Gaze bias: Selective encoding and liking effects

People look longer at things that they choose than things they do not choose. How much of this tendency—the gaze bias effect—is due to a liking effect compared to the information encoding aspect of the decision-making process? Do these processes compete under certain conditions? We monitored eye movements during a visual decision-making task with four decision prompts: Like, dislike, older, and newer. The gaze bias effect was present during the first dwell in all conditions except the dislike condition, when the preference to look at the liked item and the goal to identify the disliked item compete. Colour content (whether a photograph was colour or black-and-white), not decision type, influenced the gaze bias effect in the older/newer decisions because colour is a relevant feature for such decisions. These interactions appear early in the eye movement record, indicating that gaze bias is influenced during information encoding.     

Rapid decisions from experience

In many everyday decisions, people quickly integrate noisy samples of information to form a preference among alternatives that offer uncertain rewards. Here, we investigated this decision process using the Flash Gambling Task (FGT), in which participants made a series of choices between a certain payoff and an uncertain alternative that produced a normal distribution of payoffs. For each choice, participants experienced the distribution of payoffs via rapid samples updated every 50 ms. We show that people can make these rapid decisions from experience and that the decision process is consistent with a sequential sampling process. Results also reveal a dissociation between these preferential decisions and equivalent perceptual decisions where participants had to determine which alternatives contained more dots on average. To account for this dissociation, we developed a sequential sampling rank-dependent utility model, which showed that participants in the FGT attended more to larger potential payoffs than participants in the perceptual task despite being given equivalent information. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of computational models of preferential choice and a more complete understanding of experience-based decision making.     

Think different: the merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making

The role of unconscious and conscious thought in decision making was investigated in 5 experiments. Because of the low processing capacity of consciousness, conscious thought was hypothesized to be maladaptive when making complex decisions. Conversely, unconscious thought was expected to be highly effective. In Experiments 1-3, participants were presented with a complex decision problem in which they had to choose between various alternatives, each with multiple attributes. Some participants had to make a decision immediately after being presented with the options. In the conscious thought condition, participants could think about the decision for a few minutes. In the unconscious thought condition, participants were distracted for a few minutes and then indicated their decision. Throughout the experiments, unconscious thinkers made the best decisions. Additional evidence obtained in Experiments 4 and 5 suggests that unconscious thought leads to clearer, more polarized, and more integrated representations in memory.     

Interrupting the cascade: orienting contributes to decision making even in the absence of visual stimulation

Most systematic studies of human decision making approach the subject from a cost analysis point of view and assume that people make the highest utility choice. Very few articles investigate subjective decision making, such as that involving preference, although such decisions are very important for our daily functioning. We have argued (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003) that an orienting bias effectively leads to the preference decision by means of a positive feedback loop involving mere exposure and preferential looking. The illustration of this process is a continually increasing gaze bias toward the eventual choice, which we call the gaze cascade effect. In the present study, we interrupt the natural process of preference selection, but we show that gaze behavior does not change even when the stimuli are removed from observers' visual field. This demonstrates that once started, the involvement of orienting in decision making cannot be stopped and that orienting acts independently of the presence of visual stimuli. We also show that the cascade effect is intrinsically linked to the decision itself and is not triggered simply by a tendency to look at preferred targets.     

The Value of Task Conflict to Group Decisions

We tested the ability of task conflict to improve the quality of decisions made by four‐person groups. In a choice between two entrepreneurial investments, conflict was created by endowing group members with a preference for either one investment or the other. Because the decision was subjective, decision quality was necessarily judged by a process criterion, the reduction in the biased evaluation of new information to support the leading alternative. Groups in which conflict was installed exhibited less bias than individuals, who themselves exhibited less bias than groups without such conflict. Regardless of whether conflict was installed, groups that reached an early consensus exhibited the greatest information bias, while groups that experienced sustained conflict exhibited the least. Before achieving consensus, information bias was not significantly different from zero, but then rose steadily after that agreement. This result identifies one specific mechanism by which conflict can improve the process of group decisions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策的风险偏好

使用中国文化背景下修订的Beisswanger等人的异性交友决策问卷, 采用2种方法操纵自我-他人心理距离, 考察了男女大学生在后果严重性不同的异性交友决策任务上为不同心理距离他人决策风险偏好的差异。实验1发现, 被试为具体和笼统他人决策时的风险偏好无显著差异, 在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。心理距离与决策者性别的交互作用显著：男性为具体他人决策更冒险, 而女性为笼统他人决策更冒险。实验2发现, 被试为不相似他人比为相似他人决策更冒险, 在后果不严重任务上比在后果严重任务上更冒险, 男性比女性更冒险。后果严重性与决策者性别交互作用显著：男性在后果严重和不严重任务上的风险偏好无显著差异, 而女性在后果不严重任务上比后果严重任务上更冒险。综合两个实验的结果, 可以得出以下结论：相对于具体和笼统他人的区分而言, 相似和不相似他人的区分是一种更加稳定和有效的区分自我-他人心理距离的方法。结合相关研究及理论对结果进行了讨论。     

Stimulus exposure and gaze bias: A further test of the gaze cascade model

We tested predictions derived from the gaze cascade model of preference decision making (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003; Simion & Shimojo, 2006, 2007). In each trial, participants’ eye movements were monitored while they performed an eight-alternative decision task in which four of the items in the array were preexposed prior to the trial. Replicating previous findings, we found a gaze bias toward the chosen item prior to the response. However, contrary to the prediction of the gaze cascade model, preexposure of stimuli decreased, rather than increased, the magnitude of the gaze bias in preference decisions. Furthermore, unlike the prediction of the model, preexposure did not affect the likelihood of an item being chosen, and the pattern of looking behavior in preference decisions and on a nonpreference control task was remarkably similar. Implications of the present findings in multistage models of decision making are discussed.     

