Reading ‘is’ Existentially in Republic 476–80

An existential reading of ‘is’ in the argument at Republic 476–480 is widely thought to be objectionable because it commits Plato to belief in degrees of existence. In this paper, I argue that neither proposed alternative—the veridical reading or the predicative reading—can be reconciled with the text, thus forcing the existential reading upon us. Further, I show that when Plato's doctrine of existence is properly understood, his commitment to degrees of existence is not at all absurd.     

Does luck have a place in epistemology?

Some epistemologists hold that exploration and elaboration of the nature of luck will allow us to better understand knowledge. I argue this is a mistake.     

What is so Magical About a Theory of Intrinsic Intensionality?

Abstract

Curiously missing in the vast literature on Hilary Putnam's so-called model-theoretic argument against semantic realism is any response from would-be proponents of what Putnam would call magical theories of reference. Such silence is surprising in light of the fact that such theories have occupied a significant position in the history of philosophy and the fact that there are still several prominent thinkers who would, no doubt, favor such a theory. This paper develops and examines various responses to Putnam's argument on behalf of the proponent of a magical theory of reference. While Putnam's explicit replies to such responses to his argument seem to involve little more than name calling, I develop arguments that show that there are significant problems facing any would-be proponent of such a view. While magical theories of reference are far from the strawmen Putnam seems to take them to be, there are, I argue, genuine reasons for a semantic realist to prefer a non-magical theory of reference.     

Is there a place for individual subjectivity within a social constructionist epistemology?

The epistemological turn towards social constructionism has become well established within the field of family systemic therapy. Social constructionism has provided therapists with a theoretical rationale for the concentration upon the social context within which individuals and families live their lives. This is a philosophical position that pushes to the margins the positivist premise that individuals have fixed and measurable personalities in favour of a discourse which proposes that the person is encountered differently within different social contexts. Prompted by the growing interest in systemic practice with individuals and by the rediscovery of the psychoanalytic canon within family therapy literature, the adequacy of this position is examined and an attempt is made to open up a space within social constructionist discourse for a theory of individual subjectivity. Findings from a research project are the starting point for this venture. These findings are understood through the lens of psychoanalytic theory, with particular reference to the work of Jacques Lacan.     

Personhood: What's in a name?

Although there are persistent metaphysical challenges to the notion of “natural kinds” of entities that are what they are essentially, all developed and useful taxonomies are based on just such notions. “Persons,” if they are to be distinguished from other kinds of things, must possess unique properties or the potential for acquiring such properties. Reductive strategies, far from locating these properties, ignore them and thus render the concept of “person” either ambiguous or unintelligible. The properties that count, it is argued here, are those associated with moral and civic forms of life.     

Erratum: Comment: What's in a name?

Erratum . New Blackfriars Volume 86, Number 1004
In this article by Fergus Kerr in Volume 86, Number 1004, July 2005: - p. 360, line 5 of text: 'He reaffirms his predecessor's condemnation of "Modernism" (he is said to have found a document delating himself in the papal in-tray); but, by these "new terms"' should read: 'He reaffirms his predecessor's condemnation of "Modernism" (he is said to have found a document delating himself in the papal in-tray); but, by these "new terms", he means the categorization of Catholics as "modernists" and "integrists".'     

Feelings of belonging in a congregation: a social–psychological assessment

The purpose of this study is to empirically evaluate a conceptual model that explores the social aspects of congregational life that promote feelings of belonging in a congregation. The following core hypotheses are embedded in this model: (1) individuals who go to church more often will receive more spiritual support from fellow church members; (2) people who get more spiritual support from coreligionists will have more practical wisdom; (3) those with more practical wisdom will be more likely to provide emotional support to the individuals in their congregation; (4) people who provide emotional support to fellow church members will be more highly valued by their coreligionists; and (5) individuals who feel they are valued by their fellow congregants will be more likely to believe that they belong in the place where they worship. Data from a recent nationwide survey (N?=?1154) of Christians provide support for each of these relationships.     

Personality: a vulnerability factor in rhinitis?

Personality traits were assessed in 63 patients with persistent allergic or non-allergic rhinitis with the Karolinska Scales of Personality, developed with the aim of measuring psychobiological vulnerability factors, and were compared with a reference group comprising a random sample of 400 sex- and age-stratified subjects. The patients' personality profile differed slightly - within one standard deviation - but significantly from the reference group on a number of factors together suggestive of a disinhibitory disposition, an inclination to express anxiety through somatic rather than psychological channels, difficulties in maintaining emotional distance to others, and a limited awareness of aggressive affect, a pattern that suggests that they expose themselves to more stimulation than they can process in terms of thought and feelings, generating sustained physiological arousal that may contribute to the development of their intolerance reactions.     

