Time-compressed spoken word primes crossmodally enhance processing of semantically congruent visual targets

Findings from three experiments support the conclusion that auditory primes facilitate the processing of related targets. In Experiments 1 and 2, we employed a crossmodal Stroop color identification task with auditory color words (as primes) and visual color patches (as targets). Responses were faster for congruent priming, in comparison to neutral or incongruent priming. This effect also emerged for different levels of time compression of the auditory primes (to 30 % and 10 % of the original length; i.e., 120 and 40 ms) and turned out to be even more pronounced under high-perceptual-load conditions (Exps. 1 and 2). In Experiment 3, target-present or -absent decisions for brief target displays had to be made, thereby ruling out response-priming processes as a cause of the congruency effects. Nevertheless, target detection (d') was increased by congruent primes (30 % compression) in comparison to incongruent or neutral primes. Our results suggest semantic object-based auditory–visual interactions, which rapidly increase the denoted target object’s salience. This would apply, in particular, to complex visual scenes.     

A motor similarity effect in object memory

In line with theories of embodied cognition (e.g., Versace et al. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 21, 522–560, 2009), several studies have suggested that the motor system used to interact with objects in our environment is involved in object recognition (e.g., Helbig, Graf, & Kiefer Experimental Brain Research, 174, 221-228, 2006). However, the role of the motor system in immediate memory for objects is more controversial. The objective of the present study was to investigate the role of the motor system in object memory by manipulating the similarity between the actions associated to series of objects to be retained in memory. In Experiment 1, we showed that lists of objects associated to dissimilar actions were better recalled than lists associated to similar actions. We then showed that this effect was abolished when participants were required to perform a concurrent motor suppression task (Experiment 2) and when the objects to be memorized were unmanipulable (Experiment 3). The motor similarity effect provides evidence for the role of motor affordances in object memory.     

The mental wormhole: Internal attention shifts without regard for distance

Attention operates perceptually on items in the environment, and internally on objects in visuospatial working memory. In the present study, we investigated whether spatial and temporal constraints affecting endogenous perceptual attention extend to internal attention. A retro-cue paradigm in which a cue is presented beyond the range of iconic memory and after stimulus encoding was used to manipulate shifts of internal attention. Participants?? memories were tested for colored circles (Experiments 1, 2, 3a, 4) or for novel shapes (Experiment 3b) and their locations within an array. In these experiments, the time to shift internal attention (Experiments 1 and 3) and the eccentricity of encoded objects (Experiments 2?C4) were manipulated. Our data showed that, unlike endogenous perceptual attention, internal shifts of attention are not modulated by stimulus eccentricity. Across several timing parameters and stimuli, we found that shifts of internal attention require a minimum quantal amount of time regardless of the object eccentricity at encoding. Our findings are consistent with the view that internal attention operates on objects whose spatial information is represented in relative terms. Although endogenous perceptual attention abides by the laws of space and time, internal attention can shift across spatial representations without regard for physical distance.     

Age-of-acquisition effects in delayed picture-naming tasks

We report two experiments that explored the linguistic locus of age-of-acquisition effects in picture naming by using a delayed naming task that involved only a low proportion of trials (25 %) while, for the large majority of the trials (75 %), participants performed another task—that is, the prevalent task. The prevalent tasks were semantic categorization in Experiment 1a and grammatical-gender decision in Experiments 1b and 2. In Experiment 1a, in which participants were biased to retrieve semantic information in order to perform the semantic categorization task, delayed naming times were affected by age of acquisition, reflecting a postsemantic locus of the effect. In Experiments 1b and 2, in which participants were biased to retrieve lexical information in order to perform the grammatical gender decision task, there was also an age-of-acquisition effect. These results suggest that part of the age-of-acquisition effect in picture naming occurs at the level at which the phonological properties of words are retrieved.     

