A dualistic identity theory

Whilst it is accepted that humankind has been responsible for a considerable amount of environmental change, it is only recently that quantitative measures have been devised to express this. Such measures include a habitat index, the ecological footprint and the Living Planet Index. The applications and implications of these measures are discussed along with direct measures of changing atmospheric composition. All indicate that Europe is the most anthropogenically transformed continent and Australasia the least altered. In so far as a population increase of c. 36 per cent is likely to occur in the next 25 years, human induced environmental change is set to continue at a rapid pace. It is likely to be exacerbated by rapid industrialisation in some nations and increasing standards of living. Local, regional and international measures to curb environmental deterioration may temper this to a degree but new technologies e.g. biotechnology, may bring disadvantages as well as advantages.     

A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity

Synthese - Geach points out that some pairs of beliefs have a common focus despite there being, apparently, no object at that focus. For example, two or more beliefs can be directed at Vulcan even...     

A note on latent trait theory and Bowker's test

Bowker's test for marginal equality in contingency tables provides a familiar chi-square test to determine whether the marginal distributions are the same across two or more factors or occasions. In this note it is shown how latent trait theory provides a theoretical framework for the development and application of this test.The research reported here was supported by a grant to the senior author from the National Institute on Aging (AG03164).     

A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity

The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P₁ at time T₁ is numerically identical with a person P₂ at a later time T₂, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views.     

Judgment and the identity theory of truth

The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought’s answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.     

The case-slot identity theory

Many people have noted the similarities between case theories in linguistics and frame representations in artificial intelligence. In particular, the cases of a verb seem to correspond to the slots of a frame. This has led many people, including Fillmore [1977] and Winston [1977] to assert that cases and slots are one and the same. This hypothesis has not attracted much attention, probably because the notion of “slot” in frame representations is so underconstrained that the theory would seem to be content free. In this note, we wish to show that this is not true. For one thing, the case-slot identity theory can explain the difficulty linguists have had in deciding how many cases there are. Furthermore, its adoption will place certain interesting, and plausible constraints on the frame and case theories compatible with it.