When choices give in to temptations: Explaining the disagreement among importance measures

Respondents’ overt statements of relative importance rarely correspond to weights derived from a regression analysis of their decisions. This paper conjectures that differential effects of high-level goals on importance beliefs and choices can explain these discrepancies. It is argued that the goal to justify decisions influences importance beliefs more than choices whereas the goal to assess preferences accurately affects choices more than importance beliefs. It is also argued that differential effects of high-level goals on importance statements and choices vary as a function of whether decision-maker controls the information flow and the extent of prior knowledge and experiences with choice options. These predictions were tested within the context of a contraceptive decision-making task. Choices among contraceptives made the justification goal salient to subjects by requiring tradeoffs between attributes that are either considered rational or tempting in making such decisions (e.g., health risks vs. pleasure/convenience). As predicted, subjects assigned larger importance weights to rational attributes in their subjective evaluations than in their choices whereas the impact of tempting attributes was stronger for choices than for subjective importance evaluations. Moreover, these observed discrepancies between importance measures were reduced in favor of rational attributes when subjects controlled the information flow and could not access their prior experiences. Overall, the results suggest that, although tempting attributes affect choices, decision makers appear to be unwilling to acknowledge the impact of tempting attributes on their decisions in judging attribute importance.     

Which is the compromise option? Information format and task format as determinants

When consumers must make a decision but are uncertain of their preferences, they often select a compromise choice. Early studies emphasized the relational properties of choice alternatives and indicated that the middle option, whose attribute values fall between the values of other alternatives, is always the compromise option. More recent studies have suggested that when consumers rate two attributes with the same metrics, the attribute–balance choice whose two attributes have equal ratings, might represent the compromise choice. We propose that the different characteristics of the middle and attribute–balance options—which may be compatible with certain determinants such as information and task formats—might be more salient and affect the relative attractiveness of each option. The results of three experiments confirmed this prediction: the middle option was more attractive in list‐by‐attributes and rejecting conditions, whereas the attribute–balance option was more attractive in list‐by‐alternatives and choosing conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The function of concrete emotions in rational decision making

The present study investigates the role of anticipated concrete emotions in preferential decision making. Concrete emotions are conceptualized as a special set of attributes in a multi-attribute utility framework. It is argued that emotions cannot be reduced to patterns of objective attribute values. It is hypothesized that decisions are determined by both concrete emotions and objective attributes. Furthermore, the relative impact of emotions is hypothesized to vary with characteristics of the decision task, namely, the decision domain (persons vs. cities), the similarity of the decision options (similar vs. dissimilar), and the response mode (rating vs. ranking). Four sets of decision options were presented to subjects on a questionnaire. For each option, subjects indicated a preference rating, a ranking of the option within its set, the intensity of four concrete emotions, and the degree to which the option is characterized by four objective attributes. Regression analyses show that including emotions as predictors significantly increases the portion of explained variance of preferences. The relative impact of emotions is moderated by the response mode. Factor analyses yield two independent factors of positive and negative emotions. Surprisingly, only positive emotions are significantly correlated with preferences. We conclude that concrete emotions are a necessary and non-redundant part of the decision process.     

Stating Preference for the Ethereal but Choosing the Concrete: How the Tangibility of Attributes Affects Attribute Weighting in Value Elicitation and Choice

Marketers routinely make use of stated consumer preferences and the relative attribute‐importance weights implied by these preferences when making decisions on issues such as advertising messages and product design. Using this information as a basis for managerial decision making is risky, though, if stated preferences diverge from actual choices. Practical evidence that such a divergence is of concern is provided by the current trend toward the use of stated choice‐based conjoint analysis. This article examines differences between the attribute‐importance weights consumers use during value elicitation and the attribute weights revealed to influence actual choice. The results of an empirical analysis of automobile stated preference and purchase decisions, and an experiment and subsequent qualitative analysis of wine choice, converge to suggest that consumers’ attribute weightings differ in value elicitation versus choice in a reliable manner. Specifically, we demonstrate a tangibility effect—the tendency for tangible attributes to be weighted relatively more heavily than intangible attributes in choice as compared to in value elicitation. The process underlying the tangibility effect is discussed, as are the implications for researchers and managers.     

Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions

Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB-users’ decision behaviour in a memory-based decision task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-irrelevant information.     

Six of One, Half Dozen of the Other: Expanding and Contracting Numerical Dimensions Produces Preference Reversals

ABSTRACT— The scales used to describe the attributes of different choice options are usually open to alternative expressions, such as inches versus feet or minutes versus hours. More generally, a ratio scale can be multiplied by an arbitrary factor (e.g., 12) while preserving all of the information it conveys about different choice alternatives. We propose that expanded scales (e.g., price per year) lead decision makers to discriminate between choice options more than do contracted scales (e.g., price per month) because they exaggerate the difference between options on the expanded attribute. Two studies show that simply increasing the size of an attribute's scale systematically changes its weight in both multiattribute preferences and willingness to pay: Expanding scales for one attribute shifts preferences to alternatives favored on that attribute.     

Decision by sampling: The role of the decision environment in risky choice

Decision by sampling (DbS) is a theory about how our environment shapes the decisions that we make. Here, I review the application of DbS to risky decision making. According to classical theories of risky decision making, people make stable transformations between outcomes and probabilities and their subjective counterparts using fixed psychoeconomic functions. DbS offers a quite different account. In DbS, the subjective value of an outcome or probability is derived from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons with a sample of other outcomes or probabilities from the decision environment. In this way, the distribution of attribute values in the environment determines the subjective valuations of outcomes and probabilities. I show how DbS interacts with the real-world distributions of gains, losses, and probabilities to produce the classical psychoeconomic functions. I extend DbS to account for preferences in benchmark data sets. Finally, in a challenge to the classical notion of stable subjective valuations, I review evidence that manipulating the distribution of attribute values in the environment changes our subjective valuations just as DbS predicts.     

Graph‐Framing Effects in Decision Making

This study manipulated the graphical representation of options by framing the physical characters in figures and found that preferences could be affected even when the words and numbers of the problem were constant. Based on attribute substitution theory and an equate‐to‐differentiate approach, we proposed a two‐process model of graph‐framing effects. In the first mental process, the graph‐editing process, the physical features (e.g., distance, size) represented in the graph are visually edited, and the perceived numerical difference between the options is judged based on its physical features. The second mental process, the preferential choice process, occurs by an equate‐to‐differentiate approach in which people seek to equate the difference between options on the dimension on which the difference is smaller, thus leaving the greater other‐dimensional difference to be the determinant of the final choice. Four experiments were tested for graph‐framing effects. Experiment 1 found a graph‐framing effect in coordinate graphs resting on the (de)compression of the scales employed in the figures. Experiment 2 revealed additional graph‐framing effects in other question scenarios and showed that preference changes were mediated by perceived numerical distances. Experiment 3 further confirmed the presence of graph‐framing effects in sector graphs similar to those found in coordinate ones. Experiment 4 suggested that such graph‐framing effects could be eliminated when logical processing (e.g., introducing a mathematical operation before a choice task) was encouraged. This paper discusses related research and a possible substrate basis for graph‐framing effects. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attribute Dismissal and Valence Effects in Preferential Decision Processing

The processing of attribute information during preference‐based decision making is affected by both the valence of that information and its importance to the decision. Although these two factors have typically been examined separately, we propose that their effects on elaboration and encoding are often codependent. Results of four experiments demonstrate that the traditional negativity effect, whereby negative attribute information is processed more extensively than positive attribute information, obtains only for the subset of attributes perceived to be most important. Among other attributes, the negativity effect is reduced or even reversed (a positivity effect). Our findings suggest important qualifications to prevailing notions of selective information processing. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Should you Sleep on it? The Effects of Overnight Sleep on Subjective Preference‐based Choice

