The puzzle of joking: Disentangling the cognitive and affective components of humorous distraction

Studies in cognitive psychology, marketing, and education indicate that humor distracts attention from non‐humorous information presented at the same time. Two experiments investigated why humor distracts attention. The two basic components of humor comprise (1) incongruency resolution, which poses cognitive demands and (2) positive affect. We disentangled the contributions of cognitive demands and positive affect on distraction based on the notions that (a) both components are possible sources of distraction, and (b) the components were always confounded in previous research. In an evaluative conditioning paradigm, novel products were consistently paired with humorous stimuli, whereas other products were paired with stimuli that were either (1) equally demanding but neutral, (2) equally positive but undemanding, and (3) undemanding and neutral. The results showed that cognitively demanding stimuli distracted attention, irrespective of stimulus positivity. These findings suggest that the cognitive demands of humor, not the positive affect it evokes, underlie the distraction effect. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neural Processing to Visual Stimuli in a Three-Choice Reaction-Time Task

Some authors have suggested that certain components of the event-related potentials (ERPs) reflect underlying stages in the discrimination process. Previous studies have shown that in an auditive three-choice reaction-time task the discrimination is accomplished as a two-stage process, with the more frequently occurring stimulus discriminated at an earlier point than the rarer stimulus and the subjects could be classified as fast and slow responders in function of their response to the most frequent of the three tones. We continuously recorded the electrocerebral activity (EEG) from the scalp and the electromyographic activity (EMG) from the responding muscles in a visual three-choice reaction-time task in 10 strictly right-handed subjects. EEG and EMG responses were subsequently analyzed off-line by aligning them by the onset of either the stimulus (stimulus-synchronized) or the response (response-synchronized). The results suggest that processes of visual stimuli evaluation and response execution are continuously integrated. The discrimination and response systems to visual stimuli is accomplished as a three-stage process, one to frequent tone, another for rare 1, and the last for rare 2. The subjects were classified as fast and slow responders in function of their response to the most frequent of the three tones.     

Comparison at a distance

The visual system is known to contain hard-wired mechanisms that compare the values of a given stimulus attribute at adjacent positions in the visual field; but how are comparisons performed when the stimuli are not adjacent? We ask empirically how well a human observer can compare two stimuli that are separated in the visual field. For the stimulus attributes of spatial frequency, contrast, and orientation, we have measured discrimination thresholds as a function of the spatial separation of the discriminanda. The three attributes were studied in separate experiments, but in all cases the target stimuli were briefly presented Gabor patches. The Gabor patches lay on an imaginary circle, which was centred on the fixation point and had a radius of 5 deg of visual angle. Our psychophysical procedures were designed to ensure that the subject actively compared the two stimuli on each presentation, rather than referring just one stimulus to a stored template or criterion. For the cases of spatial frequency and contrast, there was no systematic effect of spatial separation up to 10 deg. We conclude that the subject's judgment does not depend on discontinuity detectors in the early visual system but on more central codes that represent the two stimuli individually. In the case of orientation discrimination, two naive subjects performed as in the cases of spatial frequency and contrast; but two highly trained subjects showed a systematic increase of threshold with spatial separation, suggesting that they were exploiting a distal mechanism designed to detect the parallelism or non-parallelism of contours.     

Neural representation of consciously imperceptible speech sound differences

The concept of subliminal perception has been a subject of interest and controversy for decades. Of interest in the present investigation was whether a neurophysiologic index of stimulus change could be elicited to speech sound contrasts that were consciously indiscriminable. The stimuli were chosen on the basis of each individual subject's discrimination threshold. The speech stimuli (which varied along an F3 onset frequency continuum from /da/ to /ga/) were synthesized so that the acoustical properties of the stimuli could be tightly controlled. Subthreshold and suprathreshold stimuli were chosen on the basis of behavioral ability demonstrated during psychophysical testing. A significant neural representation of stimulus change, reflected by the mismatch negativity response, was obtained in all but 1 subject in response to subthreshold stimuli. Grand average responses differed significantly from responses obtained in a control condition consisting of physiologic responses elicited by physically identical stimuli. Furthermore, responses to suprathreshold stimuli (close to threshold) did not differ significantly from subthreshold responses with respect to latency, amplitude, or area. These results suggest that neural representation of consciously imperceptible stimulus differences occurs and that this representation occurs at a preattentive level.     

