Do new objects capture attention?

The visual system relies on several heuristics to direct attention to important locations and objects. One of these mechanisms directs attention to sudden changes in the environment. Although a substantial body of research suggests that this capture of attention occurs only for the abrupt appearance of a new perceptual object, more recent evidence shows that some luminance-based transients (e.g., motion and looming) and some types of brightness change also capture attention. These findings show that new objects are not necessary for attention capture. The present study tested whether they are even sufficient. That is, does a new object attract attention because the visual system is sensitive to new objects or because it is sensitive to the transients that new objects create? In two experiments using a visual search task, new objects did not capture attention unless they created a strong local luminance transient.     

When do luminance changes capture attention?

In two experiments, we examined the ability of task-irrelevant changes in luminance to capture attention in an irrelevant singleton search. By using uniform increment and decrement arrays, we were able to create changes of the same absolute magnitude, but resulting in a singleton with either higher or lower contrast magnitude, relative to other elements in the search array. A condition where a singleton changed contrast polarity without a concomitant change in the overall contrast magnitude was also included. It was found that only luminance changes resulting in a singleton having increased contrast (or saliency) were effective in capturing attention. In addition, no attentional capture was observed when the irrelevant singleton was characterized by the equivalent amount of static luminance differences, suggesting a unique attentional prioritization of luminance changes that increase singleton saliency.     

Do locally defined feature discontinuities capture attention?

Results from previous visual search studies have suggested that abrupt onsets produce involuntary shifts of attention (i.e., attentional capture), but discontinuities in simple features such as color and brightness do not (Jonides & Yantis, 1988). In the present study we tested whether feature discontinuities (i.e., “singletons”) can produce attentional capture in a visual search task if defined “locally” or over a small spatial range. On each trial, a variable number of letters appeared, one of which differed from the others in color or intensity. The location of this singleton was uncorrelated with target location. Local discontinuities were created by embedding the letters in a dot texture. In Experiment 1, display size effects for singleton targets were not reduced with the addition of a background dot texture. Similar results were obtained in Experiment 2, regardless of variations in texture density. Experiment 3 confirmed that when targets are defined by a color or intensity singleton, they are detected preattentively, and that increasing texture density yields faster detection. We conclude that the spatial range over which feature discontinuities are defined may influence the guidance of spatial attention, but it has no influence on their ability to capture attention.     

Do happy faces capture attention? The happiness superiority effect in attentional blink

This study investigated the influence of positive affect on attentional blink (AB) with schematic faces. Results of Experiment 1 showed that the AB effect was smaller for both upright and inverted positive face icons than other face icons (neutral and angry faces) of corresponding orientations, confirming and extending the results of the earlier study by Mack, Pappas, Silverman, and Gay (2002). Results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that this attenuation of AB was unlikely to be attributable to attentional capture by the happy face. Perceptual saliency is suggested as a likely cause of the effect.     

Do hands attract attention?

Social stimuli, like faces (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997) or bodies (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001), engage specific areas within the visual cortex. Behavioural research reveals an attentional bias to these same stimuli (Ro, Friggel, & Lavie, 2007). The current study examined whether there is an attentional bias towards hands, and whether such a bias is distinct from any bias towards human bodies. In a two-alternative, forced-choice dot-probe task, participants saw two side-by-side pictures for 500 ms. A probe dot then appeared on either side and participants indicated where the dot appeared. Participants were significantly faster to respond when the probe location coincided with the location of pictures of bodies, hands, or feet, compared to dogs, starfish, hand tools, toaster ovens, inverted hands, or inverted bodies. Results suggest an attentional bias to bodies and body parts but found no evidence of a difference in attentional advantage of hands over bodies or feet.     

Does imminent threat capture and hold attention?

According to models of attention and emotion, threat captures and holds attention. In behavioral tasks, robust evidence has been found for attentional holding but not for attentional capture by threat. An important explanation for the absence of attentional capture effects is that the visual stimuli used posed no genuine threat. The present study investigated whether visual cues that signal an aversive white noise can elicit attentional capture and holding effects. Cues presented in an attentional task were simultaneously provided with a threat value through an aversive conditioning procedure. Response latencies showed that threatening cues captured and held attention. These results support recent views on attention to threat, proposing that imminent threat captures attention in everyone.     

