On some structural aspects of physical problems

Bachelard's concept of the problématique is used in order to classify physical problems and their interrelations. This classification is effectuated along two dimensions. Along the horizontal dimension, physical problems are divided into the kinds that the different modes of physics' development define. These modes are themselves determined by the interplay among the conceptual system, the object and the experimentation transactions specific to physics. Along the vertical dimension, physical problems are classified according to the different stages of maturation they have to undergo before the process of their solution is effectively undertaken. To determine these maturation stages, the Althusserian conception of ideology is used. The interrelations between physical problems are examined through the introduction and elaboration of the notion interdependence network.It is a pleasure to thank Marcello Pera and Kostas Gavroglou for their very helpful comments and criticisms.     

On finite approximability of ψ-intermediate logics

The aim of this note is to show (Theorem 1.6) that in each of the cases: = {, }, or {, , }, or {, , } there are uncountably many -intermediate logics which are not finitely approximable. This result together with the results known in literature allow us to conclude (Theorem 2.2) that for each : either all -intermediate logics are finitely approximate or there are uncountably many of them which lack the property.     

General education,cultural diversity,and identity

The issue of this paper is cultural plurality as a problem for public, general education and for (personal) identity. In order to examine this question, one needs to be clear about the meaning of the concepts of general education, on the one hand, and cultural diversity on the other. In the first section, we will fix the meaning of these concepts. A conceptual distinction between cultural diversity and cultural pluralism will be introduced. In the second section, it will be argued that open pluralism can only be maintained if there is a basic common culture apart from the cultural diversity that pluralism affirms. Therefore, there is yet an indispensable role for general education in an open, pluralistic society. In the third section we will look at two metaphors that give an opposite significance to the relation between identity and diversity: the conversational metaphor and the food metaphor mishmash. The final section expands on the conversational metaphor by way of an exposition of Ricoeur's hermeneutics of the self. It supplies us with a promising concept of identity that is not in complete opposition to diversity.     

Socialism in One Country: A Reassessment

Until 1917 Lenin and Trotsky believed that an isolated revolutionary Russia would have no chance of survival. However, from 1917 to 1923 Lenin's standpoint on this matter underwent a complete reversal. First he came to the conclusion that socialism could be built in an isolated Russia, although it would remain incomplete in the absence of the world revolution. By 1923 he was abandoning that latter qualification too. The standpoint of Stalin and Bukharin in the debate on socialism in one country of 1925–26 was more orthodox-Leninist than the position taken by Trotsky, who had at first also embraced the notion of incomplete socialism, but subsequently returned to the old concept, abandoned by Lenin, that the restoration of capitalism was inevitable in the absence of the world revolution.     

The language dependence of accuracy

David Miller has demonstrated to the satisfaction of a variety of philosophers that the accuracy of false quantitative theories is language dependent (cf. Miller 1975). This demonstration renders the accuracy-based mode of comparison for such theories obsolete. The purpose of this essay is to supply an alternate basis for theory comparison which in this paper is deemed the knowledge-based mode of quantitative theory comparison. It is argued that the status of a quantitative theory as knowledge depends primarily on the soundness of the measurement procedure which produced the theory; such soundness is invariant, on my view, under Milleresque translations. This point is the basis for the linguistic invariance of knowledgelikeness. When the aim of science is not construed simply in terms of the truthlikeness or accuracy of theories, but in terms of the knowledge such theories embody, Miller's language dependence problem is overcome. One result of this analysis is that the possibility of objective scientific progress is restored, a possibility that Miller's analysis has prima facie defeated.I am grateful to Noretta Koertge for numerous comments and criticisms. Thanks are also due to David Miller for clarification of several points in his (1975). Veronica Barnes also made a number of pertinent observations.     

A notorious affair called exportation

In Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes, Quine held (a) that the rule of exportation is always admissible, and (b) that there is a significant distinction between a believes-true (Ex)Fx and (Ex) a believes-true F of x. An argument of Hintikka's, also urged by Sleigh, persuaded him that these two intuitions are incompatible; and he consequently repudiated the rule of exportation. Hintikka and Kaplan propose to restrict exportation and quantifying in to favoured contexts — Hintikka to contexts where the believer knows who or what the person or thing in question is; Kaplan to contexts where the believer possesses a vivid name of the person or thing in question. The bulk of this paper is taken up with criticisms of these proposals. Its ultimate purpose, however, is to motivate an alternative approach, which imposes no restrictions on exportation or quantifying in, but repudiates Quine's other intuition: this is the approach taken in my A Logical Form for the Propositional Attitudes.This paper is based on my doctoral dissertation (Rockefeller University, 1977). I wish to thank Susan Haack for her help in turning a draft into the present version.     

Stuffed Cabbage in the Old New School Cafeteria

The purpose of this lecture is to celebrate the memory of Aron Gurwitsch by examining and enlarging the domain of phenomenological clarification of some elements of what Gurwitsch called the logic of reality. Chief among those elements are the nature of the taken-for-grantedness of our existential belief, the difference between presentive and non-presentive indices of reality and the ground for the self-illumination of the world of working.     

