Suppressing the truth as a mechanism of deception: Delta plots reveal the role of response inhibition in lying

Lying takes more time than telling the truth. Because lying involves withholding the truth, this “lie effect” has been related to response inhibition. We investigated the response inhibition hypothesis of lying using the delta-plot method: A leveling-off of the standard increase of the lie effect with slower reaction times would be indicative of successful response inhibition. Participants performed a reaction-time task that required them to alternate between lying and truth telling in response to autobiographical questions. In two experiments, we found that the delta plot of the lie effect leveled off with longer response latencies, but only in a group of participants who had better inhibitory skills as indexed by relatively small lie effects. This finding supports the role of response inhibition in lying. We elaborate on repercussions for cognitive models of deception and the data analysis of reaction-time based lie tests.     

Partners in Crime: How Liars in Collusion Betray Themselves1

The paradigmatic task for participants in studies on deception is to assess veracity on the basis of a single statement. However, in applied contexts, lie catchers are often faced with multiple statements (reported by one or several suspects). To appreciate this mismatch, we conducted a study where each member of 10 truth‐telling pairs and 10 lying pairs (reporting fabricated alibis) was interrogated twice about an alibi. As predicted, lying pair members were more consistent between themselves than were truth‐telling pair members, and single liars and truth tellers were equally consistent over time. Furthermore, truth tellers made more commissions than did liars. Although in line with our repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis, these findings contrast sharply with beliefs held by professional lie catchers and recommendations found in literature on deception detection. The results are translated into an applied psycholegal context.     

Chinese children's evaluations of white lies: weighing the consequences for recipients

This research examined how Chinese children make moral judgments about lie telling and truth telling when facing a “white lie” or “politeness” dilemma in which telling a blunt truth is likely to hurt the feelings of another. We examined the possibility that the judgments of participants (7-11 years of age, N = 240) would differ as a function of the social context in which communication takes place. The expected social consequences were manipulated systematically in two studies. In Study 1, participants rated truth telling more negatively and rated lie telling more positively in a public situation where telling a blunt truth is especially likely to have negative social consequences. In Study 2, participants rated truth telling more positively and rated lie telling more negatively in a situation where accurate information is likely to be helpful for the recipient to achieve future success. Both studies showed that with increased age, children’s evaluations became significantly influenced by the social context, with the strongest effects being seen among the 11-year-olds. These results suggest that Chinese children learn to take anticipated social consequences into account when making moral judgments about the appropriateness of telling a blunt truth versus lying to protect the feelings of another.     

外语焦虑、紧张情绪与认知负荷对外语说谎的影响：来自中-英双语者的证据

采用错误陈述范式探究中-英双语者用母语和外语说真话和说谎时的认知神经差异, 涉及外语焦虑、认知负荷和说谎诱发的紧张情绪。对P200和CNV观察发现：(1)中-英双语者用英语说真话的P200波幅比用母语大, 说明被试用英语说话时受外语焦虑情绪影响; (2)中-英双语者用英语说谎与说真话的P200波幅无显著差异, 但用母语说谎和讲真话的P200波幅差异显著, 说明被试用外语说谎没有用母语说谎诱发的紧张情绪大; (3)中-英双语者说谎时的CNV波幅比说真话时大, 说明被试说谎比说真话的认知负荷更大; (4)中-英双语者用英语说谎时的CNV波幅比用汉语说谎时大, 说明被试用外语说谎比用母语说谎产生了更大的认知负荷。相关分析表明, 英语熟练程度是影响中-英双语者用母语和外语说谎时的认知神经差异的重要变量。     

交往情景下个体对说谎的理解及其道德评价

研究探讨了个体理解交往情景下说谎／说真话概念及其道德评价上的年龄差异,以及事实成份、交往动机与交往情景因素在其中的作用。结果表明：(1)3岁到4岁是说谎概念理解的转折点;(2)除3岁儿童外,大部分被试依据事实成份来理解谎前真话;(3)从小学开始,随着年龄的增长,个体对“白谎”与直率真话的道德评价中越来越多地考虑到交往动机或情景因素。     

