Measuring strategic control in artificial grammar learning

In response to concerns with existing procedures for measuring strategic control over implicit knowledge in artificial grammar learning (AGL), we introduce a more stringent measurement procedure. After two separate training blocks which each consisted of letter strings derived from a different grammar, participants either judged the grammaticality of novel letter strings with respect to only one of these two grammars (pure-block condition), or had the target grammar varying randomly from trial to trial (novel mixed-block condition) which required a higher degree of conscious flexible control. Random variation in the colour and font of letters was introduced to disguise the nature of the rule and reduce explicit learning. Strategic control was observed both in the pure-block and mixed-block conditions, and even among participants who did not realise the rule was based on letter identity. This indicated detailed strategic control in the absence of explicit learning.     

The relationship between strategic control and conscious structural knowledge in artificial grammar learning

We address Jacoby’s (1991) proposal that strategic control over knowledge requires conscious awareness of that knowledge. In a two-grammar artificial grammar learning experiment all participants were trained on two grammars, consisting of a regularity in letter sequences, while two other dimensions (colours and fonts) varied randomly. Strategic control was measured as the ability to selectively apply the grammars during classification. For each classification, participants also made a combined judgement of (a) decision strategy and (b) relevant stimulus dimension. Strategic control was found for all types of decision strategy, including trials where participants claimed to lack conscious structural knowledge. However, strong evidence of strategic control only occurred when participants knew or guessed that the letter dimension was relevant, suggesting that strategic control might be associated with – or even causally requires – global awareness of the nature of the rules even though it does not require detailed knowledge of their content.     

Intentional control based on familiarity in artificial grammar learning

It is commonly held that implicit learning is based largely on familiarity. It is also commonly held that familiarity is not affected by intentions. It follows that people should not be able to use familiarity to distinguish strings from two different implicitly learned grammars. In two experiments, subjects were trained on two grammars and then asked to endorse strings from only one of the grammars. Subjects also rated how familiar each string felt and reported whether or not they used familiarity to make their grammaticality judgment. We found subjects could endorse the strings of just one grammar and ignore the strings from the other. Importantly, when subjects said they were using familiarity, the rated familiarity for test strings consistent with their chosen grammar was greater than that for strings from the other grammar. Familiarity, subjectively defined, is sensitive to intentions and can play a key role in strategic control.     

Mindfulness reduces habitual responding based on implicit knowledge: Evidence from artificial grammar learning

Participants were unknowingly exposed to complex regularities in a working memory task. The existence of implicit knowledge was subsequently inferred from a preference for stimuli with similar grammatical regularities. Several affective traits have been shown to influence AGL performance positively, many of which are related to a tendency for automatic responding. We therefore tested whether the mindfulness trait predicted a reduction of grammatically congruent preferences, and used emotional primes to explore the influence of affect. Mindfulness was shown to correlate negatively with grammatically congruent responses. Negative primes were shown to result in faster and more negative evaluations. We conclude that grammatically congruent preference ratings rely on habitual responses, and that our findings provide empirical evidence for the non-reactive disposition of the mindfulness trait.     

Modes of knowledge acquisition and retrieval in artificial grammar learning

The aim of this study was to conceptualize artificial grammar learning (AGL) in terms of two orthogonal dimensions—the mode of knowledge acquisition and the mode of knowledge retrieval—as was done by Perlman and Tzelgov (2006) for sequence learning. Experiment 1 was carried out to validate our experimental task; Experiments 2–4 tested, respectively, performance in the intentional, incidental, and automatic retrieval modes, for each of the three modes of acquisition. Furthermore, signal detection theory (SDT) was used as an analytic tool, consistent with our assumption that the processing of legality-relevant information involves decisions along a continuous dimension of fluency. The results presented support the analysis of AGL in terms of the proposed dimensions. They also indicate that knowledge acquired during training may include many aspects of the presented stimuli (whole strings, relations among elements, etc.). The contribution of the various components to performance depends on both the specific instruction in the acquisition phase and the requirements of the retrieval task.     

