When Does Framing Influence Preferences,Risk Perceptions,and Risk Attitudes? The Explicated Valence Account

When faced with an expected loss and a choice between a sure option and a risky option, the gain–loss framing of the problem has been shown to influence option preference. According to prospect theory, this framing effect is the result of contradictory attitudes about risks involving gains and losses. This article develops and tests an alternative explicated valence account (EVA), which proposes that preference reversals are caused by differences in the explicated outcome valences of the options under consideration. EVA can account for previous findings where framing effects are observed, eliminated, or even reversed. In two experiments, EVA successfully predicted when framing effects were observed, eliminated, and reversed. The findings also showed that although framing influenced risk perception, it did not influence risk attitudes. Copyright © 2015 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada Journal of Behavioral Decision Making © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Item Difficulty,Discrimination, and the Confidence-Frequency Effect in a Categorical Judgment Task

Three experiments are presented to examine the role of discrimination abilities in the relationship between confidence and performance across items that vary in difficulty. The studies also test the confidence-frequency effect, predicted in the theory of probabilistic mental models (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991), by investigating the relationship between performance estimates provided as confidence judgments and as estimates of the frequency of correct responding. The categorical judgment task involved predicting whether a handwriting sample, generated using naturalistic sampling, had been written by a female or male. The results suggest that, when outcome variability is taken into account, discrimination ability differs drastically between easy, medium, and hard items. Discriminability is greatest for easy items and decreases until it disappears for hard items. There was also evidence of a confidence-frequency effect, with mean confidence judgments showing a slight tendency toward overconfidence and frequency estimates showing a slight tendency to underestimate performance.     

Age-related variance in decisions under ambiguity is explained by changes in reasoning,executive functions,and decision-making under risk

Previous literature has explained older individuals’ disadvantageous decision-making under ambiguity in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) by reduced emotional warning signals preceding decisions. We argue that age-related reductions in IGT performance may also be explained by reductions in certain cognitive abilities (reasoning, executive functions). In 210 participants (18–86 years), we found that the age-related variance on IGT performance occurred only in the last 60 trials. The effect was mediated by cognitive abilities and their relation with decision-making performance under risk with explicit rules (Game of Dice Task). Thus, reductions in cognitive functions in older age may be associated with both a reduced ability to gain explicit insight into the rules of the ambiguous decision situation and with failure to choose the less risky options consequently after the rules have been understood explicitly. Previous literature may have underestimated the relevance of cognitive functions for age-related decline in decision-making performance under ambiguity.     

Risking Everything in Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder: An Analogue Decision-Making Study

An experiment examined decision-making processes among nonclinical participants with low or high levels of OCD symptomatology (N?=?303). To better simulate the decision environments that are most likely to be problematic for clients with OCD, we employed decision tasks that incorporated “black swan” options that have a very low probability but involve substantial loss. When faced with a choice between a safer option that involved no risk of loss or a riskier alternative with a very low probability of substantial loss, most participants chose the safer option regardless of OCD symptom level. However, when faced with choices between options that had similar expected values to the previous choices, but where each option had some low risk of a substantial loss, there was a significant shift towards riskier decisions. These effects were stronger when the task involved a contamination based, health-relevant decision task as compared to one with financial outcomes. The results suggest that both low and high symptom OC participants approach decisions involving risk-free options and decisions involving risky alternatives in qualitatively different ways. There was some evidence that measures of impulsivity were better predictors of the shift to risky decision making than OCD symptomatology.

     

On Minimizing Guessing Effects on Multiple‐Choice Items: Superiority of a two solutions and three distractors item format to a one solution and five distractors item format

Multiple‐choice response formats are troublesome, as an item is often scored as solved simply because the examinee may be lucky at guessing the correct option. Instead of pertinent Item Response Theory models, which take guessing effects into account, this paper considers a psycho‐technological approach to re‐conceptualizing multiple‐choice response formats. The free‐response format is compared with two different multiple‐choice formats: a traditional format with a single correct response option and five distractors (‘1 of 6’), and another with five response options, three of them being distractors and two of them being correct (‘2 of 5’). For the latter format, an item is scored as mastered only if both correct response options and none of the distractors are marked. After the exclusion of a few items, the Rasch model analyses revealed appropriate fit for 188 items altogether. The resulting item‐difficulty parameters were used for comparison. The multiple‐choice format ‘1 of 6’ differs significantly from the multiple‐choice format ‘2 of 5’, while the latter does not differ significantly from the free‐response format. The lower difficulty of items ‘1 of 6’ suggests guessing effects.     