Adult credibility assessments of misinformed,deceptive and truthful children

This study compared how adults assess the credibility of children who either: (1) experienced a misleading suggestive interview, (2) were coached to lie or (3) experienced a non‐misleading interview. Preschool children (N = 24) were interviewed about a game they had played. One third of them spontaneously reported the truth, one third lied in response to coaching and one third spontaneously reported misinformation from a prior misleading suggestive interview. One hundred and twenty‐nine college students watched videotaped interviews of these children describing their alleged play activities and assessed their credibility. Children who had experienced misleading suggestive questioning were rated as less credible than those who were telling the truth and those who were lying. Adults could accurately detect truth‐telling children above chance, whereas accuracy was below chance detecting both lying children and children who had been misinformed. Adults were most confident of their ratings of truth‐telling children. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lying and executive control: an experimental investigation using ego depletion and goal neglect

This study investigated whether lying requires executive control using a reaction-time based lie test. We hypothesized that (1) goal neglect induced by a long response-stimulus interval (RSI; 5-8s) would make lying harder relative to a short RSI (.2 s) that promoted attentional focus, and (2) participants whose executive control resources were depleted by an initial executive control task would experience more difficulty to lie than control participants who performed a task that required little executive control. Across two experiments, the ego depletion manipulation did not reliably affect lying. Both experiments revealed that the cognitive cost associated with lying was larger for the long compared to the short RSI. This finding supports the idea that lying requires more executive control than truth telling. The manipulation of RSI may provide a simple, yet effective means to improve lie detection accuracy.     

Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

Lies,Damn Lies,and Expectations: How Base Rates Inform Lie–Truth Judgments

We are biased towards thinking that people are telling the truth. Our study represents the first test of how beliefs about the base rate of truths and lies affect this truth bias. Raters were told either 20, 50 or 80% of the speakers would be telling the truth. As the speaker delivered their statement, participants indicated moment by moment whether they thought the speaker was lying or being truthful. At the end of the statement, they made a final lie–truth judgment and indicated their confidence. While viewing the statement, base rate beliefs had an early influence, but as time progressed, all conditions showed a truth bias. In the final judgment at the end of the statement, raters were truth biased when expecting mostly truths but did not show a lie bias when expecting mostly lies. We conclude base rate beliefs have an early influence, but over time, a truth bias dominates. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sex and personality traits influence the difference between time taken to tell the truth or lie

A necessary component of lying is the withholding of a truthful response. Hence, lying may be conceptualised as involving the inhibition of an initial, automatic response (the truth) while an alternative response (the lie) is generated. We investigated response times to visually and auditorially presented questions probing recent episodic memory, when subjects answered questions truthfully or with lies. We also investigated whether the absolute response times or difference between time taken to tell the truth or lie was affected by participants' sex or correlated with personality scores on the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised-Short Scale. 61 subjects answered the same 36 questions five times. The first time involved answering all questions truthfully, which allowed post hoc analysis of whether subjects had been consistent in their lying and truth-telling on the following four occasions. These latter four occasions involved answering all questions (one each with 'truth' or 'lie') for both types of presentation. Regardless of type of presentation or subjects' sex, subjects took approximately 200 msec. longer to lie than to tell the truth in response to each question (p<.001). There were significant correlations between truthful response times to auditorially presented questions and Eysenck 'Neuroticism' scores. There was also a significant correlation for women between mean individual lie-minus-truth time to auditorially presented questions and Eysenck 'Lie' scores. These preliminary data suggest that response time is systematically longer when telling a lie and that personality variables may play a part in this process.     