Top-down constraint on recognition memory

Can recognition memory be constrained “at the front end,” such that people are more likely to retrieve information about studying a recognition-test probe from a specified target source than they are to retrieve such information about a probe from a nontarget source? We adapted a procedure developed by Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 12:852–857, 2005) to address this question. Experiment 1 yielded evidence of source-constrained retrieval, but that pattern was not significant in Experiments 2, 3, and 4 (nor in several unpublished pilot experiments). In Experiment 5, in which items from the two studied sources were perceptibly different, a pattern consistent with front-end constraint of recognition emerged, but this constraint was likely exercised via visual attention rather than memory. Experiment 6 replicated both the absence of a significant constrained-retrieval pattern when the sources did not differ perceptibly (as in Exps. 2, 3 and 4) and the presence of that pattern when they did differ perceptibly (as in Exp. 5). Our results suggest that people can easily constrain recognition when items from the to-be-recognized source differ perceptibly from items from other sources (presumably via visual attention), but that it is difficult to constrain retrieval solely on the basis of source memory.     

Infants’ discrimination of crossed and uncrossed horizontal disparity

In a series of preferential-looking experiments, infants 5 to 6 months of age were tested for their responsiveness to crossed and uncrossed horizontal disparity. In Experiments 1 and 2, infants were presented with dynamic random dot stereograms displaying a square target defined by either a 0.5° crossed or a 0.5° uncrossed horizontal disparity and a square control target defined by a 0.5° vertical disparity. In Experiment 3, infants were presented with the crossed and the uncrossed horizontal disparity targets used in Experiments 1 and 2. According to the results, the participants looked more often at the crossed (Experiment 1), as well as the uncrossed (Experiment 2), horizontal disparity targets than at the vertical disparity target. These results suggest that the infants were sensitive to both crossed and uncrossed horizontal disparity information. Moreover, the participants exhibited a natural visual preference for the crossed over the uncrossed horizontal disparity (Experiment 3). Since prior research established natural looking and reaching preferences for the (apparently) nearer of two objects, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the infants were able to extract the depth relations specified by crossed (near) and uncrossed (far) horizontal disparity.     

The world is either digital or analogue

We address an argument by Floridi (Synthese 168(1):151–178, 2009; 2011a), to the effect that digital and analogue are not features of reality, only of modes of presentation of reality. One can therefore have an informational ontology, like Floridi’s Informational Structural Realism, without commitment to a supposedly digital or analogue world. After introducing the topic in Sect. 1, in Sect. 2 we explain what the proposition expressed by the title of our paper means. In Sect. 3, we describe Floridi’s argument. In the following three sections, we raise three difficulties for it, (i) an objection from intuitions: Floridi’s view is not supported by the intuitions embedded in the scientific views he exploits (Sect. 4); (ii) an objection from mereology: the view is incompatible with the world’s having parts (Sect. 5); (iii) an objection from counting: the view entails that the question of how many things there are doesn’t make sense (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we outline two possible ways out for Floridi’s position. Such ways out involve tampering with the logical properties of identity, and this may be bothersome enough. Thus, Floridi’s modus ponens will be our (and most ontologists’) modus tollens.     

Guidance of attention by information held in working memory

Information held in working memory (WM) can guide attention during visual search. The authors of recent studies have interpreted the effect of holding verbal labels in WM as guidance of visual attention by semantic information. In a series of experiments, we tested how attention is influenced by visual features versus category-level information about complex objects held in WM. Participants either memorized an object’s image or its category. While holding this information in memory, they searched for a target in a four-object search display. On exact-match trials, the memorized item reappeared as a distractor in the search display. On category-match trials, another exemplar of the memorized item appeared as a distractor. On neutral trials, none of the distractors were related to the memorized object. We found attentional guidance in visual search on both exact-match and category-match trials in Experiment 1, in which the exemplars were visually similar. When we controlled for visual similarity among the exemplars by using four possible exemplars (Exp. 2) or by using two exemplars rated as being visually dissimilar (Exp. 3), we found attentional guidance only on exact-match trials when participants memorized the object’s image. The same pattern of results held when the target was invariant (Exps. 2–3) and when the target was defined semantically and varied in visual features (Exp. 4). The findings of these experiments suggest that attentional guidance by WM requires active visual information.     