Age-related changes in decision making: comparing informed and noninformed situations

Advantageous decision making progressively develops into early adulthood, most specifically in complex and motivationally salient decision situations in which direct feedback on gains and losses is provided (Figner & Weber, 2011). However, the factors that underlie this developmental improvement in decision making are still not well understood. The current study therefore investigates 2 potential factors, long-term memory and working memory, by assigning a large developmental sample (7-29 years of age) to a condition with either high or low demands on long-term and working memory. The first condition featured an age-adapted version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; i.e., a noninformed situation), whereas the second condition provided an external store where explicit information on gains, losses, and probabilities per choice option was presented (i.e., an informed situation). Consistent with previous developmental IGT studies, children up to age 12 did not learn to prefer advantageous options in the noninformed condition. In contrast, all age groups learned to prefer the advantageous options in the informed conditions, although a slight developmental increase in advantageous decision making remained. These results indicate that lowering dependence on long-term and working memory improves children's advantageous decision making. The results additionally suggest that other factors, like inhibitory control processes, may play an additional role in the development of advantageous decision making.     

When is guessing incorrectly better than studying for enhancing memory?

Recently, Kornell, Hays, and Bjork (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 35:989-998, 2009) demonstrated that incorrect guessing can benefit subsequent memory to a greater degree than can an equivalent amount of study time. We explored this intriguing finding to determine which factors moderate the advantage of incorrect guessing relative to study. In contrast to the findings of Kornell et al., our Experiment 1 revealed that incorrect guessing resulted in worse performance than did studying and that the number of incorrect guesses did not moderate the effect. In contrast, Experiment 2 revealed that the timing of subsequent study moderated the effectiveness of incorrect guessing over study. Final test performance was greater for incorrectly guessed items than for prestudied items when a subsequent study opportunity occurred immediately after the pretrial, whereas the pattern reversed when subsequent study was delayed. This crossover interaction emerged largely because prestudy items showed a classic spacing effect, whereas the guess items did not. One plausible explanation for the absence of a spacing benefit for guess items is that delaying the subsequent study trial increases source-monitoring errors during retrieval, such that participants confuse their original guess with the correctly studied target. However, Experiment 3 provided evidence against this source-monitoring account. We concluded by discussing other possible accounts of why the timing of study could moderate the effectiveness of incorrect guessing.     

得失情境下的图形框架对跨期选择倾向的影响

为分离言语表述的干扰,实验采用简单选择任务,通过2(图形框架)×2(跨期选择)×2(得失情境)被试内实验设计探讨得失情境下图形框架对个体跨期选择的影响。结果发现:(1)在突出时间条件下,被试更倾向于选择小而即时的选项,而在突出金额条件下,被试选择小而即时和大而延时的概率没有差异;(2)收益情境中,个体更多地选择大而延时的选项,而在损失情境中,个体选择即时损失的概率更高。结果表明,跨期选择中个体的决策偏好会随着得失情境及决策选项描述方式的变化而变化。     

The uncertainty appraisal enhances the prominent deck B effect in the Iowa gambling task

The Iowa gambling task (Bechara et al., Cognition 50:7–15, 1994) is designed to simulate a decision making problem under ambiguity, in which the degree of reliance on emotional cues arising from previous experiences contributes to perform advantageously. Recent studies based on the appraisal tendency framework demonstrated that emotional certainty (associated with intuitive strategies) leads to a more advantageous decision pattern, whereas emotional uncertainty (associated with deliberative strategies) impairs the performance in the IGT (Bagneux et al., Motivation and Emotion 37(4):818–827, 2013; Bollon and Bagneux, Cognition and Emotion 27(2):376–384, 2013). Due to the problems in the IGT (Dunn et al., Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 30:239–271, 2006; Steingroever et al., Psychological Assessment 25(1):180–193, 2013), however, it is an open question to what extent the disadvantageous IGT performance in the uncertainty conditions was based on risky decision making. Addressing the main criticisms on the IGT, the primary aim of the present study is to provide a further explanation for the underlying source of the IGT impairment led by uncertainty appraisals. In line with previous research, we found that participants in the certainty-associated emotion condition (disgust) outperformed those in uncertainty-associated conditions (fear, sadness) in the gambling game. Detailed four-deck format analyses on decision patterns and knowledge levels provided supporting evidence for our main hypothesis that the weak IGT scores in the uncertainty conditions can be summarized as a failure to anticipate the badness and the goodness of the most difficult decks, and a dominant preference for a risky option with high immediate gains and infrequent losses.     

