It just felt right: The neural correlates of the fluency heuristic

Simple heuristics exploit basic human abilities, such as recognition memory, to make decisions based on sparse information. Based on the relative speed of recognizing two objects, the fluency heuristic infers that the one recognized more quickly has the higher value with respect to the criterion of interest. Behavioral data show that reliance on retrieval fluency enables quick inferences. Our goal with the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study was to isolate fluency-heuristic-based judgments to map the use of fluency onto specific brain areas that might give a better understanding of the heuristic’s underlying processes. Activation within the claustrum for fluency heuristic decisions was found. Given that claustrum activation is thought to reflect the integration of perceptual and memory elements into a conscious gestalt, we suggest this activation correlates with the experience of fluency.     

Fluent, fast, and frugal? A formal model evaluation of the interplay between memory, fluency, and comparative judgments

A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency-that is, the speed with which objects are recognized-will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has remained largely untested due to methodological difficulties. To overcome the latter, we propose a measurement model from the class of multinomial processing tree models that can estimate true single-cue reliance on recognition and retrieval fluency. We applied this model to aggregate and individual data from a probabilistic inference experiment and considered both goodness of fit and model complexity to evaluate different hypotheses. The results were relatively clear-cut, revealing that the fluency heuristic is an unlikely candidate for describing comparative judgments concerning recognized objects. These findings are discussed in light of a broader theoretical view on the interplay of memory and judgment processes.     

On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use

The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension.     

Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does easily learned mean easily remembered?: it depends on your beliefs about intelligence

Because numerous studies have shown that feelings of encoding fluency are positively correlated with judgments of learning, a single dominant heuristic, easily learned = easily remembered (ELER), has been posited to explain how people interpret encoding fluency when assessing their own memory. However, the inferences people draw from feelings of encoding fluency may vary with their beliefs about why information is easy or effortful to encode. We conducted two experiments in which participants studied word lists and then predicted their future recall of those items. Results revealed that subjects who viewed intelligence as fixed, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating that they had reached the limits of their ability, used the ELER heuristic to make judgments of learning. However, subjects who viewed intelligence as malleable, and who tended to interpret effortful encoding as indicating greater engagement in learning, did not use the ELER heuristic and at times predicted greater memory for items that they found more effortful to learn.     

Take the best versus simultaneous feature matching: probabilistic inferences from memory and effects of representation format

In 4 experiments, the tendency to use the simple heuristic Take The Best (TTB; G. Gigerenzer & D. Goldstein, 1996) was explored for probabilistic multiattribute inferences from memory. In a newly developed procedure, participants first learned attribute patterns that formed the basis for inferences in a second phase. A Bayesian method classified strategies as TTB, compensatory, or guessing. Experiment 1 had a high rate (64%) of participants classified as TTB users when inferences were made from memory. Experiment 2 showed that this was no mere materials effect. In Experiments 3 and 4, the authors examined effects of the representational format of the attribute information. Experiment 4 showed that the representational format may be an important moderating variable for strategy use.     

Recollection, fluency, and the explicit/implicit distinction in artificial grammar learning

In this article, the authors propose that both implicit memory and implicit learning phenomena can be explained by a common set of principles, in particular via participants' strategic use of recollective and fluency heuristics. In a series of experiments, it was demonstrated that manipulating processing fluency had an impact on classification decisions in an artificial grammar learning task (Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 7), showing that participants were using a fluency heuristic. Under identical conditions, however, this manipulation had no effect on recognition decisions (Experiments 3 and 5), consistent with a greater default reliance on recollection. Most significant, the authors also showed that a fluency effect can be induced in recognition (Experiments 4-6) and can be eliminated in classification (Experiment 7).     

How forgetting aids heuristic inference

Some theorists, ranging from W. James (1890) to contemporary psychologists, have argued that forgetting is the key to proper functioning of memory. The authors elaborate on the notion of beneficial forgetting by proposing that loss of information aids inference heuristics that exploit mnemonic information. To this end, the authors bring together 2 research programs that take an ecological approach to studying cognition. Specifically, they implement fast and frugal heuristics within the ACT-R cognitive architecture. Simulations of the recognition heuristic, which relies on systematic failures of recognition to infer which of 2 objects scores higher on a criterion value, demonstrate that forgetting can boost accuracy by increasing the chances that only 1 object is recognized. Simulations of the fluency heuristic, which arrives at the same inference on the basis of the speed with which objects are recognized, indicate that forgetting aids the discrimination between the objects' recognition speeds.     