The effect of an after-coming random pattern on the perception of brief visual stimuli

The perception of briefly exposed visual forms is shown to be masked by an after- coming random pattern stimulus of approximately equal intensity. This effect occurs only under certain well defined conditions; it is limited by the minimum stimulus exposure time in excess of threshold which overcomes masking (critical stimulus duration) as well as by the minimum interval between presentation of the two stimuli which permits evasion of the masking action (critical interval). Over the range of stimulus duration in which masking occurs, critical interval varied with stimulus duration in such a way that the interval multiplied by the stimulus duration equals a constant. Critical stimulus duration and critical interval at threshold are shown to vary little under a variety of conditions. The effect of the random pattern stimulus is limited to the part of the visual field to which it is presented.     

Ipsi-and bilateral interactions in taste

In two experiments, the integration over spatial extent in taste was investigated for threshold sensitivity to NaCl and for suprathreshold intensity perception of saltiness. The area of stimulation was doubled by adding either an ipsilateral or a bilateral stimulus. The two stimuli could be of equal or unequal intensity. The data showed that at threshold level a probability summation model applied to all bilateral and most of the ipsilateral stimulus combinations. Probability summation failed to predict detection probability when two stimuli with different intensities were presented at the same tongue side. For suprathreshold stimuli, the magnitude of the saltiness sensation as estimated by a line-length method depended on the level of stimulation. The possible peripheral interaction mechanisms and central factors contributing to the taste response were discussed.     

No creation, no revelation

There is a strong claim that the world’s createdness, if true, cannot be known but through revelation. In this paper we try to dismiss this claim by arguing that creation cannot be merely a revealed truth (revelabile tantum), since it is on the contrary the very preamble to any genuine revelation. Ontologically, no revelation can happen in a self-existent world. No creation, no revelation. Epistemically, no revelation is to be admitted but on the assumption that the world depends, for its existence and operation, on a supernatural agent. No admittance of creative power, no justified identification of any revelatory activity.     

Conditions under which children experience inhibitory difficulty with a "button-press" go/no-go task

Go/no-go tasks seem to provide a simple marker of inhibitory development in young children. Children are told to respond to one stimulus on go trials but to make no response to another stimulus on no-go trials; responding on no-go trials is assumed to reflect a failure to inhibit the go response. However, there is evidence to suggest that a type of go/no-go task, which we call the "button-press" task, does not require inhibition. We investigated the conditions under which young children (M=3 years 6 months, N=120) experience inhibitory difficulty with this type of task. The data suggest that the speed of stimulus presentation is crucial and that other studies using this type of task have presented the stimuli too briefly. The importance of establishing the inhibitory credentials of a task before it is used as a marker of inhibitory control is emphasized.     

The role of duration and rapid temporal processing on the lateral perception of consonants and vowels

This study explored the extent to which rapid temporal processing and duration contribute to the right-ear advantage (REA) and presumably left-hemisphere processing for stop consonants and the lack of clear-cut laterality effects for vowels. Three sets of synthetic stimuli were constructed: consonant vowel stimuli [ba da ga bi di gi bu du gu] of 300 msec duration (full stimuli) and two shortened stimuli consisting either of a noise burst and 40-msec transitions (40-msec stimuli), or a noise burst and 20-msec transitions (20-msec stimuli). Stimuli were presented dichotically for consonant, vowel, and syllable identification. Results indicated a significant REA for consonants in the full and 40-msec conditions and a non-significant REA in the 20-msec condition. Nevertheless, the magnitude of laterality did not change across the three conditions. These results suggest that although transition information including duration contributes to lateralization for stop consonants, it is the presence of abrupt onsets which crucially determines lateralized processing. For vowels, there was a significant REA only in the full stimulus condition, and a significant decrement in the magnitude of the laterality effect in the two shortened stimulus conditions. These results suggest that for vowel perception, it is the nature of the acoustic cue used for phonetic identification and not duration that seems to be the critical determinant of lateralization effects.     

