曾子伦理政治思想述评

在孔孟之间的思想变迁过程中,“孔子之学,曾子独得其宗”。曾子一方面继承和发扬了孔子重孝道、重道德修养、理想人格及重修己正人等思想,另一方面又直接启导了后来的子思、孟子思想,起到了承上启下的重要作用,是孔孟思想变迁过程中十分关键的代表性人物。在儒学思想发展史上,曾子对儒家思想发展最大的贡献就在于他的孝道观、道德自律观及修己正人的道德政治观。曾子的伦理政治思想成为孔子思想进一步理论化、系统化的必不可少的重要环节。     

中西方古代“性善论”比较研究

本论文以中国古代儒家思想（以孔子和孟子为代表）和西方古希腊三杰（苏格拉底、柏拉图和亚里士多德）的人性思想中的＂性善论＂为研究对象,说明两者在唯心主义色彩、重义轻利的立场以及在重视人性的后天培养等几个方面的相似性;同时,作者还认识到,由于文化差异,双方在诸多方面又存在不同,主要表现为中西方在历史上占主导地位的人性观不同、在人性培养的方法认识上的差别、人与人之间关系的差异等。     

New insight into Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature

In Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature, fate is the original source of xing (nature). Heart is the appearance of nature. There are two aspects to nature and heart: ti (form) and yong (function). From the perspective of form, nature is liangzhi (the goodness in conscience) and liangneng (the inborn ability to be good) in human beings and heart is human’s conscience and original heart. From the perspective of function, nature is the four things of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, and heart consists in compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong. As the foundation for the theory of the original goodness in human nature, conscience and heart are a combination of human moral instinct, moral rationality and moral volition, whereas moral instinct gradually rises to moral volition and passes through moral rationality. Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature is not a theory of future goodness, but a theory of original goodness.     

竹简《文子》天道论初探

＂天道＂是中国思想史上的重要概念。在竹简《文子》中,天道不仅是对于世界万物起源的认识,也是对社会发展规律性的认识,它具有自然和社会双重属性。竹简《文子》的天道论继承了老子＂道生于有＂的思想,但否认＂有生于无＂,＂有＂是其终极。人的行为必须遵循天道。竹简《文子》中对于＂天道＂自然属性和社会属性的阐释,也为后世很多思想家所继承。     

An Eriksonian Psycho-Social Response to Confucius on the Development of Virtue in Boys and Men

As the exemplar of how men should live, for over six hundred years Confucius has contributed greatly to the formation of the mindset and identity of Korean males. His life and teachings that emphasize the values of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and sincerity have long been regarded as the quintessential frame of reference for males in Korea to emulate. Yet at the same time, some of the legacies of Confucius connote oppression because of their overemphasis on the enhancement of human cognition and will to the neglect of the robustness and usefulness of emotion. It is quite probable that the oppressive mechanism inherent in Confucian teachings on human development—i.e., the rigid and regulatory characteristic that overemphasizes or obsesses about rites, rules, decency, and norms—comes to a large extent from Confucius’s own relational and emotional vulnerability toward his parents. This paper suggests that Erik Erikson’s view on the psychosocial dimension of human development can usefully complement what Confucius did not pay much attention to in his lifelong efforts to cultivate human virtue. Indeed, Erikson shows that the robustness of emotion precedes the enrichment of cognition as well as the reinforcement of will and that it is nurtured by one’s caring and constructive relationships with significant others. In this regard, the caregiver’s role is to help males in Korea reconcile with their genuine selves in which cognition and will are in harmony with emotion.     

孔、孟所论“圣人”异同考

孔子心目中的"圣人"要求德、位兼备,而在孟子那里则更加注重于对德的要求。孟子所论"圣人"与孔子有所不同,可以说是孟子因应了从"犹秉周礼"至"杀人盈城"这一现实的形势、因应了"距杨墨"这一思想层面的形势以及为更加便于教化等因素影响而造成的。于孔子、孟子之间,从郭店楚简《五行》篇"德之行"五与"行"四等论述看,其中就已有了突出"圣"之德性的趋势。     

Zhi and Neng belong to mind: a study of the capacity to be good in the mind of Xunzi

ABSTRACT

The mainstream of academia thinks that Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which claims that human nature is bad, is in contrast with those of Confucius and Mencius and is unable to provide a foundation for human moral subjectivity. However, there are more and more scholars bringing up different ideas, such as Lu Debin and Fung Yiuming. They think that Xunzi’s wei 偽 (artifice), which includes zhi知 (knowing) and neng 能 (capacity), is a kind of inborn capacity to think and activate that belongs to xing. This paper points out that zhi and neng belong to xin 心 (mind) rather than xing. In the text of Xunzi, xing is mainly regarded as human emotions and desires which would result in chaos if not controlled. Making zhi and neng belong to xing does not accord with Xunzi’s theory and will confuse people with the connotation of Xunzi’s xing.     

