Emergence of Life

Discussions of the origin of life usually assume that there is a specific event, however improbable, by which dead matter became a living entity. Naturalistic accounts, although in seeming opposition to theistic explanations of the apparent design of even the simplest cells, often share the assumption that there is a specific line to be crossed. If the problem is recast as one of a process of emergence of biochemistry from protobiochemistry, which in turn emerged from the organic chemistry and geochemistry of primitive earth, the resources of the new sciences of complex systems dynamics can provide a more robust conceptual framework within which to explore the possible pathways of chemical complexification leading to life. In such a view the emergence of life is the result of deep natural laws (the outlines of which we are only beginning to perceive) and reflects a degree of holism in those systems that led to life. Further, there is the possibility of developing a more general theory of biology and of natural organization from such an approach. The emergence of life may thus be seen as an instance of the broader innate creativity of nature and consistent with a possible natural teleology.     

DIVINE ACTION IN THE WORLD (SYNOPSIS)

The following is a synopsis of the paper presented by Alvin Plantinga at the Ratio conference on The Meaning of Theism held in April 2005 at the University of Reading. The synopsis has been prepared by the Editor, with the author's approval, from a handout provided by the author at the conference. The paper reflects on whether religious belief of a traditional Christian kind can be maintained consistently with accepting our modern scientific worldview. Many theologians, and also many scientists, maintain that the idea of divine intervention is at odds with the framework of natural laws disclosed by science. The paper argues that this notion of a ‘religion/science problem’ is misguided. When properly understood, neither the classical (Newtonian) picture of natural laws, nor the more recent quantum mechanical picture, rules out divine intervention. There is nothing in science, under either the old or the new picture, that conflicts with, or even calls in to question, special divine action, including miracles.     

LAWS IN ECOLOGY: DIVERSE MODES OF EXPLANATION FOR A HOLISTIC SCIENCE

Ecology's reputation as a holistic science is partly due to widespread misconceptions of its nature as well as shortcomings in its methodology. This article argues that the pursuit of empirical laws of ecology can foster the emergence of a more unified and predictive science based on complementary modes of explanation. Numerical analyses of population dynamics have a distinguished pedigree, spatial analyses generate predictive laws of macroecology, and physical analyses are typically pursued by the ecosystem paradigm. The most characteristically ecological laws, however, are found in biotic analyses in the functional trait paradigm. Holistic credentials for ecology may thus be restored on two bases: its accommodating complementary modes of analysis and explanation, and its having some laws within the least reductionistic mode consistent with its subject matter. These claims, grounded in the aspectual theory of Herman Dooyeweerd, lead to some suggestions for enhancing the versatility and usefulness of ecology—and other sciences—by balancing different research paradigms under a holistic vision.     

IN DEFENCE OF NATURAL DAYLIGHT

Objects appear different as the illumination under which they are perceived varies. This fact is sometimes thought to pose a problem for the view that colours are mind‐independent properties: if a coloured object appears different under different illuminations, then under which illumination does the object appear the colour it really is? I argue that given the nature of natural daylight, and certain plausible assumptions about the nature of the colours it illuminates, there is a non‐arbitrary reason to suppose that it is under natural daylight that we are able to perceive the real colours of objects.     

Pragmatism,enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism

This paper argues that it is possible to combine enactivism and ecological psychology in a single post-cognitivist research framework if we highlight the common pragmatist assumptions of both approaches. These pragmatist assumptions or starting points are shared by ecological psychology and the enactive approach independently of being historically related to pragmatism, and they are based on the idea of organic coordination, which states that the evolution and development of the cognitive abilities of an organism are explained by appealing to the history of interactions of that organism with its environment. It is argued that the idea of behavioral or organic coordination within the enactive approach gives rise to the sensorimotor abilities of the organism, while the ecological approach emphasizes the coordination at a higher-level between organism and environment through the agent’s exploratory behavior for perceiving affordances. As such, these two different processes of organic coordination can be integrated in a post-cognitivist research framework, which will be based on two levels of analysis: the subpersonal one (the neural dynamics of the sensorimotor contingencies and the emergence of enactive agency) and the personal one (the dynamics that emerges from the organism-environment interaction in ecological terms). If this proposal is on the right track, this may be a promising first step for offering a systematized and consistent post-cognitivist approach to cognition that retain the full potential of both enactivism and ecological psychology.

