Mental rubbernecking to negative information depends on task context

We previously demonstratedmental rubbernecking during the simple cognitive act ofrefreshing a just activated representation. Participants saw two neutral and one negative word presented simultaneously and, 425 msec later, were cued to mentally refresh (i.e., think of) one of the no-longer-present words. They were slower to refresh a neutral word than the negative word (Johnson et al., 2005, Experiment 6A). The present experiments extended that work by showing mental rubbernecking when negative items were sometimes the target of refreshing, but not when negative items were present but never the target of refreshing, indicating that expectations influence mental rubbernecking. How expectations might modulate the impact of emotional distraction is discussed.     

Nonlinear associations between job insecurity and adaptive performance: The mediating role of negative affect and negative work reflection

This study aimed at investigating the association between employee-rated job insecurity and supervisor-rated adaptive performance. We hypothesized a nonlinear association between job insecurity and adaptive performance, expecting negative affect and negative work reflections to mediate this relationship. Using a sample of 131 employee–supervisor dyads, path analysis revealed a curvilinear relation between job insecurity and supervisor-rated adaptive performance, indicating medium job insecurity being linked to the lowest adaptive performance. Bootstrapping confirmed that negative affect and negative work reflection both mediated the nonlinear association between job insecurity and adaptive performance. After a time lag of 16 weeks, 71 supervisors again rated their employees’ adaptive performance. Path analysis confirmed a nonlinear association between employees’ job insecurity (T1) and supervisor-rated adaptive performance (T2). Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Effects of age on metacognitive efficiency

Humans have a capacity to become aware of thoughts and behaviours known as metacognition. Metacognitive efficiency refers to the relationship between subjective reports and objective behaviour. Understanding how this efficiency changes as we age is important because poor metacognition can lead to negative consequences, such as believing one is a good driver despite a recent spate of accidents. We quantified metacognition in two cognitive domains, perception and memory, in healthy adults between 18 and 84 years old, employing measures that dissociate objective task performance from metacognitive efficiency. We identified a marked decrease in perceptual metacognitive efficiency with age and a non-significant decrease in memory metacognitive efficiency. No significant relationship was identified between executive function and metacognition in either domain. Annual decline in metacognitive efficiency after controlling for executive function was ∼0.6%. Decreases in metacognitive efficiency may explain why dissociations between behaviour and beliefs become more marked as we age.     

Resisting persuasion by illegitimate means: a metacognitive perspective on minority influence

The present research tests a new metacognitive perspective on resistance in minority influence situations. It is proposed that when people initially resist persuasive messages from sources in the numerical minority, they can lose attitude certainty if they perceive that they have based their attitudes on the source's minority status and also believe this is an illegitimate basis for resistance. In three studies, participants were presented with a message from a minority source. In Study 1, participants became less certain of their attitudes after resisting this message. In Study 2, this effect only emerged when participants were led to believe they had based their attitudes on the source's minority status and this was an illegitimate thing to do. In Study 3, this effect was shown to have implications for persuasion in response to a second message. The implications of these findings for classic minority influence effects are discussed.     

Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.     

Overcoming intuition: metacognitive difficulty activates analytic reasoning

Humans appear to reason using two processing styles: System 1 processes that are quick, intuitive, and effortless and System 2 processes that are slow, analytical, and deliberate that occasionally correct the output of System 1. Four experiments suggest that System 2 processes are activated by metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency during the process of reasoning. Incidental experiences of difficulty or disfluency--receiving information in a degraded font (Experiments 1 and 4), in difficult-to-read lettering (Experiment 2), or while furrowing one's brow (Experiment 3)--reduced the impact of heuristics and defaults in judgment (Experiments 1 and 3), reduced reliance on peripheral cues in persuasion (Experiment 2), and improved syllogistic reasoning (Experiment 4). Metacognitive experiences of difficulty or disfluency appear to serve as an alarm that activates analytic forms of reasoning that assess and sometimes correct the output of more intuitive forms of reasoning.     

