认知神经科学的心理学理论价值

从认知神经科学面临的三个挑战--(1)神经科学是“还原” 的,不能完全解释一个人的心理活动过程;（2）认知神经科学无法真正解释人的心理与行为;（3）认知神经科学只能揭示出神经事件与认知活动或行为活动的相关性--入手来讨论其心理学理论价值,阐明认知神经科学在心理学研究中的重要地位及主流趋势。同时指出,认知神经科学只是心理学学科门类中的一种,它能解决的问题也只限于特定的范围,对它要有科学理性的认识和定位。     

Precis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Philosophy and Neuroscience</Emphasis>: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Ruthlessly Reductive Account</Emphasis>

This book precis describes the motives behind my recent attempt to bring to bear “ruthlessly reductive” results from cellular and molecular neuroscience onto issues in the philosophy of mind. Since readers of this journal will probably be most interested in results addressing features of conscious experience, I highlight these most prominently. My main challenge is that philosophers (even scientifically-inspired ones) are missing the nature and scope of reductionism in contemporary neuroscience by focusing exclusively on higher-level cognitive neuroscience, and ignoring the discipline's cell-physiological and molecular-biological core.     

The molecules of social recognition memory: implications for social cognition, extended mind, and neuroethics

Social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroethics have reached a synthesis of late, but some troubling features are present. The neuroscience that currently dominates the study of social cognition is exclusively cognitive neuroscience, as contrasted with the cellular and increasingly molecular emphasis that has gripped mainstream neuroscience over the past three decades. Furthermore, the recent field of molecular and cellular cognition has begun to unravel some molecular mechanisms involved in social cognition, especially pertaining to the consolidation of memories of particular conspecific organisms. Some new experimental techniques for positive interventions into these hypothesized mechanisms offer opportunities for establishing direct causal linkages between intra-neuronal molecular events and the behaviors used to measure social cognitive phenomena. Predicted results from an experiment described below also cast doubt on the application of the “extended mind” approach from recent cognitive science to ground the neuroscience of social cognition. Since neuroethics relies heavily on our best neuroscience of social cognition, that field may soon need to extend its attention beyond cognitive neuroscience, and into neuroscience’s cellular and molecular mainstream.     

Reducing mind to molecular pathways: explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience

As opposed to the dismissive attitude toward reductionism that is popular in current philosophy of mind, a “ruthless reductionism” is alive and thriving in “molecular and cellular cognition”—a field of research within cellular and molecular neuroscience, the current mainstream of the discipline. Basic experimental practices and emerging results from this field imply that two common assertions by philosophers and cognitive scientists are false: (1) that we do not know much about how the brain works, and (2) that lower-level neuroscience cannot explain cognition and complex behavior directly. These experimental practices involve intervening directly with molecular components of sub-cellular and gene expression pathways in neurons and then measuring specific behaviors. These behaviors are tracked using tests that are widely accepted by experimental psychologists to study the psychological phenomenon at issue (e.g., memory, attention, and perception). Here I illustrate these practices and their importance for explanation and reduction in current mainstream neuroscience by describing recent work on social recognition memory in mammals.     

Doing cognitive neuroscience: a third way

The “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches have been thought to exhaust the possibilities for doing cognitive neuroscience. We argue that neither approach is likely to succeed in providing a theory that enables us to understand how cognition is achieved in biological creatures like ourselves. We consider a promising third way of doing cognitive neuroscience, what might be called the “neural dynamic systems” approach, that construes cognitive neuroscience as an autonomous explanatory endeavor, aiming to characterize in its own terms the states and processes responsible for brain-based cognition. We sketch the basic motivation for the approach, describe a particular version of the approach, so-called ‘Dynamic Causal Modeling’ (DCM), and consider a concrete example of DCM. This third way, we argue, has the potential to avoid the problems that afflict the other two approaches.     

Do birds (pigeons and bantams) know how confident they are of their perceptual decisions?