     

From the Critique of judgment to the hermeneutics of nature: Sketching the fate of philosophy of nature after Kant

This paper proposes an interpretative framework for some developments of the philosophy of nature after Kant. I emphasize the critique of the economy of nature in the Critique of judgement. I argue that it resulted in a split of a previous structure of knowledge; such a structure articulated natural theology and natural philosophy on the basis of the consideration of the order displayed by living beings, both in their internal organisation and their ecological distribution. The possibility of a philosophical discourse on nature that is neither mathematical nor theological stemmed from this shift. I call “hermeneutics of nature” such a program, since it aims at unpacking an immanent meaning in nature that is not explicated by the sciences of nature, which are dealing with the laws of nature. The Naturphilosophie, undertaken by Schelling, as well as the philosophies of nature of Hegel and Schopenhauer, are several realizations of this program. I highlight the structural traits that they share, such as a pregnant sense of conflicts in nature, an emphasis on the riddles of gender, and above all a prominent status given to organisms as a clue to the meaning of nature. Finally, I try to sketch the ramifications of this hermeneutics of nature in contemporary philosophy, especially phenomenology, and argue that the coming philosophy of nature, as shown by the attempts of syntheses between phenomenology and ecology, seems to depart from this hermeneutical program.     

Susanna Newcome's cosmological argument

ABSTRACT

Despite its philosophical interest, Susanna Newcome's Enquiry into the Evidence of the Christian Religion (1728, revised 1732) has received little attention from commentators. This paper seeks to redress this oversight by offering a reconstruction of Newcome's innovative argument for God's existence. Newcome employs a cosmological argument that differs from Thomist and kalām version of the argument. Specifically, Newcome challenges the idea that the causal chains observed in nature can exist independently. She does this through an appeal to findings from Newtonian natural philosophy that suggest that the universe has entropic tendencies. This suggests the the continued operations of nature are dependent on a cause external to the universe. Newcome identifies this external cause with God. Various strengths and weaknesses of Newcome's argument are discussed and an attempt is made to situate the argument within her broader epistemic framework and the larger context of Newtonian physico-theology. The paper also explores what is known of Newcome's biography and intellectual milieu.     

"顺天应人"的生态自然观与中国古典建筑

“顺天应人”是中国古代生态自然观的主要内容,一方面指人应该顺应自然规律,另一方面指人应该发挥主观能动性,改造自然环境,使之适应人的生存和生活。“顺天应人”的生态自然观对中国古典建筑观念产生了重要的影响,主要体现在“虽由人作、宛自天开”的建筑观和“因地制宜、因势利导”的建筑观方面。无论是顺天还是应人,目的都是使人与自然和谐共处、相得益彰,这对于现代生态伦理学和现代生态建筑学都是具有启发意义的。     

《格萨尔》史诗中的生态文化及其现代转换

《格萨尔》史诗蕴藏的丰富的生态文化起源于原始崇拜与宗教信仰,其哲理基础是二元的,藏传佛教“众生平等”的宗教理念是史诗中生态文化的主要哲理基础。古代藏族人民以宗教信仰与宗教惩罚、部落法规及习俗禁忌等社会机制为手段对藏区的自然生态进行了有效的保护,在藏区建立了和谐的生态环境。在生态问题叠出的今天,探讨史诗中的传统生态文化向现代生态文化的转换则具有极为重要的现实意义。建立正确的生态伦理观与自然观,转变生态理念,完善生态保护的制度化、规范化则是进行现代转换的三条主要途径。唯此,《格萨尔》史诗才能在生态的21世纪更加凸显其传统生态文化的现代意义。     

Science,Religious Naturalism,and Biblical Theology: Ground for the Emergence of Sustainable Living

During this century, humans must learn to live in ways that are sustainable, both ecologically and morally. The global community already consumes more ecological resources than Earth can generate; population growth and increasing development are widening that gap. We suggest that paths to sustainability can be found by mindful reflection on meanings discerned in the convergence of a scientific understanding of nature, religious naturalism, and biblical understandings of creation. The patterns of ecological sustainability observed in natural systems and the wise ways of relating to the land discerned in the Hebrew Bible suggest that sustainability must be grounded in social and ecological justice and that just ways of living can emerge from a deep sense of the ways in which nature and all of humanity are interdependent. We conclude that the twentieth-century emphasis on individual control of our future must make room for the emergence of a new understanding of mutuality. There can be no flourishing apart from mutual flourishing.     

