The attentional cost of inattentional blindness

When our attention is engaged in a visual task, we can be blind to events which would otherwise not be missed. In three experiments, 97 out of the 165 observers performing a visual attention task failed to notice an unexpected, irrelevant object moving across the display. Surprisingly, this object significantly lowered accuracy in the primary task when, and only when, it failed to reach awareness. We suggest that an unexpected stimulus causes a state of alert that would normally generate an attentional shift; if this response is prevented by an attention-consuming task, a portion of the attentional resources remains allocated to the object. Such a portion is large enough to disturb performance, but not so large that the object can be recognized as task-irrelevant and accordingly ignored. Our findings have one counterintuitive implication: irrelevant stimuli might hamper some types of performance only when perceived subliminally.     

Amodal processing of visual speech as revealed by priming

This study investigated the linguistic processing of visual speech (video of a talker's utterance without audio) by determining if such has the capacity to prime subsequently presented word and nonword targets. The priming procedure is well suited for the investigation of whether speech perception is amodal since visual speech primes can be used with targets presented in different modalities. To this end, a series of priming experiments were conducted using several tasks. It was found that visually spoken words (for which overt identification was poor) acted as reliable primes for repeated target words in the naming, written and auditory lexical decision tasks. These visual speech primes did not produce associative or reliable form priming. The lack of form priming suggests that the repetition priming effect was constrained by lexical level processes. That priming found in all tasks is consistent with the view that similar processes operate in both visual and auditory speech processing.     

Misdirected by the gap: the relationship between inattentional blindness and attentional misdirection

In several of our articles we have drawn analogies between inattentional blindness paradigms and misdirection. Memmert (2010) however, has criticized this analogy and urged for caution in assuming too much of a close relationship between these two phenomena. Here we consider the points raised by Memmert and highlight some misunderstandings and omissions in his interpretation of our work, which substantially undermine his argument. Debating the similarities and differences between aspects of misdirection and inattentional blindness is valuable and has the potential to highlight the utility of these two phenomena. However, it is important not to be misdirected by subtle differences between particular instances of each phenomenon, at the expense of failing to detect the opportunities that these phenomena present for extending our understanding of attention and awareness.     

Dissociation of processing time and awareness by the inattentional blindness paradigm

Consciousness researchers are interested in distinguishing between mental activity that occurs with and without awareness (i.e., explicit versus implicit processes). The inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm is an excellent tool for this question because it permits the independent manipulation of processing time and awareness. In the present study, we show that implicit texture segregation can occur during inattentional blindness, provided that the texture is exposed for a sufficient duration. In contrast, a Simon effect does not occur during inattentional blindness, even with similar exposure duration of the critical stimulus. This reveals a dissociation between processing time and awareness, consistent with the possibility of separate processing streams for explicit and implicit visual perception.     

Inattentional blindness for ignored words: Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks

Inattentional blindness is described as the failure to perceive a supra-threshold stimulus when attention is directed away from that stimulus. Based on performance on an explicit recognition memory test and concurrent functional imaging data Rees, Russell, Frith, and Driver [Rees, G., Russell, C., Frith, C. D., & Driver, J. (1999). Inattentional blindness versus inattentional amnesia for fixated but ignored words. Science, 286, 2504–2507] reported inattentional blindness for word stimuli that were fixated but ignored. The present study examined both explicit and implicit memory for fixated but ignored words using a selective-attention task in which overlapping picture/word stimuli were presented at fixation. No explicit awareness of the unattended words was apparent on a recognition memory test. Analysis of an implicit memory task, however, indicated that unattended words were perceived at a perceptual level. Thus, the selective-attention task did not result in perfect filtering as suggested by Rees et al. While there was no evidence of conscious perception, subjects were not blind to the implicit perceptual properties of fixated but ignored words.     

