Unification: What is it,how do we Reach and why do we Want it?

This article has three aims. The first is to give a partial explication of the concept of unification. My explication will be partial because I confine myself to unification of particular events, because I do not consider events of a quantitative nature, and discuss only deductive cases. The second aim is to analyze how unification can be reached. My third aim is to show that unification is an intellectual benefit. Instead of being an intellectual benefit unification could be an intellectual harm, i.e., a state of mind we should try to avoid by all means. By calling unification an intellectual benefit, we claim that this form of understanding has an intrinsic value for us. I argue that unification really has this alleged intrinsic value. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Discourse about discourse: what is it and how does it progress in Alzheimer's disease?

Discourse about discourse or a subject's comments about his/her performance during a discourse task can be defined as modalizing discourse (discours modalisateur; [Nespoulous, 1980]; [Nespoulous et al., 1998]). Since it does not convey the expected content of the discourse task (referential discourse), modalizing discourse has often been considered non-informative, and as such, has received little interest. The present study investigated the modalizing aspect of discourse production and its evolution in Alzheimer's disease (AD). Five AD patients produced a picture-induced narrative across five consecutive assessments. Two measures were derived: the modalizing/referential ratio (M/R ratio) and the percentage of repeated ideas. Results revealed that, compared to a group of 27 normal controls matched for age and education, AD patients: (1) obtained higher M/R ratios that tended to diminish as the number of assessments increased, and (2) produced higher percentages of repeated ideas throughout all assessments. These results suggest that modalizing discourse makes up a large proportion of AD patients' discourse and should be included in further studies to accurately describe their discourse behavior. The implications of modalizing discourse on preserved pragmatic abilities and its inclusion in comprehensive management programs of AD patients are discussed.     

What is episodic memory and how do we use it?

What are the neural and computational principles that give rise to episodic memory? Although memory is probably the most studied topic in psychology and cognitive neuroscience, most research has focused on learning at the micro-level. I outline the limitations of this approach and propose a ‘molar’ approach to tackle episodic memory at the scale of life.     

Imitation by animals: how do they do it?

Imitation is of psychological interest in part because it has cognitive implications for how organisms view the behavior of others, relative to their own behavior. It implies the ability to take the perspective of another. For this reason, researchers have tried to distinguish imitation from other kinds of social learning and influence. In the two-action procedure, one of two response topographies is demonstrated, and the correlation between the topography demonstrated and the topography later used by the observer is a measure of imitation. Both pigeons and Japanese quail show response matching, despite the fact that from their perspective, their own behavior appears quite different from that demonstrated. Although imitation has been demonstrated in birds and several species of primates, researchers are still not certain what mechanisms underlie this ability.     

Rater bias in psychological research: when is it a problem and what can we do about it?

Rater bias is a substantial source of error in psychological research. Bias distorts observed effect sizes beyond the expected level of attenuation due to intrarater error, and the impact of bias is not accurately estimated using conventional methods of correction for attenuation. Using a model based on multivariate generalizability theory, this article illustrates how bias affects research results. The model identifies 4 types of bias that may affect findings in research using observer ratings, including the biases traditionally termed leniency and halo errors. The impact of bias depends on which of 4 classes of rating design is used, and formulas are derived for correcting observed effect sizes for attenuation (due to bias variance) and inflation (due to bias covariance) in each of these classes. The rater bias model suggests procedures for researchers seeking to minimize adverse impact of bias on study findings.     

Judging relationships between events: how do we do it?

A decade ago, Allan (1993) concluded that associative models provided the best account of data generated in tasks that require human observers to judge the relationship between binary events. In the intervening years, new data have been reported that provide evidence for higher-order processes. Some have argued that these new data pose a serious threat to the viability of the associative account. The purpose of the present paper is to review this evidence and to assess the severity of this threat.     

When do children learn from unreliable speakers?

Children do not necessarily disbelieve a speaker with a history of inaccuracy; they take into account reasons for errors. Three- to five-year-olds (N = 97) aimed to identify a hidden target in collaboration with a puppet. The puppet’s history of inaccuracy arose either from false beliefs or occurred despite his being fully informed. On a subsequent test trial, children’s realistic expectation about the target was contradicted by the puppet who was fully informed. Children were more likely to revise their belief in line with the puppet’s assertion when his previous errors were due to false beliefs. Children who explained this puppet’s prior inaccuracy in terms of false belief were more likely to believe the puppet than those who did not. As children’s understanding of the mind advances, they increasingly balance the risk of learning falsehoods from unreliable speakers against that of rejecting truths from speakers who made excusable errors.     

