JUSTICE AS INHERENT RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS

The critical comments by my fellow symposiasts on my book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs , have provided me with the opportunity to clarify parts of my argument and to correct some misunderstandings; they have also helped me see more clearly than I did before the import of some parts of my argument. In his comments, Paul Weithman points out features of the right order conception of justice that I had not noticed. They have also prodded me to clarify in what way rights are trumps; and both his comments and Bernstein's have prodded me to clarify certain aspects of the theistic account of human rights that I offered. Attridge's comments lead me to see that I was perhaps over-zealous in emphasizing the objective aspects of the semantic range of dikaiosunê as used in the New Testament and downplaying the subjective aspects. And O'Donovan's comments have provided me with the opportunity to make clear that my account of rights is not an immunities account that presupposes nominalism, and to emphasize the ways in which it is not an asocial individualistic account.     

THEODICY: A RESPONSE TO CHRISTOPHER SOUTHGATE

This article is a critical and appreciative interaction with Christopher Southgate's theodicy and theology of glory. I critique in particular his rejection of all dualist moves in theodicy. I question why Southgate can ascribe evil to some human actions, many of which are automatic and unconscious, but not to any other level or form of consciousness. I argue that he may rely too heavily on rational scientific categories, which are not sufficient in themselves to carry the weight of key theological concepts. His use of poetry is powerful and suggestive, but in the end, he may not give it enough epistemic weight.     

JUSTIFYING METAPHYSICAL NIHILISM: A RESPONSE TO CAMERON

Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of 'concrete'. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions.     

ON THINKING THEOLOGICALLY ABOUT ANIMALS: A RESPONSE

In response to evaluations of On Animals: Volume 1, Systematic Theology by Margaret Adams, Christopher Carter, David Fergusson, and Stephen Webb, this article argues that the theological reappraisals of key doctrines argued for in the book are important for an adequate theological discussion of animals. The article addresses critical points raised by these authors in relation to the creation of human beings in the image of God, the doctrine of the incarnation, the theological ordering of creatures, anthropocentrism, and the doctrine of God. It concludes that, given previous neglect, much more discussion by theologians is required in order to think better concerning the place of animals in Christian theology, but acting better toward fellow animal creatures is an important next step toward this goal.     

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ILLUSION: MILNER, WINNICOTT AND RYCROFT

Illusion is a word that Raymond Williams might have included among his list of keywords of British culture, since it is a word that discloses 'both continuity and discontinuity, and also deep conflicts of value and belief' within its intellectual and political history (1983, p. 23). It is a banner under which the meaning of that culture has frequently been contested. The author indicates some of the more significant of these contests, with occasional glances at the wider European context and with special reference to the history of psychoanalysis, where the conflicts that characterise the larger history of the word have been interestingly re-enacted. In particular, the author explores its significance for the English psychoanalysts Marion Milner and Charles Rycroft and, more centrally, for Donald Winnicott, not least because in Winnicott's case it is a word that has been treated only peripherally in the two books that are organised around the study of his language, Alexander Newman's Non-Compliance in Winnicott's Words (1995) and Jan Abram's The Language of Winnicott (1996).     

THE FORMULATION OF DISJUNCTIVISM: A RESPONSE TO FISH

ABSTRACT Fish proposes that we need to elucidate what 'disjunctivism' stands for, and he also proposes that it stands for the rejection of a principle about the nature of experience that he calls the decisiveness principle. The present paper argues that his first proposal is reasonable, but then argues, in Section II, that his positive suggestion does not draw the line between disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism in the right place. In Section III, it is argued that disjunctivism is a thesis about the special nature of perceptual experience, and the thesis as elucidated here is then distinguished from and related to certain other ideas about perception, namely, direct realism and also McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism.     

QUESTIONING POLANYI'S MEANING: A RESPONSE TO RONALD HALL

Abstract. Michael Polanyi's distinction between the indicative meaning of scientific statements and the symbolic and metaphorical meaning of art and religion, presented in Meaning , is based on an abstraction from concrete experience and betrays an inadequate understanding of religious discourse, particularly the discourse of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. In fact, Polanyi's vision in Personal Knowledge , which analyses the priority of personal action to all achievements of explication, seems either to be denied or forgotton by the positions taken in Meaning. Hence, the argument here is that Meaning is a deviation from Personal Knowledge and a step away from the resources necessary to grasp adequately the logic of religious discourse.     

