Locke's Theory of Demonstration and Demonstrative Morality

Locke famously claimed that morality was capable of demonstration. But he also refused to provide a system of demonstrative morality. This paper addresses the mismatch between Locke's stated views and his actual philosophical practice. While Locke's claims about demonstrative morality have received a lot of attention it is rare to see them discussed in the context of his general theory of demonstration and his specific discussions of particular demonstrations. This paper explores Locke's general remarks about demonstration as well as his claims about demonstration in natural philosophy, mathematics, and morality. Careful attention to these detailed discussions motivates a reevaluation of Locke's views on demonstrative knowledge of morality. Specifically, while Locke did believe that some demonstrative moral knowledge might be in‐principle available to us he also believed that facts about the difficulty of demonstration meant that this knowledge would in‐practice be largely unattainable.     

THE PARADOXICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORALITY AND MORAL WORTH

Abstract: If the social environment were arranged so that most people in the West could, with relatively little effort, be morally good to a reasonable degree, would this be a good thing? I claim that it is not entirely obvious that we should say yes. This is no idle question: mainstream Western social morality today seems to be approaching the prospect for a morality that is not taxing. This question has substantial theoretical interest because exploring it will help us understand the paradoxical relationship between morality and moral worth.     

辛亥时期革命派内部伦理思想的分歧——兼论其时传统道德的历史命运

辛亥革命时期,具有相同政治立场的革命派人士,在如何对待中国传统道德这一问题上却出现了分歧。大致说来有两种有代表性的观点:一些人对传统道德基本认同,而另一些人则持基本否定的态度。这两种观点各有得失,因为,传统道德是一个多元综合体,而这两种观点都抓住且只抓住了这一综合体的某种要素,揭示了该综合体与近代社会之间的复杂关系的一个方面。通过对革命派内部的这一分歧的反思,有助于我们更好地认识传统道德的价值与历史命运。     

Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs

Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist belief reflects a failure to not only attend to the epistemic risk of being wrong, but also a failure to attend to the distinctively moral risk of wronging others given what we believe.     

MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots?     

SHOULD WE DE‐MORALIZE ETHICAL THEORY?

Some philosophers, such as Roger Crisp and Alastair Norcross, have recently argued that the traditional moral categories of wrongness, permissibility and obligation should be avoided when doing ethical theory. I argue that even if morality does not itself provide reasons for action, the moral categories nevertheless have a central role to play in ethical theory: they allow us to make crucial judgements about how to feel about, and react to, agents who behave in anti‐social ways, and they help motivate us to act altruistically.     

东西方文化的人性观差异及其对道德认知的影响

人性观,即认为人性究竟是本善的还是本恶的,不仅是哲学思辨的焦点,也是日常生活中形成的一种常人理论(lay theory)。对于东西方文化传统的检视表明,西方文化占主导地位的是性恶论人性观,东方文化占主导地位的则是性善论人性观。研究通过实证数据支持了这一结论,发现中国被试相对于美国被试,对于人性的主观评定更倾向于性善的一端(研究1)。这种人性观差异导致中国被试在道德方面,尤其是规范性道德(行善)方面,对人提出了更高的要求(研究1),并且这种因果关系得到了启动实验的支持(研究2)。这些研究结果有助于人们更好地理解文化如何塑造了人们对于人性和道德的看法。     

A few seemingly harmless routes to a false memory

Since the invention of photography we have learned to rely on photos to help us remember significant moments in our lives. We have come to believe that photographs are accurate and valuable records of events that—years down the track—we may not be able to remember. In this paper, we review recent research demonstrating that photographs can also help us to “remember” events that never really happened. We trace the development of the leading false autobiographical memory paradigm, and we then describe research on the power of both fake narrative stories and fake photographs to cultivate false memories.     

The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory

Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper will defend the opposite reaction. Contrary to what recent discussions lead us to expect, practical reason is not simply a philosophical fiction lacking empirical roots. Empirical research does not exclude the possibility that practical reason can play a substantive role; rather, there is evidence that it can help us both to determine our first personal moral judgments and to motivate us to act on them.     

Introduction: Egoism,Altruism and Impartiality

The distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation is firmly embedded in contemporary moral discourse, but harks back too to early modern attempts to found morality on an egoistic basis. Rejecting that latter premise means accepting that others’ interests have intrinsic value, but it remains far from clear what altruism demands of us and what its relationship is with the rest of morality. While informing our duties, altruism seems also to urge us to transcend them and embrace the other-regarding values and virtues constitutive of a good life. This rather wide conception of morality may strike us today as too demanding. At the same time, however, currently popular impartialist accounts of morality can disrupt much everyday altruism in their insistence that each person’s interests are weighed precisely equally. Having sketched this problematic of altruism, the second half of this Introduction outlines the arguments of the four papers and review essay in this collection, each of which, in a different way, negotiates the difficult relationships between egoism, altruism, morality and impartiality. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

论战国时期齐国的人才价值观——由邹忌任相封君谈起

邹忌是田齐历史上的一个重要人物,任相封君,辅助国君称“强于天下”。根据相关史料对这一人物进行详细分析,我们可以了解到战国时期齐国人才思想的鲜明特点：德才兼备而更重才,与才相比,德的要求大降。这既富有战国时期鲜明的时代特色,又带有齐国社会风俗的一些印痕。     

The voice of self-control: Blocking the inner voice increases impulsive responding

Philosophers and psychologists have long-debated the notion that the voice in our heads might help us to control our actions. Evidence from a number of lines of research suggests that verbal resources help us to focus attention, providing reason to believe that the inner voice might aid self-control via this capacity. In this study we explored the link between verbal resources and self-control by occupying the inner voice and then assessing behavioral indices of self-control. Participants completed regular and switching versions of the Go/No-Go task while doing verbal or spatial secondary tasks. Compared with the spatial task, doing the verbal task resulted in more impulsive responding, as indicated by a greater tendency to make a ‘Go’ response, a pattern that was accentuated in the switching version of the Go/No-Go. Our results suggest that the inner voice helps us to exert self-control by enhancing our ability to restrain our impulses.     