Why do males and females differ? Children's beliefs about sex differences

The present paper focuses on children's beliefs about sex differences and how these are related to age and gender. Seven, ten, and fifteen year olds (N=427) were asked to give explanations for their beliefs about sex differences. In strong agreement with previous research and the cognitive-developmental theoretical framework, marked age differences were found: younger children were more likely than older children to emphasize biological and physical factors. Significant gender differences were also found, especially for 15 year olds. Girls were much more likely to attribute sex differences to social factors, and boys to biological factors. These gender differences were interpreted as being indicative of different life experiences of males and females, with females being more likely to have experienced conflicts between their own values about sex-role behavior and those of society. Findings were also interpreted as being consistent with the recent emphasis on gender schema. Nevertheless, it was argued that theories of gender schema need to take more account of content—of the beliefs that people hold about sex roles—and, in particular, that more attention be given to exploring gender differences in beliefs.     

What is conscience and why is respect for it so important?

The literature on conscience in medicine has paid little attention to what is meant by the word ‘conscience.’ This article distinguishes between retrospective and prospective conscience, distinguishes synderesis from conscience, and argues against intuitionist views of conscience. Conscience is defined as having two interrelated parts: (1) a commitment to morality itself; to acting and choosing morally according to the best of one’s ability, and (2) the activity of judging that an act one has done or about which one is deliberating would violate that commitment. Tolerance is defined as mutual respect for conscience. A set of boundary conditions for justifiable respect for conscientious objection in medicine is proposed.

Emotional intelligence: what is it,and do Anglican clergy have it?

The development of the term “emotional intelligence” (EI), its conceptualisation and three attempts to measure it are outlined. The Assessing Emotions Scale is used as part of a longitudinal study with Anglican clergy in England and Wales in their 14th year in ordained ministry. Clergy by their role are expected to be pastors, counsellors and visitors. Contrary to expectations, the clergy scored lower on EI than any other group reported by the authors of the Assessing Emotions Scale.     

The capacity for music: what is it, and what's special about it?

We explore the capacity for music in terms of five questions: (1) What cognitive structures are invoked by music? (2) What are the principles that create these structures? (3) How do listeners acquire these principles? (4) What pre-existing resources make such acquisition possible? (5) Which aspects of these resources are specific to music, and which are more general? We examine these issues by looking at the major components of musical organization: rhythm (an interaction of grouping and meter), tonal organization (the structure of melody and harmony), and affect (the interaction of music with emotion). Each domain reveals a combination of cognitively general phenomena, such as gestalt grouping principles, harmonic roughness, and stream segregation, with phenomena that appear special to music and language, such as metrical organization. These are subtly interwoven with a residue of components that are devoted specifically to music, such as the structure of tonal systems and the contours of melodic tension and relaxation that depend on tonality. In the domain of affect, these components are especially tangled, involving the interaction of such varied factors as general-purpose aesthetic framing, communication of affect by tone of voice, and the musically specific way that tonal pitch contours evoke patterns of posture and gesture.     

When children ask, "What is it?" what do they want to know about artifacts?

When children ask, "What is it?" are they seeking information about what something is called or what kind of thing it is? To find out, we gave 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds (32 at each age) the opportunity to inquire about unfamiliar artifacts. An ambiguous question was answered with a name or with functional information, depending on the group to which the children were assigned. Children were inclined to follow up with additional questions about the object when they had been told its name, but seemed satisfied with the answer when they had been told the object's function. Moreover, children in the name condition tended to substitute questions about function for ambiguous questions over the course of the session. These results indicate that children are motivated to discover what kinds of things novel artifacts are, and that young children, like adults, conceive of artifact kinds in terms of their functions.     

Is how it is said important? The association between quality of therapist interventions and client processing

This study examined the association between the quality of therapist interventions and client in‐session processing using the York Therapist Process Measure (YTPM; Toukmanian and Armstrong, 1998). The instrument's three dimensions — attunement, tentativeness and meaning exploration — were tested separately for their impact on clients' manner of processing and depth of experiencing. For each of the 20 mild‐moderately depressed clients, treated in short‐term experiential therapy, a high and a low client‐process segment was isolated from a session that was judged by an experienced therapist to manifest the greatest amount of “good therapy moments”. Therapist interventions within these segments were then rated on the YTPM. Results revealed significant differences in the quality of therapist interventions between high and low segments. Attunement and tentativeness were associated significantly with greater complexity in manner of processing, and meaning exploration with greater depth in experiencing. The implications of these findings for psychotherapy research and practice are discussed.     

What is educational theory and how to make it?

An analysis is provided detailing the conditions for the appropriate theoretical study of the object of educational science: pedagogy.     

