Assessing children's representational attachment models: links to mother-child attachment quality in infancy and childhood

The authors examined whether the finding of a correspondence between specific behavioral patterns of attachment in infancy and childhood and specific representational patterns in childhood could be replicated using children's responses to a story depicting an imagined parent-child separation experience. The participants were 33 German mothers and their children (16 girls, 17 boys). Attachment quality was assessed via standard and exploratory attachment observations at ages 12 months, 18 months, and 6 years. Chi-square analyses indicated that there was a good level of concordance between the behavioral and representation attachment patterns in infancy and childhood.     

Young children's spontaneous use of geometry in maps

Two experiments tested whether 4-year-old children extract and use geometric information in simple maps without task instruction or feedback. Children saw maps depicting an arrangement of three containers and were asked to place an object into a container designated on the map. In Experiment 1, one of the three locations on the map and the array was distinct and therefore served as a landmark; in Experiment 2, only angle, distance and sense information specified the target container. Children in both experiments used information for distance and angle, but not sense, showing signature error patterns found in adults. Children thus show early, spontaneously developing abilities to detect geometric correspondences between three-dimensional layouts and two-dimensional maps, and they use these correspondences to guide navigation. These findings begin to chart the nature and limits of the use of core geometry in a uniquely human, symbolic task.     

Young children's use of prosody in sentence parsing

Korean children's ability to use prosodic phrasing in sentence comprehension was studied using two types of ambiguity. First, we examined a word-segmentation ambiguity in which placement of the phrasal boundary leads to different interpretations of a sentence. Next, we examined a syntactic ambiguity in which the same words were differently grouped into syntactic phrases by prosodic demarcation. Children aged 3 or 4 years showed that they could use prosodic information to segment utterances and to derive the meaning of ambiguous sentences when the sentences only contained a word-segmentation ambiguity. However, even 5- to 6-year-old children were not able to reliably resolve the second type of ambiguity, an ambiguity of phrasal grouping, by using prosodic information. The results demonstrate that children's difficulties in dealing with structural ambiguity are not due to their inability to use prosodic information.     

Young children's use of functional information to categorize artifacts: three factors that matter

Three experiments addressed factors that might influence whether or not young children take into account function, as opposed to overall appearance or shape, when they extend the names of novel artifacts. Experiment 1 showed that 4-year-olds more often extend a name on the basis of a demonstrated function when that function provides a plausible causal account of perceptible object structure. Experiment 2 showed that they more often extend a name by function when they respond slowly, and hence thoughtfully. Experiment 3 demonstrated that they are more likely to take function into account when they extend names than when they judge similarities. Comparisons of lexical and non-lexical conditions in younger children failed to show any differences. Overall, the findings suggest that by 4 years of age, children may learn names as labels for novel artifact kinds rather than perceptual classes, and that the processes by which they categorize may be mindful and reflective, as in adults.     

Young children's performance on the balance scale: the influence of relational complexity

Three experiments investigated the effect of complexity on children's understanding of a beam balance. In nonconflict problems, weights or distances varied, while the other was held constant. In conflict items, both weight and distance varied, and items were of three kinds: weight dominant, distance dominant, or balance (in which neither was dominant). In Experiment 1, 2-year-old children succeeded on nonconflict-weight and nonconflict-distance problems. This result was replicated in Experiment 2, but performance on conflict items did not exceed chance. In Experiment 3, 3- and 4-year-olds succeeded on all except conflict balance problems, while 5- and 6-year-olds succeeded on all problem types. The results were interpreted in terms of relational complexity theory. Children aged 2 to 4 years succeeded on problems that entailed binary relations, but 5- and 6-year-olds also succeeded on problems that entailed ternary relations. Ternary relations tasks from other domains--transitivity and class inclusion--accounted for 93% of the age-related variance in balance scale scores.     