Promising to tell the truth makes 8‐ to 16‐year‐olds more honest

Techniques commonly used to increase truth‐telling in most North American jurisdiction courts include requiring witnesses to discuss the morality of truth‐ and lie‐telling and to promise to tell the truth prior to testifying. While promising to tell the truth successfully decreases younger children's lie‐telling, the influence of discussing the morality of honesty and promising to tell the truth on adolescents' statements has remained unexamined. In Experiment 1, 108 youngsters, aged 8–16 years, were left alone in the room and asked not to peek at the answers to a test. The majority of participants peeked at the test answers and then lied about their transgression. More importantly, participants were eight times more likely to change their response from a lie to the truth after promising to tell the truth. Experiment 2 confirmed that the results of Experiment 1 were not solely due to repeated questioning or the moral discussion of truth‐ and lie‐telling. These results suggest that, while promising to tell the truth influences the truth‐telling behaviors of adolescents, a moral discussion of truth and lies does not. Legal implications are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

LYING PERSON-TO-PERSON ABOUT LIFE EVENTS: A COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK FOR LIE DETECTION

Undetected lies of prospective or current employees cost business billions of dollars annually. The ability to detect these lies would be of immense benefit. Several recent reports have called for research on new, theoretically based methods of lie detection. In response, we tested the Activation-Decision-Construction Model of lying ( Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphreys, 2003 ) according to which response time is a cue to deception. Participants were tested person-to-person. In Experiment 1, half lied to questions probing recent episodic memories. The other half answered honestly. Liar-truth teller response time differences were observed between subjects. Discriminant analyses demonstrated the value of response time for uncovering deceit. Those highest in social skills were the quickest liars. In Experiment 2, lying was shown to take longer than truth telling within subjects, and within-subject response time standard deviations were shown to be converging cues to deception. Based on these data and the ADCM, a Time-Restricted Integrity Confirmation (Tri-Con) framework for lie detection is proposed that might one day provide cost effective lie detection for business.     

Age-related differences in deception

Young and older participants judged the veracity of young and older speakers' opinions about topical issues. All participants found it easier to judge when an older adult was lying relative to a young adult, and older adults were worse than young adults at telling when speakers were telling the truth versus lying. Neither young nor older adults were advantaged when judging a speaker from the same age group. Overall, older adults were more transparent as liars and were worse at detecting lies, with older adults' worse emotion recognition fully mediating the relation between age group and lie detection failures.     

Lies,Harm, And Practical Interests

This paper outlines an account of the ethics of lying, which accommodates two main ideas about lying. The first of these, Anti‐Deceptionalism, is the view that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive. The second, Anti‐Absolutism, is the view that lying is not always morally wrong. It is argued that lying is not wrong in itself, but rather the wrong in lying is explained by different factors in different cases. In some cases such factors may include deceptive intentions on the part of the liar. In other cases, where such intentions are not found, the wrong in lying may be explained by other factors. Moreover, it is argued that the interaction between considerations against lying and considerations against telling the truth are sensitive to the practical interests of those lied to. When the topic of the lie in question matters little to the victim's rational decision making, the threshold for when considerations against telling the truth can outweigh considerations against lying are lowered. This account is seen to explain why lying to avoid little harm is sometimes permissible, and sometimes not.     

Promoting Honesty: The Influence of Stories on Children's Lie‐Telling Behaviours and Moral Understanding

Moral stories are a means of communicating the consequences of our actions and emphasizing virtuous behaviour, such as honesty. However, the effect of these stories on children's lie‐telling has yet to be thoroughly explored. The current study investigated the influence of moral stories on children's willingness to lie for another individual. Children were read one of three stories prior to being questioned about an accidental wrongdoing: (1) a positive story, which emphasized the benefits of being honest; (2) a negative story, which outlined the potential costs of lying; and (3) a neutral story, which was unrelated to truth‐telling or lie‐telling. Initially, most children withheld information about the event. Older children were better able to maintain their lies throughout the interview. However, when asked direct questions, children in the positive story condition were more likely to tell the truth than those in the negative and neutral conditions. No significant differences were found between the negative and neutral story conditions. The present study also investigated the relationship between children's conceptual understanding and behaviour. The findings revealed that children's knowledge of truths and lies increased with age. Children who lied had significantly higher conceptual scores than those who did not lie. Furthermore, the type of story children were read had a significant impact on their evaluations of true and false statements. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Right and Righteous: Children's Incipient Understanding and Evaluation of True and False Statements