Contrasting role morality and professional morality: implications for practice

Abstract The notion of role morality suggests individuals may adopt a different morality depending on the roles they undertake. Investigating role morality is important, since the mentality of role morality may allow agents to believe they can abdicate moral responsibility when acting in a role. This is particularly significant in the literature dealing with professional morality where professionals, because of their special status, may find themselves at odds with their best moral judgments. Here I tell four stories and draw out some distinctions. I conclude that role morality is a genuine and useful distinction. However, I suggest that the purported distinction between role morality and professional morality is over-determined. Therefore, alleged conflicts between the demands of role and profession (such as the different pressures on Pinto designers as employees and as engineers) are not conflicts between different kinds of demands, but rather conflicts arising from divergent roles that most workers will encounter regularly. Another analytical perspective is to look at moral choices at work in terms of power and the ability to bring about change. Finally, I draw the implication that we should stress moral awareness at a fairly abstract level for all employees and reinforce the moral primacy of individual choice.     

Nihilism,Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem

Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (advocated in recent years by Wright and Blackburn) that Mackie’s error theory can’t be true because if it were, we would have to give up morality or give up moralizing. I answer this argument with a little bit of help from Nietzsche. I then pose a problem, the Doppelganger Problem, for the meta-ethical nihilism that I attribute to Mackie and Nietzsche. (If A is a moral proposition then not-A is a moral proposition: hence not all moral propositions can be false.) I solve the problem by reformulating the error theory and also deal with a variant of the problem, the Reinforced Doppelganger, glancing at a famous paper of Ronald Dworkin’s. Thus, whatever its demerits, the error theory, is not self-refuting, nor does it require us to give up morality.     

Nietzsche contra contra: Difference and opposition

Nietzsche sees base morality and traditional philosophy as reactive, essentially predicated on negation and opposition. But is it possible to reject negation? To oppose oppositionality? This issue has been addressed by a variety of 20th century thinkers who think that the paradox is insurmountable. I use the thought of Deleuze to propose a way Nietzsche can respond to the accusation of paradox. Specifically, I believe Nietzsche proposes a set of philosophical terms that allow him to refer the question of opposition to a critical analysis of types of wills. Nietzsche attempts to show us a will that does not negate and oppose, but is rather affirmative. Its affirmation will be creative, rather than recognizing and reacting to an antecedent state of affairs or set of values. The purpose of this paper is to argue for the coherence and novelty of this conception of affirmative, noble will.     

A RESPONSE TO STANLEY KLEIN: A DIALOGUE ON THE RELEVANCE OF QUANTUM THEORY TO RELIGION

Abstract. I respond to Stanley Klein's critique of my essay “Quantum Reality, the Emergence of Complex Order from Virtual States, and the Importance of Consciousness in the Universe,” arguing in support of the necessity to derive a quantum perspective of evolution rather than adhering to an essentially classical view. In response to Klein's criticism of my concept of a cosmic morality, the origins of that concept are traced back to Zeno of Citium. I wholeheartedly embrace Klein's suggestion that the new science inspires views of the human condition that can help us make the world a better place.     

On Conflicts and Differences Among Women

Jana Sawicki uses the work and methods of Foucault to explore the possibility of a politics of difference. I argue that Foucault may help us overcome some forms of dogmatism inherited from men's political philosophy of the past, but Foucault is otherwise useless, or worse: misleading. Because Sawicki presents a politics of diversity among women regardless of, and independent from, a politics of sexual difference, I believe Foucault is misleading.     

“It All Comes Down to Imagination”: Reply to Commentary

In her generous and full discussion of my paper, Doris Brothers writes about patient's efforts to restore themselves following trauma and how that runs into walls caused by their “systemically emergent certainties.” She beautifully writes, “Since our capacity to hope depends on being able to tolerate uncertainty we sometimes join our patients in their hopelessness” (p. 231). Brothers emphasizes how Murakami can help us tolerate uncertainty. My emphasis is on how writers like Murakami help us restore our imaginative and empathic capacities. Frozen landscapes, as evoked by Murakami in “UFO in Kushiro,” are depictions of shut-down psychic states. Animated imagery helps to melt the ice, creating living motion in thought and affect. Both Brothers and I are looking at the crucial movement from simplified to complex shared states of mind. We seem at first to differ in our understanding of the function of rage in treatment, though I believe we may be discussing different clinical situations.     

The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals

So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory and some form of moral realism. While accepting the presuppositions of the evolutionary error theorist, I argue that contract-based approaches to morality can be sensitive to those presuppositions while still vindicating morality. Invoking Stephen Darwall’s distinction between contractualism and contractarianism, I go on to offer an evolutionary-based contractarianism.     

Moral objectivism across the lifespan

We report the results of two studies that examine folk metaethical judgments about the objectivity of morality. We found that participants attributed almost as much objectivity to ethical statements as they did to statements of physical fact and significantly more objectivity to ethical statements than to statements about preferences or tastes. In both studies, younger participants attributed less objectivity to ethical statements than older participants. Females were observed to attribute slightly less objectivity to ethical statements than males, and we found important interactions between attributions of objectivity and other factors, such as how strong participants’ moral opinions were and how much disagreement about the issue they perceived to exist within society. We believe our results have significant implications for debates about the nature of folk morality and about the nature of morality in general.