ORDER FROM VIRTUAL STATES: A DIALOGUE ON THE RELEVANCE OF QUANTUM THEORY TO RELIGION

Abstract. Lothar Schäfer has written a poetic tribute pointing out the relevance of quantum theory to religious beliefs. Two items in his article trouble me greatly. First are the excessive claims about the relevance of quantum mechanisms for the creation and evolution of life. Schäfer's claim that “everything that can happen must happen” can be dangerously misleading. The quantum rules predict that most outcomes have a near‐zero chance of occurring. Although “anything can happen” can be a wonderful metaphor for living life, it can be dangerous if taken literally. It can also be misleading when applied to Darwinian mechanisms. My second trouble was with Schäfer's desire to extract moral values from quantum principles in a literalist manner. Extracting ethics from science has always been problematic. Luckily, Schäfer provides balance to these objections by including many wonderful passages that in my opinion correctly point out how quantum theory should change the way we conceive of our place in the universe. I list twelve points in which the quantum ontology differs from our normal Newtonian ontology. Awareness of these aspects is typically missing from our usual appreciation of nature, so Schäfer's poetry on a number of these points is well appreciated.     

Wave Function Ontology

I argue that the wave function ontology for quantum mechanics is an undesirable ontology. This ontology holds that the fundamental space in which entities evolve is not three-dimensional, but instead 3N-dimensional, where N is the number of particles standardly thought to exist in three-dimensional space. I show that the state of three-dimensional objects does not supervene on the state of objects in 3N-dimensional space. I also show that the only way to guarantee the existence of the appropriate mental states in the wave function ontology has undesirable metaphysical baggage: either mind/body dualism is true, or circumstances which we take to be logically possible turn out to be logically impossible.While our theory can be extended formally in a logically consistent way by introducing the concept of a wave in a 3N-dimensional space, it is evident that this procedure is not really acceptable in a physical theory... (Bohm 1957, 117)     

The distribution postulate in Bohm's theory

On Bohm's formulation of quantum mechanics particles always have determinate positions and follow continuous trajectories. Bohm's theory, however, requires a postulate that says that particles are initially distributed in a special way: particles are randomly distributed so that the probability of their positions being represented by a point in any regionR in configuration space is equal to the square of the wave-function integrated overR. If the distribution postulate were false, then the theory would generally fail to make the right statistical predictions. Further, if it were false, then there would at least in principle be situations where a particle would approach an eigenstate of having one position but in fact always be somewhere very different. Indeed, we will see how this might happen even if the distribution postulate were true. This will help to show how loose the connection is between the wave-function and the positions of particles in Bohm's theory and what the precise role of the distribution postulate is. Finally, we will briefly consider two attempts to formulate a version of Bohm's theory without the distribution postulate.     

Transdisciplinarity and Conceptual Change

This article tenders an inaugural discussion of how conceptual change theory can contribute to deeper understandings of what is conceptually involved when people attempt (or succeed) to transition from multi- and interdisciplinarity to transdisciplinarity. After explaining the nuances of Newtonian thinking (framed as formal rather than postformal thinking), the article shares a comparison of multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinarity along four dimensions. Special attention is given to Nicolescuian transdisciplinarity, an approach predicated on the new sciences of quantum physics, chaos theory, and living systems theory (rather than Newtonian and Cartesian thinking). Nicolescuian transdisciplinarity is a new methodology for creating knowledge and it comprises three axioms: multiple Levels of Reality and the Hidden Third; the Logic of the Inclusive Middle; and, knowledge as complex, emergent, and embodied. The discussion then turns to an overview of three basic approaches to conceptual change theory: knowledge as theory, knowledge as elements, and knowledge as context. The author then applies conceptual change theory to understand what is involved in moving toward transdisciplinary thinking, including four elements necessary for conceptual change to occur (intelligibility, plausibility, fruitfulness, and dissatisfaction with existing conceptualizations and mental models). The article concludes with the idea that transdisciplinary thinking is a form of postformal thinking (especially paradigmatic order thinking) and suggests that future conceptual shifts toward transdisciplinarity involve achieving a transdisciplinary conceptual tipping point.     

Laying down a path in talking

This paper aims to provide a starting point for a non-representational approach to language. It will do so by undoing some of the reifying tendencies that are at the heart of the ontology of scientific psychology. Although non-representational theories are beginning to emerge, they remain committed to giving explanations in terms of ontological structures that are independent of human activity. If they maintain this commitment it is unlikely that they will displace representationalism in domains such as language. By following some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on language, I explain the phenomenon of reification by carefully considering the formative, situational flow of language—thus without invoking representations. In this way, the paper sketches a direction of approach for a non-representational theory of language, undercutting the most important assumptions that justify an explanatory ontology devoid of human activity.     

