Tackling Three Of Frege's Problems: Edmund Husserl on Sets and Manifolds

Edmund Husserl was one of the very first to experience the directimpact of challenging problems in set theory and his phenomenology first began to takeshape while he was struggling to solve such problems. Here I study three difficultiesassociated with Frege's use of sets that Husserl explicitly addressed: reference to non-existent, impossible, imaginary objects; the introduction of extensions; and ``Russell's' paradox.I do so within the context of Husserl's struggle to overcome the shortcomings of set theory andto develop his own theory of manifolds. I define certain issues involved and discuss howHusserl's theory of manifolds might confront them. In so doing I hope to help bring Husserl'stheories about sets and manifolds out of the realm of abstract theorizing and promptfurther exploration of uncharted philosophical territory rich in philosophical implications.     

Steven Galt Crowell,Husserl, Heidegger,and the Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology

Continental Philosophy Review -     

Nothing More or Less than Logic: General Logic, Transcendental Philosophy, and Kant's Repudiation of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre

In this paper I lay the foundations for an understanding of one of Fichte's most neglected and least understood texts: the late lecture course on Transcendental Logic. I situate this work in the context of Fichte's lifelong struggle with the problem of understanding the relation between logic and philosophy – a problem that I show to figure centrally both in Fichte's own revolutionary thinking and in his response to Kant's notorious denunciation of the Wissenschaftslehre. By attending to this context we can understand Fichte's philosophical ambitions in the late lectures: a critique of particular doctrines of general logic; a critique of the conception of thought presupposed both by the traditional logic and by Kant himself; and a new conception of the relation between logic and the philosophical theory of experience. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Edmund Husserl, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Logical Investigations. Volume I. Prolegomena to Pure Logic</Emphasis>

This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s review of the first Russian translation of volume one of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen (the “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”), which was translated by E. A. Berstein and published in 1909 by a Petersburgian editor. The review appeared in the Muscovite philosophical journal Pyccкaя мыcль (Russian Thought) in 1909. In this short text, Lossky expresses his agreement with Husserl’s early anti-psychologism in logic. He also manifests his stance against logical and axiological relativism and naturalism. As an ontological realist, Lossky thought he had found in the author of the Logische Untersuchungen an ally against the subjectivistic trends then still prevalent in Germany. The review is significant in intellectual history for its vanguard role in the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl’s thought in Russia. (Frédéric Tremblay)     

胡塞尔思想发展脉络中的心理学与现象学:从对立到调和

胡塞尔早期在对心理主义的批判中指出心理之物或心理学经验指涉相对于意向对象的实项内容,心理学则是有关于心理事实的经验科学。这时,现象学与心理学是被严格区分的。20世纪20年代初开始,心理学经验逐渐取得新的涵义,在1925年的《现象学心理学夏季讲稿》中,胡塞尔指出心理学经验本身也具有意向对象,心理学经验与超越论经验遂形成平行关系,甚至成为迈向超越论经验领域或超越论现象学的途径之一。胡塞尔对于心理学两种不同的看法是如何转变的?为了说明这个问题,我们有必要针对相关的文本进行考察,其中包括《逻辑研究》(1900/1901)、《现象学的观念》(1907)、《哲学作为严格的科学》(1911)、《观念》第一卷(1913)以及《第一哲学》(1923/1924),等等。胡塞尔在1913年的《观念》第一卷以及1917年的《现象学与心理学》讲稿中虽仍然严格区分心理学与现象学,但从20世纪20年代中期开始,胡塞尔已经不再严格区分现象学与心理学。为了说明这项演变,对于"心理现象"概念进行阐释是十分必要的。     

Transcendental Arguments,Conceivability, and Global Vs. Local Skepticism

Philosophia - In this paper, I argue that, if transcendental arguments are to proceed from premises that are acceptable to the skeptic, the Transcendental Premise, according to which “X is a...