On the Distinctive Features of Ecological Laws

Ecological psychology is grounded in the assumption of the availability of lawlike regularities in the world as the basis of reliable information for perceiving-acting systems. This article aims to articulate some of the necessary conditions for an account of lawfulness that accommodates ecological theories of perceiving and acting. This attempt considers historically influential accounts of laws but offers modifications of the notions of law and especially of cause that are of greater relevance to the practice of an ecological science. A guiding assumption is that the laws of the animate are the most general. The authors advocate understanding laws in reference to reliable regularities, causes as not being strictly Newtonian in character, and flexibility with respect to certain formal and philosophical commitments.     

Two Ways Of Looking At A Newtonian Supertask

A supertask is a process in which an infinite number of individuated actions are performed in a finite time. A Newtonian supertask is one that obeys Newton's laws of motion. Such supertasks can violate energy and momentum conservation and can exhibit indeterministic behavior. Perez Laraudogoitia, who proposed several Newtonian supertasks, uses a local, i.e., particle-by-particle, analysis to obtain these and other paradoxical properties of Newtonian supertasks. Alper and Bridger use a global analysis, embedding the system of particles in a Banach space, to determine the origin of the strange behavior. This paper provides a common framework for the discussion of both the local and global methods of analysis. Using this single framework, the areas of disagreement and agreement are made explicit. Further examples of supertasks are proposed to illuminate various aspects of the discussion.     

Humanistic Psychology and the Contemporary Crisis of Reason

Abstract

Humanistic psychology has a long-standing tradition of challenging implicit assumptions about the nature of subjectivity. These challenges and critiques have exposed psychology's “natural attitude” and in so doing, have led it in a more liberatory direction. However, the role of the rational, especially as it has been used to sustain an oppressive status quo, remains an undertheorized topic within humanistic psychology. For example, privileging the role of the rational within humanistic discourse has inadvertently contributed to dichotomous and essentialist views of femininity and masculinity. To truly appreciate the sociopolitical grounding of identity and experience, humanistic psychology must be willing to examine and relinquish its (over) investment in rationality.     

PROCESS ECOLOGY: STEPPING STONES TO BIOSEMIOSIS

Many in science are disposed not to take biosemiotics seriously, dismissing it as too anthropomorphic. Furthermore, biosemiotic apologetics are cast in top‐down fashion, thereby adding to widespread skepticism. An effective response might be to approach biosemiotics from the bottom up, but the foundational assumptions that support Enlightenment science make that avenue impossible. Considerations from ecosystem studies reveal, however, that those conventional assumptions, although once possessing great utilitarian value, have come to impede deeper understanding of living systems because they implicitly depict the evolution of the universe backward. Ecological dynamics suggests instead a smaller set of countervailing postulates that allows evolution to play forward and sets the stage for tripartite causalities, signs, and interpreters—the key elements of biosemiosis—to emerge naturally out of the interaction of chance with configurations of autocatalytic processes. Biosemiosis thereby appears as a fully legitimate outgrowth of the new metaphysic and shows promise for becoming the supervenient focus of a deeper perspective on the phenomenon of life.     

Integrating Human and Natural Systems in Community Psychology: An Ecological Model of Stewardship Behavior

Community psychology (CP) research on the natural environment lacks a theoretical framework for analyzing the complex relationship between human systems and the natural world. We introduce other academic fields concerned with the interactions between humans and the natural environment, including environmental sociology and coupled human and natural systems. To demonstrate how the natural environment can be included within CP’s ecological framework, we propose an ecological model of urban forest stewardship action. Although ecological models of behavior in CP have previously modeled health behaviors, we argue that these frameworks are also applicable to actions that positively influence the natural environment. We chose the environmental action of urban forest stewardship because cities across the United States are planting millions of trees and increased citizen participation in urban tree planting and stewardship will be needed to sustain the benefits provided by urban trees. We used the framework of an ecological model of behavior to illustrate multiple levels of factors that may promote or hinder involvement in urban forest stewardship actions. The implications of our model for the development of multi-level ecological interventions to foster stewardship actions are discussed, as well as directions for future research to further test and refine the model.     