Against Particle/Field Duality: Asymptotic Particle States And Interpolating Fields In Interacting Qft (Or: Who's Afraid Of Haag's Theorem?)

This essay touches on a number of topics in philosophy of quantum field theory from the point of view of the LSZ asymptotic approach to scattering theory. First, particle/field duality is seen to be a property of free field theory and not of interacting QFT. Second, it is demonstrated how LSZ side-steps the implicationsof Haag's theorem. Finally, a recent argument due to Redhead (1995), Malament (1996) and Arageorgis (1995) against the concept of localized particle states is addressed. Briefly, the argument observes thatthe Reeh–Schlieder theorem entails that correlations between spacelike separatedvacuum expectation values of local field operators are always present,and this, according to the above authors, dictates against the notion of a localizedparticle state. I claim that this moral is excessive and that a coherentnotion of localized particles is given by the LSZ approach. The underlyingmoral to be drawn from this analysis is that questions concerning theontology of interacting QFT cannot be appropriately addressed if one restrictsoneself to the free theory.     

A Faradayan Principle for Selecting Classical Field Theories

Faraday’s field concept presupposes that field stresses should share the axial symmetry of the lines of force. In the present article, the field dynamics is similarly required to depend only on field properties that can be tested through the motion of test‐particles. Precise expressions of this ‘Faradayan’ principle in field‐theoretical language are shown to severely restrict the form of classical field theories. In particular, static forces must obey the inverse square law in a linear approximation. Within a Minkowskian and Lagrangian framework, the Faradayan principle automatically leads to Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism and to Einstein’s theory of gravitation, without appeal to the equivalence principle. A comparison is drawn between this, Feynman’s, and Einstein’s way to arrive at general relativity.     

Contingency in Nature

Contingencies in Nature may be explained, but such explanations refer to other contingencies (pt. I). Is there a way to “explain away” all contingencies? The first physical theory of modern times, Newton’s theory of gravitation, was received in a way that leaves this question open (pt. II), while Kepler’s theory of cosmological harmony arrived at a positive solution (pt. III). However, later developments in science outdated Kepler’s approach (pt. IV).     

医学本体论的当代转向——医学教育模式改革的前提性问题

医学本体论,是指“关于医学的”最根本的根据、本质和基础的理论,它是医学赖以存在的本质基础和逻辑根据。当代医学本体论的转向是从人体学本体论向人学本体论的转变。实现这一转变的主要途径在于医学教育模式的改革,而其前提性问题,则是建构人学本体论思想。     

Theories of Truth without Standard Models and Yablo’s Sequences

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Recursive Ontology</Emphasis>: A Systemic Theory of Reality

The article introduces recursive ontology, a general ontology which aims to describe how being is organized and what are the processes that drive it. In order to answer those questions, I use a multidisciplinary approach that combines the theory of levels, philosophy and systems theory. The main claim of recursive ontology is that being is the product of a single recursive process of generation that builds up all of reality in a hierarchical fashion from fundamental physical particles to human societies. To support this assumption, I provide the general laws and the basic principles of recursive ontology as well as a semi-formalised model of the theory based on a recursive generative grammar. Recursive ontology not only actively promotes a multidisciplinary investigation of reality, but also can be used as a general framework to develop future domain-specific theories.     

On field's argument for substantivalism

In this article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space‐time to be à substance since it ascribes field properties to space‐time points. There is petitio principii error made in this reasoning because Field does not give any justification for his controversial assumption that fields are properties of space‐time points. What is more, I suggest, Field's interpretation of field theory is incompatible with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory, at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should also take into account the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space‐time to be a substance.     

Newtonian Supertasks: A Critical Analysis

In two recent papers Perez Laraudogoitia has described a variety of supertasks involving elastic collisions in Newtonian systems containing a denumerably infinite set of particles. He maintains that these various supertasks give examples of systems in which energy is not conserved, particles at rest begin to move spontaneously, particles disappear from a system, and particles are created ex nihilo. An analysis of these supertasks suggests that they involve systems that do not satisfy the mathematical conditions required of Newtonian systems at the time the supertask is due to be completed, or else they rely on the application of the time-reversal transformation to states which are not well-defined. Consequently, it is unjustified to conclude that the paradoxical results are arising from within the framework of Newtonian mechanics. In the last part of this article, we discuss various aspects of the physics of these supertasks.     

Lessons from realistic physics for the metaphysics of quantum theory

Quantum mechanics, and classical mechanics, are framework theories that incorporate many different concrete theories which in general cannot be arranged in a neat hierarchy, but discussion of ‘the ontology of quantum mechanics’ tends to proceed as if quantum mechanics were a single concrete theory, specifically the physics of nonrelativistically moving point particles interacting by long-range forces. I survey the problems this causes and make some suggestions for how a more physically realistic perspective ought to influence the metaphysics of quantum mechanics.