Syntactic structure and artificial grammar learning: the learnability of embedded hierarchical structures

Embedded hierarchical structures, such as "the rat the cat ate was brown", constitute a core generative property of a natural language theory. Several recent studies have reported learning of hierarchical embeddings in artificial grammar learning (AGL) tasks, and described the functional specificity of Broca's area for processing such structures. In two experiments, we investigated whether alternative strategies can explain the learning success in these studies. We trained participants on hierarchical sequences, and found no evidence for the learning of hierarchical embeddings in test situations identical to those from other studies in the literature. Instead, participants appeared to solve the task by exploiting surface distinctions between legal and illegal sequences, and applying strategies such as counting or repetition detection. We suggest alternative interpretations for the observed activation of Broca's area, in terms of the application of calculation rules or of a differential role of working memory. We claim that the learnability of hierarchical embeddings in AGL tasks remains to be demonstrated.     

A note on DeCaro, Thomas, and Beilock (2008): Further data demonstrate complexities in the assessment of information-integration category learning

DeCaro et al. [DeCaro, M. S., Thomas, R. D., & Beilock, S. L. (2008). Individual differences in category learning: Sometimes less working memory capacity is better than more. Cognition, 107(1), 284-294] explored how individual differences in working memory capacity differentially mediate the learning of distinct category structures. Specifically, their results showed that greater working memory capacity facilitates the learning of novel category structures that are verbalisable and discoverable through logical reasoning processes. Conversely, however, greater working memory was shown to impede the learning of novel category structures thought to be non-verbalisable, inaccessible to conscious reasoning and discoverable only through implicit (procedural) learning of appropriate stimulus-category responses. The present paper calls into question the specific nature of the category learning tasks used, in particular their ability to discriminate between different modes of category learning.     

Theoretical accounts of spatial learning: A neurobiological view (commentary on Pearce, 2009)

Theories of learning have historically taken, as their starting point, the assumption that learning processes have universal applicability. This position has been argued on grounds of parsimony, but has received two significant challenges: first, from the observation that some kinds of learning, such as spatial learning, seem to obey different rules from others, and second, that some kinds of learning take place in processing modules that are separate from each other. These challenges arose in the behavioural literature but have since received considerable support from neurobiological studies, particularly single neuron studies of spatial learning, confirming that there are indeed separable (albeit highly intercommunicating) processing modules in the brain, which may not always interact (within or between themselves) according to classic associative principles. On the basis of these neurobiological data, reviewed here, it is argued that rather than assuming universality of associative rules, it is more parsimonious to assume sets of locally operating rules, each specialized for a particular domain. By this view, although almost all learning is associative in one way or another, the behavioural-level characterization of the rules governing learning may vary depending on which neural modules are involved in a given behaviour. Neurobiological studies, in tandem with behavioural studies, can help reveal the nature of these modules and the local rules by which they interact.     

Applying an exemplar model to the artificial-grammar task: String completion and performance on individual items

Jamieson and Mewhort (2009a) demonstrated that performance in the artificial-grammar task could be understood using an exemplar model of memory. We reinforce the position by testing the model against data for individual test items both in a standard artificial-grammar experiment and in a string-completion variant of the standard procedure. We argue that retrieval is sensitive to structure in memory. The work ties performance in the artificial-grammar task to principles of explicit memory.     

Not evidence for separable controlled and automatic influences in artificial grammar learning: comment on Higham, Vokey, and Pritchard (2000)

P. A. Higham, J. R. Vokey, and J. L. Pritchard (2000) claimed to provide evidence for separable controlled and automatic processes in artificial grammar learning. It is argued that their results are compatible with a single controlled influence: Participants might mistakenly identify more grammatical items than nongrammatical items as belonging to the other grammar, because the grammars are very similar to each other, and the nongrammatical items are relatively highly dissimilar. Participants' knowledge may be ambiguous, rather than automatic. It is further argued that even if Higham et al.'s data do support automatic effects, opposition logic, in this case, cannot be said to have succeeded where dissociation logic has failed, because it is used to address the issue of whether participants have conscious control over the knowledge they acquire, rather than whether they possess conscious awareness of that knowledge.     

