艺术作品中的世界与作为世界精神的河流--论海德格尔思想的转折

1936年左右是海德格尔思想发展的关键时期,也即是其思想转折完成的时机,于是弄清楚这一转折(跨越30年代前期)的过程就相当重要了。随着《存在与时间》之后的一系列演讲的出版,其中尤其是海氏对荷尔德林诗歌的解释,可以使我们准确地理解他如何借助艺术与诗歌把存在的真理与美的显像关联来实现这一转折。本文主要通过重新阅读《艺术作品的本源》,并把它置于与荷尔德林的诗歌的关系中来讨论这一转折,从而使海德格尔这一阶段的世界理论更为明确,并为理解后期海德格尔以及第65卷对Ereignis的阐发提供了指引与路标。     

Heidegger,Art, and the Overcoming of Metaphysics

In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of Heidegger's reflections on art as we find them in his essay, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. I begin, in Section 1, by uncovering the fundamental concern that motivates Heidegger's essay. I show that Heidegger's reflections on art are part of his attempt to uncover a path beyond the history of metaphysics. I then suggest, in Section 2, that while Heidegger does think that art may allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, recent interpreters [Dreyfus ( 2005 ), Thomson ( 2011 ), and Young ( 2001 )] have mistook the kind of art that Heidegger has in mind here. The kind of art that can allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, I argue, is not art that simply thematizes and/or reconfigures cultural worlds (as these interpreters have argued). It is instead what Heidegger calls ‘primal poesy’. After discussing the nature of primal poesy, I show in more detail how this kind of art may be capable of getting us beyond the history of metaphysics in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, I reconsider the more common reading of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in light of the interpretation I've offered in Sections 2 and 3.     

RACE AND EARTH IN HEIDEGGER'S THINKING DURING THE LATE 1930s

In 1934 Heidegger offered an account of what a Volk is in terms of the existential analytic of Dasein set out in Being and Time, but soon after he abandoned this framework as he began the task of overcoming metaphysics. Integral to this new task was a confrontation with the racial policies not just of the Nazis but also of the Allies because he believed that the Western philosophical tradition was deeply implicated in these policies. Against this background, this paper explores Heidegger's attempts—hitherto unrecognized—in the late 1930s to sketch another way of thinking what his contemporaries called “race” using the conceptual resources he had introduced in “The Origin of the Work of Art.” The paper also includes some criticisms of Emmanuel Faye's recent study, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy.     

Interpreting Heidegger Across Philosophical Traditions

Heidegger's philosophy has received radically different readings. These different approaches grow from philosophical differences rooted, at least to some extent, in national philosophical traditions. Although it is not possible any longer to draw strict boundaries between different philosophical traditions by reference to nationality or to language, there certainly are tendencies and points of emphasis that differ depending on the context in which Heidegger is read.
There are many different ways of reading Heidegger. I confine myself to two: the orthodox approach and the applicative pragmatist approach. As an example for these approaches I have taken Heidegger's controversial essay, "The Origin of the Work of Art."     

九鬼周造的偶然哲学与情绪论:和海德格尔哲学的比较

九鬼周造可谓真正与海德格尔的《存在与时间》进行交锋的日本哲学家。九鬼曾出席海氏两年讲座与讨论班,娴熟其哲学,留学归国后,花费毕生精力建构了偶然性的哲学。在此过程中,海氏成为其最大的思想对手。针对海氏可能性的存在论,九鬼提出偶然性的存在论。海氏主张此在的“被抛一筹划”“非本真一本真”“遮蔽一解蔽”等生存论结构,显露出其哲学涵盖了人从非现实的可能状态朝向现实的必然状态发展的向度。九鬼认为这种从可能存在到必然存在的发展过程中缺乏偶然性,正意味着潜在的无限可能性之丧失。支撑海氏的此在生存论结构的正是“畏”这一人的根本情绪。针对畏这个情绪,九鬼提出惊讶的情绪。因为他认为拥抱原始偶然的人,必会不断地涌现惊讶之情,生命也因此有无限的实现可能性。哲学亦须“始于惊讶,终于惊讶”,才能有无限的发展可能性。     

