Does category labeling lead to forgetting?

What effect does labeling an object as a member of a familiar category have on memory for that object? Recent studies suggest that recognition memory can be negatively impacted by categorizing objects during encoding. This paper examines the “representational shift hypothesis” which argues that categorizing an object impairs recognition memory by altering the trace of the encoded memory to be more similar to the category prototype. Previous evidence for this idea comes from experiments in which a basic-level category labeling task was compared to a non-category labeling incidental encoding task, usually a preference judgment (e.g., “Do you like this item?”). In two experiments, we examine alternative tasks that attempt to control for processing demands and the degree to which category information is explicitly recruited at the time of study. Contrary to the predictions of the representational shift hypothesis, we find no evidence that memory is selectively impaired by category labeling. Overall, the pattern of results across both studies appears consistent with well-established variables known to influence memory such as encoding specificity and distinctiveness effects.     

Does drug mis-instrumentalization lead to drug abuse?

Understanding the perceived benefits of using drugs to achieve specific mental states will provide novel insights into the reasons individuals seek to use drugs. However, the precision of attempts to instrumentalize drugs is unclear both across drugs and individuals. Moreover, mis-instrumentalization, defined as discrepancies between such endpoints, may have relevance to understanding the relation among use, abuse, and addiction.     

Does viewing justified violence lead to devaluing others?

Viewing violent media has been shown to increase aggressive behavior, affect, and cognition. Viewing “justified” violence (the target is believed to be deserving of the violence) further increases the risk of aggression. The present study investigated whether viewing justified violence primes thoughts of devalued others, an inflated sense of self, or both. Participants viewed one of three eight-minute video clips depicting either justified violence, non-justified violence, or no violence. Participants' reaction times to four types of computer-presented sentences were then measured: sentences either valued the self, valued others, devalued the self, or devalued others. Viewing justified violence resulted in reaction time patterns that devalued others, but had no effect upon reaction times to self-relevant sentences. The possibility that viewing justified violence, by priming devaluing thoughts of others, may impact interpersonal behavior in non-conscious and automatic ways is discussed.     

Does viewing justified violence lead to devaluing others?

Viewing violent media has been shown to increase aggressive behavior, affect, and cognition. Viewing “justified” violence (the target is believed to be deserving of the violence) further increases the risk of aggression. The present study investigated whether viewing justified violence primes thoughts of devalued others, an inflated sense of self, or both. Participants viewed one of three eight-minute video clips depicting either justified violence, non-justified violence, or no violence. Participants' reaction times to four types of computer-presented sentences were then measured: sentences either valued the self, valued others, devalued the self, or devalued others. Viewing justified violence resulted in reaction time patterns that devalued others, but had no effect upon reaction times to self-relevant sentences. The possibility that viewing justified violence, by priming devaluing thoughts of others, may impact interpersonal behavior in non-conscious and automatic ways is discussed.     

Does anxiety lead to selective processing of threat-related information?

Four experiments investigating the detailed nature of the attentional bias in anxiety are reported. Previous research using the Stroop task has shown that, when compared with non-patient controls, anxious patients are relatively slower at colour naming threat-related words than non-threat words. Experiments One and Two investigated whether this apparent attentional bias is a function of anxiety per se and/or is related to patient/non-patient status. Experiment One compared colour-naming times for threat and non-threat words in low, medium and high trait anxiety normal subjects. High anxiety was not associated with slower colour-naming times for threat words. Experiment Two compared generalized anxiety disorder patients with equally anxious non-patients and found that the patients were significantly slower at colour-naming threat words. Read aloud and dwell tasks were also included in these experiments in order to identify the mechanism of Stroop interference. Experiments Three and Four investigated whether anxious patients' attentional bias is specific to threat-related material or also extends to certain positive, emotional material. In Experiment Three words used in previous Stroop studies were rated for emotionality. Threat words were more emotional, as well as more threatening, than control words, indicating that previous studies have confounded threat and emotionality. Experiment Four compared colour-naming times for threat words, equally emotional positive words, and neutral words. Consistent with the emotionality hypothesis, generalized anxiety disorder patients were slower than non-anxious controls at colour naming both threat words and positive words. The theoretical, methodological and clinical implications of these results are discussed.     

Does lack of control lead to conspiracy beliefs? A meta-analysis

Perceived lack of control is widely believed to motivate, at least partly, belief in conspiracy theories. We question the theoretical foundations of this belief and meta-analyze existing published and unpublished studies to assess the overall effect of lack of control on conspiracy beliefs. The overall effect was small and not statistically significant (d = −0.05), and was not moderated by comparison group (baseline vs. control affirmation), type of manipulation used to threaten control, inclusion of a manipulation check, or sample type. However, the predicted effect of control was more likely to be observed when beliefs were measured in terms of specific conspiracy theories, rather than as general or abstract claims. Overall, the present studies to date offer limited support for the hypothesis that conspiracy beliefs arise as a compensatory control.     