Genetic essentialism, neuroessentialism, and stigma: commentary on Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011)

Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) presented a masterfully broad review of the implications of genetic essentialism for understandings of human diversity. This commentary clarifies the reasons that essentialist thinking has problematic social consequences and links genetic forms of essentialism to those invoking neural essences. The mounting evidence that these forms of essentialist thinking contribute to the stigma of mental disorder is reviewed. Genetic and neuroessentialisms influence media portrayals of scientific research and distort how they are interpreted by laypeople. The common thread of these essentialisms is their tendency to deepen social divisions and promote forms of social segregation.     

Beyond IQ: A latent state-trait analysis of general intelligence, dynamic decision making, and implicit learning

The present study investigated cognitive performance measures beyond IQ. In particular, we investigated the psychometric properties of dynamic decision making variables and implicit learning variables and their relation with general intelligence and professional success. N = 173 employees from different companies and occupational groups completed two standard intelligence tests, two dynamic decision making tasks, and two implicit learning tasks at two measurement occasions each. We used structural equation models to test latent state-trait measurement models and the relation between constructs. The results suggest that dynamic decision making and implicit learning are substantially related with general intelligence. Furthermore, general intelligence is the best predictor for income, social status, and educational attainment. Dynamic decision making can predict supervisor ratings even beyond general intelligence.     

Timing is everything: Changes in presentation rate have opposite effects on auditory and visual implicit statistical learning

Implicit statistical learning (ISL) is exclusive to neither a particular sensory modality nor a single domain of processing. Even so, differences in perceptual processing may substantially affect learning across modalities. In three experiments, statistically equivalent auditory and visual familiarizations were presented under different timing conditions that either facilitated or disrupted temporal processing (fast or slow presentation rates). We find an interaction of rate and modality of presentation: At fast rates, auditory ISL was superior to visual. However, at slow presentation rates, the opposite pattern of results was found: Visual ISL was superior to auditory. Thus, we find that changes to presentation rate differentially affect ISL across sensory modalities. Additional experiments confirmed that this modality-specific effect was not due to cross-modal interference or attentional manipulations. These findings suggest that ISL is rooted in modality-specific, perceptually based processes.     

Testing for social learning and imitation in common marmosets, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Callithrix jacchus</Emphasis>, using an artificial fruit

We tested for social learning and imitation in common marmosets using an artificial foraging task and trained conspecific demonstrators. We trained a demonstrator marmoset to open an artificial fruit, providing a full demonstration of the task to be learned. Another marmoset provided a partial demonstration, controlling for stimulus enhancement effects, by eating food from the outside of the apparatus. We thus compared three observer groups, each consisting of four animals: those that received the full demonstration, those that received the partial demonstration, and a control group that saw no demonstration prior to testing. Although none of the observer marmosets succeeded in opening the artificial fruit during the test periods, there were clear effects of demonstration type. Those that saw the full demonstration manipulated the apparatus more overall, whereas those from the control group manipulated it the least of the three groups. Those from the full-demonstration group also contacted the particular parts of the artificial fruit that they had seen touched (localised stimulus enhancement) to a greater extent than the other two groups. There was also an interaction between the number of hand and mouth touches made to the artificial fruit for the full- and partial-demonstration groups. Whether or not these data represent evidence for imitation is discussed. We also propose that the clear differences between the groups suggest that social learning mechanisms provide real benefits to these animals in terms of developing novel food-processing skills analogous to the one presented here.     

Faulty assumptions: A comment on Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, and Christie (2006)

Blanton, Jaccard, Gonzales, and Christie [Blanton, H., Jaccard, J., Gonzales, P., Christie, C. (2006). Decoding the Implicit Association Test: implications for criterion prediction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 192-212.] assert that the Implicit Association Test (IAT) imposes a model that portrays relative preferences as the additive difference between single attitudes. This assertion is misplaced because relative preferences do not necessarily reduce to component attitudes. BJGC also assume that the IAT conditions represent two indicators of the same construct. This assumption is incorrect, and is the cause of their poor-fitting models. The IAT, like other experimental paradigms, contrasts performance between interdependent conditions, and cannot be reduced to component parts. This is true whether calculating a simple difference between conditions, or using the IAT D score. D—an individual effect size that is monotonically related to Cohen’s d—codifies the interdependency between IAT conditions. When their unjustified psychometric assumptions are replaced with plausible assumptions, the models fit their data very well, and basis for their poor-fitting models becomes clear.     

