Examining the role of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs in depression

Many psychological models have been developed to explain the development and maintenance of depression. The most widely evaluated model is the cognitive model of depression, and it is against this model that emerging models should be compared. Accordingly, this cross‐sectional study examined whether metacognitive beliefs, as specified in the metacognitive model of depression, would explain additional variance in depressive symptoms over dysfunctional attitudes; the core feature of the cognitive model. Moreover, mediational relationships between metacognitive beliefs, rumination, and depressive symptoms, predicted by the metacognitive model were also explored, whilst controlling for dysfunctional attitudes. A sample of 715 students completed self‐report questionnaires measuring depressive symptoms, rumination, dysfunctional attitudes, and metacognitive beliefs. Regression analyses showed that metacognitive beliefs made a significant statistical contribution to depressive symptoms, after controlling for age, gender, rumination and dysfunctional attitudes. Furthermore, as predicted by the metacognitive model, the relationship between positive metacognitive beliefs and depressive symptoms was fully mediated by rumination, whilst the relationship between negative metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and danger and depressive symptoms was partially mediated by rumination. The results provide further empirical support for the metacognitive model of depression and indicate that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs play an integral role in the maintenance of depressive symptoms.     

Mental rubbernecking to negative information depends on task context

We previously demonstratedmental rubbernecking during the simple cognitive act ofrefreshing a just activated representation. Participants saw two neutral and one negative word presented simultaneously and, 425 msec later, were cued to mentally refresh (i.e., think of) one of the no-longer-present words. They were slower to refresh a neutral word than the negative word (Johnson et al., 2005, Experiment 6A). The present experiments extended that work by showing mental rubbernecking when negative items were sometimes the target of refreshing, but not when negative items were present but never the target of refreshing, indicating that expectations influence mental rubbernecking. How expectations might modulate the impact of emotional distraction is discussed.     

Nonlinear associations between job insecurity and adaptive performance: The mediating role of negative affect and negative work reflection

This study aimed at investigating the association between employee-rated job insecurity and supervisor-rated adaptive performance. We hypothesized a nonlinear association between job insecurity and adaptive performance, expecting negative affect and negative work reflections to mediate this relationship. Using a sample of 131 employee–supervisor dyads, path analysis revealed a curvilinear relation between job insecurity and supervisor-rated adaptive performance, indicating medium job insecurity being linked to the lowest adaptive performance. Bootstrapping confirmed that negative affect and negative work reflection both mediated the nonlinear association between job insecurity and adaptive performance. After a time lag of 16 weeks, 71 supervisors again rated their employees’ adaptive performance. Path analysis confirmed a nonlinear association between employees’ job insecurity (T1) and supervisor-rated adaptive performance (T2). Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Effects of age on metacognitive efficiency

Humans have a capacity to become aware of thoughts and behaviours known as metacognition. Metacognitive efficiency refers to the relationship between subjective reports and objective behaviour. Understanding how this efficiency changes as we age is important because poor metacognition can lead to negative consequences, such as believing one is a good driver despite a recent spate of accidents. We quantified metacognition in two cognitive domains, perception and memory, in healthy adults between 18 and 84 years old, employing measures that dissociate objective task performance from metacognitive efficiency. We identified a marked decrease in perceptual metacognitive efficiency with age and a non-significant decrease in memory metacognitive efficiency. No significant relationship was identified between executive function and metacognition in either domain. Annual decline in metacognitive efficiency after controlling for executive function was ∼0.6%. Decreases in metacognitive efficiency may explain why dissociations between behaviour and beliefs become more marked as we age.     

Debriefing work experience: A reflection on reflection?

Using date from a pilot study into pupil work experience pre-16, it is argued that work experience has expanded rapidly on the basis of little evidence and many claims about what it can achieve. As experience-based learning, it relies heavily upon debriefing to maximise its learning potential. If work experience is to be more than a work transition exercise, then debriefing becomes central to its success. Although difficult to accomplish and surrounded by muddled definitions, this approach deserves greater attention in view of the contribution it can make to pupils' ability to manage their own learning and the foundation it can provide for continuous learning throughout life.     

Examining incremental explanatory power in accounting for worry severity: negative metacognitive beliefs uniquely predict worry severity following a worry episode

Background and Objectives: Contemporary conceptual models posit that different core variables contribute to worry, including intolerance of uncertainty (IU), metacognitive beliefs, and experiential avoidance. To date, a concurrent investigation of the incremental explanatory power of these variables in accounting for worry severity remains unexamined. The present study sought to address that gap in the literature.

Design/Methods: Participants endorsing frequent worry (N?=?127) completed self-report measures assessing IU, metacognitive beliefs, and experiential avoidance during an online session. Participants later attended an in-person lab-based session where they completed a worry episode and in-vivo worry severity was assessed following the worry episode.

Results: IU, negative metacognitive beliefs, and experiential avoidance each shared a bivariate association with post-episode worry severity. However, in multivariate analyses, only baseline worry severity and negative metacognitive beliefs surrounding the dangerousness and uncontrollability of worry predicted post-episode worry severity.

Conclusions: The present results further underscore links between negative metacognitive beliefs and worry.     