The evolutionary significance of habituation and sensitization across phylogeny: A behavioral homeostasis model

The phenomenon of habituation may be interpreted as a process that has evolved for filtering out iterative stimuli of little present relevance. That habituation is seen in aneural as well as neural organisms throughout phylogeny with remarkably similar characteristics suggests that its role is an important one in animal survival. If habituation is to be viewed as a process to filter out iterative stimuli that have no significant consequences, then how is sensitization to be viewed? One way of viewing these two behavioral changes, i.e. habituation and sensitization, is that they are homeostatic processes which optimize an organism’s likelihood of detecting and assessing the significance of a stimulus in a new iterative series or a change in it. If one views the level of initial responsiveness to a new stimulus as a function of an organism’s threshold just prior to stimulus occurrence, then “high responders” (i.e. those who initially react more strongly) are assumed to have a lower threshold for detecting and assessing the significance of this stimulus than are the “low responders” (i.e. those who initially react more weakly). Thus, high-responders would initially receive more sensory input and progressively decrease their responsiveness to a non-threatening stimulus (habituation). Likewise, initial low-responders would receive less sensory input followed by a decreased threshold and an increased response to the next stimulus occurrence (sensitization). The level of responsiveness achieved in both habituaters and sensitizers, as an asymptote is approached, is a balance between being too sensitive to an unimportant stimulus (and possibly missing other significant stimuli) and being too insensitive, and missing a change in the relevance of the present stimulus. These response changes can be taken as indices of the organism’s mechanisms for achieving an appropriate threshold level to an iterative stimulus in order to accurately assess its present significance and then eventually to asymptote at an optimal stable response level. This approach toward an asymptote is a behavioral homeostatic process that reflects the accumulated significance of the iterative stimulus at each occurrence. The purpose of adding “behavioral” to the term “homeostasis” is to extend the usual meaning of the concept from primarily internal processes to also include (a) iterative external stimulation, (b) the organism’s initial threshold to the initial stimulus as well as (c) the behavior which results from it. Since we are discussing organisms that range from intact, single-celled protozoa to intact mammals, as well as surgically simplified preparations, the termsstimulus, response andbehavior will be used broadly. While other investigators have focused on specific cellular mechanisms underlying habituation and sensitization in a given organism, this paper focuses on the adaptive significance of these two behavioral processes viewed across phylogeny.     

Unconscious learning. Conditioning to subliminal visual stimuli

The role of consciousness in Pavlovian conditioning was examined in two experiments in which visually masked neutral words were used as the conditioned stimuli (CS) and an electric shock as the unconditioned stimulus (US). The inter-stimulus interval (ISI) was established individually. A detection threshold was used in Experiment 1 and an identification threshold in Experiment 2. The primary dependent variable was the skin conductance response (SCR). Results showed that the conditioned response (CR) was acquired by 58% of participants who perceived stimuli above the identification threshold, 50% of participants who perceived stimuli below the detection threshold, and 11% of participants who perceived stimuli below the identification threshold, but above the detection threshold. These results suggest that consciousness of the CS-US contingency is not a necessary condition for acquiring a CR of the autonomous nervous system (ANS).     

Multisensory-mediated auditory localization

Multisensory integration is a powerful mechanism for maximizing sensitivity to sensory events. We examined its effects on auditory localization in healthy human subjects. The specific objective was to test whether the relative intensity and location of a seemingly irrelevant visual stimulus would influence auditory localization in accordance with the inverse effectiveness and spatial rules of multisensory integration that have been developed from neurophysiological studies with animals [Stein and Meredith, 1993 The Merging of the Senses (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)]. Subjects were asked to localize a sound in one condition in which a neutral visual stimulus was either above threshold (supra-threshold) or at threshold. In both cases the spatial disparity of the visual and auditory stimuli was systematically varied. The results reveal that stimulus salience is a critical factor in determining the effect of a neutral visual cue on auditory localization. Visual bias and, hence, perceptual translocation of the auditory stimulus appeared when the visual stimulus was supra-threshold, regardless of its location. However, this was not the case when the visual stimulus was at threshold. In this case, the influence of the visual cue was apparent only when the two cues were spatially coincident and resulted in an enhancement of stimulus localization. These data suggest that the brain uses multiple strategies to integrate multisensory information.     

