Karl Popper,Psychology and Philosophy

This paper intends to re-emphasize the relationship among Psychology, Popper and his Philosophy. Popper, who is often considered as one of the most important philosophers of science, had associations with the discipline of psychology in his early years. Popper was associated with Würzburg school of psychology, especially the psychologies of Külpe, Selz and Bühler. However, there was a change in Popper’s interest from the psychology of discovery to an objectivist epistemology—that is, to the logic of discovery, which he himself acknowledged (1976, p. 55). Popper, not only turned away from psychology, as early as 1930 or thereabouts, he later became one of the most outspoken opponents of a psychological approach to science. This antipathy has worked both ways! Very few psychologists study and discuss Popper. His place in the history of psychology, certainly remains inadequate. But why should psychologists ignore Popper? Instead of turning away from Popper, Psychologists’ efforts should be directed towards bringing into focus Popper, his works and association with psychology. This paper argues and tries to discuss the relationships among Popper, his training in psychology and his philosophy.     

Criticism and Tradition in Popper, Oakeshott and Hayek

ABSTRACT Popper's attitude to traditions is fundamentally rationalistic. He analyses traditions, along with other institutions and practices, in terms of their efficiency in promoting goals which can be specified independently of the traditions themselves. Hayek, by contrast, looks at traditions in terms of their contributions to the survival of the culture in which they are embedded, something whose evaluation may be opaque even to people within the culture. Both these approaches are flawed compared to Oakeshott's insistence that traditions are not goal-oriented, and that goals cannot be specified independently of agents'forms of life. Oakeshott's views constitute a via media between Popperian rationalism and Hayekian anti-rationalism.     

第3届逻辑、理性与互动国际研讨会综述

逻辑、理性与互动国际研讨会（The International Workshop on Logic,Rationalityand Interaction,LORI）旨在集合逻辑学家和他们在哲学、语言学、计算机科学、认知科学,尤其是知识互动话题方面,如信念和行动等领域的工作。LORI-3于2011年10月10日到13日,在中国广州举办。主办方是中山大学逻辑与认知研究所。下面是一份LORI-3的简要的会议综述,根据内容进行了分类。完整的会议论文集收录在了Logic,Rationality,and Interaction,LNAI 6953号,     

The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part II

In this sequel to “The logic and meaning of plurals. Part I”, I continue to present an account of logic and language that acknowledges limitations of singular constructions of natural languages and recognizes plural constructions as their peers. To this end, I present a non-reductive account of plural constructions that results from the conception of plurals as devices for talking about the many. In this paper, I give an informal semantics of plurals, formulate a formal characterization of truth for the regimented languages that results from augmenting elementary languages with refinements of basic plural constructions of natural languages, and account for the logic of plural constructions by characterizing the logic of those regimented languages.

The Logic and Meaning of Plurals. Part I

Contemporary accounts of logic and language cannot give proper treatments of plural constructions of natural languages. They assume that plural constructions are redundant devices used to abbreviate singular constructions. This paper and its sequel, “The logic and meaning of plurals, II”, aim to develop an account of logic and language that acknowledges limitations of singular constructions and recognizes plural constructions as their peers. To do so, the papers present natural accounts of the logic and meaning of plural constructions that result from the view that plural constructions are, by and large, devices for talking about many things (as such). The account of logic presented in the papers surpasses contemporary Fregean accounts in its scope. This extension of the scope of logic results from extending the range of languages that logic can directly relate to. Underlying the view of language that makes room for this is a perspective on reality that locates in the world what plural constructions can relate to. The papers suggest that reflections on plural constructions point to a broader framework for understanding logic, language, and reality that can replace the contemporary Fregean framework as this has replaced its Aristotelian ancestor.     

African Philosophy and Postmodern Rationality

Abstract

In this essay I explore some of the ramifications that postmodernism, in its re-vision of Western rationality, holds for African philosophy. Insofar as African philosophy has associated itself with the traditional form of Western rationality, I argue that much can be gleaned by African philosophy from postmodernism's re-vision of Western rationality. The merits of such a postmodern re-vision of Western rationality for African philosophy include, an acknowledgement of alternative forms of reasoning and their accompanying cultural expressions; an insistence that knowledge production is not independent of moral and political value; a grounding of rationality in social relations; and a recognition of commitment, caring and feeling in rationality.     

Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”