The coupling between spatial attention and other components of task-set: A task-switching investigation

Is spatial attention reconfigured independently of, or in tandem with, other task-set components when the task changes? We tracked the eyes of participants cued to perform one of three digit-classification tasks, each consistently associated with a distinct location. Previously we observed, on task switch trials, a substantial delay in orientation to the task-relevant location and tendency to fixate the location of the previously relevant task—“attentional inertia”. In the present experiments the cues specified (and instructions emphasized) the relevant location rather than the current task. In Experiment 1, with explicit spatial cues (arrows or spatial adverbs), the previously documented attentional handicaps all but disappeared, whilst the performance “switch cost” increased. Hence, attention can become decoupled from other aspects of task-set, but at a cost to the efficacy of task-set preparation. Experiment 2 used arbitrary single-letter cues with instructions and a training regime that encouraged participants to interpret the cue as indicating the relevant location rather than task. As in our previous experiments, and unlike in Experiment 1, we now observed clear switch-induced attentional delay and inertia, suggesting that the natural tendency is for spatial attention and task-set to be coupled and that only quasi-exogenous location cues decouple their reconfiguration.     

Losing control in front of a fearful face: The effect of emotional information on cognitive control

How is our cognitive control system modulated by emotional information, especially fearful stimuli? An intuitive hypothesis is that fearful stimuli would enhance cognitive control so that people could switch from the ongoing task to emergent events more quickly to secure themselves. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of emotional information on the shift function of cognitive control by using the task-cueing procedure, in which face images were presented as cues. With the gender of faces indicating which task to do, we manipulated the emotional valence of faces (neutral vs. fearful), finding that the switch costs were larger in the trials containing fearful cues than in the trials containing neutral cues (Experiment 1). This effect was not caused by enlarging task-set interference (Experiment 2), nor by slowing down cue encoding (Experiment 3). Contrary to the intuitive hypothesis, our results suggested that the endogenous task-set reconfiguration process was impaired when fearful faces were presented. We speculated that the benefit of decreasing cognitive flexibility in face of fearful stimuli is to speed up response in a dangerous environment, and this accelerating response is achieved by suppressing the goal-directed system to permit the fast, automatic stimulus-driven system to govern behaviours.     

Losing control in front of a fearful face: the effect of emotional information on cognitive control

How is our cognitive control system modulated by emotional information, especially fearful stimuli? An intuitive hypothesis is that fearful stimuli would enhance cognitive control so that people could switch from the ongoing task to emergent events more quickly to secure themselves. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of emotional information on the shift function of cognitive control by using the task-cueing procedure, in which face images were presented as cues. With the gender of faces indicating which task to do, we manipulated the emotional valence of faces (neutral vs. fearful), finding that the switch costs were larger in the trials containing fearful cues than in the trials containing neutral cues (Experiment 1). This effect was not caused by enlarging task-set interference (Experiment 2), nor by slowing down cue encoding (Experiment 3). Contrary to the intuitive hypothesis, our results suggested that the endogenous task-set reconfiguration process was impaired when fearful faces were presented. We speculated that the benefit of decreasing cognitive flexibility in face of fearful stimuli is to speed up response in a dangerous environment, and this accelerating response is achieved by suppressing the goal-directed system to permit the fast, automatic stimulus-driven system to govern behaviours.     

Priming of mental operations by masked stimuli

Motor responses can be affected by visual stimuli that have been made invisible by masking. Can masked visual stimuli also affect nonmotor operations that are necessary to perform the task? Here, I report priming effects of masked stimuli on operations that were cued by masking stimuli. Cues informed participants about operations that had to be executed with a forthcoming target stimulus. In five experiments, cues indicated (1) the required response, (2) part of the motor response, (3) the stimulus modality of the target stimulus, or (4) the task to be performed on a multidimensional stimulus. Motor and nonmotor priming effects followed comparable time courses, which differed from those of prime recognition. Experiment 5 demonstrated nonmotor priming without prime awareness. Results suggest that motor and nonmotor operations are similarly affected by masked stimuli.     

Unconscious vision and executive control: How unconscious processing and conscious action control interact

Research on unconscious or unaware vision has demonstrated that unconscious processing can be flexibly adapted to the current goals of human agents. The present review focuses on one area of research, masked visual priming. This method uses visual stimuli presented in a temporal sequence to lower the visibility of one of these stimuli. In this way, a stimulus can be masked and even rendered invisible. Despite its invisibility, a masked stimulus if used as a prime can influence a variety of executive functions, such as response activation, semantic processing, or attention shifting. There are also limitations on the processing of masked primes. While masked priming research demonstrates the top-down dependent usage of unconscious vision during task-set execution it also highlights that the set-up of a new task-set depends on conscious vision as its input. This basic distinction captures a major qualitative difference between conscious and unconscious vision.     

