Pseudomemory in hypnotized and task-motivated subjects.

Highly hypnotizable hypnotized (H; n = 16) and task-motivated (TM; n = 13) subjects received pseudomemory suggestions (see Orne, 1979). TM subjects reported being more awake and motivated than did H subjects and were more likely to pass the target noise suggestion. However, 69% of subjects in both conditions who passed the noise suggestion reported pseudomemories. Pseudomemory rate (for H subjects, 69% and for TM subjects, 46%) was not reduced by informing subjects that they could distinguish reality and fantasy in a state of deep concentration. At final inquiry, after deep concentration, pseudomemories remained stable (for H subjects, 75% and for TM subjects, 54%). As predicted, H subjects reported more unsuggested noises and more pseudomemories of novel noises than did TM subjects. Subjects who reported pseudomemories were more confident in the accuracy of their memories than were subjects who reported that the suggested noises were imagined.     

Hypnotically induced pseudomemories--sampling their conditions among hypnotizable subjects

Three studies are reported in a program of research that investigated a range of parameters affecting individual differences in the incidence of hypnotically induced pseudomemory among hypnotizable subjects. Study 1 replicated Laurence and Perry's (1983b) base rates for hypnotically induced pseudomemory response among hypnotizable subjects; in Study 2 the same response was analyzed under more strictly controlled stimulus conditions. Study 3 was an investigation of the impact of a broader range of stimulus events on response and a more sensitive test of the hypothesis that individual differences in pseudomemory effects are tied essentially to the social context of hypnosis. In all three studies, independent groups of subjects were tested who were highly responsive to hypnotic suggestion. Data indicated that the incidence of pseudomemory response was stable and consistent when stringent criteria of scoring were adopted. Also, for some subjects, real and suggested memories were maintained at one and the same time when hypnotically induced memory was examined in different test settings, suggesting that pseudomemories do not permanently overlay real experience. Overall, contextual factors appeared to play a major role among susceptible subjects in determining the nature and incidence of hypnotically induced pseudomemories.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Assessing the effectiveness of warnings and the phenomenological characteristics of false memories

The phenomenology of false memories was investigated in three experiments in which participants heard two experimenters read lists of items that were related to critical nonpresented items. In Experiments 1, following a recognition memory test, participants rated the phenomenological characteristics of their memories immediately and after a 48-hour delay. False recognition was prevalent and on several dimensions participants rated their true memories as more vivid than their false memories. In Experiments 2 and 3, following the study phase, participants were warned about the phenomenological differences between true and false memories and were instructed to use this information to avoid reporting nonpresented items. This type of warning was ineffective at reducing false recall (Experiment 2) and false recognition (Experiment 3) relative to unwarned participants. Importantly, the inability of explicit warnings to impact illusory recollections demonstrates that the false memories cannot be attributed simply to a criterion shift.     

Making it last: Combating hedonic adaptation in romantic relationships

Increasing evidence that positive affect enhances associative processing has lent weight to the idea that positive affect increases false memory for information that is thematically interrelated. Using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm, we examined whether mild positive affect facilitates monitoring processes in modulating false memory for associate words. When participants in the warned condition – in contrast to those in the unwarned condition – were overtly warned about possible false recognition of the critical lure, we found that positive affect, compared to neutral affect, significantly enhanced monitoring through a warning and reduced false recognition. Signal detection analyses suggest that when a warning is provided, positive affect enhances sensitivity to discriminate list items from critical lures, but it does not shift the overall decision criterion. Taken together, we conclude that positive affect facilitates the effect of a warning in reducing false memories for semantic associates.     

Hypnotically created pseudomemories: further investigation into the "memory distortion or response bias" question.

In order to study whether pseudomemories represent actual memory distortions or are a result of response bias, 60 highly hypnotizable subjects and subjects from the general population were divided into 4 experimental groups and were tested for pseudomemory manifestation after receiving a false suggestion. Of the 4 groups of subjects, 3 were offered a monetary reward as a motivation to distinguish false suggestion from actual occurrence. Pseudomemory manifestation was found to be significantly higher among subjects not offered a reward than among subjects who were offered such an reward. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Forced fabrication versus interviewer suggestions: Differences in false memory depend on how memory is assessed

