De Finetti's earliest works on the foundations of probability

Bruno de Finetti's earliest works on the foundations of probability are reviewed. These include the notion of exchangeability and the theory of random processes with independent increments. The latter theory relates to de Finetti's ideas for a probabilistic science more generally. Different aspects of his work are united by his foundational programme for a theory of subjective probabilities.This work would not have been possible in its present form without the generous help of Prof. Maria Carla Galavotti. For several years, she has unfailingly answered all my requests for papers difficult of access, and discussed the details of interpretation as well as the philosophy of probability in general. To her I express my gratitude for everything.     

On the logical structure of de Finetti's notion of event

This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values don't represent decision-relevant quantifications of uncertainty.     

Finite forms of de Finetti's theorem on exchangeability

A geometrical interpretation of independence and exchangeability leads to understanding the failure of de Finetti's theorem for a finite exchangeable sequence. In particular an exchangeable sequence of length r which can be extended to an exchangeable sequence of length k is almost a mixture of independent experiments, the error going to zero like 1/k.     

De Finetti's reconstruction of the Bayes-Laplace paradigm

This paper includes a concise survey of the work done in compliance with de Finetti's reconstruction of the Bayes-Laplace paradigm. Section 1 explains that paradigm and Section 2 deals with de Finetti's criticism. Section 3 quotes some recent results connected with de Finetti's program and Section 4 provides an illustrative example.     

The sin of subjectivism: A reply to Shapiro

Shapiro criticises our book on two grounds. He first outlines a series of mistakes. None of them we believe, in fact, have been made and this is usually quite clear from our book. His second criticism rejects our ‘subjectivist’ approach to measurement. We argue that he misrepresents our methods and fails to grasp their ability both to collect accurate data and deal adequately with possible sources of bias. Indeed in these, in its attention to the dating of both independent and dependent variables, and in the flexibility of its approach to the respondent, we feel our approach is better equipped than other existing instruments to tackle the problem of the aetiological role of psycho-social factors in illness.     

Expressivist to the core: Metaaesthetic subjectivism is stable and robust

Two common observations about aesthetics are in tension: that people generally consider aesthetic judgments subjective, and that people generally behave like objectivists (arguing over judgments, making choices based on judgments of trusted critics, rejecting strong assertions of aesthetic equivalence). This tension would be resolved if the first observation turned out to be false—if people endorsed subjectivism weakly, flexibly, or rarely. We tested whether people can be pushed to endorse objectivism under certain circumstances. Across a large sample (N = 588), aesthetic subjectivism proved consistent and robust to experimental manipulations. Even judgments that reflected participants' own evaluations of artworks were considered just as subjective as judgments directly opposed to their personal evaluations. We conclude that the apparent tension can be explained by the philosophical position of expressivism and discuss expressivism's prospects as a framework for understanding aesthetic judgment.     

Critical realism: distinguishing the psychological subjectivity of the analyst from epistemological subjectivism

To clarify the concepts of critical realism, subjectivity, and subjectivism, distinctions are drawn among ontological subjectivism, moral subjectivity, psychological subjectivity, and epistemological subjectivism. Psychological subjectivity, including the ongoing affective life of the analyst, is an essential aspect of the analyst's response to the patient, and may either facilitate or distort an adequate observation of transference and countertransference dynamics and of the psychic reality of the patient. Subjectivism in current psychoanalytic literature involves an argument that there is an "irreducible" subjectivity in the analyst, who is bound to see things from an incorrigibly personal point of view, such that there is no substantial subject-object differentiation between analyst and patient. Issues of authoritarianism in the analyst, or of pathological certainty, should not be confused with the issues of epistemological objectivism. The concept of critical realism or scientific objectivism includes the essential idea that there is no pure knowledge, no complete knowledge, that often evidence is insufficient for knowledge of some aspect of nature, and that care must be to taken understand what is sufficient knowledge in a given area, in this case clinical psychoanalysis. The question is raised whether "projective identification" makes the sorting out of "what comes from whom" impossible. It is argued that when free association is sufficiently facilitated, when there are enough corrections of the distortions wrought by transference and countertransference, when defenses are analyzed, and when sufficient subject-object differentiation is recovered, the analyst can get to know enough of the patient's psychic reality for the therapeutic and scientific purposes of psychoanalysis.     

Moral education for the elite of democracy: the classe de philosophie between sociology and philosophy

In this article, I address the issues at stake in the relationship between sociology and philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century by focusing on a debate between two parties: Emile Durkheim, who was attempting to found an independent scientific sociology, and the editors and collaborators of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale (RMM), one of the central philosophical journals of the period. This debate focused on the role of philosophy in secondary school education, but at its heart, this was a struggle between two disciplines over which ought to direct the formation of good citizens for Third Republic France.     

'Courage Not Under Fire': Realism,Anti-realism,and the Epistemological Virtues

This article offers a critical perspective on two lines of thought in recent epistemology and philosophy of science, namely Michael Dummett?s anti-realist approach to issues of truth, meaning, and knowledge and Bas van Fraassen?s influential programme of ?constructive empiricism?. While not denying the salient differences between them (the one a metaphysical doctrine premised on logicolinguistic considerations, the other a thesis primarily concerned with the scope and limits of empirical inquiry) it shows how they converge on a sceptical outlook concerning the realist claim that truth might always transcend the restrictions of some given (or indeed some future best-possible) state of knowledge. The author puts the case that such sceptical arguments, if followed through consistently, must involve giving up all claim to account for our knowledge of the growth of scientific knowledge. He also takes issue with Dummett?s idea of truth as nothing more than a matter of ?warranted assertibility? and with van Fraassen?s likewise verificationist conception of empirical warrant as the most we can have by way of epistemic justification. Thus it is wrong to suppose that the realist is merely indulging in a display of ?courage not under fire? when she assumes ontological commitments in excess of the observational data. This disavowal of realism in favour of a theory which ?saves the (empirical) appearances? has a less-than-distinguished prehistory in the range of compromise strategies adopted by upholders of a dominant metaphysics or world-view, starting out with the orthodox Catholic attempt to defuse the implications of the heliocentric hypothesis advanced by Copernicus and Galileo. Such theological motives are nowadays not so prominent although ? it is suggested ? they do emerge at certain points in Dummett?s writing. More constructively, this article presents a case for objectivism with regard to scientific truth and also for inference to the best causal explanation ? on both the micro- and the macrophysical scale ? as the only approach with an adequate claim to make sense of the history of advancements in scientific knowledge to date.     

Bruno Zumbo: a Pioneer in the Psychometrics of Quality of Life

Applied Research in Quality of Life -     

Misinformation,subjectivism, and the rational criticizability of desire

Philosophical Studies - Orthodox Humeans about normative reasons for action believe that there are no rational principles governing the substantive content of desire. But they also believe that...