Some notes on the nature of methodological indeterminacy

This paper is an attempt to extend the meaning of the concept of indeterminacy for the human sciences. The authors do this by coining the term methodological indeterminacy and arguing that indeterminacy is better understood when linked to specific methodological techniques. Paradoxically, while specific research techniques demonstrate that the issue of indeterminacy is complex, yielding the possibility of types and degrees, it does not eliminate the problem of translation first raised by Quine. However, the authors go on to argue that, from a research perspective, indeterminacy can and must be approached in such a way that it is possible to reduce cases of it, even though never completely eliminating it in the human sciences.     

Theor of free choice permission

I argue that the conjunctive distribution of permissibility over or, which is a puzzling feature of free-choice permission is just one instance of a more general class of conjunctive occurrences of the word, and that these conjunctive uses are more directly explicable by the consideration that or is a descendant of oper than by reference to the disjunctive occurrences which logicalist prejudices may tempt us to regard as semantically more fundamental. I offer an account of how the disjunctive uses of or may have come about through an intermediate discourse-adverbial use of or, drawing a parallel with but, which, etymologically, is disjunctive rather than conjunctive and whose conjunctive uses seem to represent just such a discourse-adverbial application.     

On superintuitionistic logics as fragments of proof logic extensions

Coming fromI andCl, i.e. from intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi with the substitution rule postulated, and using the sign to add a new connective there have been considered here: Grzegorozyk's logicGrz, the proof logicG and the proof-intuitionistic logicI set up correspondingly by the calculiFor any calculus we denote by the set of all formulae of the calculus and by the lattice of all logics that are the extensions of the logic of the calculus, i.e. sets of formulae containing the axioms of and closed with respect to its rules of inference. In the logiclG the sign is decoded as follows: A = (A & A). The result of placing in the formulaA before each of its subformula is denoted byTrA. The maps are defined (in the definitions of x and the decoding of is meant), by virtue of which the diagram is constructedIn this diagram the maps, x and are isomorphisms, thereforex ^–1 = ; and the maps and are the semilattice epimorphisms that are not commutative with lattice operation +. Besides, the given diagram is commutative, and the next equalities take place: ^–1 = ^–1 and = ^–1 x. The latter implies in particular that any superintuitionistic logic is a superintuitionistic fragment of some proof logic extension.     

Three views of demonstrative reference

Three views of demonstrative reference are examined: contextual, intentional, and quasi-intentional. According to the first, such reference is determined entirely by certain publicly accessible features of the context. According to the second, speaker intentions are criterial in demonstrative reference. And according to the third, both contextual features and intentions come into play in the determination of demonstrative reference. The first two views (both of which enjoy current popularity) are rejected as implausible; the third (originally proposed by Kaplan in Dthat) is argued to be highly plausible.     

Think Before You Speak: Utterances and the Logic of Indexicals

This essay discusses some aspects of the logical behaviour of sentences in languages containing indexical and demonstrative expressions. After some preliminary remarks in section one, sections two and three focus on instances of logically true sentences that may be uttered falsely, and on cases of logically equivalent sentences whose utterances may have distinct truth-values. The logical and semantic problems taken into consideration include the validity of a Principle of Translation, the so-called puzzle of addressing, and examples related to measurement and approximation. Section four discusses the complementary phenomenon of sentences that may presumably always be uttered truly, but that do not qualify as logically true. In particular, I argue against the widespread tendency to consider I am here now or I exist as truths of the logic of indexicals.     

Performativity and Pedagogy: The Making of Educational Subjects

Building from J.L. Austin's concept of performative, this essay explores the production of subjectivity and of educational subjects by applying important work from Judith Butler on Foucault, Derrida, and as centrally illustrative, through an analysis of sex and gender. Given this analytical framework, the turn is then to queer performativity and the possibility of performative power in pedagogy. The last draws assistance from Valerie Walkerdine, Homi Bhabha and especially James Donald.     

Toulmin on Ideals of Natural Order

In this paper I criticize Toulmin's concept of Ideals of Natural Order and his account of the role these Ideals play in scientific explanation as given in his book, Foresight and Understanding. I argue that Toulmin's account of Ideals of Natural Order as those theories taken to be self evident by scientists at a given time introduces an undesirable subjectivism into his account of scientific explanation. I argue also that the history of science, especially the recent history of microphysics, does not support Toulmin's contentions about the supposed self-evidence of the basic explanatory theories in science.     

The ω-rule

We prove that all proofs in -logic (a first order logic with -rule added) in which -rule is used finitely many times can be turned into proofs in which the -rule is used at most one time. Next, we prove that the word finitely above cannot be changed by the word infinitely.     

Dowód aksjomatyzowalności pewnychn-wartościowych rachunków zdań

Praca ta zostaa wykonana pod kierunkiem prof. drJerzego Supeckiego. Jej szczególny przypadek dotyczcyn-wartociowego rachunku zda o jednej wartoci wyrónionej by referowany w Warszawie na zjedzie Grupy Logiki Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii PAN. Streszczenie tego referatu [5] zostao wydrukowane w Sprawozdaniach Wydziau Nauk Spoecznych PAN.Allatum est die 19 Aprilis 1963     

A Chemically Induced “Shadow”?