Should I go with my gut? Investigating the benefits of emotion-focused decision making

Deliberative decision strategies have historically been considered the surest path to sound decisions; however, recent evidence and theory suggest that affective strategies may be equally as effective. In four experiments we examined conditions under which affective versus deliberative decision strategies might result in higher decision quality. While consciously focusing on feelings versus details, participants made choices that varied in complexity, in extent of subsequent conscious deliberation allowed, and in domain. Results indicate that focusing on feelings versus details led to superior objective and subjective decision quality for complex decisions. However, when using a feeling-focused approach, subsequent deliberation after encoding resulted in reduced choice quality. These results suggest that affective decision strategies may be more effective relative to deliberative strategies for certain complex decisions.     

Memory in motion: Movement dynamics reveal memory strength

Recognition memory is typically examined as a discrete end-state, describable by static variables, such as accuracy, response time, and confidence. In the present study, we combined real-time mouse-tracking with subsequent, overt confidence estimates to examine the dynamic nature of memory decisions. By examining participants' streaming x-, y- mouse coordinates during recognition decisions, we observed that movement trajectories revealed underlying response confidence. More confident decisions were associated with shorter decision times and more linear response trajectories. Less confident decisions were made slowly, with increased trajectory curvature. Statistical indices of curvature and decision times, including area-under-the-curve and time to maximum deviation, suggested that memory strength relates to response dynamics. Whether participants were correct or incorrect, old responses showed a stronger correspondence between mouse trajectories and confidence, relative to new responses. We suggest that people subjectively experience a correspondence between feelings of memory and feelings of confidence; that subjective experience reveals itself in real-time decision processes, as suggested by sequential sampling models of recognition decisions.     

Do People Order Cues by Retrieval Fluency when Making Probabilistic Inferences?

In multiple‐cue probabilistic inferences, people infer alternatives' unknown values on decision criteria, using alternatives' attributes as cues. Some inferential strategies, like take‐the‐best, assume that people consider relevant cues sequentially in order of decreasing validity. This assumption has been deemed cognitively implausible by some, who suggest memory retrieval principles to guide cue order. We test whether memory‐based inferences are better described by a model considering cues in order of validity or in order of memory retrieval. In an experiment, we manipulated the frequency with which cues appeared in a learning phase, increasing retrieval fluency of cue values related to the more frequently appearing cue. In a subsequent decision phase, participants made a series of two‐alternative decisions based on the learned cue values. We compared two sequential sampling models, which differed in whether cues are sampled in order of subjective cue validity or in order of retrieval fluency. To model retrieval order of cues in the fluency sampling model, we used the declarative memory theory embedded in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture. Most participants' decisions were best described by the model sampling cues in order of memory retrieval. Only a minority of participants were classified as sampling cues by validity. Our result suggests that retrieval fluency is the primary driver of cue order in inferences from memory, irrespective of the cues' validities. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are there ��His�� and ��Her�� Types of Decisions? Exploring Gender Differences in the Confirmation Bias

Research on biased information seeking demonstrates that after decisions, people show a preference for supporting rather than conflicting information (confirmation bias). In a laboratory study (N?=?86 German undergraduates), we examined the interactive effects of different decision types and gender on the confirmation bias. Our study revealed that women showed less confirmation bias when the decision concerned themselves and their mate (interdependent decision) compared to a decision concerning only themselves (independent decision). In contrast, men showed less confirmation bias when they made an independent compared to an interdependent decision. Results were discussed in terms of self-construal differences between men and women leading to different motivations (defense vs. accuracy) during the information seeking depending on the decision type.     

On the benefits of thinking unconsciously: Unconscious thought can increase post-choice satisfaction

This work compares conscious thought and unconscious thought in relation to quality of choice. Earlier work [Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 586-598] has shown that people make better choices after engaging in unconscious thought (i.e., unconscious activity during a period of distraction) rather than in conscious thought. However, the evidence was obtained for choices between hypothetical alternatives with quality of choice operationalized normatively. As quality of decision is essentially subjective, in the current experiment participants chose between real objects with quality operationalized as post-choice satisfaction. In a paradigm based on work by Wilson and colleagues [Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J., & LaFleur, S. J. (1993). Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 331-339], participants were briefly presented with five art posters, and chose one either (a) immediately, (b) after thorough conscious thinking about each poster, or (c) after a period of distraction. Participants took their favorite poster home and were phoned 3-5 weeks later. As hypothesized, unconscious thinkers were more satisfied with their choice than participants in the other two conditions.     