Social influence on metacognitive evaluations: The power of nonverbal cues

Metacognitive evaluations refer to the processes by which people assess their own cognitive operations with respect to their current goal. Little is known about whether this process is susceptible to social influence. Here we investigate whether nonverbal social signals spontaneously influence metacognitive evaluations. Participants performed a two-alternative forced-choice task, which was followed by a face randomly gazing towards or away from the response chosen by the participant. Participants then provided a metacognitive evaluation of their response by rating their confidence in their answer. In Experiment 1, the participants were told that the gaze direction was irrelevant to the task purpose and were advised to ignore it. The results revealed an effect of implicit social information on confidence ratings even though the gaze direction was random and therefore unreliable for task purposes. In addition, nonsocial cues (car) did not elicit this effect. In Experiment 2, the participants were led to believe that cue direction (face or car) reflected a previous participant's response to the same question—that is, the social information provided by the cue was made explicit, yet still objectively unreliable for the task. The results showed a similar social influence on confidence ratings, observed with both cues (car and face) but with an increased magnitude relative to Experiment 1. We additionally showed in Experiment 2 that social information impaired metacognitive accuracy. Together our results strongly suggest an involuntary susceptibility of metacognitive evaluations to nonverbal social information, even when it is implicit (Experiment 1) and unreliable (Experiments 1 and 2).     

Mental contrasting and the self-regulation of responding to negative feedback

Mentally contrasting a desired future with impeding reality promotes goal pursuit when expectations of success are high and curbs goal pursuit when expectations of success are low. Four studies tested whether mental contrasting affects responses to goal-relevant negative feedback. Mental contrasting promoted the processing of negative feedback (Studies 1 and 2), which in turn helped participants to form plans beneficial for goal pursuit (Study 2). Mental contrasting also protected the self-view of competence against negative feedback (Study 3) and facilitated beneficial attributions for negative feedback (Study 4). All effects occurred in line with expectations of success. These results suggest that mental contrasting regulates effective responses to negative feedback by bringing goal pursuit in line with expectations of success.     

Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.     

Resisting persuasion by illegitimate means: a metacognitive perspective on minority influence

The present research tests a new metacognitive perspective on resistance in minority influence situations. It is proposed that when people initially resist persuasive messages from sources in the numerical minority, they can lose attitude certainty if they perceive that they have based their attitudes on the source's minority status and also believe this is an illegitimate basis for resistance. In three studies, participants were presented with a message from a minority source. In Study 1, participants became less certain of their attitudes after resisting this message. In Study 2, this effect only emerged when participants were led to believe they had based their attitudes on the source's minority status and this was an illegitimate thing to do. In Study 3, this effect was shown to have implications for persuasion in response to a second message. The implications of these findings for classic minority influence effects are discussed.     

Information-seeking behavior: exploring metacognitive control in pigeons

Metacognitive control may occur if an organism seeks additional information when the available information for solving a problem is inadequate. Such information-seeking behavior has been documented in primates, but evidence of analogous behavior is less convincing in non-primates. In our study, we adopted a novel methodological approach. We presented pigeons with visual discriminations of varying levels of difficulty, and on special testing trials, we gave the birds the opportunity of making the discrimination easier. We initially trained pigeons on a discrimination between same and different visual arrays, each containing 12 items (low difficulty), 4 items (intermediate difficulty), or 2 items (high difficulty). We later provided an “Information” button that the pigeons could peck to increase the number of items in the arrays, thereby making the discrimination easier, plus a “Go” button which, when pecked, simply allowed the pigeons to proceed to their final discriminative response. Critically, our pigeons’ choice of the “Information” button increased as the difficulty of the task increased. As well, some of our pigeons showed evidence of prompt and appropriate transfer of using the “Information” button to help them perform brand-new brightness and size discrimination tasks. Speculation as to the contents of pigeons’ private mental states may be unwarranted, but our pigeons did objectively exhibit the kind of complex, flexible, and adaptive information-seeking behavior that is deemed to be involved in metacognitive control.     

Overcoming intuition: metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning

Humans appear to reason using two processing styles: System 1 processes that are quick, intuitive, and effortless and System 2 processes that are slow, analytical, and deliberate that occasionally correct the output of System 1. Four experiments suggest that System 2 processes are activated by metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency during the process of reasoning. Incidental experiences of difficulty or disfluency--receiving information in a degraded font (Experiments 1 and 4), in difficult-to-read lettering (Experiment 2), or while furrowing one's brow (Experiment 3)--reduced the impact of heuristics and defaults in judgment (Experiments 1 and 3), reduced reliance on peripheral cues in persuasion (Experiment 2), and improved syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 4). Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency appear to serve as an alarm that activates analytic forms of reasoning that assess and sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning.     