Crossmodal change blindness between vision and touch

Change blindness is the name given to people's inability to detect changes introduced between two consecutively-presented scenes when they are separated by a distractor that masks the transients that are typically associated with change. Change blindness has been reported within vision, audition, and touch, but has never before been investigated when successive patterns are presented to different sensory modalities. In the study reported here, we investigated change detection performance when the two to-be-compared stimulus patterns were presented in the same sensory modality (i.e., both visual or both tactile) and when one stimulus pattern was tactile while the other was presented visually or vice versa. The two to-be-compared patterns were presented consecutively, separated by an empty interval, or else separated by a masked interval. In the latter case, the masked interval could either be tactile or visual. The first experiment investigated visual-tactile and tactile-visual change detection performance. The results showed that in the absence of masking, participants detected changes in position accurately, despite the fact that the two to-be-compared displays were presented in different sensory modalities. Furthermore, when a mask was presented between the two to-be-compared displays, crossmodal change blindness was elicited no matter whether the mask was visual or tactile. The results of two further experiments showed that performance was better overall in the unimodal (visual or tactile) conditions than in the crossmodal conditions. These results suggest that certain of the processes underlying change blindness are multisensory in nature. We discuss these findings in relation to recent claims regarding the crossmodal nature of spatial attention.     

Revisiting the metacontrast dissociation: Comparing sensitivity across different measures and tasks

In the metacontrast dissociation procedure, presenting a masked shape prime prior to a visible shape target leads to reaction-time effects of the prime in an indirect measure, although participants cannot consciously detect prime shapes in a direct measure (Klotz & Neumann, 1999 Klotz, W. and Neumann, O. 1999. Motor activation without conscious discrimination in metacontrast masking. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 25: 976–992.  [Google Scholar]). This has been taken as evidence for the processing of unconscious input. The results of the present metacontrast dissociation study indicate that although participants are unable to consciously report the shape of the prime, they can consciously perceive motion between masked primes and visible targets in a hybrid direct/indirect measure (Experiments 1 and 3). This indicates that former tests did not provide an exhaustive measure for residual conscious perception of the prime in the metacontrast dissociation procedure. Further tests, however, reveal that residual motion perception cannot account for performance in the indirect measure (Experiments 2 and 3). Although the results thus leave the conception of processing of unconscious input intact, they may prompt a revision of its criteria.     

Gender differences in implicit and explicit processing of emotional facial expressions as revealed by event-related theta synchronization

Emotion information processing may occur in 2 modes that are differently represented in conscious awareness. Fast online processing involves coarse-grained analysis of salient features and is not represented in conscious awareness; offline processing takes hundreds of milliseconds to generate fine-grained analysis and is represented in conscious awareness. These processing modes may be studied using event-related electroencephalogram theta synchronization as a marker of emotion processing. Two experiments were conducted that differed on the mode of emotional information presentation. In the explicit mode, subjects were explicitly instructed to evaluate the emotional content of presented stimuli; in the implicit mode, their attention was directed to other features of the stimulus. In the implicit mode, theta synchronization was most pronounced in the early processing stage, whereas in the explicit mode, it was more pronounced in the late processing stage. The early processing stage was more pronounced in men, whereas the late processing stage was more pronounced in women. Implications of these gender differences in emotion processing for well-documented differences in social behavior are discussed.     

Release of inattentional blindness by high working memory load: elucidating the relationship between working memory and selective attention

An unexpected stimulus often remains unnoticed if attention is focused elsewhere. This inattentional blindness has been shown to be increased under conditions of high memory load. Here we show that increasing working memory load can also have the opposite effect of reducing inattentional blindness (i.e., improving stimulus detection) if stimulus detection is competing for attention with a concurrent visual task. Participants were required to judge which of two lines was the longer while holding in working memory either one digit (low load) or six digits (high load). An unexpected visual stimulus was presented once alongside the line judgment task. Detection of the unexpected stimulus was significantly improved under conditions of higher working memory load. This improvement in performance prompts the striking conclusion that an effect of cognitive load is to increase attentional spread, thereby enhancing our ability to detect perceptual stimuli to which we would normally be inattentionally blind under less taxing cognitive conditions. We discuss the implications of these findings for our understanding of the relationship between working memory and selective attention.     