Contingent attentional capture or delayed allocation of attention?

Under certain circumstances, external stimuli will elicit an involuntary shift of spatial attention, referred to as attentional capture. According to the contingent involuntary orienting account (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992), capture is conditioned by top-down factors that set attention to respond involuntarily to stimulus properties relevant to one's behavioral goals. Evidence for this comes from spatial cuing studies showing that a spatial cuing effect is observed only when cues have goal-relevant properties. Here, we examine alternative, decision-level explanations of the spatial cuing effect that attribute evidence of capture to postpresentation delays in the voluntary allocation of attention, rather than to on-line involuntary shifts in direct response to the cue. In three spatial cuing experiments, delayed-allocation accounts were tested by examining whether items at the cued location were preferentially processed. The experiments provide evidence that costs and benefits in spatial cuing experiments do reflect the on-line capture of attention. The implications of these results for models of attentional control are discussed.     

Can one pay attention to a particular color?

In an array of elements whose colors vary can we selectively choose to process all the items of a particular color preferentially in relation to those of another color? We addressed this question by presenting subjects with arrays containing many elements, and recording reaction times to a luminance change of one of the elements. Half the elements had one color and the other half another color--the spatial distribution being random. In two tasks--a simple detection of this change or a choice reaction time to the polarity of the change--we found that reaction times were independent of the number of items in the array. Cuing the subjects as to the color of the target item had no significant influence on the detection task, but subjects were faster if cued for the discrimination task. A further experiment replicated these findings and examined possible costs and benefits. Our final experiment separated the roles of attentional guidance and postattentional processes by having subjects judge the orientation of the target element and varying the magnitude of the target flash that defined which element was the target. We found that this judgment was also affected by color cuing, and that the size of the effect interacted with the flash strength, suggesting that color cuing has its influence at the stage of attentional guidance. We conclude that subjects can selectively attend to items on the basis of color given the appropriate task and stimulus dynamics.     

An electrophysiological study of attention capture by salience: Does rarity enable capture?

Several behavioural studies have suggested that rarity is critical for enabling irrelevant, salient objects to capture attention. We tested this hypothesis using the N2pc thought to reflect attentional allocation. A cue display was followed by a target display in which participants identified the letter in a specific colour. Experiment 1 pitted rare, irrelevant abrupt onset cues (appearing on only 20% of trials) against target-relevant colour cues. The relevant colour cue produced large N2pc and cue validity effects even when competing with a rare, salient, simultaneous abrupt onset. Similar results occurred even when abrupt onset frequency was reduced to only 10% of trials (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 examined rare, irrelevant colour singleton cues (20% of trials). Despite being rare and salient, these singleton cues produced no N2pc or cue validity effect indicating little attentional capture. Experiment 4 greatly increased colour cue salience by adding four background boxes, increasing colour contrast and tripling the cue display duration (from 50 to 150 ms). Small cue validity and N2pc effects were obtained, but did not strongly depend on degree of rarity (20% vs. 100%). We argue that rarity by itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce attention capture.     

Does a salient distractor capture attention early in processing?

Kim and Cave (1999) used spatial probes in order to measure the effects of bottom-up and top-down factors on the allocation of spatial attention over time. Subjects searched for a target with a unique shape, with a uniquely colored distractor present on each trial. The singleton distractor captured attention early in processing, whereas attention homed in on the target’s location later on. Kim and Cave (1999) concluded that top–down factors cannot prevent the presence of a salient distractor from delaying target selection. The present study tested the idea that such results were obtained only because subjects adopted the strategy of searching for the most salient item. Kim and Cave’s (1999) finding was replicated in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, instead of a feature search, subjects performed a conjunction search—that is, a task that could not be performed using a salience–based strategy. Probe response times were longest at the salient distractor’s location at both the short and the long stimulus onset asynchronies. These results suggest that, early in processing, top–down factors can exert their influence and prevent the capture of attention by a salient distractor.     

Visual attention to color: parvocellular guidance of attentional resources?