Problematic constructs and cultural-mediation: A comment on Heaven, Ciarrochi and Leeson (2011)

A recent study [Heaven, Ciarrochi & Leeson, (2011). Cognitive ability, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation: A five-year longitudinal study amongst adolescents. Intelligence, 39, 15-21] finds evidence that amongst an Australian student sample, low g and verbal ability are predictive of Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and that low verbal ability is predictive of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). They speculate that those high on RWA might expend little effort in information processing, exhibit simplified judgments and (in the case of SDO) possess lower social competence. RWA and SDO are primarily measures of attitudes and it is known that explicit attitudes can be wholly at variance to implicit orientations. The finding is reinterpreted in light of the cultural-mediation hypothesis, whereby high-IQ individuals possessing flexible and adaptable personalities explicitly process the political and social attitudes that best resonate with culturally constructed norms. It is concluded that the cultural-mediation hypothesis should be the default hypothesis in explaining the direction of the correlation between IQ and political orientation. Only when potential cultural mediators have been ruled out should other hypotheses be considered.     

Functional lateralization, interhemispheric transfer and position bias in serial reversal learning in pigeons (Columba livia)

In the present study we investigated lateralization of color reversal learning in pigeons. After monocular acquisition of a simple color discrimination with either the left or right eye, birds were tested in a serial reversal procedure. While there was only a slight and non-significant difference in choice accuracy during original color discrimination, a stable superiority of birds using the right eye emerged in serial reversals. Both groups showed a characteristic ‘learning-to-learn’ effect, but right-eyed subjects improved faster and reached a lower asymptotic error rate. Subsequent testing for interocular transfer demonstrated a difference between pre- and post-shift choice accuracy in pigeons switching from right to left eye but not vice versa. This can be accounted for by differences in maximum performance using either the left or right eye along with an equally efficient but incomplete interocular transfer in both directions. Detailed analysis of the birds’ response patterns during serial reversals revealed a preference for the right of two response keys in both groups. This bias was most pronounced at the beginning of a session. It decreased within sessions, but became more pronounced in late reversals, thus indicating a successful strategy for mastering the serial reversal task. Interocular transfer of response patterns revealed an unexpected asymmetry. Birds switching from right to left eye continued to prefer the right side, whereas pigeons shifting from left to right eye were now biased towards the left side. The results suggest that lateralized performance during reversal learning in pigeons rests on a complex interplay of learning about individual stimuli, stimulus dimensions, and lateralized response strategies. Received: 4 June 1999 / Accepted after revision: 18 August 1999     

Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens)

There is currently much debate about the nature of social learning in chimpanzees. The main question is whether they can copy others' actions, as opposed to reproducing the environmental effects of these actions using their own preexisting behavioral strategies. In the current study, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) were shown different demonstrations of how to open a tube-in both cases by a conspecific. In different experimental conditions, demonstrations consisted of (1) action only (the actions necessary to open the tube without actually opening it); (2) end state only (the open tube, without showing any actions); (3) both of these components (in a full demonstration); or (4) neither of these components (in a baseline condition). In the first three conditions subjects saw one of two different ways that the tube could open (break in middle; caps off ends). Subjects' behavior in each condition was assessed for how often they opened the tube, how often they opened it in the same location as the demonstrator, and how often they copied the demonstrator's actions or style of opening the tube. Whereas chimpanzees reproduced mainly the environmental results of the demonstrations (emulation), human children often reproduced the demonstrator's actions (imitation). Because the procedure used was similar in many ways to the procedure that Meltzoff (Dev Psych 31:1, 1995) used to study the understanding of others' unfulfilled intentions, the implications of these findings with regard to chimpanzees' understanding of others' intentions are also discussed.