形式显示的现象学--海德格尔早期弗莱堡讲座研究

本文讨论海德格尔早期弗莱堡讲座中的现象学。作者从题域和方法两个角度上探讨海德格尔这个时期的形式显示现象学。就题域来说,海德格尔试图突破胡塞尔现象学的“知识”或“理论”局限,深入到“前理论的”层面,即所谓前理论的“原始东西”;就方法来说,海德格尔沉思和实践了他所谓的“形式显示”的思路和言路,以此力求与传统哲学的形式化思想方法划界。作者认为,“形式显示”的现象学方法乃是海德格尔在《存在与时间》之前的现象学哲思的最富特色和创意的成分;而由于这种方法上的探索也影响到后期海德格尔的思想道路,因此一般而言,它也标志着海德格尔全部思想的现象学特质。     

Husserl's debate with Heidegger in the margins of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics

Husserl received from Martin Heidegger a copy of his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in the summer of 1929 not long before Husserl had determined to reread Heidegger's writings in order to arrive at a definitive position on Heidegger's philosophy. With this in view, Husserl reread and made extensive marginal comments in Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. This essay by the translator of the remarks in KPM offers some historical background and comment on the importance of the remarks in KPM and attempts to describe Husserl's counterposition to Heidegger on six issues that divided the two major twentieth century philosophers.     

You can't get something for nothing: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on how not to overcome Nihilism 1

This paper analyzes Kierkegaard's Religiousness A sphere of existence, presented in his edifying works, and Heidegger's concept of authenticity, proposed in Being and Time, as responses to modern nihilism. While Kierkegaard argues that Religiousness A is an unsuccessful response to modern nihilism, Heidegger claims that authenticity, a secularized version of Religiousness A, is a successful response. We argue that Heidegger's secularization of Religiousness A is incomplete and unsuccessful, that Heidegger's later work offers a reconsideration of the problem of modern nihilism, and that later Heidegger suggests a way out of nihilism which is compatible with Kierkegaard's Religiousness B sphere of existence.     

Heidegger’s Temple: How Truth Happens When Nothing is Portrayed

In his essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Martin Heidegger discusses three examples of artworks: a painting by Van Gogh of peasant shoes, a poem about a Roman fountain, and a Greek temple. The new entry on Heidegger’s aesthetics in the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy, written by Iain Thomson, focuses on this essay, and Van Gogh’s painting in particular. It argues that Heidegger uses Van Gogh’s painting to set art, as the happening of truth, in relation to ‘nothing’, which is a key term in Heidegger’s essays leading up to The Origin of the Work of Art. This paper extends a similar analysis to the Greek temple as a way of offering an exposition of Heidegger’s concerns in the essay. It begins by briefly outlining Thomson’s argument that Heidegger relates Van Gogh’s painting to ‘nothing’, and indicating the way this argument can be extended to the Greek temple. It then discusses three ways in which ‘nothing’ can open up the significance of the temple as a work of art in which truth happens: (1) it is not concerned with objective representation; (2) it depicts the primal strife of earth and world, concealing and unconcealing; (3) it is fundamentally historical.     

From Kant to Heidegger. On the path from self-consciousness to self-understanding

In this article I explore the idea that Heidegger's lectures on The Basic Problems of Phenomenology are of particular importance to our understanding of the relationship between Heidegger and Kant. These lectures can be read as a “historical” commentary on Being and Time. Of course, Heidegger does not present himself as a historian of philosophy, but acts as a philosophical reader of Kant in order to expound the principal ideas of his own philosophy. My central claim is that it is through Kant's philosophy of self-consciousness that Heidegger attempts to provide us with a better understanding of his own conception of self-understanding.     