Inhibition of return in subliminal letter priming

The present study combined exogenous spatial cueing with masked repetition priming to study attentional influences on the processing of subliminal stimuli. Participants performed an alphabetic decision task (letter versus pseudo-letter classification) with central targets and briefly presented peripherally located primes that were either cued or not cued by an abrupt onset. A relatively long delay between cue and prime was used to investigate the effect of inhibition of return (IOR) on the processing of subliminal masked primes. Primes presented to the left visual field showed standard effects of Cue Validity and no IOR (significant priming with valid cues only). Primes presented to the right visual field showed no priming from valid cues (an IOR effect), and priming with invalid cues that depended on hand of response to letter targets (right-hand in Experiment 1, left-hand in Experiment 2). The results are interpreted in terms of a differential speed of engagement and disengagement of attention to the right and left visual fields for alphabetic stimuli, coupled with a complex interaction that arises between Prime Relatedness and response-hand.     

Boundary conditions for the influence of unfamiliar non-target primes in unconscious evaluative priming: The moderating role of attentional task sets

Evaluative priming by masked emotional stimuli that are not consciously perceived has been taken as evidence that affective stimulus evaluation can also occur unconsciously. However, as masked priming effects were small and frequently observed only for familiar primes that there also presented as visible targets in an evaluative decision task, priming was thought to reflect primarily response activation based on acquired S–R associations and not evaluative semantic stimulus analysis. The present study therefore assessed across three experiments boundary conditions for the emergence of masked evaluative priming effects with unfamiliar primes in an evaluative decision task and investigated the role of the frequency of target repetition on priming with pictorial and verbal stimuli. While familiar primes elicited robust priming effects in all conditions, priming effects by unfamiliar primes were reliably obtained for low repetition (pictures) or unrepeated targets (words), but not for targets repeated at a high frequency. This suggests that unfamiliar masked stimuli only elicit evaluative priming effects when the task set associated with the visible target involves evaluative semantic analysis and is not based on S–R triggered responding as for high repetition targets. The present results therefore converge with the growing body of evidence demonstrating attentional control influences on unconscious processing.     

Selective impairment of masked priming in dual-task performance

This study investigated the impact of divided attention on masked priming. In a dual-task setting, two tasks had to be carried out in close temporal succession: a tone discrimination task and a masked priming task. The order of the tasks was varied between experiments, and attention was always allocated to the first task—that is, the first task was prioritized. The priming task was the second (nonprioritized) task in Experiment 1 and the first (prioritized) task in Experiment 2. In both experiments, “novel” prime stimuli associated with semantic processing were essentially ineffective. However, there was intact priming by another type of prime stimuli associated with response priming. Experiment 3 showed that all these prime stimuli can reveal significant priming effects during a task-switching paradigm in which both tasks were performed consecutively. We conclude that dual-task specific interference processes (e.g., the simultaneous coordination of multiple stimulus–response rules) selectively impair priming that is assumed to rely on semantic processing.     

Unconscious biases in task choices depend on conscious expectations

Recent studies highlight the influence of non-conscious information on task-set selection. However, it has not yet been tested whether this influence depends on conscious settings, as some theoretical models propose. In a series of three experiments, we explored whether non-conscious abstract cues could bias choices between a semantic and a perceptual task. In Experiment 1, we observed a non-conscious influence on task-set selection even when perceptual priming and cue-target compound confounds did not apply. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that, under restrictive conditions of visibility, cues only biased task selection when the conscious task-setting mindset led participants to search for information during the time period of the cue. However, this conscious strategy did not modulate the effect found when a subjective measure of consciousness was used. Altogether, our results show that the configuration of the conscious mindset determines the potential bias of non-conscious information on task-set selection.     

Task switching: on the origin of response congruency effects

When people frequently alternate between simple cognitive tasks, performance on stimuli which are assigned the same response in both tasks is typically faster and more accurate than on stimuli which require different responses for both tasks, thus indicating stimulus processing according to the stimulus-response (S-R) rules of the currently irrelevant task. It is currently under debate whether such response congruency effects are mediated by the activation of an abstract representation of the irrelevant task in working memory or by "direct" associations between specific stimuli and responses. We contrasted these views by manipulating concurrent memory load (Experiment 1) and the frequency of specific S-R associations (Experiment 2). While between-task response congruency effects were not affected by the amount of concurrent memory load, they were much stronger for stimuli that were processed frequently in the context of a competitor task. These findings are consistent with the idea that a large portion of the congruency effects stems from direct S-R associations and they do not support a sole mediation by task-set activation in working memory.     