Rhesus monkeys are known to recognize confidence about their immediate perceptual and cognitive decisions by using a betting procedure (Son and Kornell in The missing link in cognition: origins of self-reflective consciousness. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 296–320, 2005; Kornell et al. in Psychol Sci 18:64–71, 2007). In this report, we examined whether this ability is shared in two avian species (pigeons and bantams) in order to know how widespread this metacognitive ability is among animals. We trained pigeons and bantams to search for a differently colored disk (target) among others (distracters) displayed on a touch-sensitive monitor. In test, the subjects were required to choose one of two confidence icons, “risk” and “safe”, after the visual search. A peck at the “risk” icon after a correct response in the visual search (i.e., a peck at the target) was reinforced by food and light, while that after an incorrect response (i.e., a peck at a distracter) resulted in a timeout. A peck at the “safe” icon was always reinforced by food and light, or by light only, regardless of the visual search result. The percentages of “safe” choices after incorrect responses were higher than after correct responses in all six pigeons and two of three bantams. This behavior generalized to novel stimuli in some subjects, and even to a novel line-classification task in a pigeon. These results suggest that these two distantly related avian species have in common a metacognitive ability that allows them to recognize confidence about their immediate perceptual decisions.     

社会认知神经科学研究的最新进展

社会认知神经科学是一门采用认知神经科学技术研究社会认知现象的交叉学科,目前已经形成认知神经科学与心理生理学的热点研究领域。该文回顾了近年来有关情绪、情绪障碍、自我意识、经济决策、道德等方面的脑机制研究,临床研究和脑成像研究表明,恐惧、厌恶、愤怒、惊讶、快乐、悲伤等基本情绪在表达和识别上具有普遍性与特殊性;孤独症与“男性脑”的特征相关,抗抑郁药百忧解对抑郁症儿童的治疗作用;在自我意识的研究领域,自我概念产生的脑区定位、灵长类的自我意象、精神疾病患者的自我概念变化等研究的热点问题;经济决策的研究最近成为亮点之一,主要包括强互惠合作、风险决策、跨期选择以及品牌决策等方面;在道德的脑机制研究中,重点涉及了道德判断与捐赠行为的神经基础。文章最后展望了社会认知神经科学在我国发展的前景     

The developmental cognitive neuroscience of functional connectivity

Developmental cognitive neuroscience is a rapidly growing field that examines the relationships between biological development and cognitive ability. In the past decade, there has been ongoing refinement of concepts and methodology related to the study of ‘functional connectivity’ among distributed brain regions believed to underlie cognition and behavioral control. Due to the recent availability of relatively easy-to-use tools for functional connectivity analysis, there has been a sharp upsurge of studies that seek to characterize normal and psychopathologically abnormal brain functional integration. However, relatively few studies have applied functional and effective connectivity analysis techniques to developmental cognitive neuroscience. Functional and effective connectivity analysis methods are ideally suited to advance our understanding of the neural substrates of cognitive development, particularly in understanding how and why changes in the functional ‘wiring’ of neural networks promotes optimal cognitive control throughout development. The purpose of this review is to summarize the central concepts, methods, and findings of functional integration neuroimaging research to discuss key questions in the field of developmental cognitive neuroscience. These ideas will be presented within a context that merges relevant concepts and proposals from different developmental theorists. The review will outline a few general predictions about likely relationships between typical ‘executive’ cognitive maturation and changes in brain network functional integration during adolescence. Although not exhaustive, this conceptual review also will showcase some of recent findings that have emerged to support these predictions.     

How to Exploit Diversity for Scientific Gain: Using Individual Differences to Constrain Cognitive Theory

ABSTRACT— People often show considerable systematic variability in their ability to perform many different cognitive tasks. In this article, we argue that by combining an individual-differences approach with an experimental-cognitive-neuroscience approach one can often further constrain potential theories of the underlying cognitive mechanisms. In support of this proposal, we outline three basic benefits of using an individual-differences approach: validating neurophysiological measures, demonstrating associations among constructs, and demonstrating dissociations among apparently similar constructs. To illustrate these points, we describe recent work by us and other researchers that utilizes each of these techniques to address specific questions within the domain of visual working memory. It is our hope that some of these techniques for utilizing individual variability may be applied to other domains within cognitive neuroscience.     

