Symbols to grow on

The importance of symbols in the communication of religious traditions is considered in order to develop a critique for enhancing their potential for facilitating integration and wholeness. Four questions are proposed: 1) What precise segment of one's experience comes into focus through the symbol employed? 2) How is this experience related to the person? 3) What does the symbol contribute to self-identity? 4) How does the symbol reorient the person? In conclusion, an example is suggested from contemporary changes in the Roman Catholic Eucharistic liturgy.     

Hardiness: The courage to grow from stresses

The recent emphasis on positive psychology is welcome, and has spurred much relevant research. But, there are still many unresolved conceptual and research issues, as more variables are being proposed as relevant. As part of this process, the present paper proposes hardiness as an addition to positive psychology. Hardiness is a combination of attitudes that provides the courage and motivation to do the hard, strategic work of turning stressful circumstances from potential disasters into growth opportunities. In this regard, the inherently stressful nature of living is discussed. Also clarified are the particular aspects of excellence in performance and health to which hardiness is relevant. The paper concludes with a call for issue-resolving research through which orientations and actions proposed as part of positive psychology can be compared in their contributions to performance and health. Two studies along these lines have found hardiness more powerful than optimism and religiousness in coping with stresses.     

Acquiescing to intuition: Believing what we know isn't so

When people identify an error in their initial judgment, they typically try to correct it. But, in some cases, they choose not to—even when they know, in the moment, that they are being irrational or making a mistake. A baseball fan may know that he cannot affect the pitcher from his living room but still be reluctant to say “no‐hitter.” A person may learn that flying in an airplane is statistically safer than driving a car and still refuse to fly. Dual‐process models of judgment and decision making often implicitly assume that if an error is detected, it will be corrected. Recent work suggests, however, that models should decouple error detection and correction. Indeed, people can explicitly recognize that their intuitive judgment is wrong but, nevertheless, stick with it, a phenomenon known as acquiescence. My goals are to offer criteria for identifying acquiescence, consider why people acquiesce even when it incurs a cost, discuss how lessons that are learned in cases when acquiescence is clearly identified can be exported to cases when acquiescence may be harder to establish, and, more broadly, describe the implications of a model that decouples error detection and error correction.     

Not so fast! (and not so frugal!): rethinking the recognition heuristic

The 'fast and frugal' approach to reasoning (Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Simple heuristics that make us smart. New York: Oxford University Press) claims that individuals use non-compensatory strategies in judgment--the idea that only one cue is taken into account in reasoning. The simplest and most important of these heuristics postulates that judgment sometimes relies solely on recognition. However, the studies that have investigated usage of the recognition heuristic have confounded recognition with other cues that could also lead to similar judgments. This paper tests whether mere recognition is actually driving the findings in support of the recognition heuristic. Two studies provide evidence that judgments do not conform to the recognition heuristic when these confounds are accounted for. Implications for the study of simple heuristics are discussed.     

So much to do and so little time. Effort and perceived temporal distance

In a series of five experiments, we showed that the perception of temporal distance to a future event is shaped by the effort one must invest to realize the event. Studies 1a and 1b showed that when actors are faced with realizing an event by a certain deadline, more effortful events are perceived as closer in time, regardless of the objective temporal distance to the deadline. This negative relationship was reversed, however, when deadlines were absent (Study 2). Finally, priming high effort reduced perceived temporal distance to an event, whereas priming low effort increased perceived temporal distance to the event (Studies 3 and 4). The implications of these findings for models of temporal distance are discussed.