Information-seeking behavior: exploring metacognitive control in pigeons

Metacognitive control may occur if an organism seeks additional information when the available information for solving a problem is inadequate. Such information-seeking behavior has been documented in primates, but evidence of analogous behavior is less convincing in non-primates. In our study, we adopted a novel methodological approach. We presented pigeons with visual discriminations of varying levels of difficulty, and on special testing trials, we gave the birds the opportunity of making the discrimination easier. We initially trained pigeons on a discrimination between same and different visual arrays, each containing 12 items (low difficulty), 4 items (intermediate difficulty), or 2 items (high difficulty). We later provided an “Information” button that the pigeons could peck to increase the number of items in the arrays, thereby making the discrimination easier, plus a “Go” button which, when pecked, simply allowed the pigeons to proceed to their final discriminative response. Critically, our pigeons’ choice of the “Information” button increased as the difficulty of the task increased. As well, some of our pigeons showed evidence of prompt and appropriate transfer of using the “Information” button to help them perform brand-new brightness and size discrimination tasks. Speculation as to the contents of pigeons’ private mental states may be unwarranted, but our pigeons did objectively exhibit the kind of complex, flexible, and adaptive information-seeking behavior that is deemed to be involved in metacognitive control.     

Mental contrasting and the self-regulation of responding to negative feedback

Mentally contrasting a desired future with impeding reality promotes goal pursuit when expectations of success are high and curbs goal pursuit when expectations of success are low. Four studies tested whether mental contrasting affects responses to goal-relevant negative feedback. Mental contrasting promoted the processing of negative feedback (Studies 1 and 2), which in turn helped participants to form plans beneficial for goal pursuit (Study 2). Mental contrasting also protected the self-view of competence against negative feedback (Study 3) and facilitated beneficial attributions for negative feedback (Study 4). All effects occurred in line with expectations of success. These results suggest that mental contrasting regulates effective responses to negative feedback by bringing goal pursuit in line with expectations of success.     

Improving lecture comprehension: Effects of a metacognitive strategy

In previous research self-questioning strategies have been found to significantly improve reading comprehension, presumably because of the metacognitive nature of the self-questioning process. The purpose of the present study was to determine whether this metacognitive strategy also enhances lecture comprehension, that is, comprehension of non-text, orally presented material. In a self-questioning combined with reciprocal peer-questioning condition, ninthgraders were trained to pose questions for themselves during classroom lectures; following the lectures, they used their questions to engage in reciprocal peer-questioning and responding. Students in a self-questioning only condition also engaged in self-questioning during the lectures and then answered their own questions; in a review condition, students discussed the lecture material in small cooperative groups; and in a control group students reviewed the lecture material independently. On post-practice and 10-day maintenance tests participants in the self-questioning with reciprocal peer-questioning and the self-questioning only strategy groups showed lecture comprehension superior to that of participants in both the discussion review and control groups. These results suggest that: use of a self-questioning strategy can improve high school students' comprehension of lectures; students can maintain this strategy when external prompts are removed; and this metacognitive strategy can be readily taught to high school students and incorporated into their real-world classroom learning environment.     

Dynamics of metacognitive judgments: pre- and postretrieval mechanisms

Two experiments examined the temporal course of pre- and postretrieval mechanisms using a new kind of dynamic metacognitive judgment. Experiment 1 presented participants with primed and unprimed triples of remote associates to a target word and required them to provide repeated metacognitive judgments, 4 times during a 12-s interval, about the likelihood that they would later recognize the target. Both familiarity with the words and the processing time were associated with changes in metacognitive evaluations. Experiment 2 placed pre- and postretrieval mechanisms in opposition by transforming an element of a previously primed question. For transformed questions this led to high initial ratings, which decreased over time, while for novel questions the ratings were initially lower and increased with time. The results are discussed in terms of pre- and postretrieval mechanisms interacting over time.     

