论民族道德与政治道德

民族道德与社会政治道德具有不可分割的关系。一般说来,民族道德易受制于政治道德,而民族道德又会反作用于政治道德,同时,民族道德与政治道德作为一种有联系的精神实体,又会在相互影响、相互作用的过程中协调发展。     

宗教道德与理性道德

大约在1998年底, 《中国青年报》曾有过一 次"关于大兵瑞恩与梁晓声"的讨论。起因是《拯 救大兵瑞恩》这部美国大片在中国播出后,媒体纷 纷发表评论文章,有人对于片中故事的真实性提出 质疑,认为在战场上让那么多的人付出生命代价去 救一个人,是不合常理的,是好莱坞对美国文化和 所谓美国精神的一种渲染罢了:也有人赞同影片所 传达的理念,以为即便这故事有点夸张或是虚构, 这种在战场上不轻易丢弃任何一位战友的精神却彰     

论民族道德与宗教道德

民族和宗教虽然没有必然联系,但二者之间却又联系得非常密切。这看起来很矛盾,却是事实。脱离开民族实体去看待宗教是不对的;完全从民族的角度去看待宗教亦是不对的。就民族道德与宗教道德的相互关系而言,民族道德与宗教道德不仅相互联系,也相互作用;就民族道德与宗教道德各自的特点而言,民族道德重在自律,宗教道德重在他律。     

论民族道德与国家道德

在民族国家特别是多民族国家中,如何看待并处理好民族道德与国家道德的关系,是一个事关民族利益和国家利益的大问题。从民族道德与国家道德的关系看,民族道德统一于国家道德,民族利己主义是为国家道德所不容的,民族道德与国家道德的最高原则是无产阶级国际主义。必须用前瞻性的战略眼光来看待并认识这一问题,因为它事关民族与国家的长远利益,对构建和谐民族、和谐国家、和谐社会均具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。     

Abolishing Morality

Moral anti-realism comes in two forms – noncognitivism and the error theory. The noncognitivist says that when we make moral judgments we aren’t even trying to state moral facts. The error theorist says that when we make moral judgments we are making statements about what is objectively good, bad, right, or wrong but, since there are no moral facts, our moral judgments are uniformly false. This development of moral anti-realism was first seriously defended by John Mackie. In this paper I explore a dispute among moral error theorists about how to deal with false moral judgments. The advice of the moral abolitionist is to stop making moral judgments, but the contrary advice of the moral fictionalist is to retain moral language and moral thinking. After clarifying the choice that arises for the moral error theorist, I argue that moral abolitionism has much to recommend it. I discuss Mackie’s defense of moral fictionalism as well as a recent version of the same position offered by Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, and Caroline West. Then I second some remarks Ian Hinckfuss made in his defense of moral abolitionism and his criticism of “the moral society.” One of the worst things about moral fictionalism is that it undermines our epistemology by promoting a culture of deception. To deal with this problem Richard Joyce offers a “non-assertive” version of moral fictionalism as perhaps the last option for an error theorist who hopes to avoid moral abolitionism. I discuss some of the problems facing that form of moral fictionalism, offer some further reasons for adopting moral abolitionism in our personal lives, and conclude with reasons for thinking that abolishing morality may be an essential step in achieving the goals well-meaning moralists and moral fictionalists have always cherished.

Parental Morality and Family Processes as Predictors of Adolescent Morality

This study investigated the extent to which parents' moral thought and family processes are involved in the socialization of adolescent moral thought. Olson et al's (1992) Circumplex Model and White's (2000) Family Socialization Model provided the conceptual framework for predicting that families high in cohesion, adaptability and communication would facilitate the transmission of moral values between parents and adolescents more effectively than families low in these family processes. Results involving 218 adolescent-parent dyads revealed that perceived family cohesion and communication moderated the father-adolescent moral thought relationship; that several facets of both parents' morality significantly predicted adolescents' morality; and that all three family processes significantly predicted certain aspects of adolescent morality. Therefore the extent to which parents' socialize adolescent moral values will vary according to each parent's moral view, the strength of family processes and the content of moral thought being transmitted.     

无神论与道德

公共道德建设是目前社会上议论很多的话题,而这个话题又强烈地牵动着有神论和无 神论的敏感神经。自从数百年前开始实行政教分离,有神论逐步退出政治舞台前后,科学、 哲学、文学、艺术,也都先后从有神论的控制之下独立出来。有神论对于社会思想和社会 生活的影响,大体可以用道路越走越不宽广来形容。在这种情况下,有神论方面所能紧紧 抓住的领域,大约也就是道德建设了。     

关于伦理道德与智慧

伦理道德与智慧的关系是一个有着重要的理论和现实意义的课题。伦理、道德与智慧都有联系,但本身都不是智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧相通,但两者不是同一种意义上的智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧具有多方面的社会价值,提倡伦理智慧和道德智慧有助于当代中国的社会改革和全面进步,为此需要对中国传统伦理思想和道德价值进行批判性的反思。     

Morality and Responsibility

Abstract

This paper addresses the need to (1) support the personal moral belief system that each individual brings into the therapy room, (2) help the individual nourish and develop her/his own system of being in the world that is congruent with her/his sense of right, and (3) incorporate a sense of morality and responsibility into the therapy process when it is lacking. Case studies will present the dilemmas that two women faced concerning the conflict they experienced between their responsibility to their families and their responsibility to themselves.     

Humanism and Morality

A theory of morality acceptable to humanists must be one that can be accepted independently of religion. In this paper, I argue that while there is such a theory, it is a non-standard one, and its acceptance would have some far-reaching consequences. As one might expect, the theory is similar to others in various ways. But it is not the same as any of them. Indeed, it is a radically new theory. Like Hume’s ethics, it is founded on our natural sociability, and feelings of empathy for others. Like Aristotle’s theory, it incorporates an ethics of virtue. Like Kant’s theory, it regards the set of moral principles as those appropriate for a socially ideal society. But unlike Kant’s theory, it is essentially utilitarian. I call it ‘social contractual utilitarianism’.     

Morality and advantage

Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B. The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in all cases.     

Morality and Freedom

What might be termed 'the problem of morality' concerns how freedom–restricting principles may be justified, given that we value our freedom. Perhaps an answer can be found in freedom itself. For if the most obvious reason for rejecting moral demands is that they invade one's personal freedom, then the price of freedom from invasive demands that others would otherwise make may well require everyone accepting freedom in general, say, as a value that provides sufficient reason for adhering to principles that serve to maximize, or at least safeguard, freedom in general. But then it is precisely such a value, freedom in general, which can be argued to ground an adequate moral system. Hence whereas the value of freedom appears at first sight to pose problems for moral systems, it can be employed to ground a certain variety of them.