Does subgroup membership information lead to better estimation of true subscores?

Haberman (2008) suggested a method to determine if subtest scores have added value over the total score. The method is based on classical test theory and considers the estimation of the true subscores. Performance of subgroups, for example, those based on gender or ethnicity, on subtests is often of interest. Researchers such as Stricker (1993) and Livingston and Rupp (2004) found that the difference in performance between the subgroups often varies over the different subtests. We suggest a method to examine whether the knowledge of the subgroup membership of the examinees leads to a better estimation of the true subscores. We apply our suggested method to data from two operational testing programmes. The knowledge of the subgroup membership of the examinees does not lead to a better estimation of the true subscore for the data sets.     

Does the cognitive reflection test measure cognitive reflection? A mathematical modeling approach

We used a mathematical modeling approach, based on a sample of 2,019 participants, to better understand what the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick In Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25–42, 2005) measures. This test, which is typically completed in less than 10 min, contains three problems and aims to measure the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind. However, since the test contains three mathematically based problems, it is possible that the test only measures mathematical abilities, and not cognitive reflection. We found that the models that included an inhibition parameter (i.e., the probability of inhibiting an intuitive response), as well as a mathematical parameter (i.e., the probability of using an adequate mathematical procedure), fitted the data better than a model that only included a mathematical parameter. We also found that the inhibition parameter in males is best explained by both rational thinking ability and the disposition toward actively open-minded thinking, whereas in females this parameter was better explained by rational thinking only. With these findings, this study contributes to the understanding of the processes involved in solving the CRT, and will be particularly useful for researchers who are considering using this test in their research.     

Mind-wandering and negative mood: Does one thing really lead to another?

Mind-wandering is closely connected with negative mood. Whether negative mood is a cause or consequence of mind-wandering remains an important, unresolved, issue. We sought to clarify the direction of this relationship by measuring mood before and after mind-wandering. We also measured the affective content, time-orientation and relevance of mind-wandering to current concerns to explore whether the link between mind-wandering and negative mood might be explained by these characteristics. A novel experience-sampling technique with smartphone application prompted participants to answer questions about mind-wandering and mood across 7 days. While sadness tended to precede mind-wandering, mind-wandering itself was not associated with later mood and only predicted feeling worse if its content was negative. We also found prior sadness predicted retrospective mind-wandering, and prior negative mood predicted mind-wandering to current concerns. Our findings provide new insight into how mood and mind-wandering relate but suggest mind-wandering is not inherently detrimental to well-being.     

Does rejection lead to disidentification? The role of internal motivation and avoidance strategies

Getting rejected can either push newcomers out of the group or make them try harder to become accepted. It is suggested that newcomers' internal motivation to become a group member and their strategies determine the outcomes of rejection. It was expected that in rejected newcomers, avoidance strategies (but not approach strategies) lead to stronger disidentification. Moreover, the disidentification effect of avoidance strategies is predicted to be buffered by the internal motivation to become a group member. Two studies supported these predictions. Study 1 manipulated the group's feedback (rejection vs. acceptance) and assessed internal motivation and strategies. Study 2 measured feedback and replicated the findings in the field. Thus, by the adoption of the right motivational approach, newcomers can prepare themselves not to be driven out of a new group by the almost unavoidable experiences of rejection. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does self-love lead to love for others? A story of narcissistic game playing

Five studies investigated the links among narcissism, self-esteem, and love. Across all studies, narcissism was associated primarily with a game-playing love style. This link was found in reports of general love styles (Study 1a) and of love in ongoing romantic relationships (Studies 1b-3, 5). Narcissists' game-playing love style was the result of a need for power and autonomy (Study 2) and was linked with greater relationship alternatives and lesser commitment (Study 3). Finally, narcissists' self-reports of game playing were confirmed by their partners in past and current relationships (Studies 4, 5). In contrast, self-esteem was negatively linked to manic love and positively linked to passionate love across studies. Implications for the understanding of narcissism in relationships are discussed.     

Imagination and memory: Does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.     

Does training under consistent mapping conditions lead to automatic attention attraction to targets in search tasks?

Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) proposed that training under consistent stimulus-response mapping (CM) leads to automatic target detection in search tasks. Other theories, such as Treisman and Gelade's (1980) feature integration theory, consider target-distractor discriminability as the main determinant of search performance. The first two experiments pit these two principles against each other. The results show that CM training is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve optimal search performance. Two other experiments examine whether CM trained targets, presented as distractors in unattended display locations, attract attention away from current targets. The results are again found to vary with target-distractor similarity. Overall, the present study strongly suggests that CM training does not invariably lead to automatic attention attraction in search tasks.     