Effects of study time and meaningfulness on environmental context-dependent recognition

In two experiments, we examined whether the size of place-context-dependent recognition decreased with study time and with the meaningfulness of the to-be-remembered materials. A group of 80 undergraduates intentionally studied a list of words in a short (1.5?s per item) or a long (4.0?s per item) study-time condition (Exp. 1). Another 40 undergraduates studied lists consisting of words and nonwords in the long-study-time condition (Exp. 2). After a short retention interval, recognition for the targets was tested in the same or in a different context. Context was manipulated by means of the combination of place, subsidiary task, and experimenter. Significant context-dependent recognition discrimination was found for words in the short-study-time condition (Exp. 1), but not in the long-study-time condition (Exps. 1 and 2). Significant effects were found as well for nonwords, even in the long-study-time condition (Exp. 2). These results are explained well by an outshining account: that is, by principles of outshining and encoding specificity.     

On what inferentially justifies what: the vices of reliabilism and proper functionalism

We commonly say that some evidence supports a hypothesis or that some premise evidentially supports a conclusion. Both internalists and externalists attempt to analyze this notion of evidential support, and the primary purpose of this paper is to argue that reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of this relation fail. Since evidential support is one component of inferential justification, the upshot of this failure is that their accounts of inferential justification also fail. In Sect. 2, I clarify the evidential support relation. In Sects. 3–5, I subject reliabilist and proper functionalist accounts of evidential support to various counterexamples. In Sect. 6, I show that the most promising ways to address these counterexamples aren’t very promising.     

Working memory for relations among objects

Across many areas of study in cognition, the capacity of working memory (WM) is widely agreed to be roughly three to five items: three to five objects (i.e., bound collections of object features) in the literature on visual WM or three to five role bindings (i.e., objects in specific relational roles) in the literature on memory and reasoning. Three experiments investigated the capacity of observers’ WM for the spatial relations among objects in a visual display, and the results suggest that the “items” in WM are neither simply objects nor simply role bindings. The results of Experiment 1 are most consistent with a model that treats an “item” in visual WM as an object, along with the roles of all its relations to one other object. Experiment 2 compared observers’ WM for object size with their memory for relative size and provided evidence that observers compute and store objects’ relations per se (rather than just absolute size) in WM. Experiment 3 tested and confirmed several more nuanced predictions of the model supported by Experiment 1. Together, these findings suggest that objects are stored in visual WM in pairs (along with all the relations between the objects in a pair) and that, from the perspective of WM, a given object in one pair is not the same “item” as that same object in a different pair.     

What skilled typists don’t know about the QWERTY keyboard

We conducted four experiments to investigate skilled typists’ explicit knowledge of the locations of keys on the QWERTY keyboard, with three procedures: free recall (Exp.?1), cued recall (Exp.?2), and recognition (Exp.?3). We found that skilled typists’ explicit knowledge of key locations is incomplete and inaccurate. The findings are consistent with theories of skilled performance and automaticity that associate implicit knowledge with skilled performance and explicit knowledge with novice performance. In Experiment?4, we investigated whether novice typists acquire more complete explicit knowledge of key locations when learning to touch-type. We had skilled QWERTY typists complete a Dvorak touch-typing tutorial. We then tested their explicit knowledge of the Dvorak and QWERTY key locations with the free recall task. We found no difference in explicit knowledge of the two keyboards, suggesting that typists know little about key locations on the keyboard, whether they are exposed to the keyboard for 2 h or 12 years.     

The role of flicker and abrupt displacement in attention capture by motion onsets

Sunny and von Mühlenen (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 1050–1056, 2011) showed that an onset of motion captured attention only when the motion was jerky (refreshed at 8 or 17 Hz), but not when it was smooth (33 or 100 Hz). However, it remained unclear why the onset of jerky motion captures attention. In the present study, we systematically tested the role of different aspects of jerky motion in capturing attention. Simple flicker without motion did not capture attention in the same way as jerky motion (Exp. 1). An abrupt displacement between 0.26° and 1.05° captured attention, irrespective of whether the stimulus subsequently continued to move smoothly (Exp. 2) or whether it remained stationary (Exps. 3 and 4). A displaced stimulus that was preceded briefly at the new location by a figure-8 placeholder did not capture attention (Exp. 5). These results are explained within a masking account, according to which abrupt onsets and abrupt displacements receive a processing advantage because they escape forward masking by the preceding figure-8 placeholders.     