The path or the goal? Decision vs. information focus in biased information seeking after preliminary decisions

Research on the phenomenon of selective exposure to information demonstrates that after preliminary or final decisions, people show a preference for supporting rather than conflicting information (confirmation bias). In this article, we examine conditions that increase or decrease distortions in the search for information. We report on four experiments indicating that the confirmation bias is influenced by whether people focus on their decision or on the presented pieces of information during the information search. Focusing on the decision, for example, because a reward for a correct decision is promised or simply because participants repeatedly think of it, increases the confirmation bias. On the other hand, if participants focus on the available pieces of information because they have to invest money in order to search for information or because they have to evaluate the individual pieces of information, the confirmation bias decreases. Implications for theoretical understanding and interventions for decision-making situations are discussed.     

Hindsight bias and outcome-consistent thoughts when observing and making service provider decisions

Two studies examined the relationship between hindsight bias and corresponding open-ended thoughts for decisions in a service provider setting. Perspectives of those observing and making decisions were examined. In study 1, business students who learned the results of a financial advisor’s stock purchase showed the traditional hindsight effect regardless of outcome favorability, and produced heightened outcome-consistent thoughts. In contrast, study 2 participants were asked to make (rather than to observe) a purchase decision. They produced hindsight bias and consistent thoughts only when their decision outcomes were favorable. Relative to observers, those acting as the service provider (a) showed more bias when outcomes were favorable, and (b) showed less bias when outcomes were unfavorable. Discussion focuses on hindsight implications in service provider decision-making settings.     

Think, blink or sleep on it? The impact of modes of thought on complex decision making

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of "unconscious thought" for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage "unconscious thought processes"). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made "unconsciously", but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving "online judgement" rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to "stop thinking" about complex decisions.     

Tracking the Decision‐Making Process in Multiple‐Choice Assessment: Evidence from Eye Movements

This study investigated students' decision‐making processes in a knowledge‐assessing multiple‐choice (MC) test using eye‐tracking methodology. More precisely, the gaze bias effect (more attention to more preferred options) and its relation to domain knowledge were the focus of the study. Eye movements of students with high (HPK) and low (LPK) prior domain knowledge were recorded while they solved 21 MC items. Afterwards, students rated every answer option according to their subjective preference. As expected, both HPK and LPK students showed a gaze bias towards subjectively preferred answer options, whereby HPK students spent more time on objectively correct answers. Furthermore, a fine‐grained time‐course analysis showed similar patterns of attention distribution over time for both HPK and LPK students, when focusing on subjective preference levels. Thus, these data offer a new perspective on knowledge‐related MC item solving and provide evidence for the generalizability of the gaze bias effect across decision tasks. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

Selective exposure in decided and undecided individuals: differential relations to automatic associations and conscious beliefs

People often show a preference for information that confirms their attitudes and beliefs, and this tendency is reduced for opinions that are not held with conviction. The present study shows that both decided and undecided individuals show a tendency to selectively expose themselves to confirmatory information, albeit with different antecedents and consequences. Whereas selective exposure in decided participants was predicted by conscious beliefs and not by automatic associations, selective exposure in undecided participants was predicted by automatic associations and not by conscious beliefs. Moreover, selective exposure led undecided participants to adopt conscious beliefs that were in line with their preexisting automatic associations. Conversely, for decided participants, selective exposure shifted automatic associations in a direction that was in line with their preexisting conscious beliefs. Implications for decision making and mutual influences of automatic associations and conscious beliefs in attitude change are discussed.     

决策者角色及相关变量对风险偏好的影响

采用IAT技术测查被试的内隐自尊, 并引入收益和损失两种任务框架, 综合探讨了内隐自尊水平、任务得失框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果发现：(1)在收益框架下, 被试为他人决策时更冒险, 而在损失框架下, 为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (2)与为自我决策相比, 低内隐自尊者为他人决策时更冒险, 而高内隐自尊者为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (3)内隐自尊水平与任务框架的交互作用及内隐自尊水平、任务框架和决策者角色之间的三级交互作用均不显著。依据相关的理论和发现对这种结果进行了分析和讨论。     

Memory monitoring and the control of stereotype distortion

We propose a framework for investigating the role of conscious experience in regulating stereotype-based memory distortions. Memory biases are mediated by multiple memory processes, including forms of discriminability and response biases. Different psychological interpretations of these processes depend on how they relate to subjective experiences (e.g., conscious recollection vs. implicit accessibility processes). The ability to control memory distortions, in turn, depends on the psychological meaning attached to these parameters. In Experiment 1 we found that confidence was positively related to discriminability but uncorrelated with stereotype-consistent bias. In Experiment 2 participants were allowed to selectively control when they responded. Because of the asymmetry in monitoring ability, participants were able to increase overall accuracy, but were not able to reduce the stereotype bias. Discussion focuses on the conditions in which subjective experience may provide a valid basis for controlling biases, and when subjective experience may prove deceptive, exacerbating biases.