     

Evaluating Elizabeth Grosz's Biological Turn

Elizabeth Grosz's interpretation of Darwinian evolutionary theory to ground a feminist ontology of biology has been particularly controversial. Most critics have understood Grosz as supporting her theory with empirical evidence, and they criticize her for being either inaccurate or uncritical of and overly dependent on science. I argue that Grosz reads Darwin as a philosopher in a Deleuzian and Irigarayan sense, and that Grosz's project is therefore better understood in terms of its ethical and political goals rather than in terms of empirical adequacy. Employing this evaluative framework leads to a novel route for critique of Grosz's ontology in terms of its reliance on the Darwinian distinction between organism and environment. I conclude that Grosz's work is valuable for the way it maintains ethical and political considerations in feminist ontological debates, and that introducing a more sensitive understanding of the organism–environment relation will lead us closer to a truly feminist ontology of biology.     

Epistemological and ontological issues in counseling: Implications of social systems theory

Philosophical issues related to theoretical and methodological developments in counseling are addressed, especially related to epistemology (theory of knowledge) and ontology (theory of reality). Social systems theory is described as an epistemologically and ontologically significant challenger to psychological theory, which has traditionally predominated as a foundation for counseling approaches. Recent developments from cognitive biology are used to demonstrate how systems theory may be metatheoretical to the psychological point of view, accounting for all that psychological theory can account for, and more.     

A formal system for classical particle mechanics,its model-theoretic applications and space-time structure

In the history of Newtonian Mechanics physicists and astronomers did not rely on so-called inertial frames, indeed they were not able to identify such frames. So the usual neo-Newtonian formalism of Newtonian Mechanics contains some superfluous components. In the present paper I will formulate a formal system for classical particle mechanics in Leibnizian space-time, where a relation, a counterpart of the second law of motion, between force on bodies and derivative of their momentum will be defined relative to every, inertial or not, reference frame. And I will present a view that in the research process under Newtonian mechanics the accumulation of those models of the relation that satisfied some realistic conditions determined an additional structure of non-rotating frames to Leibnizian space-time.     

Maxwell–Boltzmann Statistics And The Metaphysics Of Modality

Two arguments have recently been advanced that Maxwell-Boltzmann particles areindistinguishable just like Bose–Einstein and Fermi–Dirac particles. Bringing modalmetaphysics to bear on these arguments shows that ontological indistinguishabilityfor classical (MB) particles does not follow. The first argument, resting on symmetryin the occupation representation for all three cases, fails since peculiar correlationsexist in the quantum (BE and FD) context as harbingers of ontic indistinguishability,while the indistinguishability of classical particles remains purely epistemic. The secondargument, deriving from the classical limits of quantum statistical partition functions,embodies a conceptual confusion. After clarifying the doctrine of haecceitism, a thirdargument is considered that attempts to deflate metaphysical concerns altogether byshowing that the phase-space and distribution-space representations of MB-statisticshave contrary haecceitistic import. Careful analysis shows this argument to fail as well,leaving de re modality unproblematically grounding particle identity in the classicalcontext while genuine puzzlement about the underlying ontology remains for quantumstatistics.     

The Turn from Ontology to Ethics: Three Kantian Responses to Three Levinasian Critiques

Abstract

Both Kant and Levinas state that traditional ontology is a type of philosophy that illegitimately forces the structure of human reason onto other beings, thus making the subject the center and origin of all meaning. Kant’s critique of the ontology of his scholastic predecessors is well known. For Levinas, however, it does not suffice. He rejects what we could call an ‘existential ontology’: a self-centered way of living as a whole, of which all philosophical ontology is but a branch. Alternatively, he presents an ethical way of living centered on ‘the Other’. Kant also, however, eventually turns to ethics to uncover a more fundamental domain of meaning. Hence, both thinkers ultimately agree about the primacy of ethics over theory. Despite this concurrence, Levinas nevertheless criticizes all aspects of Kant’s turn towards ethics: his reason for making this turn, the kind of critique that he applies to this domain, and the outcome thereof. These three points reflect Levinas’ more general critique that Kant did not succeed in overcoming ontological discourse. This paper shows how Kant can reply to, and overcome, each of Levinas’ three critiques. In this way, I reveal certain commonalities between these two thinkers that commentators still often overlook.     

From One Testament to the Other

Translation of Paul Ricoeur, “D'un testament à l'autre” Translator's Preface: This essay, part of the section “Essais d'herméneutique biblique” in Ricoeur's Lectures 3: aux frontières de la philosophie, is one example of the later Ricoeur's increasing willingness to let theology and philosophy speak to each other. I would like to draw readers’ attention to two moves made here by Ricoeur: (1) the way in which his philosophical hermeneutics opens the way for a biblical ontology rooted in Exodus 3:14, and (2) the way his theory of metaphor reveals the same implied ontology behind 1 John 4:8.