Comments on Abrahamsen's (2004) "Linguistic humor comprehension in children with articulation impairments"

This commentary expresses concerns about the validity of the results of Abrahamsen's study of "Linguistic humor comprehension in children with articulation impairments" (2004). Some of the problems noted included overlapping of lexical and phonological humor categories, the nature and placement of several of the stimulus items, lack of demonstrated equivalent difficulty of the stimuli presented to each group, and limited analysis of other factors that may have affected children's responses.     

The influence of stimulus scale-interval upon the assessment of pain threshold

An experiment concerning the influence of the scale of stimulus values upon the perception of heat-pain is reported in which it is found that the value of the threshold stimulus is dependent upon the size of the steps between successive stimuli.

The results are analysed in the light of a paper by Brown and Cane (1959) in which they point out that the value of a sensory threshold yielded by the Limiting Method is mathematically dependent upon the size of the steps between successive values of the variable stimulus. The threshold values reported here are found to be dependent on the step-size between stimuli to a greater extent than that which would be predicted by Brown and Cane.

In view of these results, an attempt is made to explain the wide variety of pain threshold values reported in the literature.     

大脑两半球与整体和局部性质的选择性加工

研究大脑两半球在加工整体和局部性质中的优势以及两半球能否同时分别选择两个复合刺激的整体和局部性质。实验中把一个复合字母随机呈现在左视野或右视野,或者把两个复合字母同时分别呈现在左视野和右视野。实验一发现,在单侧呈现条件下,被试检测左右视野的整体或局部靶目标的反应时没有显著差别,但在双侧同时呈现条件下,检测右视野局部靶目标比检测左视野局部靶目标时的反应时短。实验二要求被试检测同时呈现在左右视野的整体或局部靶目标,发现当两个视野的靶目标处于同一水平时(整体或局部)反应时较短,两个视野的靶目标处于不同水平时(一侧处于整体水平而另一侧处于局部水平)反应时较长。这些结果提示,当两个复合刺激同时呈现在左右视野时,大脑左半球在选择性加工局部性质时具有优势;左右两半球更容易选择两个复合刺激同一个水平的性质,分别选择两个复合刺激不同水平的性质比较困难。     

Does ignoring lead to worse evaluations? A new explanation of the stimulus devaluation effect

Affective evaluation of stimuli just seen in visual search tasks has been shown to depend on task-relevant stimulus configuration (Raymond, Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003): Whereas targets and novel stimuli were evaluated similarly, distractors were devaluated. These results were explained by an inhibition-based account of the influence of selective attention on emotion. In the present experiments, we demonstrated that stimulus devaluation might not be a consequence of attentional inhibition. By simply instructing participants to react to an accepted or rejected stimulus in the visual search task of Experiment 1, we found distractor devaluation in the first case and target devaluation in the second case. We conclude that devaluation of stimuli is mediated by the affective connotation implied by response labels and instructions. This was confirmed in Experiment 2: To-be-ignored stimuli were not devaluated when participants knew that those stimuli would become task-relevant during the experiment.     

Context-dependent brightness priming occurs without visual awareness

Our visual systems account for stimulus context in brightness perception, but whether such adjustments occur for stimuli that we are unaware of has not been established. We therefore assessed whether stimulus context influences brightness processing by measuring unconscious priming with metacontrast masking. When a middle-gray disk was presented on a darker (or brighter) background, such that it could be consciously perceived as brighter (or darker) via simultaneous brightness contrast (SBC), reaction times were significantly faster to a bright (or dark) annulus than to a dark (or bright) annulus. We further show that context-dependent brightness priming does not correlate with visibility using an objective measure of awareness (Experiment 1) and that context-dependent, but not context-independent brightness priming, occurs equally strongly for stimuli below or above the subjective threshold for awareness (Experiment 2). These results suggest that SBC occurs at early levels of visual input and is not influenced by conscious perception.     