A Peircean Theory of Decision

It is sometimes argued that the fact that possession of perfect knowledge about the future is impossible, means that it is impossible for decisions to be rational. This reasoning is fallacious. If rationality is given a new interpretation, then decisions can be considered rational. A theory of decision that has as its basis Peirce’s theory of abduction can provide a new way of understanding decisions as rational processes. The Peircean theory of decision (i) considers decisions as part of a complete strategy, and (ii) shows that decision making is governed by the same rules as scientific abduction. These rules are neither permissive rules like rules of deductive inference nor predictive like laws of nature, but rather genuine laws of conduct that determine what step should be made, if a given end is to be reached. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Emergence: selection,allowed operations,and conserved quantities

We treat emergence via reference to four ideas: (1) the different levels of emergence are characterised by distinct conservation laws, (2) the emergence process starts from some instability, (3) the driving force of emergence is given by selection processes allowing canalisation of specific (emerging) paths, and (4) new forms of stability are determined by new kinds of operations. At a quantum-mechanical level entropy is conserved in an isolated system or at global level and the only allowed operations are local shifts in order and disorder – that implies weakening and strengthening correlations. The stable state is here represented by a highly symmetric state. Emergence of the classical physical world arises when energy is conserved and allowable operations include building and breaking of physical-chemical connections. The stable state is here the energy minimum. Emergence of the biotic world implies that the conserved quantity is energy efficiency. Energy is no longer locally conserved. The allowed operations are those that are consistent with the survival (persistence) of the organism. The emergence of the mind is grounded in selecting those operations that are rational (in the sense of maintaining biological self-organisation). Here, the rational value of behaviour is the quantity of interest. Mounting the ladder of (both cosmic and biological) evolution means to have more and more selection of the possible outcomes (and therefore of the relative operations) but in a growing space of possibilities: if selection would reduce more and more the space of possibilities, the final result would be a rigid order; at the other extreme, if we had only expansion of the possibilities without selection, the final result would be disorder. So growing complexity can be understood as a path in the evolutionary landscape of the systems in which a balance of order and disorder is maintained although each level emerges as a result of the selection.     

Theory change as dimensional change: conceptual spaces applied to the dynamics of empirical theories

This paper offers a novel way of reconstructing conceptual change in empirical theories. Changes occur in terms of the structure of the dimensions—that is to say, the conceptual spaces—underlying the conceptual framework within which a given theory is formulated. Five types of changes are identified: (1) addition or deletion of special laws, (2) change in scale or metric, (3) change in the importance of dimensions, (4) change in the separability of dimensions, and (5) addition or deletion of dimensions. Given this classification, the conceptual development of empirical theories becomes more gradual and rationalizable. Only the most extreme type—replacement of dimensions—comes close to a revolution. The five types are exemplified and applied in a case study on the development within physics from the original Newtonian mechanics to special relativity theory.     

EMERGENCE EVERYWHERE?! REFLECTIONS ON PHILIP CLAYTON'S MIND AND EMERGENCE

Abstract. Emergence is a powerful concept marked by great emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual appeal. It makes inroads into the understanding of the most diverse phenomena. Emergence appears to have the potential of explaining anything from the behavior of atoms, ant colonies, and traffic jams to insurance risks, human consciousness, and divine action. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence (2004) offers much‐needed clarification of the philosophical grounding of emergence theory. To a large extent, emergence hinges on the concept of levels and hierarchies in nature. The preferred metaphor is that of a ladder. Given the tendency of concepts like emergence to build ideology, a careful analysis of language and metaphor is called for, however. I argue that the preference for the ladder metaphor does not do justice to the differentiated relationality that is a distinct mark of emergence. This oversight may have detrimental consequences when emergence theory is transferred from natural to social and cultural processes. A hermeneutical analysis suggests that better metaphors and visualizations need to be found. As an invitation to consider alternatives, some examples of complex regular poly topes are offered.