Language input and acquisition in a Mayan village: how important is directed speech?

Theories of language acquisition have highlighted the importance of adult speakers as active participants in children’s language learning. However, in many communities children are reported to be directly engaged by their caregivers only rarely ( Lieven, 1994 ). This observation raises the possibility that these children learn language from observing, rather than participating in, communicative exchanges. In this paper, we quantify naturally occurring language input in one community where directed interaction with children has been reported to be rare (Yucatec Mayan). We compare this input to the input heard by children growing up in large families in the United States, and we consider how directed and overheard input relate to Mayan children’s later vocabulary. In Study 1, we demonstrate that 1‐year‐old Mayan children do indeed hear a smaller proportion of total input in directed speech than children from the US. In Study 2, we show that for Mayan (but not US) children, there are great increases in the proportion of directed input that children receive between 13 and 35 months. In Study 3, we explore the validity of using videotaped data in a Mayan village. In Study 4, we demonstrate that word types directed to Mayan children from adults at 24 months (but not word types overheard by children or word types directed from other children) predict later vocabulary. These findings suggest that adult talk directed to children is important for early word learning, even in communities where much of children’s early language input comes from overheard speech. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZgA4CxmBTNk&feature=youtu.be     

At what age do children learn to discriminate between act and actor?

Children's ability to make moral judgements about an act on the basis of aspects of the act rather than on liking and preconceived ideas about the actor was investigated. 85 children of 4 age groups (preschool, Grades 1, 2, and 3, age range 5-9 years) participated. Act/Actor discrimination was investigated with a test consisting of 8 cartoons. In 4, a rabbit was behaving aggressively against a wolf; the other 4 portrayed identical acts with the wolf as aggressor and the rabbit as victim. Participants made moral evaluations of each cartoon. IQ was measured with Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices, and the general level of moral development was measured in accord with Piaget's (1932) criteria. Age, IQ, and general moral development correlated with discriminative ability for Act and Actor. In Piagetian terms, children at the heteronomous level were not capable of such discrimination, while children at the autonomous level (above 7 years of age) in general were.     

What is chaos and how is it relevant for philosophy of mind?

This paper argues, in agreement with Neuringer, Beggs and others, that if we wish to scientifically characterise human choice, we have to work with a probabilistic or chaos-derived model. This has a number of implications for philosophy of mind. Firstly, it is in theory possible to describe human behaviour with some form of law-like equation; it is just a matter of figuring out what equation best captures the states of our central nervous system. Secondly, it means that our choices are not random but are chaotic: deterministic, but just hard to predict due to internal complexity. According to the current research, our actions are most likely caused by ‘precipitated avalanches’ of neural activity, which are difficult to predict due to chaos.     

Monitoring of learning for emotional faces: how do fine-grained categories of emotion influence participants’ judgments of learning and beliefs about memory?

Researchers have evaluated how broad categories of emotion (i.e. positive and negative) influence judgments of learning (JOLs) relative to neutral items. Specifically, JOLs are typically higher for emotional relative to neutral items. The novel goal of the present research was to evaluate JOLs for fine-grained categories of emotion. Participants studied faces with afraid, angry, sad, or neutral expressions (Experiment 1) and with afraid, angry, or sad expressions (Experiment 2). Participants identified the expressed emotion, made a JOL for each, and completed a recognition test. JOLs were higher for the emotional relative to neutral expressions. However, JOLs were insensitive to the categories of negative emotion. Using a survey design in Experiment 3, participants demonstrated idiosyncratic beliefs about emotion. Some people believed the fine-grained emotions were equally memorable, whereas others believed a specific emotion (e.g. anger) was most memorable. Thus, beliefs about emotion are nuanced, which has important implications for JOL theory.     

Group polarization and choice‐dilemmas: how important is self‐categorization?

Self‐categorization proponents (e.g., Turner, 1991 ) assume that group polarization occurs because discussants wish to differentiate themselves from outgroup positions and implicitly think of such groups even when they are not specifically mentioned. Ingroup/outgroup salience is thought to heighten such effects. To examine this view, we had participants discuss Choice Dilemma items either with or without explicit knowledge of outgroup positions. Contrary to a self‐categorization account, this manipulation of outgroup salience did not affect the degree of group polarization. In addition, rating measures revealed little spontaneous consideration of outgroup positions on the part of participants, nor was consideration of outgroup positions related to degree of polarization. Group members did show evidence of ingroup identification, but this identification was unrelated to participants' post‐discussion conformity to the group consensus. Taken as a whole, these results suggest distinct limits to the self‐categorization interpretation of group polarization involving Choice Dilemmas. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.