共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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本文首先追溯了"诗"和"哲学"在古希腊语境中的原始涵义,并对柏拉图批评诗的思想史背景做了某种程度上的还原。在这些铺垫之后,文章的主体部分详细阐明了柏拉图如何在"教化"和"真理"这两个基本视域中展开他的"文艺批评",并且指出了这两种视域之间的内在张力。文章的最后部分对如何确认诗与哲学各自的地位做了几点提示。 相似文献
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Ermanno Bencivenga 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(2):158-169
Since Descartes, mathematics has been dominated by a reductionist tendency, whose success would seem to promise greater certainty: the fewer basic objects mathematics can be understood as dealing with, and the fewer principles one is forced to assume about these objects, the easier it will be to establish a secure foundation for it. But this tendency has had the effect of sharply limiting the expressive power of mathematics, in a way that is made especially apparent by its disappointing applications to the social sciences. We should move in the opposite direction: toward a mathematics that deals in general with constructed objects, and whose scope includes fictional, poetic characters as much as numbers and sets. 相似文献
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Studies in Philosophy and Education - 相似文献
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Alex Blum 《Philosophical Investigations》2011,34(4):393-395
The theme of the paper is that what is true cannot be false and conversely. This position was anticipated by Aristotle in De Interpretatione and by G. H. von Wright. The latter calls it “a truth of the logic of relative modalities.” Aristotle has been taken to task by Susan Haack and others for arguing fallaciously from the Principle of Bivalence, that every statement is either true or false, to fatalism. The implication holds, but we show that it is unreasonable to assume that Aristotle grounded his argument on this implication rather than on what we call the force of truth. 相似文献
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This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence.
I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look
at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee
to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing.
I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the
burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden.
This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
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Ernest Adams 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2002,83(3):207-222
This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like "It is raining" seem to fit best the bivalent "scheme" of classical logic, the general proposition "It is always raining" is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a "practically vague" proposition like "The lecture will start at 1" is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this "rating system" are commented on. 相似文献
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John Peterson 《Ratio》2000,13(3):234-238
Truth implies mind because falsity does and the same analysis must be given of each. Some philosophers (Aristotle, Brentano) express this by saying that 'true' and 'false' apply strictly speaking to judgments and derivatively to everything else. A consequence of this is that all non-judgmental senses of 'true' and 'false' include some relation to a judgment. But counterexamples to this occur. So an alternative assay must be sought which both covers all cases and retains the idea that truth is mind-dependent. Under this correction, something is true if and only if it conforms to an ideal standard or measure.
This broader view of truth is compatible with realism and conceptualism but not with nominalism. If there are independent reasons for rejecting realism, it follows that conceptualism is true and universals exist only in minds. 相似文献
This broader view of truth is compatible with realism and conceptualism but not with nominalism. If there are independent reasons for rejecting realism, it follows that conceptualism is true and universals exist only in minds. 相似文献
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Journal of Philosophical Logic - I apply the notions of alethic reference introduced in previous work in the construction of several classical semantic truth theories. Furthermore, I provide... 相似文献
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Jan Woleński 《Axiomathes》2010,20(2-3):347-355
This paper investigates relations between truth and consistency. The basic intuition is that truth implies consistency, but the reverse dependence fails. However, this simple account leads to some troubles, due to some metalogical results, in particular the Gödel-Malcev completeness theorem. Thus, a more advanced analysis is required. This is done by employing the concept of ω-consistency and ω-inconsistency. Both concepts motivate that the concept of the standard truth should be introduced as well. The results are illustrated by an interpretation of the well-known logical square and its generalization. 相似文献
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In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself. 相似文献
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Truth and reflection 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Yablo 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》1985,14(3):297-349
Conclusion Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics lie between fixed point and stability semantics? In what sense, exactly, are our semantical rules inconsistent? In what sense, if any, does their inconsistency resolve the problem of the paradoxes?The ideals of strength, grounding, and closure together define an intuitively appealing conception of truth. Nothing would be gained by insisting that it was the intuitive conception of truth, and in fact recent developments make me wonder whether such a thing exists. However that may be, until the alternatives are better understood it would be foolish to attempt to decide between them. Truth gives up her secrets slowly and grudgingly, and loves to confound our presumptions. 相似文献