Many studies show that witnesses can develop false memories for suggested misinformation provided by an interviewer. The forced fabrication effect extends this finding by demonstrating that witnesses can also develop false memories for events they were forced to fabricate themselves. In two experiments we compared the incidence of false memory following forced fabrication and interviewer provided suggestion under various conditions (pre‐test warning/no warning; one‐week/two‐week delay) and type of test (source recognition vs. narrative recall). Whereas interviewer suggestions resulted in more false memories than forced fabrications on source recognition tests when participants overtly resisted fabricating and were warned at test, tests of narrative recall showed the opposite pattern even with pre‐test warnings: Fabrications generated following overt resistance led to more false recall than interviewer provided suggestions. This dissociation between suggestive interview type and test type indicates that predictions about the deleterious consequences of interviews are dependent on the way memory is assessed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hypnotizability, preference for an imagic cognitive style, and memory creation in hypnosis

We sought to extend the finding (Laurence & Perry, 1983) that it is possible through hypnosis to create a pseudomemory of a specific event. Subjects were compared on their responses to a hypnotic suggestion. We also examined the relation between nonhypnotic measures (Preference for an Imagic Cognitive Style [PICS] test and the Tellegen Absorption Scale [TAS]) and response to the suggestion. Highly (45.45%) and moderately-highly (46.15%) susceptible subjects believed that the pseudomemory was veridical, but none of the low susceptible subjects did so. Together, hypnotic susceptibility, the PICS, and their interaction more strongly predicted pseudomemory creation than any of these main effects alone. Performance on the TAS was also related to the occurrence of pseudomemory, but this relation was redundant with performance on the other measures. These results point to the complexity of the variables involved in pseudomemory creation during hypnosis.     

Personality,Faking, and Convergent Validity: A Warning Concerning Warning Statements

Personality measures continue to be criticized for their susceptibility to faking and socially desirable responding. The present study examined the effects of warning applicants against faking on convergent validity of self-observer ratings. Four hundred sixty-four participants completed personality inventories in either a warned or unwarned condition. Results indicated that warning statements resulted in lower mean scores for some personality dimensions but did not improve convergent validity for any of these dimensions. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to employment selection and future research.     

The Effect of Warnings to Timeout on Child Compliance to Parental Instructions

ABSTRACT

One common component of behavioral parent training packages is the use of a warning prior to implementation of a timeout following noncompliance to parental instructions. The primary purpose of this research was to evaluate the effects of warnings on compliance. An alternating treatments design was used to evaluate compliance to warned versus unwarned timeouts with three typically developing children. All participants showed a significant increase in compliance upon implementation of the timeout package, either with or without a warning. However, compliance decreased over time in the Warning condition for two participants and increased in variability for a third. All participants had more timeouts in the No Warning condition. Results also showed preliminary evidence for parental preference of Warned timeouts. Implications are discussed.     

Pseudomemory effects over time in the hypnotic setting

Highly (n = 36), moderately (n = 26), and low (n = 48) susceptible subjects were administered either hypnosis or waking instruction to examine the hypothesis that pseudomemory will occur for hypnotic subjects as long as 2 weeks after suggestions are given for accepting false events. Accuracy and confidence of memory were measured for all subjects, and memory was examined for free recall, structured recall, and recognition. Results indicated persistence of pseudomemory for the 2-week period for both highly and moderately susceptible subjects. Data highlighted the multifaceted operation of skill, contextual, and state instruction factors, and an hypothesis that ambiguity of communication when suggestion is delivered plays a part in the maintenance of pseudomemory over time is offered for further testing.     

Warning Against Faking on a Personality Test: Effects on Applicant Reactions and Personality Test Scores

To reduce faking on personality tests, applicants may be warned that a social desirability scale is embedded in the test. Although this procedure has been shown to substantially reduce faking, there is no data that addresses how such a warning may influence applicant reactions toward the selection procedure or the relationships among personality constructs. Using an organizational justice framework, this study examines the effect of warning on procedural justice perceptions. Additionally, the extent to which warning changes the relationships among personality variables, socially desirable responding, and organizational justice variables, was explored. The results suggest that warning did not negatively affect test‐taker reactions. However, the relationships among the justice measures and the personality variables and socially desirable responding differed across the warned and unwarned groups. The organizational justice model fit best and there was less multicollinearity among the personality variables in the warned condition, compared to the unwarned condition. Thus, providing a warning appears to have positive consequences when using personality measures.     

Reports of real and false memories: the relevance of hypnosis, hypnotizability, and context of memory test.