Young children's use of range-of-reference information in word learning

An important source of information about a new word's meaning (and its associated lexical class) is its range of reference: the number of objects to which it is extended. Ninety toddlers (mean age = 37 months) participated in a study to determine whether young children can use this information in word learning. When a novel word was presented with unambiguous lexical class cues as either a proper name (i.e. 'His name is DAXY') or an adjective (i.e. 'He is very DAXY'), toddlers interpreted it appropriately, regardless of whether it was applied to one or both members of a pair of identical-looking stuffed animals. They restricted a proper name to the designated animal(s); but they generalized an adjective from the labeled animal(s) to a new animal bearing the same property. However, when the word was presented with no specific lexical class cues (i.e. 'DAXY'), toddlers made significantly different interpretations, depending on the number of referents. When the word was applied to one animal, they restricted it to that animal (consistent with a proper name interpretation); when the word was applied to two animals, they generalized it to a new animal with the property (consistent with an adjective or a restricted count noun interpretation). Range-of-reference information thus provided toddlers with a default cue to the meaning (and associated lexical class) of a novel word.     

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following. (i) The structure of the child's concept of artifact function changes profoundly between ages 5 and 7. At age 5, the child's conceptual machinery defines the function of an artifact as any goal a user might have; by age 7, its function is defined by the artifact's typical or intended use. (ii) This conceptual shift has a striking effect on problem-solving performance, i.e. the child's concept of artifact function appears to be deployed in problem solving. (iii) This effect on problem solving is not caused by differences in the amount of knowledge that children have about the typical use of a particular tool; it is mediated by the structure of the child's artifact concept (which organizes and deploys the child's knowledge). In two studies, children between 5 and 7 years of age were matched for their knowledge of what a particular artifact "is for", and then given a problem that can only be solved if that tool is used for an atypical purpose. All children performed well in a baseline condition. But when they were primed by a demonstration of the artifact's typical function, 5-year-old children solved the problem much faster than 6-7-year-old children. Because all children knew what the tools were for, differences in knowledge alone cannot explain the results. We argue that the older children were slower to solve the problem when the typical function was primed because (i) their artifact concept plays a role in problem solving, and (ii) intended purpose is central to their concept of artifact function, but not to that of the younger children.     

Young children's use of statistical sampling evidence to infer the subjectivity of preferences

A crucial task in social interaction involves understanding subjective mental states. Here we report two experiments with toddlers exploring whether they can use statistical evidence to infer the subjective nature of preferences. We found that 2-year-olds were likely to interpret another person’s nonrandom sampling behavior as a cue for a preference different from their own. When there was no alternative in the population or if the sampling was random, 2-year-olds did not ascribe a preference and persisted in their initial beliefs that the person would share their own preference. We found similar but weaker patterns of responses in 16-month-olds. These results suggest that the ability to infer the subjectivity of preferences based on sampling information begins to emerge between 16 months and 2 years. Our findings provide some of the first evidence that from early in development, young children can use statistical evidence to make rational inferences about the social world.     

Constraints on representational change: evidence from children's drawing.

This paper uses children's drawing as clues to general constraints on internal representational change and flexibility. Fifty-four children between 4 and 11 years of age each produced six drawings. They were first asked to draw a house, and then to draw a house that does not exist. The same procedure was used for man and animal. The technique forced children into operating on their normal, efficient drawing procedures, and allowed the researcher to ascertain the types of constraint that obtain on representational change and flexibility. Striking developmental differences emerged between the 4- to 6-year-old age group and the 8- to 10-year-old age group. Changes introduced by the younger children involved deletions and changes in size and shape, whereas older children changed position and orientation of elements and added elements from other conceptual categories, resulting in ever-increasing inter-representational flexibility. Development is accounted for in terms of reiterated cycles of change from internal representations specified as a sequentially fixed list, embodying a constraint that was inherent in the earlier procedural representations, to internal representations specified as a structured, yet flexibly ordered set of manipulable features. The constraints are considered to be general and are compared with work on seriation and number in children, and on phonological awareness and musical ability in adults. The results are integrated into a general model of developmental change which is compatible both with initial modularity and with subsequent domain-general constraints.     