Becoming a philosopher: What Heidegger learned from Dilthey, 1919–25

Wilhelm Dilthey is, famously, an epistemological pioneer for a second, ‘human’ kind of science that ‘understands’ life as we live it, instead of ‘explaining’ things as we observe them. Even today, he is usually cited for his role in the Erklären–Verstehen debate. My article, however, follows Heidegger's suggestion that we make the existence of the debate itself the problem. Whether there are different sorts of entity, different reasons for studying them and different means for doing so – such issues raise questions about science itself, not just about how to do it better. Moreover, what sort of philosopher is competent to address such questions? Heidegger argues that Dilthey's later writings intimate that it must be one who thinks from the ‘standpoint of (historical) life itself.’ This issue, says Heidegger, is ‘alive’ in Dilthey but is continually short-circuited by his very traditional plan for a ‘Critique of Historical Reason.’ Dilthey's unsuccessful struggles to produce this Critique are his gift to us, however. They encourage us to explicitly reconsider, as Heidegger does not only in Being and Time but throughout his life, what Dilthey cannot: If philosophy, like all human practices, is historical to the core, what is it to ‘be’ philosophical, about science or anything else?     

Critical Notices

In Being and Time, Heidegger explicitly defers any consideration of ourselves (Dasein) as embodied. I try to account for Heidegger's reluctance to talk about 'the body' in connection with his explication of Dasein, by arguing that doing so would be at odds with the kind of investigation his 'phenomenology of everydayness' is meant to be. That Heidegger omits discussion of the body in Being and Time might lead one to think of the human body in terms of the other categories Heidegger deploys: readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand (Being and Time) and biological organisms (Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics). I argue that any such identification ought to be resisted, as these categories serve only to deprive our bodies of their specifically human dimension. Indeed, by surveying the failure of these categories as proper to the human body, we gain further insight into Heidegger's initial deferral: only given the existential analytic can one begin to offer a proper account of ourselves in bodily terms.     

The Concept of Profound Boredom: Learning from Moments of Vision

This paper recognizes that we become bored in our post-modern, consumerist Western world and that boredom is related to this existence and hidden within it. Through Heidegger, it seeks to provide a way to structure our understanding of boredom and suggest ways of acknowledging its cause, and then to allow it to liberate our authentic appreciation of the world of our workplace and what can be learnt through it. Using the approach of focusing on being in a societal workplace environment, and the link to Heidegger’s notion of mood, revealed in Being and Time, boredom’s fundamental role is shown as a complex temporal manifold. Our superficial attempts to deal with things in datable time means that we miss the essential importance of the temporal manifold through which our being is revealed and where the Augenblick, (moment of vision) is the authentic present and temporalises itself of the authentic future (Heidegger in Being and time (trans: J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson). Blackwell, Oxford, 1962, p. 338). For Heidegger this is to be understood as ecstasis (ibid, p. 338) when the resolute Dasein “is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered (ibid, p. 338). Such resoluteness enables the private capabilities to arise in public practice, not, however, in the conformity of what ‘one does’ (Das Man) but as an authentically choosing being. The challenge of an ontological pedagogy, regardless of its place of revelation that this prescribes a possibly be edifying mission for Dasein. Instead of chasing away boredom through busyness, a moment of vision could produce creative and authentic ways of being.     

Heidegger and the contradiction of Being: a dialetheic interpretation of the late Heidegger

ABSTRACT

It is well known that, from the beginning to the end of his philosophical trajectory, Martin Heidegger tries to develop a fundamental ontology which aims at answering the so-called question of Being: what does Being mean? Unfortunately, in trying to answer this question, Heidegger faces a predicament: given his own premises, speaking about Being leads to a contradiction. Moreover, according to the majority, if not all, of the interpreters who admit the existence of such a predicament, Heidegger tries to avoid the contradiction in question. But is this the only way Heidegger tries to solve the predicament? In this paper, I argue that, in some of his late works and, in particular, in the Contributions to Philosophy, Heidegger also takes into serious consideration the possibility of accepting the contradiction he faces in speaking about Being as true. If this is correct, Heidegger endorses what nowadays analytic philosophers call dialetheism, namely the metaphysical position according to which some (but not all) contradictions are true.     