《论语》与《孔子诗论》的学术联系与区别

《孔子诗论》的诗学思想与《论语》既有联系又有区别。《孔子诗论》吸纳了《论语》诗乐教化和兴观群怨等学术观点。但在学《诗》目的上,它不像《论语》那样重视出使应对;在说《诗》方法上,它不像《论语》那样断章取义,而是直探诗旨本身;在对人性的看法上,它不像孔子不谈性,而是以子思学派的性情理论说《诗》。惟其学孔而不泥于孔,《孔子诗论》才能取得诗歌理论的巨大成就。     

Mystery,Values, and Meaning: Religious Options that Respect Science

Abstract

Human nature is a contested concept and notions of it vary across disciplines. Despite this diversity, three basic notions of human nature emerge. One identifies human nature with properties that are innate, hardwired or products of some kind of necessary essence. Another understands it as consisting of properties that make human unique or distinct from non-human animals. Finally, some seek human nature by attempting to identify universal or near-universal properties of humans. While the sciences might not give us a robust form of innate or hardwired human nature, “human nature” as a concept might still serve other, non-scientific, goals.     

孔子传《易》与作《春秋》的关系新论

孔子传《易》,直接出于作《春秋》的需要——孔子所作《春秋》,不是《春秋经》,而是《左传》蓝本．孔子传《易》之“窃义”,与其作《春秋》的“窃义”,异曲同工。孔子传《易》与作《春秋》,相互促成,共同形成了儒学的“天道—性命—道德”三位一统的道德本体学说体系．     

Virtue and the Good Life in the Early Confucian Tradition

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non‐moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non‐moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self‐sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non‐moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non‐moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non‐moral goods in human life.     

The Manifestation Range of Innately Good Knowledge and Ability,and the Danger of Separation: On Zhuzi’s Question about Understanding Words

Zhuzi (Zhu Xi), Zhang Nanxuan and Lü Donglai continued a discussion begun by Hu Wufeng and his disciples on the subject of “knowing the form of benevolence,” and “seeking for a true mind in an absent one.” One result of their discussion was to make people realize that innately good knowledge and ability are not only manifested in loving one’s parents and respecting one’s elders, but also in the simple acts of drinking when thirsty and eating when hungry. This generated the idea of “manifestation range of innately good knowledge and ability.” However, another conclusion of this discussion claimed that if the desire to drink and eat or the king of Qi’s grudging an ox are included in this range, there would be a danger of viewing innately good knowledge and ability merely as inborn human nature or instinct. This discussion reveals an unsteady relationship between innately good knowledge and ability and the feeling of commiseration, which are sometimes united and sometimes separate.     

TRANSCENDING OUR BIOLOGY: A VIRTUE ETHICS INTERPRETATION OF THE APPEAL TO NATURE IN TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

“Arguments from nature” are used, and have historically been used, in popular responses to advances in technology and to environmental issues—there is a widely shared body of ethical intuitions that nature, or perhaps human nature, sets some limits on the kinds of ends that we should seek, the kinds of things that we should do, or the kinds of lives that we should lead. Virtue ethics can provide the context for a defensible form of the argument from nature, and one that makes proper sense of its enduring role in debates concerning our relationship to technology and the environment. However, the notion of an ethics founded upon an account of the essential features of human nature is controversial. On the one hand, contemporary biological science no longer defines species by their essential characteristics, so from a biological point of view there just are no essential characteristics of human beings. On the other hand, it might be argued that humans have, in some sense, “transcended our biology,” so an understanding of humans as a biological species is extraneous to ethical questions. In this article, I examine and defend the argument from nature, as a way to ground an ethic of virtue, from some of the more common criticisms that are made against it. I argue that, properly interpreted as an appeal to an evaluative account of human nature, the argument from nature is defensible with the context of virtue ethics and, in this light, I show how arguments from nature made in popular responses to technological and environmental issues are best understood.     

孟子性善论新探

In Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature, fate is the original source of xing (nature). Heart is the appearance of nature. There are two aspects to nature and heart: ti (form) and yong (function). From the perspective of form, nature is liangzhi (the goodness in conscience) and liangneng (the inborn ability to be good) in human beings and heart is human’s conscience and original heart. From the perspective of function, nature is the four things of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, and heart consists in compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong. As the foundation for the theory of the original goodness in human nature, conscience and heart are a combination of human moral instinct, moral rationality and moral volition, whereas moral instinct gradually rises to moral volition and passes through moral rationality. Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature is not a theory of future goodness, but a theory of original goodness. Translated by Wang Bei from Qilu Xuekan 齐鲁学刊(Journal of Qilu), 2006, (4): 16–20     