On the binary quality of recognition and the inconsequentiality of further knowledge: two critical tests of the recognition heuristic

The recognition heuristic is claimed to be distinguished from notions of availability and fluency through its categorical or “binary” treatment of information and the “inconsequentiality” of further knowledge to inferences based on recognition. Using the city‐size task of Goldstein and Gigerenzer ( 2002 ) we demonstrate that: (1) increasing the validity of other information in the environment decreases the reliance on recognition; (2) cities that are both recognized and have other information known about them (e.g. they have a soccer team) are chosen more often than those which are simply recognized; and (3) there is a negative correlation between the time taken to identify a city and the proportion of times it is selected as the larger of a pair. None of these results is predicted by the process model of the recognition heuristic. The implication of the results for the distinction between the recognition, availability and fluency heuristics is discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Understanding text after severe closed-head injury: assessing inferences and memory operations with a think-aloud procedure

A think-aloud method was used to examine the content of information available to working memory during narrative comprehension in a CHI population. Twenty severe CHI participants (>1 year post-injury) and 20 controls talked aloud after they read each sentence of story narratives. Trabasso and Magliano's (1996a) verbal protocol analysis was then used to code for the production of inferential and non-inferential clauses and the memory operations that supported inferential clause production. We found that CHI and control groups produced a comparable number of clauses, that inferences dominated narrative comprehension, and that both groups produced more explanatory inferences than predictive or associative inferences. Despite these qualitative similarities, the CHI group demonstrated poorer comprehension, generated proportionately fewer inferences, relied less on retrieval as a memory source for explanatory inferences, and produced more non-inferential clauses and associative inferences.     

Bias in self-motion perceived speed can enhance episodic memory

Prior experiences of a stimulus facilitate reprocessing of that stimulus on a subsequent occasion. This relative ease and speed with which information is processed is defined as fluency and can constitute a basis for memory judgment. Fluency can also be manipulated on line by perceptual bias (e.g., levels of noise), leading to an increase in recognition for items processed more fluently (e.g., items with less noise). Previous experiments using Remember-Know paradigm have shown an impact of perceptual fluency only on familiarity and not on recollection. Recent episodic memory models have postulated a strong link between episodic memory and spatial processes, especially with egocentric updating (Gomez et al. in Acta Psychol 132(3):221-227, 2009). The present experiment was conducted to determine whether self-motion fluency affects recognition performance and particularly has an impact on "Remember" responses. Thirty participants learned a 4-min path movie and then had to recognize among short paths if they were part of the learned path, followed by a Remember-Know procedure for recognized items. Self-motion fluency was manipulated with the presence of nimble acceleration applied on a small part of the recognition paths. Results show that the presence of a self-motion fluency increases significantly the proportion of remember responses solely on learned paths. This study spotlights for the first time a specific fluency effect on recollection and indicates an implication of egocentric-updating processing in episodic memory retrieval.     

知觉模糊度影响学习的延迟效应

基于迁移适当加工理论,采用连续识别任务范式,通过操纵字词和图片的模糊度来考察知觉模糊非流畅的延迟效应。结果发现：（1）模糊不流畅的材料学习判断值更低;（2） 知觉模糊程度对即时的再认成绩没有影响,但在延迟再认测试中流畅性较低的模糊材料成绩更好。该结果表明实验操纵方式所引发的编码过程和记忆测试所需的检索过程性质上相匹配,而且延迟测试时,知觉非流畅可以促进学习,说明该效应存在边界。     

Aging and strategic retrieval processes: reducing false memories with a distinctiveness heuristic

The authors show that a strategic retrieval process--the distinctiveness heuristic--is a powerful mechanism for reducing false memories in the elderly. Individuals studied words, pictures, or both types of items and then completed a recognition test on which the studied items appeared once, whereas the new words appeared twice. After studying either pictures only or a mixture of pictures and words, both younger and older adults falsely recognized fewer repeated new words than did participants who studied words. Studying pictures provided a basis for using a distinctiveness heuristic during the recognition test: Individuals inferred that the absence of memory for picture information indicates that an item is "new."     