Development of decision making: sequential versus integrative rules

Decisions can be made by applying a variety of decision-making rules-sequential rules in which decisions are based on a sequential evaluation of choice dimensions and the integrative normative rule in which decisions are based on an integration of choice dimensions. In this study, we investigated the developmental trajectory of such decision-making rules. In the Gambling Machine Task, participants choose between options that differ in three dimensions: frequency of loss, amount of loss, and certain gain. The task was administered to 231 children and adolescents (age range=8-17 years). Latent group analysis of their performance allowed precise classification of the underlying decision rules. The majority of participants used sequential decision rules, and the number of evaluated dimensions in these rules increased with age. Integrative rule use decreased with age. We discuss these results in light of traditional developmental theories and fuzzy trace theory.     

The dynamics of choice in a changing world: Effects of full and partial feedback

We explored the dynamics of choice behavior while the values of the options changed, unannounced, several times. In particular, choice dynamics were compared when the outcome values of all available options were known (full feedback) and when the outcome value of only the chosen option was known (partial feedback). The frequency of change, the values of the options, and the difference between them were also manipulated. In an experiment with N = 427, we found that the patterns of choices were different for the two levels of feedback. Whereas behavior in the full-feedback condition showed a tendency to switch choices following a missed opportunity—replicating previous findings—the behavior in the partial-feedback condition was different. It was sensitive to the outcome value of the chosen option in comparison to some memory of the last-experienced outcome value of the unchosen option. However, the comparison of these two values influenced choice behavior only when the outcome of the currently chosen option was satisfactory and the last outcome of the unchosen one was not. As expected, the other manipulated variables (change frequency, the options’ values, and the difference between them) had no effect on the dynamics of behavior.     

Collecting information: Optimizing outcomes, screening options, or facilitating discrimination?

Collection of information prior to a decision may be integrated into a compensatory choice process; if it is, the information packet that is collected should be the one that produces the highest net gain. Alternatively,information may be collected in order to screen out options that fail to meet minimum standards; if this is the case, people should not choose options on which they have not collected available information. We tested these and other predictions from the two approaches in four experiments. Participants were given specific information about three attributes of each choice option but only probabilistic information about a fourth one. They rated attractiveness of options, decidedwhether to collect specific information about the fourth attribute of each one, rated options again, and then selected one of them. Data were consistent with neither of the above approaches. Instead they suggested that people collect information in order to facilitate their ability to discriminate between the attractiveness of options.     

Heterogeneity of strategy use in the Iowa gambling task: A comparison of win-stay/lose-shift and reinforcement learning models

The Iowa gambling task (IGT) has been used in numerous studies, often to examine decision-making performance in different clinical populations. Reinforcement learning (RL) models such as the expectancy valence (EV) model have often been used to characterize choice behavior in this work, and accordingly, parameter differences from these models have been used to examine differences in decision-making processes between different populations. These RL models assume a strategy whereby participants incrementally update the expected rewards for each option and probabilistically select options with higher expected rewards. Here we show that a formal model that assumes a win-stay/lose-shift (WSLS) strategy—which is sensitive only to the outcome of the previous choice—provides the best fit to IGT data from about half of our sample of healthy young adults, and that a prospect valence learning (PVL) model that utilizes a decay reinforcement learning rule provides the best fit to the other half of the data. Further analyses suggested that the better fits of the WSLS model to many participants’ data were not due to an enhanced ability of the WSLS model to mimic the RL strategy assumed by the PVL and EV models. These results suggest that WSLS is a common strategy in the IGT and that both heuristic-based and RL-based models should be used to inform decision-making behavior in the IGT and similar choice tasks.     

Does Practical Deliberation Crowd Out Self-Prediction?

It is a popular view thatpractical deliberation excludes foreknowledge of one's choice. Wolfgang Spohn and Isaac Levi have argued that not even a purely probabilistic self-predictionis available to thedeliberator, if one takes subjective probabilities to be conceptually linked to betting rates. It makes no sense to have a betting rate for an option, for one's willingness to bet on the option depends on the net gain from the bet, in combination with the option's antecedent utility, rather than on the offered odds. And even apart from this consideration, assigning probabilities to the options among which one is choosing is futile since such probabilities could be of no possible use in choice. The paper subjects these arguments to critical examination and suggests that, appearances notwithstanding, practical deliberation need not crowd outself-prediction.     