Conventional wisdom and studies of unconscious processing suggest that sleeping on a choice may improve decision making. Although sleep has been shown to benefit several cognitive tasks, including problem solving, its impact on everyday choices remains unclear. Here we explore the effects of ‘sleeping on it’ on preference‐based decisions among multiple options. In two studies, individuals viewed several attributes describing a set of items and were asked to select their preferred item after a 12‐hour interval that either contained sleep or was spent fully awake. After an overnight period including sleep, individuals showed increases in positive perceptions of the choice set. This finding contrasts with previous research showing that sleep selectively enhances recall for negative information. In addition, this increase in positive recall did not translate into a greater desire to purchase their preferred item or into an overall benefit for choice satisfaction. Time‐of‐day controls were used to confirm that the observed effects could not be explained by circadian influences. Thus, we show that people may feel more positive about the choice options but not more confident about the choice after ‘sleeping on’ a subjective decision. We discuss how the valence of recalled choice set information may be important in understanding the effects of sleep on multi‐attribute decision making and suggest several avenues for future research. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collecting information: Optimizing outcomes, screening options, or facilitating discrimination?

Collection of information prior to a decision may be integrated into a compensatory choice process; if it is, the information packet that is collected should be the one that produces the highest net gain. Alternatively,information may be collected in order to screen out options that fail to meet minimum standards; if this is the case, people should not choose options on which they have not collected available information. We tested these and other predictions from the two approaches in four experiments. Participants were given specific information about three attributes of each choice option but only probabilistic information about a fourth one. They rated attractiveness of options, decidedwhether to collect specific information about the fourth attribute of each one, rated options again, and then selected one of them. Data were consistent with neither of the above approaches. Instead they suggested that people collect information in order to facilitate their ability to discriminate between the attractiveness of options.     

Attribute-value functions as global interpretations of attribute importance

In order to better understand decision maker’s perceptions of the importance of attributes, Goldstein (1990) differentiates between global and local interpretations of attribute importance. While the appreciation for the distinction is growing, research on the relationship between measures of global and local importance is inconclusive. We believe that these inconclusive findings are caused by operationalizing global attribute importance with single-point measures that implicitly assume that the global interpretation of attribute importance linearly depends on the relevant range of context-specific attribute levels. To address this, we propose to operationalize the global interpretation of attribute importance by estimating decision makers’ attribute-value functions. Two empirical studies demonstrate that the shape of attribute-value functions changes from concave to convex with global attribute importance. Furthermore, the steepness of these functions increases with global attribute importance while the diminishing sensitivity decreases. Finally, it is demonstrated that the inconclusive findings about the relationship between common, single-point measures of global and local attribute importance is driven by non-linearities in decision makers’ attribute-value functions. The results suggest great promise for future research on using decision makers’ attribute-value functions for measuring the importance of attributes.     

Contingent Weighting in Self-Other Decision Making

Three studies are presented that examine the decision-making processes that lead advisors to have preferences distinct from personal decision makers (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). Advising and personal decision making were hypothesized to invoke different interpersonal frames, which lead to different weighting of decision attributes. Alternatively, advisors might simply exert less effort in decision making for others than do personal decision makers. In Study 1, the contingent weighting of attributes was examined in two decision-making tasks (choice vs. matching). Advisors were more likely to choose in a manner consistent with "what most people would prefer" than personal decision makers, but no differences in preferences were observed in the matching task. Advisors subsequently reported experiencing less regret and blame and more strongly preferred the chosen alternative than did personal decision makers. In Study 2, advisors considered more decision attributes to be important in the abstract compared to personal decision makers, and the choice pattern of Study 1 was replicated. In Study 3, advisors and personal decision makers generated more considerations when making a decision compared to individuals making decisions in the abstract. Finally, the preferences of personal decision makers were more consistent with their reported attribute importance judgments than were those of advisors. In total, the results suggest advisors incorrectly infer others' preferences, rather than suffer from a deficit of motivation, when giving advice. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

质量还是价格?折衷产品缺货情境下的消费者选择

基于情境效应和决策冲突理论, 通过三个实验探讨折衷产品选项的不可得如何影响消费者对余下可得产品的偏好。研究结果表明, 折衷商品不可得对余下商品的吸引力呈现非对称性的影响。以质量和价格产品属性的购买情境为例, 中等价格中等质量商品的不可得将显著提升低价格商品的吸引力(实验1), 其原因在于折衷方案不可得显著提高了消费者的决策冲突, 高水平的决策冲突导致决策者偏好具有确定性优势的选项, 规避优势存在模糊性的选项。随着质量属性模糊性的降低(提供专家评价, 实验2; 消费者专业知识较强, 实验3)或提高(质量存在波动范围, 实验2), 折衷商品不可得效应相应减弱或加强。     