An unforgettable apple: Memory and attention for forbidden objects

Are we humans drawn to the forbidden? From jumbo-sized soft drinks to illicit substances, the influence of prohibited ownership on subsequent demand has made this question a pressing one. We know that objects that we ourselves own have a heightened psychological saliency, relative to comparable objects that are owned by others, but do these kinds of effects extend from self-owned to “forbidden” objects? To address this question, we developed a modified version of the Turk shopping paradigm in which “purchased” items were assigned to various recipients. Participants sorted everyday objects labeled as “self-owned”, “other-owned,” and either “forbidden to oneself” (Experiment 1) or “forbidden to everyone” (Experiment 2). Subsequent surprise recognition memory tests revealed that forbidden objects with high (Experiment 1) but not with low (Experiment 2) self-relevance were recognized as well as were self-owned objects, and better than other-owned objects. In a third and final experiment, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to determine whether self-owned and self-forbidden objects, which showed a common memory advantage, are in fact treated the same at a neurocognitive–affective level. We found that both object types were associated with enhanced cognitive analysis, relative to other-owned objects, as measured by the P300 ERP component. However, we also found that self-forbidden objects uniquely triggered an enhanced response preceding the P300, in an ERP component (the N2) that is sensitive to more rapid, affect-related processing. Our findings thus suggest that, whereas self-forbidden objects share a common cognitive signature with self-owned objects, they are unique in being identified more quickly at a neurocognitive level.     

Dissociations between vision for perception and vision for action depend on the relative availability of egocentric and allocentric information

In three experiments, we scrutinized the dissociation between perception and action, as reflected by the contributions of egocentric and allocentric information. In Experiment 1, participants stood at the base of a large-scale one-tailed version of a Müller-Lyer illusion (with a hoop) and either threw a beanbag to the endpoint of the shaft or verbally estimated the egocentric distance to that location. The results confirmed an effect of the illusion on verbal estimates, but not on throwing, providing evidence for a dissociation between perception and action. In Experiment 2, participants observed a two-tailed version of the Müller-Lyer illusion from a distance of 1.5 m and performed the same tasks as in Experiment 1, yet neither the typical illusion effects nor a dissociation became apparent. Experiment 3 was a replication of Experiment 1, with the difference that participants stood at a distance of 1.5 m from the base of the one-tailed illusion. The results indicated an illusion effect on both the verbal estimate task and the throwing task; hence, there was no dissociation between perception and action. The presence (Exp. 1) and absence (Exp. 3) of a dissociation between perception and action may indicate that dissociations are a function of the relative availability of egocentric and allocentric information. When distance estimates are purely egocentric, dissociations between perception and action occur. However, when egocentric distance estimates have a (complementary) exocentric component, the use of allocentric information is promoted, and dissociations between perception and action are reduced or absent.     

Strength cues and blocking at test promote reliable within-list criterion shifts in recognition memory

In seven experiments, we explored the potential for strength-based, within-list criterion shifts in recognition memory. People studied a mix of target words, some presented four times (strong) and others studied once (weak). In Experiments 1, 2, 4A, and 4B, the test was organized into alternating blocks of 10, 20, or 40 trials. Each block contained lures intermixed with strong targets only or weak targets only. In strength-cued conditions, test probes appeared in a unique font color for strong and weak blocks. In the uncued conditions of Experiments 1 and 2, similar strength blocks were tested, but strength was not cued with font color. False alarms to lures were lower in blocks containing strong target words, as compared with lures in blocks containing weak targets, but only when strength was cued with font color. Providing test feedback in Experiment 2 did not alter these results. In Experiments 3A–3C, test items were presented in a random order (i.e., not blocked by strength). Of these three experiments, only one demonstrated a significant shift even though strength cues were provided. Overall, the criterion shift was larger and more reliable as block size increased, and the shift occurred only when strength was cued with font color. These results clarify the factors that affect participants’ willingness to change their response criterion within a test list.     