What shall we do with emergence? A survey of a fundamental issue in the metaphysics and epistemology of science

A survey of some recent literature on the concept of emergence provides a case study of an important issue in the general metaphysics and epistemology of science. Emergentism has often been motivated by the desire to avoid excessive reductionism in the philosophy of mind and culture and in the respective fields of the philosophy of science—philosophy of psychology and of the human and social sciences. Philosophers employing the concept of emergence usually argue that there are several ‘levels’ of reality and that the entities and properties of the ‘higher’ levels (e.g., mentality) emerge from those of the ‘lower’ ones (e.g., the physical universe). The standard division between ontological and epistemological approaches to this concept is shown to be inadequate through a critical discussion of emergence from the perspective of a pragmatist philosophy of science. It is argued that emergence should be conceived of both ontologically and epistemologically, because there is no humanly possible point of view for ontologizing about the way the world is structured in itself, entirely independently of our epistemic standpoints. Emergence thus turns out to be an example of the way in which the ‘pre-critical’ dispute between dogmatic metaphysics and skeptical reactions to it (which Kant famously wanted to overcome) still dominates philosophy of science. Hence, the problems of emergence and realism are observed to be intimately connected.     

Simplicity: a unifying principle in cognitive science?

Much of perception, learning and high-level cognition involves finding patterns in data. But there are always infinitely many patterns compatible with any finite amount of data. How does the cognitive system choose 'sensible' patterns? A long tradition in epistemology, philosophy of science, and mathematical and computational theories of learning argues that patterns 'should' be chosen according to how simply they explain the data. This article reviews research exploring the idea that simplicity drives a wide range of cognitive processes. We outline mathematical theory, computational results and empirical data that underpin this viewpoint.     

Confidentiality in psychological practice: a decrepit concept?

Although the principle of confidentiality in the relationship between psychologists and client has been vaunted, and is emphasised in the Australian Psychological Society's Code of Professional Conduct (the APS code; 1994), the confidentiality of this relationship is circumscribed by the absence of legal protections, the ethical beliefs of psychologists, institutional practices, and the provisions of the APS code itself. Lack of privilege in judicial proceedings, and statutory obligations to report certain types of behaviour, mandate breaches of confidentiality in some circumstances. Ethical beliefs of psychologists may support disclosure, especially where it is believed that there is danger of serious physical harm to the client or others. Multidisciplinary teams and institutional settings require the exchange of information for optimal delivery of services. Recent amendments to the APS code may require disclosure without the client's consent when a client is believed to be suicidal. Such developments, when considered at all, are typically regarded as exceptions to a general obligation of confidentiality. However, discussion of exceptions presupposes agreement on fundamental principle: the significance of, and rationale for, confidentiality in the psychologist-client relationship. It is argued in this paper that the obligation of confidentiality has been assumed rather than vigorously analysed and empirically explored. A critical examination of this obligation is the most appropriate starting point for the rehabilitation of contemporary principles of confidentiality in the psychologist-client relationship.     

Belief in astrology: a symptom of maladjustment?

Previous research has demonstrated that people with a greater belief in astrology show more signs of maladjustment than people who have less belief or none at all. However, those who have the greatest commitment, the astrologers themselves, have been neglected. In the present study 66 students of astrology completed the EPQ and the 16PF. In general, their mean scores did not show any consistent signs of neuroticism and their 16PF group profile was significantly different from those of various neurotic groups but very similar to that of a comparison group of psychology students. The only sign of maladjustment was in their high P scores but even these were not significantly higher than those of the psychology students.     

Configurality in judgment: Is it a bias?

Past research has shown that the relationship between cue and judgment often depends on the level of other cues (configural relationship). It is not clear, however, if this relationship is environmentally appropriate. To examine this issue, I compare configural models of the judgment with configural models of the criterion associated with this judgment. Two databases are analyzed. In one, the cues are the parents’ educational level, the judgment is the educational expectations of the child, and the criterion is the actual educational achievement. In the other, the cues are the MMPI scores of psychiatric patients, the judgment is the clinical psychologists’ estimation of the degree of pathology, and the criterion is the actual pathology. The analysis of both databases revealed that configurality characterizes the judgment but not the criterion.