Stevenson's classic yarn, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, is explored as a vivid, insightful story of addiction. In spite of clinical temptations to chase deeper issues connected with the dark side, this article suggests that pastoral counselors and psychotherapists need to first ask whether a client's shadow may be chemically induced.     

Allgemeinpsychologische Untersuchungen zum Vigilanzverhalten

Zusammenfassung Mit Hilfe eines 2×2×2-Designs wurde die Wirkung der Anzahl der Signalflächen, Anzahl der irrelevanten Reize und Art der Motivation auf die Vigilanzleistung untersucht. Dabei zeigte sich, daß die Wahrscheinlichkeiten von verpaßten Signalen und falschen Alarmen mit der Anzahl der Signalquellen zunehmen. Die Menge der Nicht-Signale gleicher Modalität wie die Signalreize beeinflußt weder die Signalentdeckungen noch die falschen Alarme.Weiterhin wurde versucht, eine Systematisierung von Motivationswirkungen in Vigilanzaufgaben im Rahmen des detection-Modells vorzunehmen. Bei großen Gewinnen für richtige Signalentdeckungen und geringen Verlusten für falsche Alarme (Risiko-Motivation) ergab sich eine wesentlich höhere Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit und eine geringfügig höhere Rate von falschen Alarmen als bei geringen Gewinnen für richtige Signalentdeckungen und hohen Kosten für falsche Alarme (Vorsichts-Motivation). Weiterhin zeigte sich unter Risiko-Motivation ein Abfall der Entdeckungswahrscheinlichkeit und bei Vorsichts-Motivation ein Anstieg, während sich die entsprechenden Raten der falschen Alarme im Verlauf der Aufgabe nicht signifikant veränderten.

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Experimental application of detection theory to vigilance behaviour

Summary In a 2×2×2-design the effects of number of dials, number of irrelevant stimuli and kind of motivation were combined. It was found out, that probabilities of missed signals and false alarms increased with spatial uncertainty. The number of irrelevant stimuli, which were of equal sensory modality as the relevant stimuli, had no influence either on detection probability or on false alarms rate.Further attempt was made to systematize effects of motivation on vigilance performance in the detection model. With great values for hits and small costs for false alarms (risky motivation) there was an essentially higher detection pobability and a slightly higher false alarms rate than with small values for hits and high costs for false detections (cautious motivation). The probabilities of detections decreased under risky motivation and increased under cautious motivation as the watch prolonged, whereas the corresponding probabilities of false alarms showed no significant changes.

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Teil I der Dissertation, die im Januar 1969 der Philosophischen Fakultät der Freien Universität Berlin vorgelegt wurde.     

PROXY FUNCTIONS,TRUTH AND REFERENCE

Quines ontological relativity is related to Tarskis theory of truth in two ways: Quine repudiates term-by-term-correspondence, as does Tarskis rule of truth; and Quines proxy argument in support of relativity finds exact formulation in Tarskis truth definition.Unfortunately, relativity is threatened by the fact that the proxy argument doesnt comply with the rule of truth (Tarskis celebrated condition (T)). Despite Quines express allegiance to (T), use of proxy schemes does not generate all of the true sentences condition (T) requires.A possible adjustment is to drop (T), retain the satisfaction definition and proxy argument, and appeal to the theory of observation and indeterminacy of reference as grounds of relativity. But as we shall see Quines theories of assent to observation sentences and of reference-learning dont square easily with his naturalism. The first attributes intentional attitudes to observers; and the second assumes a holistic context principle and a concept of individuation which do not withstand scrutiny as empirical notions. Both appear to violate Quines behavorist canon.A saving alternative is a theory of term-reference that appears in Roots of Reference and affords a return to behaviorism, and reinstatement of the proxy argument and relativity in a way compatible with Tarskis (T).     

Early German approaches to experimental reading research: The contributions of Wilhelm Wundt and Ernst Meumann

Summary Wundt looked at the reading process from a predominantly theoretical perspective. He opposed the total shape theory formulated by Erdmann and Dodge and insisted on the occurrence of attention shifts during word recognition. As an alternative to the total shape theory, he formulated a two-stage theory of word recognition. An initial, apperceptive phase of reading is concerned with the active analysis of visually salient local details, and a second, assimilative phase fills in the unanalyzed parts of words on the basis of a passive evocation of earlier experiences with graphemic input. Meumann looked at the reading process from the point of view of an educational psychologist. His review of experimental reading research presents most of the basic issues which are still controversial today. In his recommendations for the teaching of reading, he emphasized the importance of analyzing words into their constituent sounds and of articulatory awareness as a precondition for the firm establishment of connections between graphemes and speech sounds. The review discusses some of the reasons why the experimentally based approach to the psychology of reading failed to evoke the interest of German educators after World War I.