Thirty high- and 30 low-hypnotizable subjects saw slides of a purse snatching and then imagined seeing the slides in hypnosis or waking conditions. The experimenter suggested the offender had a moustache (true), wore a scarf (false), and picked up flowers (false). Memory was tested by the experimenter after the suggestion, by another experimenter during an inquiry session, and again by the 2nd experimenter after the experimenter appeared to end the session. Hypnotizability, but not hypnosis, was associated with false memory reports; more high-than low-hypnotizable subjects reported false memories. The context of testing influenced true and false memory reports; fewer reports occurred in an informal rather than a formal test context.     

Using warnings to reduce categorical false memories in younger and older adults

Warnings about memory errors can reduce their incidence, although past work has largely focused on associative memory errors. The current study sought to explore whether warnings could be tailored to specifically reduce false recall of categorical information in both younger and older populations. Before encoding word pairs designed to induce categorical false memories, half of the younger and older participants were warned to avoid committing these types of memory errors. Older adults who received a warning committed fewer categorical memory errors, as well as other types of semantic memory errors, than those who did not receive a warning. In contrast, young adults' memory errors did not differ for the warning versus no-warning groups. Our findings provide evidence for the effectiveness of warnings at reducing categorical memory errors in older adults, perhaps by supporting source monitoring, reduction in reliance on gist traces, or through effective metacognitive strategies.     

Associative false recognition occurs without strategic criterion shifts

In the DRM (Deese/Roediger and McDermott) false memory paradigm, subjects studied lists of words associated with nonpresented critical words. They were tested in one of four instructional conditions. In a standard condition, subjects were not warned about the DRM Effect. In three other conditions, they were told to avoid false recognition of critical words. One group was warned before study of the lists (affecting encoding and retrieval processes), and two groups were warned after study (affecting only retrieval processes). Replicating prior work, the warning before study considerably reduced false recognition. The warning after study also reduced false recognition, but only when critical items had never been studied; when critical items were studied in half the lists so that subjects had to monitor memory for their presence or absence, the warning after study had little effect on false recognition. Because warned subjects were trying to avoid false recognition, the high levels of false recognition in the latter condition cannot be due to strategically guessing that critical test items were studied. False memories in the DRM paradigm are not caused by such liberal criterion shifts.     

The effect of warnings on false memories in young and older adults

In the present experiments, we examined adult age differences in the ability to suppress false memories, using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Participants studied lists of words (e.g., bed, rest, awake, etc.), each related to a nonpresented critical lure word (e.g., sleep). Typically, recognition tests reveal false alarms to critical lures at rates comparable to those for hits for studied words. In two experiments, separate groups of young and older adults were unwarned about the false memory effect, warned before studying the lists, or warned after study and before test. Lists were presented at either a slow rate (4 sec/word) or a faster rate (2 sec/word). Young adults were better able to discriminate between studied words and critical lures when warned about the DRM effect either before study or after study but before retrieval, and their performance improved with a slower presentation rate. Older adults were able to discriminate between studied words and critical lures when given warnings before study, but not when given warnings after study but before retrieval. Performance on a working memory capacity measure predicted false recognition following study and retrieval warnings. The results suggest that effective use of warnings to reduce false memories is contingent on the quality and type of encoded information, as well as on whether that information is accessed at retrieval. Furthermore, discriminating between similar sources of activation is dependent on working memory capacity, which declines with advancing age.     

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.     

“Queasy does it”: False alcohol beliefs and memories may lead to diminished alcohol preferences

Studies have shown that false memories can be implanted via innocuous suggestions, and that these memories can play a role in shaping people's subsequent attitudes and preferences. The current study explored whether participants (N = 147) who received a false suggestion that they had become ill drinking a particular type of alcohol would increase their confidence that the event had occurred, and whether their new-found belief would subsequently affect their alcohol preferences. Results indicated that participants who received a suggestion that they had gotten sick drinking rum or vodka before the age of 16 reported increased confidence that the suggested experience had occurred. Moreover, participants who received a false alcohol suggestion also showed a strong trend to report diminished preference for the specified type of alcohol after the false suggestion. Implantation of a false memory related to one's past drinking experiences may influence current drink preferences and could be an important avenue for further exploration in the development of alcohol interventions.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants’ reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

暗示条件下的错误记忆研究概述

心理学家通过采用事后提供误导信息的方法以及临床治疗中的催眠、想象等暗示性程序发现的记忆歪曲和记忆移植现象,说明记忆的改变并不局限于对经历的或记得的情节的某方面的修改,它还能创造虚假的自传性事件记忆。