Young children's use of syntactic cues to learn proper names and count nouns

In 6 experiments, 144 toddlers were tested in groups ranging in mean age from 20 to 37 months. In all experiments, children learned a novel label for a doll or a stuffed animal. The label was modeled syntactically as either a count noun (e.g., "This is a ZAV") or a proper name (e.g., "This is ZAV"). The object was then moved to a new location in front of the child, and a second identical-looking object was placed nearby. The children's task was to choose 1 of the 2 objects as a referent for the novel word. By 24 months, both girls (Experiment 2) and boys (Experiment 5) were significantly more likely to select the labeled object if they heard a proper name than if they heard a count noun. At 20 months, neither girls (Experiments 1 and 6) nor boys (Experiment 1) demonstrated this effect. By their 2nd birthdays, children can use syntactic information to distinguish appropriately between labels for individual objects and those for object categories.     

Comparative judgments as an alternative to ratings: identifying the scale origin

Although comparative judgment methods have a number of distinct advantages over ratings, they share one common problem: On the basis of comparative judgments, it is not possible to recover the origin of item evaluations. One item may be judged more positively than another, but this result does not allow any conclusions about whether either of the items are attractive or unattractive. This article discusses the implications of this limitation for the interpretation of individual differences in comparative judgments. It also presents 3 different methods that may allow determination of the scale origin using a nested model comparison approach. An application illustrates the proposed approach as well as the benefits of determining the scale origin in understanding value judgments.     

The development of representational insight: beyond the model/room paradigm

Two experiments were conducted to determine whether very young children have difficulty with dual representations when change in perspective has been eliminated, that is, the task no longer requires transfer between a traversable and surveyable array. In a preliminary experiment children 30 and 36 months of age attempted to transfer an action observed with one of four tools associated with a child-size workbench to a miniature replica of that workbench or vice versa. Children at both ages exhibited limited success on both transfer and memory trials; the demands of selecting a tool and transferring the appropriate imitative response were hypothesized to exceed their processing capacity. A second experiment using an object-retrieval procedure involving the two workbenches revealed successful transfer by 36-month-olds, but not 30-month-olds. The results confirm that limitations in dual representation extend to contexts other than the room and model of the room paradigm where spatial perspective differs. The results are discussed in terms of procedures that support or interfere with children’s ability to demonstrate symbolic insight.     

Young children's use of spatial categorization as a mnemonic strategy

The interdependence of knowledge and strategic behavior is becoming increasingly well established. The purpose of this research was to determine whether young children could use spatial categorization--a cognitive skill well within the repertoire of even 2-year-olds--as a mnemonic strategy. The results of three studies revealed that young children are capable of spatially organizing objects as a strategy in the service of future retrieval. There were clear developmental trends in the strategic deployment of categorization. Although there was some evidence of the mnemonic use of perceptually defined categories by 2- and 3-year-olds, these children rarely executed the strategy effectively. Four-year-old children were quite successful at exploiting perceptually defined categories to aid retrieval. By five years of age, children were able, in addition, to actively construct physical categories based on an internal representation and use them in the service of memory.     

Young children's use of a delayed video representation to solve a retrieval problem pertaining to self

The experiments reported here were concerned with the development of delayed self-recognition. Children were videotaped playing a game and were marked covertly with a sticker on their forehead while doing so. The findings, of both a cross-sectional sample and a prospective longitudinal one, revealed that 3- but not 2.5-year-old children reached to remove this sticker reliably during video playback only after they had been trained to use the video to guide their search for an object that was not directly visible to the unaided eye. It appears that by 3 years of age children understand that their briefly delayed self video-representation is related to their present self. In contrast, while 2.5-year-olds can use delayed video information to locate objects in space that cannot be seen by the unaided eye, they cannot use this type of information to locate an object that pertains to a part of self that is not directly visible, such as a sticker on one's hair. The findings are discussed in terms of the emergence of an extended sense of self.     

