Hearing by eye: how much spatial degradation can be tolerated?

In the McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976 Nature 264 746-748), illusory auditory perception is produced if the visual information from lip movements is discrepant from the auditory information from the voice. A study is reported of the tolerance of the effect to varying levels of spatial degradation (videotaped images of a speaker's face were quantised by a mosaic transform). The illusory effect systematically decreased with an increase in the coarseness of the spatial quantisation. However, even with the coarsest level (11.2 pixels/face) the illusion did not completely disappear. In addition, those participants who did not experience the illusion nevertheless showed the effects of auditory-visual interaction in their clarity ratings of the auditory stimulus. It is concluded that auditory-visual interaction in visible speech perception is based on relatively coarse-spatial-scale information.     

When can attention not be divided?

Humans can guide simple concurrent and seemingly independent movements of digits between hands, but it is shown here that they find it impossible to do this with digits within a hand. This inability demonstrates a basic characteristic of the relation between attention and the control of the skeletal musculature. Mechanisms that are available to provide the illusion of concurrent and independent guidance of separate movements between hands are not available within a single-hand control system. There is no reason to believe that the inability to divide focal attention in the guidance of two concurrent controlled activities, as exemplified in the example of within-hand movements, does not also extend to nonmotor processes.     

Behavior-analytic repertoires: Where will they come from and how can they be maintained?

The field of behavior analysis faces a number of issues concerning its existence as a discipline and as a profession, including (a) identification of the knowledge and skills comprising the repertoire of competent behavior analysts, (b) the nature of the curricula that will produce the scientists and practitioners needed by the discipline, (c) identification of the generic professional and social skills required for any successful professional career, (d) academic employment opportunities for behavior analysts, and (e) the maintenance of behavior-analytic repertoires. Recommendations are offered as possible solutions to problems raised with respect to each of these issues.     

The dissociation paradigm and its discontents: how can unconscious perception or memory be inferred?

Erdelyi does us all a great service by his customarily incisive discussion of the various ways in which our field tends to neglect, confuse, and misunderstand numerous critical issues in attempting to differentiate conscious from unconscious perception and memory. Although no single commentary could hope to comprehensively assess these issues, I will address Erdelyi's three main points: (1) How (and if) the dissociation paradigm can be used to validly infer unconscious perception; (2) The implications of below-chance effects; and (3) The role of time. I suggest that (a) significant progress on construct validity issues is possible; (b) below-chance effects are part of a more general bidirectional phenomenon, very likely unconscious, and do not threaten absolute subliminality; and (c) practice/learning effects pose potential difficulties for time-based dissociation paradigms.     

The dead donor rule: how much does the public care...and how much should we care?

In this brief commentary, we reflect on the recent study by Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner of public attitudes toward "brain death" and organ donation, focusing on the implications of their findings for the rules governing from whom organs can be obtained. Although the data suggest that many seem to view "brain death" as "as good as death" rather than "dead" (calling the dead donor rule into question), we find that the study most clearly demonstrates that understanding an individual's definition of death is neither a straightforward task nor a good predictor of views about donation. Reflecting on the implications for ongoing debates over the dead donor rule, we suggest that perhaps it is not a change in policy that is warranted, but rather a change in the priorities that have garnered such intense focus on this issue within the field of bioethics.     

Panel: What could be Jungian about Human Rights work?

The question of whether Jungian analysts should move beyond the consulting room to engage with mental health issues that pertain to the collective is the focus of this paper. Two narratives are presented: one from the view point of a psychiatrist in Occupied Palestine, the other from the conflicted situation which faces an Israeli analyst. Despite the strong ambivalence that is experienced on both sides, there is a willingness to meet and to take a standpoint without necessarily coming to a resolution. A third position is offered by describing experiences from the South African perspective. The African notion of Ubuntu is offered as a moral entry point that states that community goes beyond one's own; from this point of view, Jungian analysts can do no other than to act.     