Does ignoring lead to worse evaluations? A new explanation of the stimulus devaluation effect

Affective evaluation of stimuli just seen in visual search tasks has been shown to depend on task-relevant stimulus configuration (Raymond, Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003): Whereas targets and novel stimuli were evaluated similarly, distractors were devaluated. These results were explained by an inhibition-based account of the influence of selective attention on emotion. In the present experiments, we demonstrated that stimulus devaluation might not be a consequence of attentional inhibition. By simply instructing participants to react to an accepted or rejected stimulus in the visual search task of Experiment 1, we found distractor devaluation in the first case and target devaluation in the second case. We conclude that devaluation of stimuli is mediated by the affective connotation implied by response labels and instructions. This was confirmed in Experiment 2: To-be-ignored stimuli were not devaluated when participants knew that those stimuli would become task-relevant during the experiment.     

Does debt pressure lead to unethical behaviour intention? Evidence on aggregate and individual levels

Studies have shown that debt pressure impairs people's subjective well-being and social functioning, but few studies have examined its moral consequences. To explore the relationship between debt pressure and unethical behaviour intention, we conducted three studies and obtained aggregate-level (Study 1) and individual-level evidence (Studies 2 and 3). Study 1 analysed data on quarterly search volumes related to unethical behaviour intention on Baidu and quarterly measures of debt pressure in China, demonstrating that increased debt pressure predicted subsequent greater levels of unethical behaviour intention. Study 2 found that, compared with the control condition, individuals in the debt pressure condition exhibited greater unethical behaviour intention. Study 3 further tested the mediating role of self-control and showed that individuals under high debt pressure evinced diminished self-control and, in turn, displayed more unethical behaviour intention.     

Reconstructing with trace information: Does rapid identification information lead to better crime reconstructions?

Currently, promising new tools are under development that will enable crime scene investigators to analyze fingerprints or DNA‐traces at the crime scene. While these technologies could help to find a perpetrator early in the investigation, they may also strengthen confirmation bias when an incorrect scenario directs the investigation this early. In this study, 40 experienced Crime scene investigators (CSIs) investigated a mock crime scene to study the influence of rapid identification technologies on the investigation. This initial study shows that receiving identification information during the investigation results in more accurate scenarios. CSIs in general are not as much reconstructing the event that took place, but rather have a “who done it routine.” Their focus is on finding perpetrator traces with the risk of missing important information at the start of the investigation. Furthermore, identification information was mostly integrated in their final scenarios when the results of the analysis matched their expectations. CSIs have the tendency to look for confirmation, but the technology has no influence on this tendency. CSIs should be made aware of the risks of this strategy as important offender information could be missed or innocent people could be wrongfully accused.     

Does shared group identification lead to group creativity? Group regulatory focus as a moderator

Regarding the effect of identification on creativity in groups, two theoretical views compete. One view emphasizing group‐welfare motives underlying identification proposes a positive identification–creativity relationship in groups because members sharing high group identification are motivated to engage in behaviors that they believe are optimal for their group, including those that depart from the group's status quo, thus resulting in enhanced group creativity. The other view highlighting affiliative motives underlying identification, in contrast, posits a negative identification–creativity relationship in groups because highly identified members are motivated to engage in behaviors that certify their belongingness in the group, that is, behaviors that conform to the existing group norms and status quo, which constrains the group's potential for creativity. This study aims to reconcile these competing perspectives by invoking regulatory focus theory. Drawing on the notion that group identification effects rely on the content of group identity that the identification is based on, the authors suggest that group regulatory focus, as a critical group identity content, moderates the identification–creativity relationship in groups; the relationship is positive when the group's regulatory focus is highly promotion‐oriented, whereas it is negative when the group's regulatory focus is highly prevention‐oriented. Analyzing data from 65 workgroups in a cosmetics company in Korea, the authors show evidence that the identification–creativity relationship is positive in groups with a high promotion focus. The prediction regarding the prevention–focus moderation effect is not supported. The implications of the findings for both theory and practice are discussed.     

Does a cognitive map guide choices in the radial-arm maze?

Fifteen rats performed in a standard radial-arm maze task (Experiment 1) and in a modified task with a set of forced choices and a 15-min retention interval prior to completion of the maze (Experiment 2). In addition to the standard measure of choice in the radial-arm maze, orientation toward arms was measured and considered to constitute go-no-go "microchoice" decisions. Rats investigated but rejected many arms. A model of choice was developed in which it was assumed that choice decisions about arms were made independently and that microchoices were not selectively guided toward baited arms. The model performed nearly as well as the rats. These results place important limitations on the theory that choice behavior in the radial-arm maze is guided by a cognitive map.