The allure of the alignable: younger and older adults' false memories of choice features

When making choices, people often try to directly compare the features of different options rather than evaluating each option separately. Not every feature has an analogous (or alignable) feature in the other option, however. In this study, both younger and older adults filled in such gaps when remembering, creating features in the other option to contrast with existing features. Thus, participants had a tendency to remember choice options as more comparable than they originally were. High performance on tasks tapping strategic processing was associated with a pattern of mostly feature-based comparisons during choice for older adults but with a pattern of mostly option-based comparisons for younger adults. This pattern suggests that younger and older adults' comparison processes are influenced by different goals.     

When and why do people avoid unknown probabilities in decisions under uncertainty? Testing some predictions from optimal foraging theory.

When given a choice between two otherwise equivalent options - one in which the probability information is stated and another in which it is missing - most people avoid the option with missing probability information (Camerer & Weber, 1992). This robust, frequently replicated tendency is known as the ambiguity effect. It is unclear, however, why the ambiguity effect occurs. Experiments 1 and 2, which separated effects of the comparison process from those related to missing probability information, demonstrate that the ambiguity effect is elicited by missing probabilities rather than by comparison of options. Experiments 3 and 4 test predictions drawn from the literature on behavioral ecology. It is suggested that choices between two options should reflect three parameters: (1) the need of the organism, (2) the mean expected outcome of each option; and (3) the variance associated with each option's outcome. It is hypothesized that unknown probabilities are avoided because they co-occur with high outcome variability. In Experiment 3 it was found that subjects systematically avoid options with high outcome variability regardless of whether probabilities are explicitly stated or not. In Experiment 4, we reversed the ambiguity effect: when participants' need was greater than the known option's expected mean outcome, subjects preferred the ambiguous (high variance) option. From these experiments we conclude that people do not generally avoid ambiguous options. Instead, they take into account expected outcome, outcome variability, and their need in order to arrive at a decision that is most likely to satisfy this need.     

Is human decision making under ambiguity guided by loss frequency regardless of the costs? A developmental study using the Soochow Gambling Task

Converging developmental decision-making studies have demonstrated that until late adolescence, individuals prefer options for which the risk of a loss is low regardless of the final outcome. Recent works have shown a similar inability to consider both loss frequency and final outcome among adults. The current study aimed to identify developmental changes in feedback-monitoring ability to consider both loss frequency and final outcome in decision making under ambiguity. Children, adolescents, and adults performed an adapted version of the Soochow Gambling Task. Our results showed that children and adolescents presented an exclusive preference for options associated with infrequent punishment. In contrast, only adults seemed to consider both loss frequency and the final outcome by favoring the advantageous options when the frequency of losses was low. These findings suggest that the ability to integrate both loss frequency and final outcome develops with age. Moreover, the analysis of strategic adjustments following gains and losses reveals that adults switch less often after losses compared with children and adolescents. This finding suggests that psychological tolerance to loss may facilitate learning the characteristics of each option and improve the ability to choose advantageously.     

Perceived control,nature of risk information and risk taking. An experimental test of a simple taxonomy of uncertainty

Uncertainty may be categorized along two dimensions: (1) the nature of probabilistic information (i.e. frequency information, about the outcomes of similar situations in the past, versus process information, about the way(s) in which a future loss might occur), and (2) the degree of personal control (i.e. the extent to which an activity's outcomes depend on internal factors (e.g. knowledge, skills) versus external (e.g. chance) factors). The effects of variations in both dimensions on people's risk-taking tendency were experimentally studied. In a computerized task, subjects had to stop a fast-moving symbol before it passed a target line. Success yielded a financial gain, failure led them into a ‘penalty task’ with the possibility of a considerable loss. On each trial subjects chose among 10 risk levels (varying symbol speeds): low levels resulted in small but almost sure gains, high levels yielded larger but less probable gains. Across subgroups of subjects, three penalty task characteristics were varied: (1) the actual loss probability, (2) the external versus internal determination of outcomes, and (3) the available risk information. Major findings were: (a) subjects did not set a lower risk level, but they did appear to be more attentive (i.e. they failed fewer trials) when the actual loss probability was lower; (b) internal outcome determination resulted in more failed trials (lesser caution); (c) subjects ignored frequency information, but were sensitive to process information. Results are discussed in terms of effort allocation for controlling risk during task performance.     

得失不对称：跨期选择中自我-他人决策差异

采用跨期选择任务范式,考察得失情境下自我–他人决策差异。结果发现：（1）为自己决策比为他人决策更偏好于选择即刻选项;（2）损失情境比获益情境下更偏好于选择即刻选项;（3）获益情境下为自己决策与为他人决策在选择即刻选项上不存在显著差异,而损失情境下为自己决策比为他人决策更偏好于选择即刻选项,表明得失情境下自我–他人决策差异存在不对称性。