Prospect relativity: how choice options influence decision under risk

In many theories of decision under risk (e.g., expected utility theory, rank-dependent utility theory, and prospect theory), the utility of a prospect is independent of other options in the choice set. The experiments presented here show a large effect of the available options, suggesting instead that prospects are valued relative to one another. The judged certainty equivalent for a prospect is strongly influenced by the options available. Similarly, the selection of a preferred prospect is strongly influenced by the prospects available. Alternative theories of decision under risk (e.g., the stochastic difference model, multialternative decision field theory, and range frequency theory), where prospects are valued relative to one another, can provide an account of these context effects.     

Position‐based beliefs: The center‐stage effect

This paper examines the existence and consequences of consumers' position-based beliefs about product layouts. We propose that consumers believe that options placed in the center of a simultaneously presented array are the most popular. This belief translates into their choosing options placed in the center more often than those on the sides of a display: the center-stage effect (Studies 1 and 5). Results are driven by inferences of product popularity rather than higher levels of attention to products in a given position (Studies 2 and 3). The preference for middle options is accentuated when people explicitly take into account other people's preferences, increasing the need to choose a popular option (Study 3), but attenuated when layout-based information is not diagnostic (Study 4). Increasing the accessibility of own preferences for the intrinsic attributes about the products reduces the use of position-based beliefs to make judgments and attenuates the center-stage effect (Study 5). Theoretical implications for marketplace meta-cognitions, visual information processing, position effects, and the use of overall cognitive beliefs versus perceptual attention and memory-based individuating information to make judgments are discussed.     

Rough approximation of pairwise comparisons described by multi‐attribute stochastic dominance

Given a finite set A of actions evaluated by a set of attributes, preferential information is considered in the form of a pairwise comparison table including pairs of actions from subset B⊂A described by stochastic dominance relations on particular attributes and a total order on the decision attribute. Using a rough sets approach for the analysis of the subset of preference relations, a set of decision rules is obtained, and these are applied to a set A\B of potential actions. The rough sets approach of looking for the reduction of the set of attributes gives us the possibility of operating on a multi‐attribute stochastic dominance for a reduced number of attributes. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How identity related goals moderate the role of attributes in product evaluation

This research examines how identity related goals influence product evaluation. It is proposed that products are evaluated based on an attribute level to fulfill an identity related goal. Further, the positive relationship between an attribute level and product evaluation is strengthened by goal activation (the degree to which a goal occupies a consumer's thinking) and goal‐product fit (the extent to which consumers think a product is related to a particular goal). Results of three experimental studies support the above propositions. The research makes contributions in that it identifies two moderators, that is, goal activation and goal‐product fit, in the relationship between attributes ability and product evaluation. First, identity‐related goals are higher order and likely to have higher priority for consumers. However, results in this paper show that it still needs to be activated before it can exert an influence on attribute importance. Specifically, when an identity related goal (e.g., one supportive of the fair trade goal) is activated, it takes over a lower‐order goal (e.g., seek for a good taste or a good priced coffee in this case). As goal activation increases, relevant attributes become more important, and the positive relationship between an attribute level and product evaluation strengthens. Second, this paper introduces a new construct of goal‐product fit into identity‐related goals and product evaluation literature. The results of study three suggest that when goal‐product fit becomes stronger, the relevant attribute that can fulfill the goal becomes more important in the overall product evaluation.     

A Note on the Power of Multiattribute One‐switch Utility Functions

One‐switch utility functions model situations in which the preference between two alternatives switches only once as the outcome of one attribute of both alternatives changes from low to high. Recent research cites evidence that the sum of exponential functions (sumex) is the most convincing type for modelling one‐switch utility functions. Sumex functions allow to model exactly one preferential switch and they are convenient for estimating one‐switch utility functions. However, it is unclear so far if sumex functions are suitable to model preferential switches that are perceivable by a decision maker. This paper first analyses how different the utility of two alternatives before and after a preferential can be modelled with sumex functions given that the preferential switch is caused by a particular attribute outcome improvement. It thereafter investigates how accurately decision makers perceive such utility differences. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.