CRITICAL REALISM REDUX: A RESPONSE TO JOSH REEVES

This article combines an appreciation of several themes in Josh Reeves's Against Methodology in Science and Religion: Recent Debates on Rationality and Theology while arguing in favor of critical realism. The author holds that critical realism manages to combine the objective truth reached through inference and especially cognitive acts of judgment as well as the various, contingent historical contexts that also define where science is practiced. Reeves advocates a historical perspective, but this article claims that in order for critical realism to be credible, a philosophical perspective must be maintained.     

A RESPONSE TO ERVIN LASZLO: QUANTUM AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Abstract. I respond to Ervin Laszlo's suggestions and criticism regarding my essay in this issue of Zygon. Virtual atomic orbitals are used as a model to illustrate the existence of a general realm of potentiality in physical reality from which the actual world emanates. Laszlo's suggestions for “paradigm repair” are supported and accepted as essentially being in agreement with my intentions and as offering highly useful clarifications. I compare virtual states to historic ideas of forms as metaphysical principles of being that inspire thoughts regarding the actions of a Cosmic Consciousness in the processes of the universe. Metaphysical and theological interpretations of the results of scientific research are defended, provided that they are not used to interfere a priori with the technical program of scientific research.     

MIND UPLOADING AND EMBODIED COGNITION: A THEOLOGICAL RESPONSE

One of the more radical transhumanist proposals for future human being envisions the uploading of our minds to a digital substrate, trading our dependence on frail, degenerating “meat” bodies for the immortality of software existence. Yet metaphor studies indicate that our use of metaphor operates in our bodily inhabiting of the world, and a phenomenological approach emphasizes a “hybridity” to human being that resists traditional mind/body dichotomies. Future scenarios envisioning mind uploading and disembodied artificial intelligence (AI) share an apocalyptic category with more traditional religious eschatologies, though they differ markedly in content; therefore, the insights of embodied cognition and their uptake in technological innovation are considered as they apply to theological concerns. Theology often functions in debates over the technological future to critique or to caution. However, theologians may learn from their technological dialogue partners when it comes to the future of embodiment and its implications for the construction and practice of theology.     

EVALUATION OF A BRIEF STIMULUS PREFERENCE ASSESSMENT

We evaluated the utility of a brief (5-min) stimulus preference assessment for individuals with developmental disabilities. Participants had noncontingent (free) access to an array of stimuli and could interact with any of the stimuli at any time. Stimuli were never withdrawn or withheld from the participants during a 5-min session. In Experiment 1, the brief preference assessment was conducted for 10 participants to identify differentially preferred stimuli, and reinforcer assessments were conducted to test the reinforcing efficacy of those stimuli identified as highly preferred. In Experiment 2, a comparison was conducted between the brief preference assessment and a commonly used paired-stimulus preference assessment. Collectively, results demonstrated that the brief preference assessment identified stimuli that functioned as reinforcers for a simple operant response, identified preferred stimuli that were differentially effective as reinforcers compared to nonpreferred stimuli, was associated with fewer problem behaviors, and required less time to complete than a commonly used paired-stimulus preference assessment.     

KNOWING BEFORE DOING: DISCRIMINATION BY RATS OF A BRIEF INTERRUPTION OF A TONE

Eight rats' lever presses were reinforced after an interruption in a tone, provided the lever had not been pressed before the tone interruption. After a few sessions, long before the animals reliably refrained from lever pressing before the interruption, the latencies of postinterruption presses (time from the termination of the interruption to the moment of the lever press) dissociated into two classes: short ones for to-be-rewarded presses, and long ones for presses in the other trials, which contained no reward because one or more lever presses had occurred before the interruption. Thus discrimination of impending reinforcement in the current trial occurred before there was evidence of sensitivity to reinforcement in the reinforcement-producing aspect of behavior. This finding is related to Shimp's (1981) contention that the temporal properties of recent behavior are reinforceable, if remembered. The present finding shows that learning to discriminate whether one's behavior has met a contingency, and learning to carry out this behavior, need not go together, implying that memory of temporal properties is probably a necessary but not a sufficient condition for learning the latter.