Similarity and difference in the processing of same- and other-race faces as revealed by eye tracking in 4- to 9-month-olds

Fixation duration for same-race (i.e., Asian) and other-race (i.e., Caucasian) female faces by Asian infant participants between 4 and 9 months of age was investigated with an eye-tracking procedure. The age range tested corresponded with prior reports of processing differences between same- and other-race faces observed in behavioral looking time studies, with preference for same-race faces apparent at 3 months of age and recognition memory differences in favor of same-race faces emerging between 3 and 9 months of age. The eye-tracking results revealed both similarity and difference in infants’ processing of own- and other-race faces. There was no overall fixation time difference between same race and other race for the whole face stimuli. In addition, although fixation time was greater for the upper half of the face than for the lower half of the face and trended higher on the right side of the face than on the left side of the face, face race did not impact these effects. However, over the age range tested, there was a gradual decrement in fixation time on the internal features of other-race faces and a maintenance of fixation time on the internal features of same-race faces. Moreover, the decrement in fixation time for the internal features of other-race faces was most prominent on the nose. The findings suggest that (a) same-race preferences may be more readily evidenced in paired comparison testing formats, (b) the behavioral decline in recognition memory for other-race faces corresponds in timing with a decline in fixation on the internal features of other-race faces, and (c) the center of the face (i.e., the nose) is a differential region for processing same- versus other-race faces by Asian infants.     

Retrieval independence between parts and wholes in successive recognition tasks

Participants studied AB word pairs and completed three recognition tests. In one recognition test each A word was presented with two distractors that did not appear on the study list. In another recognition test each B word was presented with two distractors that did not appear on the study list. In a third recognition test an AB target was presented with two distractors composed of words not on the study list. Six different groups of participants each performed the recognition tests in a different order, so that all possible orders were tested. Recognition of the A, B, and AB targets for a given study pair were independent of each other when single-word recognition preceded double-word recognition. There was almost complete independence in the reverse order. Even when recognition judgements were restricted to those for which the participants were most confident, there was independence of recognition among the three tests. A pair recognition test served as an additional study trial for the individual words; however, the reverse was not the case. All of these results were predicted by a single three-parameter mathematical model derived from the hypothesis that single-word and double-word targets had independent representations in memory.     

Temporal processing within and across senses

This special issue on temporal processing within and across senses was the outcome of a two-day workshop that took place in Tübingen, Germany. The aim of the workshop and this special issue was to advance our knowledge on timing and the senses and to bring together two lines of research that have not yet interacted, those of synchrony and duration perception.     

Mind the gap: Misdirection, inattentional blindness and the relationship between overt and covert attention

The present commentary addresses two issues arising from Memmert’s (2010) paper. First, can the ‘misdirection’ and ‘inattentional blindness’ paradigms provide important insights into the relationship between ‘overt’ and ‘covert’ attentional processes? Second, what are the most fruitful directions for research that seeks to combine these attentional paradigms in ecologically valid settings? We argue that although Memmert’s (2010) paper postulates several important differences between the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms, it may not emphasise sufficiently strongly the significant insights into attention that have been yielded by the former approach. To illustrate, we discuss the utility of the misdirection paradigm in providing an ecologically valid method to investigate the relationship between overt and covert attentional processes. Such naturalistic methods are required to ensure optimal integration of the misdirection and inattentional blindness paradigms within a general theory of attention.     

Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and Seth

In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010), Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply, we claim that there is a difference between conscious visual experience, which may be partial, and the resulting conscious content, which is conceptual. Whereas PAS measures the first, confidence judgments and post-decision wagering measure the second.     

Both motor prediction and conceptual congruency between preview and action-effect contribute to explicit judgment of agency

The sense of agency is the sense that one is causing an action. The inferential account of the sense of agency proposes that we experience the sense of agency when we infer that one’s own thoughts are the cause of an action. According to this account, the inference occurs when a thought appears in consciousness prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by conspicuous other causes of the action. Alternatively, a predictive account of the sense of agency proposes that sensory prediction based on efferent (motor) information plays a critical role in generating the sense of agency. The present study investigated whether the sense of agency depended primarily on the conceptual congruence between preview information (i.e., to elicit a thought) and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the inferential account, or whether it depended primarily on the sensory-motor congruence between prediction and actual sensory feedback as suggested by the predictive account. The results indicated that both of these factors did contribute to the sense of agency, although sensory-motor congruence appears to have a more robust impact.     