Young children's selective learning of rule games from reliable and unreliable models

We investigated preschoolers’ selective learning from models that had previously appeared to be reliable or unreliable. Replicating previous research, children from 4 years selectively learned novel words from reliable over unreliable speakers. Extending previous research, children also selectively learned other kinds of acts – novel games – from reliable actors. More important, – and novel to this study, this selective learning was not just based on a preference for one model or one kind of act, but had a normative dimension to it. Children understood the way a reliable actor demonstrated an act not only as the better one, but as the normatively appropriate or correct one, as indicated in both their explicit verbal comments and their spontaneous normative interventions (e.g., protest, critique) in response to third-party acts deviating from the one demonstrated. These findings are discussed in the broader context of the development of children's social cognition and cultural learning.     

The development of children's rule use on the balance scale task

Cognitive development can be characterized by a sequence of increasingly complex rules or strategies for solving problems. Our work focuses on the development of children's proportional reasoning, assessed by the balance scale task using Siegler's (1976, 1981) rule assessment methodology. We studied whether children use rules, whether children of different ages use qualitatively different rules, and whether rules are used consistently. Nonverbal balance scale problems were administered to 805 participants between 5 and 19 years of age. Latent class analyses indicate that children use rules, that children of different ages use different rules, and that both consistent and inconsistent use of rules occurs. A model for the development of reasoning about the balance scale task is proposed. The model is a restricted form of the overlapping waves model (Siegler, 1996) and predicts both discontinuous and gradual transitions between rules.     

Young children's representations of peers' distress: associations to children's social functioning and acceptance of distressed peers

Children's mental representations of situations involving another child's distress were examined in two studies. Study 1 examined 3- to 7-year-old children's (n= 44) ideas about what victims and bystanders would think, feel and do in hypothetical situations. In Study 2, 7- to 8-year-olds (n= 40) described their own cognitive response to situations in which they were confronted with another's distress. In both studies, representational bias was examined in relation to children's display of prosocial and aggressive behavior and in relation to their acceptance of distressed peers. Although not entirely consistent, findings indicate that three types of representational biases are associated with low levels of considerate behavior and with relatively low acceptance of distressed peers: (a) mentally representing the victim's problem without giving thought to its implications for the victim, (b) significantly reducing the emotional significance of the problem and (c) exaggerating negative aspects of the problem.     

Young children's emerging ability to make false statements

This study examined the origins of children's ability to make consciously false statements, a necessary component of lying. Children 2 to 5 years of age were rewarded for claiming that they saw a picture of a bird when viewing pictures of fish. They were asked outcome questions ("Do you win/lose?"), recognition questions ("Do you have a bird/fish?"), and recall questions ("What do you have?"), which were hypothesized to vary in difficulty depending on the need for consciousness of falsity (less for outcome questions) and self-generation of an appropriate response (more for recall questions). The youngest children (2? to 3? years old) were above chance on outcome questions, but it was not until age 3? that children performed above chance on recognition questions or were capable of maintaining false claims across question types. Findings have implications for understanding the emergence of deception in young children.     

Young children's attention to global magnitude: evidence from classification tasks

Young children often compare objects holistically and not in terms of separate dimensions such as size and color. One holistic relation that often governs young children's object comparisons is overall similarity. Two experiments were conducted to examine the possibility that a holistic magnitude relation might also govern children's object comparisons. Objects varying on two dimensions of magnitude-size and saturation--were classified by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds. The results indicated that the younger children were sensitive to global magnitude as well as overall similarity. They grouped together large and saturated objects or small and desaturated objects more often than they did large and desaturated (or small and saturated) objects and thus appear to have been classifying by combined magnitude across both dimensions. This new finding that young children classify by a global relation of magnitude refines the understanding of perceptual development and provides information about the structure of perception. Young children's use of global magnitudes in classification also fits well with recent findings about children's acquisitions of dimension words.