Although transient changes in luminance have been well documented to automatically attract attention to their location, experiments looking at abrupt changes in color have failed to find similar attentional capture. These results are consistent with current theories of the role of the magnocellular (M) and parvocellular (P) streams that postulate that the M stream, which is "color-blind," plays the dominant role in guiding attention and eye movements. The experiment reported here used stimuli that contained only information defined by color, and masked residual luminance information with dynamic noise, to assess the capacity of purely chromatic cues to automatically guide spatial attention. Such stimuli were as effective as those containing large luminance signals in guiding attention. To the extent that these purely chromatic signals isolated the P stream, these results suggest that this stream is also capable of automatic attentional capture. Hence, color vision not only aids target identification but also is a strong aid for target detection and localization.     

Why does a red snake in the grass capture your attention?

It has been suggested that affective stimuli automatically capture attention; this preferential processing is thought to be related to the evolutionary significance of affective stimuli. However, recent evidence suggests that perceptual salience alone might explain why some affective stimuli are more likely to influence attentional processes in certain contexts. In this study, we manipulated affective and perceptual salience to better understand how affective information is processed and how it impacts attentional processes in different contexts. We used stimuli that are both affectively and perceptually salient, while varying the task requirement to encourage the processing of perceptually salient (Experiment 1) or affectively salient (Experiment 2) information. This design made it possible to observe independent and interdependent relationships between perceptual and affective salience. The results showed that when the task encouraged the processing of perceptually salient information, affective salience did not influence task performance. In contrast, when the task encouraged the processing of affectively salient information, affectively salient information impaired task performance. The findings suggest that the affective nature of the stimuli does not always influence attentional processes.     

Do we conceptualize every color we consciously discriminate?

Mandik understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik's arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.     

Does color synesthesia pose a paradox for early-selection theories of attention?

Abstract— P.M. is a synesthete who experiences colors when viewing alphanumeric symbols. Her search for a target differing from distractors by a synesthetic color feature takes the form of a pop-out search. Thus, it would seem that synesthesia can occur preattentively. However, discrepancies between the regression functions of response times observed in target-present trials and target-absent trials, and the fact that fast response times occur only when the target is within a few degrees of visual angle from fixation, indicate that P.M.'s synesthesia does not occur preattentively, but rather is within the focus of attention. We conclude that synesthesia is a genuine perceptual phenomenon that can have substantial influence on visual processing.     

Do working memory-driven attention shifts speed up visual awareness?

Previous research has shown that content representations in working memory (WM) can bias attention in favor of matching stimuli in the scene. Using a visual prior-entry procedure, we here investigate whether such WM-driven attention shifts can speed up the conscious awareness of memory-matching relative to memory-mismatching stimuli. Participants were asked to hold a color cue in WM and to subsequently perform a temporal order judgment (TOJ) task by reporting either of two different-colored circles (presented to the left and right of fixation with a variable temporal interval) as having the first onset. One of the two TOJ circles could match the memory cue in color. We found that awareness of the temporal order of the circle onsets was not affected by the contents of WM, even when participants were explicitly informed that one of the TOJ circles would always match the WM contents. The null effect of WM on TOJs was not due to an inability of the memory-matching item to capture attention, since response times to the target in a follow-up experiment were improved when it appeared at the location of the memory-matching item. The present findings suggest that WM-driven attention shifts cannot accelerate phenomenal awareness of matching stimuli in the visual field.     

Do response modality effects support multiprocessor models of divided attention?

Some studies have suggested that dual-task interference is greatly reduced when tasks requiring very different types of responses (e.g., manual and vocal) are combined. However, in those studies, the order of stimuli varied unpredictably. In Experiments 1 and 2, variable stimulus order greatly inflated interference between two manual tasks, whereas interference between a manual and a vocal task was only slightly exacerbated. However, central interference (the psychological refractory period) persisted even with the manual/vocal combination. Selection of 2 manual responses with unknown stimulus order may require a special strategy to preclude intertask intrusion errors. Experiment 3 demonstrated that such errors could be provoked with speed stress. Together, these results reconcile response modality effects with the response selection bottleneck model for dual-task interference (once it is suitably amended).