Serial order processing in human infants and the role of multisensory redundancy

Perception, production, and understanding of sequences is fundamental to human behavior and depends, in large part, on the ability to detect serial order. Despite the importance of this issue across many domains of human functioning, the development of serial order skills has been neglected in developmental studies. The current article reviews evidence that the basic temporal and spatiotemporal skills that are necessary for the development of serial order skills emerge early in human development. The article then presents recent evidence from the authors laboratory showing that serial order perceptual skills emerge at the same time and improve rapidly. Consistent with a multisensory redundancy view of perception, when serial order perceptual abilities first emerge in infancy, they depend critically on the redundant specification of sequences in both the auditory and visual modalities. The findings suggest that infants ability to perceive the surface serial order characteristics of sequentially organized events provides the necessary antecedents to the development of more complex serial order skills that ultimately enable us to extract meanings from sequentially organized events and perform complex sequential actions.Edited by: Marie-Hélène Giard and Mark Wallace     

Gender moderates the relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem

Relative to men, women are more strongly socialized to trust their feelings and intuitions. We thus expected that the association between implicit and explicit self-esteem would be stronger for women than for men. That is, if implicit self-esteem contains a large intuitive, experiential or affective component, then people who are in touch with their feelings and intuitions should be more likely to report explicit self-esteem scores that are congruent with their implicit self-esteem scores. Six studies supported this idea by showing that the association between implicit and explicit self-esteem is indeed stronger for women than for men. This finding held in three different cultures and for two different measures of implicit self-esteem. We discuss the implications of this finding for debates regarding the nature and validity of implicit self-esteem.     

Attitude importance as a moderator of the relationship between implicit and explicit attitude measures

The authors examined attitude importance as a moderator of the relationship between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and explicit attitude measures. In Study 1 (N = 194), as ratings of attitude importance regarding the 2000 presidential election increased, the strength of the relationship between a Bush-Gore IAT and explicit attitude measures also increased. Study 2 provided a conceptual replication of these results using attitudes toward Coke and Pepsi (N = 112). In addition, across both studies, explicit attitude measures were better predictors of deliberative behaviors than IAT scores. In Study 3 (N = 77), the authors examined the role of elaboration as a mechanism by which attitude importance may moderate IAT-explicit attitude correlations. As predicted, increased elaboration resulted in stronger IAT-explicit attitude correlations. Other possible mechanisms by which attitude importance may moderate the IAT-explicit attitude relationship also are discussed.     

Dissociations between implicit and explicit memory in children: the role of strategic processing and the knowledge base

A review of the literature shows that explicit memory develops substantially from three years of age to adulthood, while implicit memory remains stable across this age range. Previously, this developmental dissociation has been attributed to different memory systems, or to confounds with perceptual vs. conceptual processing. Prompted by an alternative developmental framework, the experiments reported here provide evidence against both interpretations. Instead, it will be argued that (a) the implicit-explicit developmental dissociation reflects differences in strategic processing (strategy use and metamemory) across childhood and (b) that implicit memory can show development if a child's knowledge base in the tested domain is developing with age.     

Questioning implicit motor learning as instantiated by the pursuit-tracking task

The effect of concurrent visual feedback on the implicit learning of repeated segments in a task of pursuit tracking has been tested. Although this feedback makes it possible to regulate the positional error during the movement, it could also induce negative guidance effects. To test this hypothesis, a first set of participants (N?=?42) were assigned to two groups, which performed either the standard pursuit-tracking task based on the experimental paradigm of Pew (1974 Pew, R. W. 1974. Levels of analysis in motor control. Brain Research, 71: 393–400. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; group F-ST), or a task called “movement reproduction” in which the feedback was suppressed (group noF-ST). A second set of participants (N?=?26) performed in the same feedback condition groups but in a dual-task situation (F-DT and noF-DT; Experiment 2). The results appear to confirm our predictions since the participants in groups without feedback, contrary to those in groups with feedback, succeeded with practice in differentiating their performances as a function of the nature of the segments (repeated or nonrepeated) both in simple (Experiment 1) and in dual-task (Experiment 2) situations. These experiments indicate that the feedback in the pursuit-tracking task induces a guidance function potentially resulting in an easiness tracking that prevents the participants from learning the repetition.