Unconscious cues bias first saccades in a free-saccade task

Visual–spatial attention can be biased towards salient visual information without visual awareness. It is unclear, however, whether such bias can further influence free-choices such as saccades in a free viewing task. In our experiment, we presented visual cues below awareness threshold immediately before people made free saccades. Our results showed that masked cues could influence the direction and latency of the first free saccade, suggesting that salient visual information can unconsciously influence free actions.     

Task switching: the effect of task recency with dual- and single-affordance stimuli

When we switch to a new task, performance is transiently relatively poor, but improves dramatically after one trial. Such a “switch cost” may result from the preceding task being highly primed while the new task is not yet primed. This predicts that it should become more difficult to switch back to Task A when more trials of Task B have intervened. Such a lag effect has been found in some but not in most previous experiments, and to resolve this discrepancy we examined the effects of task lag with different stimuli. We found that when stimuli uniquely and clearly cued the task—minimizing the need for control—switch reaction time increased with task lag. However, when the need for control was increased by using similar or identical stimuli in the two tasks, this lag effect was abolished or reversed. Thus only when control processes are minimized can priming explain the difficulty of switching back from Task B to Task A. Second, we asked how the impact of control is mediated in conditions where it is not minimized. If it is mediated through altering the relative activation states of competing tasks, then as it becomes easier to do one task—the relative task-set activation state is tipped in that task's favour—it should always become harder to do the other task. On the other hand, if control bias affects switch performance directly, this relationship need not hold. We found that as it becomes easier to perform one task it can become easier, not harder, to switch to the competing task. Thus control bias must act directly on switch performance, rather than only through its influence on relative task-set activation.     

Control processes in voluntary and explicitly cued task switching

Explicitly cued task switching slows performance relative to performing the same task on consecutive trials. This effect appears to be due partly to more efficient encoding of the task cue when the same cue is used on consecutive trials and partly to an additional task-switching process. These components were examined by comparing explicitly cued and voluntary task switching groups, with external cues presented to both groups. Cue-switch effects varied in predictable ways to dissociate explicitly cued and voluntary task switching, whereas task-switch effects had similar characteristics for both instructional groups. The data were well fitted by a mathematical model of task switching that included a cue-encoding mechanism (whereby cue repetition improves performance) and an additional process that was invoked on task-switch trials. Analyses of response-time distributions suggest that this additional process involves task-set reconfiguration that may or may not be engaged before the target stimulus is presented.     

Locus of inhibition in the masked priming of response alternatives

Masked prime stimuli presented immediately before target stimuli in a choice reaction task give rise to behavioral costs when the primes and the target stimuli are mapped to the same response and result in benefits when they are mapped to opposite responses. Researchers assume that this negative compatibility effect reflects inhibitory processes in the control of perceptuomotor links. The authors investigated whether the inhibition operates at the level of abstract central codes or at effector-specific motor stages. In 2 experiments (N = 8 participants in each), left or right hand or foot responses were required to target stimuli that were preceded by masked arrow primes mapped to the same response side as the target stimuli in compatible trials and to the opposite response side in incompatible trials; the primes were irrelevant in neutral trials. In Experiment 1, when the masked primes determined both response side and modality, there was no transfer of negative compatibility effects across response modalities. That finding is inconsistent with a central abstract locus of inhibition and suggests that inhibition operates at effector-specific motor stages. In Experiment 2, primes conveyed only response side information but left response modality uncertain, and negative compatibility effects were elicited for both hand and foot responses, suggesting that partially informative masked primes can trigger a parallel activation and subsequent inhibition of response processes within separate effector systems.     