Anticipation of visual form independent of knowing where the form will occur

We investigated how selective preparation for specific forms is affected by concurrent preknowledge of location when upcoming visual stimuli are anticipated. In three experiments, participants performed a two-choice response time (RT) task in which they discriminated between standard upright and rotated alphanumeric characters while fixating a central fixation cross. In different conditions, we gave the participants preknowledge of only form, only location, both location and form, or neither location nor form. We found main effects of both preknowledge of form and preknowledge of location, with significantly lower RTs when preknowledge was present than when it was absent. Our main finding was that the two factors had additive effects on RTs. A strong interaction between the two factors, such that preknowledge of form had little or no effect without preknowledge of location, would have supported the hypothesis that form anticipation relies on depictive, perception-like activations in topographically organized parts of the visual cortex. The results provided no support for this hypothesis. On the other hand, by an additive-factors logic Sternberg (Sternberg, Acta Psychologica 30:276?C315, 1969), the additivity of our effects suggested that preknowledge of form and location, respectively, affected two functionally independent, serial stages of processing. We suggest that the two stages were, first, direction of attention to the stimulus location and, subsequently, discrimination between upright and rotated stimuli. Presumably, preknowledge of location advanced the point in time at which attention was directed at the stimulus location, whereas preknowledge of form reduced the time subsequently taken for stimulus discrimination.     

The glass is not yet half empty: agitation but not <Emphasis Type="Italic">Varroa</Emphasis> treatment causes cognitive bias in honey bees

Honey bees (Apis mellifera) are prone to judge an ambiguous stimulus negatively if they had been agitated through shaking which simulates a predator attack. Such a cognitive bias has been suggested to reflect an internal emotional state analogous to humans who judge more pessimistically when they do not feel well. In order to test cognitive bias experimentally, an animal is conditioned to respond to two different stimuli, where one is punished while the other is rewarded. Subsequently a third, ambiguous stimulus is presented and it is measured whether the subject responds as if it expects a reward or a punishment. Generally, it is assumed that negative experiences lower future expectations, rendering the animals more pessimistic. Here we tested whether a most likely negatively experienced formic acid treatment against the parasitic mite Varroa destructor also affects future expectations of honey bees. We applied an olfactory learning paradigm (i.e., conditioned proboscis extension response) using two odorants and blends of these odorants as the ambiguous stimuli. Unlike agitating honey bees, exposure to formic acid did not significantly change the response to the ambiguous stimuli in comparison with untreated bees. Overall evidence suggests that the commonest treatment against one of the most harmful bee pests has no detrimental effects on cognitive bias in honey bees.     

A role for recency of response conflict in producing the bivalency effect

The bivalency effect is a block-wise response slowing that is observed during task-switching when rare stimuli that cue two tasks (bivalent stimuli) are encountered. This adjustment in response style affects all trials that follow bivalent stimuli, including those trials that do not share any features with bivalent stimuli. However, the specific stimulus and response properties that trigger the bivalency effect are not well understood. In typical bivalency effect experiments, bivalent stimuli can be congruent or incongruent with respect to the response afforded by the irrelevant stimulus feature, and this distinction has never been examined. In the present study, we show that cognitive load defined by the response incongruence on bivalent trials plays a critical role in producing the subsequent response slowing observed in the bivalency effect, as well as maintaining the magnitude of the bivalency effect across practice. We propose that the bivalency effect reflects a process involved in predicting future cognitive load based on recent cognitive load experience. This is in line with a recent proposal for a role of the ACC in monitoring ongoing changes in the environment to optimize future performance (Sheth et al., in Nature 488:218–221, 2012).