Why Are We Certain that We Exist?

Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self‐reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito.     

We Were,We Are,Will We Be? The Social Psychology of Collective Angst

Not all social groups survive the passage of time. Groups once in existence are now but memories of the past. If history is any indication, other social groups are likely to experience a similar fate and join the list of groups that once were. The concern that one’s group might one day join such a list is the focus of this paper. Specifically, we examine the social psychology of collective angst – a group‐based emotion that stems from concern for the future vitality of one’s social group. We begin by discussing the anatomy of collective angst and how it differs from other collective emotions. We then outline factors that foster collective angst. Importantly, we provide a novel theoretical framework outlining both constructive and destructive means by which members may defend against a future that does not include their group. For example, we examine collective angst as a facilitator of, among other things, ingroup cohesion and outgroup aggression. Finally, we discuss how collective angst has manifested on the world stage as well as implications for relations within and between groups.     

What Do We See When We See Total Darkness?

Seeing total darkness is a peculiar perceptual state: in it, the subject is visually aware of something while seeming to fail to be aware of anything. Recent treatments of the topic (Sorensen 2008 , Soteriou 2000 ) leave this particular puzzle unsolved. Here, I attempt a solution. Following Dretske, I begin by suggesting that the perceptual report ‘S sees (total) darkness’ is ambiguous between two distinct kinds of perceptual states: epistemic and non‐epistemic. This will lead to an examination of the metaphysics of what is supposed to be seen. I show, on the one hand, the difficulty of reducing the perception of total darkness to the perception of a particular instantiation of a property, and on the other, that it has important similarities with the perception of (non‐particular) ‘stuff’. I propose, finally, that the solution to the puzzle might involve postulating a novel ontological status for total darkness: that of a ‘concrete universal’. Potential implications of interest for particularism and for naïve realism are suggested.     

Where Have We Been, How Did We Get There, and Where Shall We Go?

Commentators expressed a wide variety of views on my evaluation of the state of assessment center (AC) research and practice. In this response, I first trace the evolution of the construct validity paradox "urban legend." Next, I consider the commentators' comments as they relate to (a) my recommendation to abandon dimension-based ACs in lieu of task- or role-based structures (b) my recommendation to discontinue design fix attempts toward making ACs conform to multitrait–multimethod construct validity criteria, and (c) considerations of construct validity and validation evidence. Finally, I offer some directions for future AC research and practice.     

Would We Recognize Progress if We Saw it? A Commentary

Comments on the nature of special education as an enterprise and judgment of its progress are offered. Five independent but necessary and sufficient criteria for judgment of progress in special education for students with emotional or behavioral disorders are suggested. Comments are made on each of the articles in the series, and concluding remarks call for more data and better thinking.     

What Are We Doing When We Translate from Quantitative Models?

Although quantitative analysis (in which behavior principles are defined in terms of equations) has become common in basic behavior analysis, translational efforts often examine everyday events through the lens of narrative versions of laboratory-derived principles. This approach to translation, although useful, is incomplete because equations may convey concepts that are difficult to capture in words. To support this point, we provide a nontechnical introduction to selected aspects of quantitative analysis; consider some issues that translational investigators (and, potentially, practitioners) confront when attempting to translate from quantitative models; and discuss examples of relevant translational studies. We conclude that, where behavior-science translation is concerned, the quantitative features of quantitative models cannot be ignored without sacrificing conceptual precision, scientific and practical insights, and the capacity of the basic and applied wings of behavior analysis to communicate effectively.     

Spirituality in Occupational Therapy: Do We Practice What We Teach?

This mixed-method study examined the responses of 97 occupational therapists on the subject of spirituality in occupational therapy practice. The inclusion of spirituality into the Occupational Therapy Practice Framework (2008) implies that clinicians address spirituality as a component of client-centered practice. This research revealed a gap between education, theory, and practice as evidenced in the quantitative and qualitative data. Although occupational therapy is intended to be holistic, therapists require a more complete understanding of what spirituality is and what the role of the occupational therapist is when addressing spirituality in evaluation or treatment. The discussion of this research provides information for future occupational therapy educators and educational programs as they seek to incorporate the construct of spirituality into curricula.     

Preschool Assessment: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going?

This article reviews trends in the assessment of preschool children. Preschool assessment is compared with the assessment of other populations and early history, current status, recent advances, and future needs are discussed. Preschool assessment is seen as having both similarities with and important differences from other types of assessment. Though the last two decades have seen changes in models, procedures, and theories, it is concluded that much remains to be accomplished.     

Shiny Objects—Why We Spend Money We Don’t Have in Search of Happiness We Can’t Buy

This is a book review of “Shiny Objects—Why We Spend Money We Don’t Have in Search of Happiness We Can’t Buy” by James A. Roberts, published by Harper-Collins, New York, 2011. This book addresses issues of materialism and focuses on the history of America by discussing the American dream as being a belief in the freedom that allows citizens to pursue their goals through hard work and freedom of choice in relation to the search for happiness.     

Do We Decide Intentionally?

In a recent article in this journal, Joshua Shepherd presents and rejects a new argument for the sceptical conclusion that everyday decisions aren't intentional actions. After relating his focal argument to a different argument for the same conclusion that is presented and rejected by Alfred Mele, I defend these arguments from extant criticisms, and develop new objections that shed light on the intentionality of typical decisions.     

Can We Understand Ourselves?

When it is asked if it is 'possible' for us to understand alien cultures, a contrast is implied with a certain conception of the understanding we have of our own culture. This contrast has certain parallels with the philosophical 'problem of other minds', in which a contrast is also drawn between understanding myself and others. Though these are different questions, they are related — in that somewhat parallel confusion about the notion of 'understanding' are involved in both. Our own culture is not in principle transparent to our understanding; neither are other cultures in principle opaque.