the severity of the memory deficit itself, because patients who exhibited source amnesia recalled as many facts as the patients who did not. These results show that the deficit in amnesia includes an impairment in acquiring and retaining new facts. Source amnesia can also occur, but it is dissociable from impaired recall and recognition and appears to reflect difficulty in remembering the specific context in which information is acquired. The findings are discussed in terms of their significance for how memory is organized.     

Tracing memory-structure activation during person judgments

The purpose of the reported research was twofold: (a) to introduce a procedure for measuring concept activation during memory-based decisions and (b) to employ the procedure to investigate memory-activation processes in social judgments. Recent research has focused on subjects' reliance on memory for earlier inferred categorizations as the basis for judgments about persons. However, subjects have also been shown to rely on memory for factual information when making such decisions. To more fully understand how social judgments are made, methods are needed that are capable of tracing concept activation during the judgment process. The present study introduces a procedure that relies on probe recognition speed as a measure of concept activation. The procedure is used to examine alternative models of how subjects activate categorical and event memory when making contemplative impression judgments (i.e., judgments that they have to justify). The results favor a dependent memory-activation model that hypothesizes subjects activate both facts and earlier categorizations that they have made about a person when making subsequent memory-based judgments. Memory-structure activation was dependent in that facts relevant to forming the early categorizations were more likely to be activated in the service of a judgment than category-irrelevant facts. Advantages and limitations of the probe procedure as a measure of memory-structure activation during decisions are discussed.     

Memory Errors Reveal a Bias to Spontaneously Generalize to Categories

Much evidence suggests that, from a young age, humans are able to generalize information learned about a subset of a category to the category itself. Here, we propose that—beyond simply being able to perform such generalizations—people are biased to generalize to categories, such that they routinely make spontaneous, implicit category generalizations from information that licenses such generalizations. To demonstrate the existence of this bias, we asked participants to perform a task in which category generalizations would distract from the main goal of the task, leading to a characteristic pattern of errors. Specifically, participants were asked to memorize two types of novel facts: quantified facts about sets of kind members (e.g., facts about all or many stups) and generic facts about entire kinds (e.g., facts about zorbs as a kind). Moreover, half of the facts concerned properties that are typically generalizable to an animal kind (e.g., eating fruits and vegetables), and half concerned properties that are typically more idiosyncratic (e.g., getting mud in their hair). We predicted that—because of the hypothesized bias—participants would spontaneously generalize the quantified facts to the corresponding kinds, and would do so more frequently for the facts about generalizable (rather than idiosyncratic) properties. In turn, these generalizations would lead to a higher rate of quantified‐to‐generic memory errors for the generalizable properties. The results of four experiments (N = 449) supported this prediction. Moreover, the same generalizable‐versus‐idiosyncratic difference in memory errors occurred even under cognitive load, which suggests that the hypothesized bias operates unnoticed in the background, requiring few cognitive resources. In sum, this evidence suggests the presence of a powerful bias to draw generalizations about kinds.