Evolution and the meaning of being: Heidegger,Jonas and Nihilism

Hans Jonas accuses Heidegger of “never bring[ing] his question about Being into correlation with the testimony of our physical and biological evolution.” Neither the early nor later Heidegger has a “philosophy of nature,” Jonas charges, because Naturphilosophie demands a new concept of matter, a monistic account of cosmogony and evolution, and the grounding of ethical responsibility for future generations in an ontological “first principle.” Jonas’s ontological rethinking of Darwinism allows him to overcome the nihilism that a mechanistic interpretation of evolution forces upon us: a nihilism allegedly shared by Heidegger. I imagine a Heideggerian response to Jonas, and ask whether the dream of recovering a synthesis between cosmogony and moral insight has been irrecoverably shattered by modern natural science.     

时间与本源——关于德里达对海德格尔时间概念的批判

在《存在与书写》①一文中,德里达针对海德格尔《存在与时间》②第82节注释中对哲学史流俗时间观的梳理,对亚里士多德、康德、黑格尔的文本进行了重新的阅读。本文将把德里达的批评重构为三组,并依次指明其中的弊病。     

On the Path Towards Thinking: Learning from Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Steiner

This paper is a philosophical study of the nature of thinking based on the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Rudolf Steiner. For Heidegger, the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers exemplified genuine thinking, appreciating the meaning of Being. But this kind of philosophy was soon replaced by the onto-theological approach, in which Being was reductively objectified, and the question of the meaning of Being was forgotten. Hence, according to Heidegger, we still have to learn to think. Commentators on Heidegger point to the similarities between his approach to thinking and that of various mystical teachings, such as those of Meister Eckhart or Zen Buddhism. Another less well known philosopher who devoted himself to this question was Rudolf Steiner. Like Heidegger, Steiner claims that we do not know what it means to really think. Steiner was however more outspoken in insisting that only through a kind of meditative practice can we directly experience the nature of thinking. Present day materialistic explanations of thinking as caused by the brain stand in clear opposition to his spiritual conception of thinking. Drawing upon Heidegger (somewhat) and Steiner (mostly) I argue against the materialistic understanding of thinking as jumping to unwarranted conclusions. The paper ends with describing some of the elements of Steiner Waldorf education which are intended to promote the development of living, creative thinking.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Metontology</Emphasis>, moral particularism,and the “art of existing:” a dialogue between Heidegger,Aristotle, and Bernard Williams

An important shift occurs in Martin Heidegger’s thinking one year after the publication of Being and Time, in the Appendix to the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. The shift is from his project of fundamental ontology—which provides an existential analysis of human existence on an ontological level—to metontology. Metontology is a neologism that refers to the ontic sphere of human experience and to the regional ontologies that were excluded from Being and Time. It is within metontology, Heidegger states, that “the question of ethics may be raised for the first time.” This paper makes explicit both Heidegger’s argument for metontology, and the relation between metontology and ethics. In examining what he means by “the art of existing,” the paper argues that there is an ethical dimension to Heidegger’s thinking that corresponds to a moderate form of moral particularism. In order to justify this position, a comparative analysis is made between Heidegger, Aristotle, and Bernard Williams.     

Introducing an existential-phenomenological approach: Basic phenomenological theory and research–Part I

What is often referred to as the existential approach to counselling and psychotherapy may be defined as the application of existential-phenomenological philosophy towards psychotherapeutic ends, in which individual practitioners choose how to apply their readings of the leading authors. The first of this two-part exposition introduces a form of ‘experiential’ philosophy called phenomenology, a regular experiential method that is in many ways antithetical to the conventional scientific approach. This first paper concentrates on one of the many successive definitions of phenomenology given by Husserl, the philosopher of science, in 1927, with help from his ex-student Heidegger. In the second paper, phenomenology is brought to bear on human experience, and it is Heidegger in Being and Time who added it to the writings of the earlier existentialists Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; to produce existential psychology and philosophy. Also in the second part, three forms of existential therapy are briefly mentioned. This first paper introduces a handful of key ideas for counselling psychologists, and illustrates how philosophical work is an inherent part of life, as well as the production and use of psychological knowledge.