Postidentification feedback effects on face recognition confidence: evidence for metacognitive influences

Information given to witnesses after an identification decision greatly alters their impressions of the original event and importantly, their identification confidence. Two experiments investigated the possibility that the effect of feedback on confidence may be altered according to the strength of the witness's cues to accuracy. Experiment 1 used a manipulation of exposure duration to alter recognition accuracy prior to the delivery of confirming, disconfirming or no feedback. While the feedback effect was not different across exposure duration conditions, decisions that were made more quickly were less likely to show large changes in confidence due to feedback. Experiment 2 manipulated the distinctiveness of faces and showed that the effects of feedback on confidence, and on the resolution of the confidence judgement, were more pronounced when disconfirming feedback was given for distinctive faces and when confirming feedback was given for typical faces. These studies showed that the impressions that participants formed of their likely accuracy might moderate the effects of feedback on decision confidence. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamics of metacognitive judgments: pre- and postretrieval mechanisms

Two experiments examined the temporal course of pre- and postretrieval mechanisms using a new kind of dynamic metacognitive judgment. Experiment 1 presented participants with primed and unprimed triples of remote associates to a target word and required them to provide repeated metacognitive judgments, 4 times during a 12-s interval, about the likelihood that they would later recognize the target. Both familiarity with the words and the processing time were associated with changes in metacognitive evaluations. Experiment 2 placed pre- and postretrieval mechanisms in opposition by transforming an element of a previously primed question. For transformed questions this led to high initial ratings, which decreased over time, while for novel questions the ratings were initially lower and increased with time. The results are discussed in terms of pre- and postretrieval mechanisms interacting over time.     

Improving lecture comprehension: Effects of a metacognitive strategy

In previous research self-questioning strategies have been found to significantly improve reading comprehension, presumably because of the metacognitive nature of the self-questioning process. The purpose of the present study was to determine whether this metacognitive strategy also enhances lecture comprehension, that is, comprehension of non-text, orally presented material. In a self-questioning combined with reciprocal peer-questioning condition, ninthgraders were trained to pose questions for themselves during classroom lectures; following the lectures, they used their questions to engage in reciprocal peer-questioning and responding. Students in a self-questioning only condition also engaged in self-questioning during the lectures and then answered their own questions; in a review condition, students discussed the lecture material in small cooperative groups; and in a control group students reviewed the lecture material independently. On post-practice and 10-day maintenance tests participants in the self-questioning with reciprocal peer-questioning and the self-questioning only strategy groups showed lecture comprehension superior to that of participants in both the discussion review and control groups. These results suggest that: use of a self-questioning strategy can improve high school students' comprehension of lectures; students can maintain this strategy when external prompts are removed; and this metacognitive strategy can be readily taught to high school students and incorporated into their real-world classroom learning environment.     

Motivated comprehension regulation: Vigilant versus eager metacognitive control

The more accurately people assess their comprehension, the more likely they are to engage in study behaviors that precisely target gaps in their learning. However, comprehension regulation involves more than knowing when to implement a new study strategy; it also involves deciding which strategy will most effectively resolve one’s confusion. In two experiments, we explored how people’s motivational orientations influence which study strategies they select to regulate their comprehension. In Experiment 1, people who were motivated to vigilantly protect against potential mistakes (i.e., prevention-focused individuals) were more likely to adopt a rereading strategy than people who were motivated to eagerly pursue new learning opportunities (i.e., promotion-focused individuals). In Experiment 2, this difference in strategy use emerged specifically in response to confusing sentences that had been inserted into the text. Furthermore, by using rereading strategies to resolve their confusion, prevention-focused individuals performed better than promotion-focused individuals on a comprehension test and a transfer task.     

Epistemic emotions: Cognitive underpinnings and relations with metacognitive feelings

The aim of this paper is to review research on epistemic emotions in learning. The emphasis is not only on the cognitive states that give rise to epistemic emotions but also on the dynamics of epistemic emotions in complex learning situations. The interrelations between epistemic emotions and their interactions with affective states and metacognitive experiences are also explored. The position put forth is that epistemic emotions are triggered by cognitive states involving discrepancy, or conflict, between active schemas and incoming information, or gap in one's knowledge. However, each of the epistemic emotions has its specific triggering conditions that differentiate it from the others. Changing conditions during a cognitive endeavor impact the intensity as well as the interrelations between epistemic emotions. Also, there are relations between epistemic emotions and metacognitive experiences such as feeling of difficulty or confidence, albeit not so strong. The implications for future research are discussed.     

Test anxiety and metacognitive skillfulness: Availability versus production deficiencies

Abstract

This paper focuses on the role of metacognition in test anxiety. In two experiments, the metacognitive skillfulness of high vs. low test-anxious secondary school students was contrasted. Low test-anxious subjects exhibited a superior metacognitive skillfulness during math performance relative to high test-anxious subjects. Furthermore, differences in metacognitive skillfulness were performance related. In order to unravel causality in the relation between metacognition and test anxiety, two types of test-anxious students may be distinguished analogous to Naveh-Benjamin (1991). Type-1 students would lack metacognitive skills (availability deficiency), through which they experience failure and develop test anxiety. Type-2 students would experience task irrelevant thoughts, which causes cognitive interference with available metacognitive skills (production deficiency). Results of Study 1 reveal that metacognitive cueing may represent an adequate method for the identification of both types. Due to time-constraints, metacognitive cueing in Study 2 failed to do so.