How much can people really change?

The basic purpose of pastoral counseling, and counseling in general, is to help people change. Therefore, it's critically important to understand the nature of change and to have realistic expectations with respect to how much people can change. To expect too little change can lead to underachievement and despair, whereas to expect too much change can cause needless frustration and an abiding sense of failure. This article discusses behavioral change, its potential and its limits, from the point of view of genetic potential and offers some specific pastoral implications.     

Developmental aspects of consciousness: how much theory of mind do you need to be consciously aware?

When do children become consciously aware of events in the world? Five possible strategies are considered for their usefulness in determining the age in question. Three of these strategies ask when children show signs of engaging in activities for which conscious awareness seems necessary in adults (verbal communication, executive control, explicit memory), and two of the strategies consider when children have the ability to have the minimal form of higher-order thought necessary for access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, respectively. The tentative answer to the guiding question is that children become consciously aware between 12 and 15 months (+/-3 months).     

Impact of an interactive anti-speeding threat appeal: how much threat is too much?

This study investigates the impact of an interactive television public-service announcement (PSA) containing an anti-speeding threat appeal on feelings of telepresence and behavioral intention. In a 2?×?2?×?2 between-subjects factorial design with 213 participants, the level of threat evoked by a traditional PSA, by the interactive part of the PSA (dedicated advertising location or DAL) and by the preceding program context are manipulated to be either low or high. The results support the assumptions of the Extended Parallel Processing Model with regard to the effect of the level of perceived threat and perceived efficacy in an interactive media environment, and the important role of telepresence as a processing variable. The results of the three-way interaction effect of threat evoked by the program, the PSA and the DAL on telepresence show that when the threat levels of the program and the PSA are both either low or high, exposure to the threatening information in the DAL does not generate a significantly higher feeling of telepresence. However, when a low-threat program is followed by a high-threat PSA, the threat level of the DAL has a positive effect on telepresence. The same trend is found with a high-threat program and a low-threat PSA, although the effect of the threat evoked by the DAL on telepresence is not significant at conventional levels. Finally, there is a positive effect of telepresence on the behavioral intention to reduce speeding, which is partly mediated by the viewer's perceived efficacy to follow the recommended behavior.     

Anesthesiological ethics: can informed consent be implied?

Surgical ethics is a well-recognized field in clinical ethics, distinct from medical ethics. It includes at least a dozen important issues common to surgery that do not exist in internal medicine simply because of the differences in their practices. But until now there has been a tendency to include ethical issues of anesthesiology as a part of surgical ethics. This may mask the importance of ethical issues in anesthesiology, and even help perpetuate an unfortunate view that surgeons are "captain of the ship" in the operating theater (leaving anesthesiologists in a subservient role). We will have a better ethical understanding if we see surgery and anesthesia as two equal partners, ethically as well as in terms of patient care. Informed consent is one such issue, but it is not limited to that. Even on the topic of what type of anesthesia to use, anesthesiologists have often felt subsumed to the surgeon's preferences. This commentary takes the case study and uses it as a exemplar for this very claim: it is time to give due recognition for a new field in clinical ethics, ethics in anesthesia.     

Thought action fusion: can it be corrected?

The goal of this study was to investigate whether or not a brief educational intervention delivered prior to engaging in an anxiety-provoking task (writing a sentence about hoping that a friend/relative was in a car accident) would be effective in offsetting anxiety in college students with a strong propensity to endorse statements of thought action fusion (TAF). As hypothesized, individuals receiving the educational intervention were less anxious than a placebo intervention control group at post task; they were also less likely to endorse statements of TAF after receiving the educational intervention. Also, those who chose to neutralize after writing the sentence (regardless of experimental group) were more likely to report feeling guiltier, more immoral and a greater sense of responsibility about writing the sentence prior to neutralizing than those who did not subsequently neutralize. These results are discussed in relation to the cognitive theory of obsessive-compulsive disorder and implications for prevention programs.