Automatic identification of familiar faces

Much research has suggested that facial identification has some characteristics of automaticity, in that it is rapid, nonconscious, and mandatory. However, little research has tested whether it can occur even if attention is already devoted to the demanding central processes of another task. In the present study, we addressed this type of automaticity using the psychological refractory period paradigm. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants successfully identified familiar faces, even while they were engaged with another task, indicating the automaticity of familiar-face identification. In Experiments 3 and 4, however, participants could not identify unfamiliar faces as automatically as they could identify the familiar faces. We concluded that automatic face identification is possible, but dependent on prior familiarity.     

The importance of context information for the spatial specificity of gaze cueing

In three experiments, we investigated the spatial allocation of attention in response to central gaze cues. In particular, we examined whether the allocation of attentional resources is influenced by context information—that is, the presence or absence of reference objects (i.e., placeholders) in the periphery. On each trial, gaze cues were followed by a target stimulus to which participants had to respond by keypress or by performing a target-directed saccade. Targets were presented either in an empty visual field (Exps. 1 and 2) or in previewed location placeholders (Exp. 3) and appeared at one of either 18 (Exp. 1) or six (Exps. 2 and 3) possible positions. The spatial distribution of attention was determined by comparing response times as a function of the distance between the cued and target positions. Gaze cueing was not specific to the exact cued position, but instead generalized equally to all positions in the cued hemifield, when no context information was provided. However, gaze direction induced a facilitation effect specific to the exact gazed-at position when reference objects were presented. We concluded that the presence of possible objects in the periphery to which gaze cues could refer is a prerequisite for attention shifts being specific to the gazed-at position.     

The production effect in paired-associate learning: Benefits for item and associative information

In five experiments, we extended the production effect—better memory for items said aloud than for items read silently—to paired-associate learning, the goal being to explore whether production enhances associative information in addition to enhancing item information. In Experiments 1 and 2, we used a semantic-relatedness task in addition to the production manipulation and found no evidence of a production effect, whether the measure was cued recall or item recognition. Experiment 3 showed that the semantic-relatedness task had overshadowed the production effect; the effect was present when the semantic-relatedness task was removed, again whether cued recall or item recognition was the measure. Experiments 4 and 5 provided further evidence that production can enhance recall for word pairs and, using an associate recognition test with intact versus rearranged pairs, indicated that production may also enhance associative information. That production boosts memory for both types of information is considered in terms of distinctive encoding.     

Against representations with two directions of fit

The idea that there are representations with a double direction of fit has acquired a pride of place in contemporary debates on the ontology of institutions. This paper will argue against the very idea of anything at all having both directions of fit. There is a simple problem which has thus far gone unnoticed. The suggestion that there are representations with both directions of fit amounts to a suggestion that, in cases of discrepancy between a representation and the world, both should change—the representation and the world. But that would merely amount to another discrepancy, and so both should change again, ad infinitum. The paper will first elucidate the notion of a “direction of fit” and clarify how the criticism to be presented here differs from earlier criticisms (Section 1).The next section sheds some light on why and how acts and attitudes with both directions of fit have seemed to play a part in explaining the existence of institutional reality (Section 2). The next sections present the argument against any representations with both directions of fit, relying on a normative understanding of the distinction. The argument will have three steps (Sections 3, 4, and 5). The section that follows shows that the criticism also applies to the dispositional understanding of the notion of a direction of fit (Section 6), and then the paper asks whether a third kind of reading would be available (Section 7) and whether the infallibility of the relevant representations would be of help (Section 8). Finally, the paper assesses briefly the consequences of dropping the notion of two directions of fit (Section 9).