Remembering makes evidence compelling: retrieval from memory can give rise to the illusion of truth

The illusion of truth is traditionally described as the increase in perceived validity of statements when they are repeated (Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977). However, subsequent work has demonstrated that the effect can arise due to the increased familiarity or fluency afforded by repetition and not necessarily to repetition per se. We examine the case of information retrieved from memory. Recently experienced information is expected to be subsequently reexperienced as more fluent and familiar than novel information (Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Therefore, the possibility exists that information retrieved from memory, because it is subjectively re-experienced at retrieval, would be more fluent or familiar than when it was first learned and would thus lead to an increase in perceived validity. Using a method to indirectly poll the perceived truth of factual statements, our experiment demonstrated that information retrieved from memory does indeed give rise to an illusion of truth. The effect was larger than when statements were explicitly repeated twice and was of comparable size to when statements were repeated 4 times. We conclude that memory retrieval is a powerful method for increasing the perceived validity of statements (and subsequent illusion of truth) and that the illusion of truth is a robust effect that can be observed even without directly polling the factual statements in question.     

Bias in self-motion perceived speed can enhance episodic memory

Prior experiences of a stimulus facilitate reprocessing of that stimulus on a subsequent occasion. This relative ease and speed with which information is processed is defined as fluency and can constitute a basis for memory judgment. Fluency can also be manipulated on line by perceptual bias (e.g., levels of noise), leading to an increase in recognition for items processed more fluently (e.g., items with less noise). Previous experiments using Remember–Know paradigm have shown an impact of perceptual fluency only on familiarity and not on recollection. Recent episodic memory models have postulated a strong link between episodic memory and spatial processes, especially with egocentric updating (Gomez et al. in Acta Psychol 132(3):221–227, 2009). The present experiment was conducted to determine whether self-motion fluency affects recognition performance and particularly has an impact on “Remember” responses. Thirty participants learned a 4-min path movie and then had to recognize among short paths if they were part of the learned path, followed by a Remember–Know procedure for recognized items. Self-motion fluency was manipulated with the presence of nimble acceleration applied on a small part of the recognition paths. Results show that the presence of a self-motion fluency increases significantly the proportion of remember responses solely on learned paths. This study spotlights for the first time a specific fluency effect on recollection and indicates an implication of egocentric-updating processing in episodic memory retrieval.     

Measures of fluency as predictors of incidental memory among older adults

This study investigated fluency performance as a mediator of age-related declines in incidental memory performance as both are thought to rely on strategic retrieval processes. A large sample of community dwelling older adults completed a battery of tests assessing fluency, verbal knowledge, speed of information processing, and incidental recall. Fluency measures included initial and excluded letter fluency and the Uses for Objects Test, and they were assumed to reflect increasing reliance on strategic retrieval search. Speed emerged as the best mediator of age-related variance in incidental recall, and Uses for Objects Test performance added to the variance after controlling for verbal knowledge and speed. The results suggest that age-related decline in incidental recall is largely due to speed and the strategic search of memory.     

The generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition: cooperation and competition

Like all probabilistic decisions, recognition memory judgments are based on inferences about the strength and quality of stimulus familiarity. In recent articles, B. W. A. Whittlesea and J. Leboe (2000; J. Leboe & B. W. A. Whittlesea, 2002) proposed that such memory decisions entail various heuristics, similar to well-known heuristics in overt decision making. Using verbal stimulus materials, Whittlesea and Leboe illustrated 3 separate memory heuristics: fluency, generation, and resemblance. In the present investigation, the authors examined the generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition. In 12 experiments, people memorized faces and later performed exclusion (source memory) tasks. Every experiment contained natural groups of facial photographs (e.g., Caucasian vs. Asian faces), but such groups were not always valid source-memory predictors. Instead, across experiments, the potential utility of generation and resemblance strategies was systematically varied. People were quite sensitive to such variations, changing from one heuristic to another as needed. However, they also combined heuristics, both improving and damaging performance across conditions. The relevance of recognition decision heuristics to eyewitness memory is considered.     

Models of ecological rationality: the recognition heuristic

One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counterintuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences.     

Are two heuristics better than one? The fluency and distinctiveness heuristics in recognition memory

Four experiments were conducted to test the impact of having multiple heuristics (distinctiveness and fluency) available during a recognition test. Recent work by Gallo, Perlmutter, Moore, and Schacter (Memory & Cognition 36:461–466, 2008) suggested that fluency effects are reduced when the distinctiveness heuristic can be applied to a recognition decision. In Experiment 1, we used a response reversal paradigm (Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 30:1147–1166, 2004) to demonstrate that participants transitioned from an early response strategy that was largely reliant on fluency to a later strategy in which the influences of fluency and distinctiveness were both observable. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3 showed no evidence for reduction of the fluency heuristic after picture study when the test required a delayed response (Exp. 2a), confidence ratings (Exp. 2b), or the application of conceptual fluency (Exp. 3). The results are consistent with models of memory that assume that familiarity and recollection influence individual memory decisions Wixted (Psychological Review, 114:152–176, 2007).