Task switching: The effect of task recency with dual- and single-affordance stimuli

When we switch to a new task, performance is transiently relatively poor, but improves dramatically after one trial. Such a “switch cost” may result from the preceding task being highly primed while the new task is not yet primed. This predicts that it should become more difficult to switch back to Task A when more trials of Task B have intervened. Such a lag effect has been found in some but not in most previous experiments, and to resolve this discrepancy we examined the effects of task lag with different stimuli. We found that when stimuli uniquely and clearly cued the task—minimizing the need for control—switch reaction time increased with task lag. However, when the need for control was increased by using similar or identical stimuli in the two tasks, this lag effect was abolished or reversed. Thus only when control processes are minimized can priming explain the difficulty of switching back from Task B to Task A. Second, we asked how the impact of control is mediated in conditions where it is not minimized. If it is mediated through altering the relative activation states of competing tasks, then as it becomes easier to do one task—the relative task-set activation state is tipped in that task's favour—it should always become harder to do the other task. On the other hand, if control bias affects switch performance directly, this relationship need not hold. We found that as it becomes easier to perform one task it can become easier, not harder, to switch to the competing task. Thus control bias must act directly on switch performance, rather than only through its influence on relative task-set activation.     

Differential effects of cue changes and task changes on task-set selection costs

A task-switching paradigm with a 2:1 mapping between cues and tasks was used to separate cue-switching processes (indexed through pure cue-switch costs) from actual task-switching processes (indexed through additional costs in case of cue and task changes). A large portion of total switch costs was due to cue changes (Experiments 1 and 2), and cue-switch costs but not task-switch costs were sensitive to effects of practice (Experiment 1) and preparation (Experiment 2). In contrast, task-switch costs were particularly sensitive to response-priming effects (Experiments 1 and 2) and task-set inhibition (Experiment 3). Results suggest two processing stages relevant during task-set selection: cue-driven retrieval of task rules from long-term memory and the automatic application of rules to a particular stimulus situation.     

On the difficulty of task switching: Assessing the role of task-set inhibition

This study assessed whether or not the difficulty of task switching stems from previous inhibition of the task set. A predictable sequence of univalent stimuli (affording performance of one active task) and bivalent stimuli (affording performance of two tasks) was used in two experiments. Experiment 1 used an alternating-runs paradigm (AABB) and Experiment 2 used a strictly alternating sequence (ABAB). The critical variable was whether the incentive for task-set inhibition was strong (on bivalent trials) or weak (on univalent trials). The question was whether it would be more difficult to switch to a task that previously needed to be inhibited than to a task that did not need to be inhibited. This pattern was not observed in either experiment. Thus, the data provide no evidence that task switching is difficult because of the need to overcome recent task-set inhibition.     

Only pre-cueing but no retro-cueing effects emerge with masked arrow cues

The impact of masked stimulation on cognitive control processes is investigated with much interest. In many cases, masked stimulation suffices to initiate and employ control processes. Shifts of attention either happen in the external environment or internally, for example, in working memory. In the former, even masked cues (i.e., cues that are presented for a period too short to allow strategic use) were shown efficient for shifting attention to particular locations in pre-cue paradigms. Internal attention shifting can be investigated using retro-cues: long after encoding, a valid cue indicates the location to-be-tested via change detection, and this improves performance (retro-cue effect). In the present experiment, participants performed in both a pre- and a retro-cue task with masked and normally presented cues. While the masked cues benefitted performance in the pre-cue task, they did not in the retro-cue task. These results inform about limits of masked stimulation.     

Joint task switching

The present study investigates the representation of task-sets in a joint dual-task setting. To this end, a task-switching approach is used. Task switching is associated with a switch cost, which can be decomposed in several markers of task-set coordination. These markers can be used to investigate whether participants represent the co-actor's task-set in a joint dual-task setting. A joint task-switching procedure was used in which two participants performed a distinct task and the participants’ turn to respond could switch or repeat on a trial-by-trial basis. The results indicate that joint task switching also elicits a switch cost. However, this switch cost does not seem to be related to the representation of the co-actor's task-set. It is suggested that the switch cost observed in joint task switching is based on processes of task monitoring, which increase the saliency of task-irrelevant stimulus information.     

不同控制水平下的汉字语义加工

字词语义的加工是否受其它加工过程或操纵手段的控制一直是自动化研究的热点,以往针对英文字词的研究结果不尽一致。本研究以在该类研究中比英文单词更具优越性的汉字为材料,采用部件搜索任务,通过操纵控制水平的强弱探讨汉字的语义加工是否受控制这一问题。实验一考察汉字的语义是否受浅水平加工和无意识操纵的控制（低控制水平）;实验二探讨增强了的控制水平是否能够控制语义的加工。结果在实验一中发现了语义负启动效应;实验二出现了正启动和负启动效应。该结果表明,控制机制并不能阻止汉字语义加工本身的发生,仅能对已经产生激活的语义进行调控,提示汉字的语义加工是不可控的。