默认网络的神经机制、功能假设及临床应用

认知神经科学的迅速发展使得研究者对大脑的功能有了深刻的认识。近些年来, 研究者对大脑在进行外在注意任务时产生的负激活有了更多的了解, 默认网络(Default Mode Network)的概念被提出, 并引起了很多神经科学家的关注, 关于默认网络的相关理论也已提出。当前综述对默认网络的研究历史, 概念理论, 个体和种系发展, 及其与疾病的关系以及临床应用等方面进行了概括总结。未来研究可从默认网络的个体发展, 种系差异, 与其他大脑网络(如注意网络, 视觉网络, 执行控制网络)的关系以及与具体疾病的关系等角度入手进行研究, 共同来探讨默认网络的神经机制。     

A matter of facts

We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a mutual constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally, to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level.     

The experience of watching dance: phenomenological–neuroscience duets

This paper discusses possible correspondences between neuroscientific findings and phenomenologically informed methodologies in the investigation of kinesthetic empathy in watching dance. Interest in phenomenology has recently increased in cognitive science (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008) and dance scholars have recently contributed important new insights into the use of phenomenology in dance studies (e.g. Legrand and Ravn (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8(3):389–408, 2009); Parviainen (Dance Research Journal 34(1):11–26, 2002); Rothfield (Topoi 24:43–53, 2005)). In vision research, coherent neural mechanisms for perceptual phenomena were uncovered, thus supporting correlation of phenomenology and neurophysiology Spillmann (Vision Research 49(12):1507–1521, 2009). Correspondingly, correlating subjects’ neurophysiological data with qualitative responses has been proposed as a means to research the human brain in the study of consciousness (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008), with similar issues in clinical psychology Mishara (Current Opinion in Psychiatry 20(6):559–569, 2007) and biology Kosslyn et al. (American Psychologist 57:341–351, 2002). Yet the relationship between neuroscience and qualitative research informed by phenomenology remains problematic. How qualitative research normally handles subjective experiences is difficult to reconcile with standard statistical analysis of objective data. Recent technological developments in cognitive neuroscience have inspired a number of researchers to use more naturalistic stimuli, outside the laboratory environment, such as dance, thereby perhaps helping to open up the cognitive sciences to more phenomenologically informed approaches. A question central to our research, addressed here, is how the phenomenal experiences of a dance audience member, as accessed by qualitative research methods, can be related to underlying neurophysiological events. We outline below some methodological challenges encountered in relating audiences’ first-person accounts of watching live dance performance to neurophysiological evidence of their experiences.     

Contribution of Callosal Connections to the Interhemispheric Integration of Visuomotor and Cognitive Processes

In recent years, cognitive neuroscience has been concerned with the role of the corpus callosum and interhemispheric communication for lower-level processes and higher-order cognitive functions. There is empirical evidence that not only callosal disconnection but also subtle degradation of the corpus callosum can influence the transfer of information and integration between the hemispheres. The reviewed studies on patients with callosal degradation with and without disconnection indicate a dissociation of callosal functions: while anterior callosal regions were associated with interhemispheric inhibition in situations of semantic (Stroop) and visuospatial (hierarchical letters) competition, posterior callosal areas were associated with interhemispheric facilitation from redundant information at visuomotor and cognitive levels. Together, the reviewed research on selective cognitive functions provides evidence that the corpus callosum contributes to the integration of perception and action within a subcortico-cortical network promoting a unified experience of the way we perceive the visual world and prepare our actions.     