Two studies examined young children's early understanding and evaluation of truth telling and lying and the role that factuality plays in their judgments. Study 1 (one hundred four 2- to 5-year-olds) found that even the youngest children reliably accepted true statements and rejected false statements and that older children's ability to label true and false (T/F) statements as “truth” and “lie” emerged in tandem with their positive evaluation of true statements and “truth” and their negative evaluation of false statements and “lie.” The findings suggest that children's early preference for factuality develops into a conception of “truth” and “lie” that is linked both to factuality and moral evaluation. Study 2 (one hundred twenty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds) revealed that whereas young children exhibited good understanding of the association of T/F statements with “truth,” “lie,” “mistake,” “right,” and “wrong,” they showed little awareness of assumptions about speaker knowledge underlying “lie” and “mistake.” The results further support the primacy of factuality in children's early understanding and evaluation of truth and lies.     

Cross-cultural differences in children's choices, categorizations, and evaluations of truths and lies

This study examined cross-cultural differences and similarities in children's moral understanding of individual- or collective-oriented lies and truths. Seven-, 9-, and 11-year-old Canadian and Chinese children were read stories about story characters facing moral dilemmas about whether to lie or tell the truth to help a group but harm an individual or vice versa. Participants chose to lie or to tell the truth as if they were the character (Experiments 1 and 2) and categorized and evaluated the story characters' truthful and untruthful statements (Experiments 3 and 4). Most children in both cultures labeled lies as lies and truths as truths. The major cultural differences lay in choices and moral evaluations. Chinese children chose lying to help a collective but harm an individual, and they rated it less negatively than lying with opposite consequences. Chinese children rated truth telling to help an individual but harm a group less positively than the alternative. Canadian children did the opposite. These findings suggest that cross-cultural differences in emphasis on groups versus individuals affect children's choices and moral judgments about truth and deception.     

Adult Detection of Children's Selfish and Polite Lies: Experience Matters

Five groups of participants (N = 150) with differing amounts of experience working with children were assessed on their ability to detect children's lying or truth telling. Children's lies were told for antisocial reasons (i.e., self‐serving lies) and for prosocial reasons (i.e., to benefit others). Overall, adults were more accurate at identifying children's dishonest statements than their true statements, and children's antisocial lies were detected more accurately than were their prosocial lies. While adults without experience were poor at detecting child lie tellers and truth tellers, adults with extensive child experience were better at distinguishing children's lies and truths.     

Children's and adults' conceptualization and evaluation of lying and truth‐telling

The present study examined children's and adults' categorization and moral judgment of truthful and untruthful statements. 7‐, 9‐ and 11‐year‐old Chinese children and college students read stories in which story characters made truthful or untruthful statements and were asked to classify and evaluate the statements. The statements varied in terms of whether the speaker intended to help or harm a listener and whether the statement was made in a setting that called for informational accuracy or politeness. Results showed that the communicative intent and setting factors jointly influence children's categorization of lying and truth‐telling, which extends an earlier finding (Lee & Ross, 1997) to childhood. Also, we found that children's and adults' moral judgments of lying and truth‐telling were influenced by the communicative intent but not the setting factor. The present results were discussed in terms of Sweetser's (1987) folkloristic model of lying. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Few Can Catch a Liar

Research suggests that most people cannot tell from demeanor when others are lying. Such poor performance is typical not only of laypeople but also of most professionals concerned with lying. In this study, three professional groups with special interest or skill in deception, two law-enforcement groups and a select group of clinical psychologists, obtained high accuracy in judging videotapes of people who were lying or telling the truth about their opinions. These findings strengthen earlier evidence that some professional lie catchers are highly accurate, and that behavioral clues to lying are detectable in real time. This study also provides the first evidence that some psychologists can achieve high accuracy in catching lies.