Wings of desire: Reflections on sexual desire,identity and freedom

The aim of this paper is to give a critical discussion of Sartre’s concept of sexual desire and its relation to self-identity and freedom. Why Sartre? Sartre is one of very few philosophers who offers a systematic account of sexual desire. He has influenced eminent philosophical concepts of sexual desire held by, for instance, de Beauvoir, Lacan, Foucault, Levinas, Irigaray and Butler, but not much is written about his own notion of sexual desire. This alone is reason to explore Sartre’s view. What makes his view of sexual desire particularly interesting is that it is framed by his theory of freedom. Sartre offers the original, radical notion that freedom is absolute. Because consciousness is never self-identical, he argues, human identity is not fixed. Instead, we are consequently nothing else but what we keep desiring to make of ourselves. He concludes that we are always free to choose our drives and desires, even what seem to be our most enslaving, natural sexual instincts. The question raised in this article, however, concerns what the nature of sexual desire is and how free we really are to choose our sexual desires. I first contextualise Sartre’s view of sexual desire within his notion of desire in general and its relation to instinct, drive, consciousness, freedom and identity. Then, I give a detailed discussion of his analysis of sexual desire, its relation to freedom, and, what Sartre calls its failures. Finally, I discuss a critique of, and alternative to, Sartre’s theory of sexual desire from the perspective of my own notion of heteronomous and autonomous desire and freedom.     

未完结的本能：郭任远与中国本能论战

受到达尔文生物进化论的深刻影响, “本能”这一概念在19世纪末至20世纪初逐渐成为人类和动物心理学的核心议题。年轻的中国发展心理生物学家郭任远在美国心理学界掀起了一场声势浩大的反本能运动。返回中国后, 他持续阐发其激进行为主义思想, 推动了“中国现代心理学史上三场争论之一”的本能论战。这场争论不仅促使艾伟、潘菽、高觉敷等心理学家纷纷参与, 还吸引了周建人、李石岑等公共知识分子的目光。郭任远的理论主张与实验工作, 桥接起了本能争论的中国与世界战场, 并激荡起诸多积极、消极与混合反应。论战加速了本能的心理学研究在方法论上从“扶手椅”迈向“实验室”, 也深陷混淆发育解释与进化解释的历史圈套。虽然郭任远及其推动的中国本能论战并没有实现对本能心理学的“完结”, 但却揭示出语义和信仰在科学研究中的认识论价值。这种理论渗透的意识形态最终确立起郭氏在行为科学史上独特的学术地位, 并为本能演变成“未完结”的、开放的科学问题提供动力。     

The Historical Character of Human Nature in Freud's Theories

In Freud’ theories of human development, human nature is described and analyzed as essentially historical. At the core of human history is the restructuring of the sexual instinct and the death instinct (or its unique form as destructive impulses). The conscious, asked-for shaping of these two instincts, under the rule of the “reality principle”, forms the basis of human society at all stages. This conscious restructuring has also unintended, unasked-for results, which are part of the historically developing human nature. The historical choice has been the building of human society as a social complex based on the de-eroticization of both the individual and society. Freud suggested that the historical process of changing human nature and maintaining the achieved new structure has mainly been an enterprise of enlightened political elite, which has imposed (in all societies) the various elements of the new nature upon the ordinary people. Human history is essentially a deed of the political sphere. In viewing human nature as consisting of both asked-for and unasked-for results of human conscious purposeful activity Freud belongs to the same historical school as Marx.     

The subjectivity and Universality of virtues��An investigation based on Confucius�� and Aristotle��s views

Philosophers today are inclined to propose virtues are either something subjective or something universal. However, Confucius and Aristotle, who made the most profound investigations into virtues, did not develop such theses. The deep-seated reason lies in their belief that there is always a possibility for a human being to become a man of practice, which cancels the need of proposing subjectivity thesis. The reason for their not raising the universality thesis of virtues is that they do not think that virtues are directly universal to all contemporarily existing minds. Rather, in their view, virtues involve a possible universality that may present in a virtuous mind. We can summarize Aristotle’s view into the concept of possible universality of virtue understood in terms of the perfect state of mind, since he explains the perfect state of mind in terms of perfect state of activity, and makes his investigations with an eye to the interactions between people with similar states of virtues. The view of Confucius can be summarized into the concept of possible universality of virtue understood in terms of the history of mind, since his investigations are made from the point of view of the states of mind reached through virtuous practices, i.e., a historical process of human life in which one’s pre-dispositions and feelings gradually reach some state of natural harmony and gains continual enrichment, and with an eye to the interactions between virtuous people and common people. From that similarly expressed view we can reasonably infer that virtues do possess the character called by today’s philosophers as universality, but it is a possible universality whose possibility is based on practice and on the development of virtuous minds.     

What God Cannot Do: Divine Power,the Gratuity of Grace,and Henri De Lubac

When Pius XII promulgated his encyclical Humani generis in 1950, it was widely read as censuring Henri de Lubac’s views on human nature and the desire for God. In recent years, as controversies about nature and grace have revived, this reading of Humani generis has been widely assumed by supporters and critics of de Lubac alike. Henri de Lubac, however, always insisted that the encyclical did not touch his position. This article will argue that, whatever the objectives of the encyclical’s drafters, he was correct. It will make its case by turning to an issue neglected in contemporary debates about nature and grace: divine power. It will first trace the history of Christian reflection on divine power, a story whose twists and turns have only recently been uncovered by medieval historians, and then argue that, with this history in view, interpreting the crucial line in Humani generis as excluding de Lubac’s position becomes untenable. Finally, this article will discuss the implications of this conclusion for contemporary accounts of human nature, the desire for God, and the gratuity of grace.