Pattern recognition makes search possible: Comments on Holding (1992)

Chase and Simon's chunking theory of expert memory, which emphasizes the role of pattern recognition in problem solving, has attracted much attention in cognitive psychology. Holding advanced a series of criticisms that, taken together, purported to refute the theory. Two valid criticisms – that chunk size and LTM encoding were underestimated – are dealt with by a simple extension of the theory. The remainder of Holding's criticisms either are not empirically founded or are based on a misunderstanding of the chunking theory and its role in a comprehensive theory of skill. Holding's alternative SEEK theory, which emphasizes the role of search, lacks key mechanisms that could be implemented by the type of pattern recognition proposed by Chase and Simon. Received: 3 September 1997 / Accepted: 28 January 1998     

Neuroanatomical substrates of social cognition dysfunction in autism

In this review article, we summarize recent progress toward understanding the neural structures and circuitry underlying dysfunctional social cognition in autism. We review selected studies from the growing literature that has used the functional neuroimaging techniques of cognitive neuroscience to map out the neuroanatomical substrates of social cognition in autism. We also draw upon functional neuroimaging studies with neurologically normal individuals and individuals with brain lesions to highlight the insights these studies offer that may help elucidate the search for the neural basis of social cognition deficits in autism. We organize this review around key brain structures that have been implicated in the social cognition deficits in autism: (1) the amygdala, (2) the superior temporal sulcus region, and (3) the fusiform gyrus. We review some of what is known about the contribution of each structure to social cognition and then review autism studies that implicate that particular structure. We conclude with a discussion of several potential future directions in the cognitive neuroscience of social deficits in autism.     

Realization,explanation and the mind-body relation

The Morris water maze has been put forward in the philosophy of neuroscience as an example of an experimental arrangement that may be used to delineate the cognitive faculty of spatial memory (e.g., Craver and Darden, Theory and method in the neurosciences, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2001; Craver, Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). However, in the experimental and review literature on the water maze throughout the history of its use, we encounter numerous responses to the question of “what” phenomenon it circumscribes ranging from cognitive functions (e.g., “spatial learning”, “spatial navigation”), to representational changes (e.g., “cognitive map formation”) to terms that appear to refer exclusively to observable changes in behavior (e.g., “water maze performance”). To date philosophical analyses of the water maze have not been directed at sorting out what phenomenon the device delineates nor the sources of the different answers to the question of what. I undertake both of these tasks in this paper. I begin with an analysis of Morris’s first published research study using the water maze and demonstrate that he emerged from it with an experimental learning paradigm that at best circumscribed a discrete set of observable changes in behavior. However, it delineated neither a discrete set of representational changes nor a discrete cognitive function. I cite this in combination with a reductionist-oriented research agenda in cellular and molecular neurobiology dating back to the 1980s as two sources of the lack of consistency across the history of the experimental and review literature as to what is under study in the water maze.     

视觉意识及其神经机制

视觉意识的神经机制是当前认知神经科学研究的热点问题之一。过去普遍认为视觉信息加工主要有两条通路:腹侧通路和背侧通路;而新近的研究表明还存在不经过初级视觉皮层(V1区)的第三条通路。高级视觉皮层、V1区和皮层下结构都对意识觉知的产生起到了相应的作用。已有的实验证据表明,意识的产生过程异常复杂,仍有很多问题值得继续深入讨论和研究。     

Nature and Dynamics of Reference Frames in Visual Search for Orientation: Implications for Early Visual Processing

Visual detection of a line target differing in orientation from a background of lines is assumed to occur early in vision and to involve filter mechanisms acting in parallel over the visual field in retinotopic maps (Foster & Ward, 1991; Treisman, 1985; Wolfe, 1994). But retinotopicality does not imply that early vision takes place in a retinal reference frame. This article briefly reviews experiments on this issue and analyzes their implications regarding early visual processing. The review shows that the spatial frame of reference used in visual search for orientation is dynamically determined by various sensory cues to orientation (Marendaz, Stivalet, Barraclough, & Walkowiac, 1993; Stivalet, Marendaz, Barraclough, & Mourareau, 1995). These findings suggest that intersensory integration and perceptual organization are involved at a processing level preceding visual search. This functional viewpoint is discussed in relation to data from neuroscience and psychology (visual search, microgravity).