Motivated comprehension regulation: Vigilant versus eager metacognitive control

The more accurately people assess their comprehension, the more likely they are to engage in study behaviors that precisely target gaps in their learning. However, comprehension regulation involves more than knowing when to implement a new study strategy; it also involves deciding which strategy will most effectively resolve one’s confusion. In two experiments, we explored how people’s motivational orientations influence which study strategies they select to regulate their comprehension. In Experiment 1, people who were motivated to vigilantly protect against potential mistakes (i.e., prevention-focused individuals) were more likely to adopt a rereading strategy than people who were motivated to eagerly pursue new learning opportunities (i.e., promotion-focused individuals). In Experiment 2, this difference in strategy use emerged specifically in response to confusing sentences that had been inserted into the text. Furthermore, by using rereading strategies to resolve their confusion, prevention-focused individuals performed better than promotion-focused individuals on a comprehension test and a transfer task.     

Accuracy and stability of metacognitive monitoring: A new measure

An examination of gamma (?; Goodman & Kruskal, 1954) and the Hamann coefficient (HC; see Schraw, 1995) as a measure of feeling-of-knowing (FOK) accuracy in the prediction of subsequent memory performance shows that neither coefficient provides a pure measure of accuracy in 2 (feeling-of-not-knowing and FOK) × 2 (correct and incorrect recognition) cases. γ underestimated accuracy in the m × 2 case with m being an integer larger than 2, producing low and unstable values of γ. In the present study, FOK predictive accuracy is treated as the extent to which the percentage of correct recognition can be increased by an increase from one FOK rank to another. A statistic computing the relative magnitude of the percentage increase to its maximal increase, designated as C, is able to provide a correct estimate of accuracy. Furthermore, the value of C is stable across different portions of FOK data and is free from restricted-/truncated-range and fineness/ coarseness effects.     

Relating inter-individual differences in metacognitive performance on different perceptual tasks

Human behavior depends on the ability to effectively introspect about our performance. For simple perceptual decisions, this introspective or metacognitive ability varies substantially across individuals and is correlated with the structure of focal areas in prefrontal cortex. This raises the possibility that the ability to introspect about different perceptual decisions might be mediated by a common cognitive process. To test this hypothesis, we examined whether inter-individual differences in metacognitive ability were correlated across two different perceptual tasks where individuals made judgments about different and unrelated visual stimulus properties. We found that inter-individual differences were strongly correlated between the two tasks for metacognitive ability but not objective performance. Such stability of an individual’s metacognitive ability across different perceptual tasks indicates a general mechanism supporting metacognition independent of the specific task.     

The influence of delaying judgments of learning on metacognitive accuracy: a meta-analytic review

Many studies have examined the accuracy of predictions of future memory performance solicited through judgments of learning (JOLs). Among the most robust findings in this literature is that delaying predictions serves to substantially increase the relative accuracy of JOLs compared with soliciting JOLs immediately after study, a finding termed the delayed JOL effect. The meta-analyses reported in the current study examined the predominant theoretical accounts as well as potential moderators of the delayed JOL effect. The first meta-analysis examined the relative accuracy of delayed compared with immediate JOLs across 4,554 participants (112 effect sizes) through gamma correlations between JOLs and memory accuracy. Those data showed that delaying JOLs leads to robust benefits to relative accuracy (g = 0.93). The second meta-analysis examined memory performance for delayed compared with immediate JOLs across 3,807 participants (98 effect sizes). Those data showed that delayed JOLs result in a modest but reliable benefit for memory performance relative to immediate JOLs (g = 0.08). Findings from these meta-analyses are well accommodated by theories suggesting that delayed JOL accuracy reflects access to more diagnostic information from long-term memory rather than being a by-product of a retrieval opportunity. However, these data also suggest that theories proposing that the delayed JOL effect results from a memorial benefit or the match between the cues available for JOLs and those available at test may also provide viable explanatory mechanisms necessary for a comprehensive account.     

Age related differences in metacognitive control: role of executive functioning

To examine whether aging affects metacognitive control, elderly and young adults carried out a readiness-recall task, in which subjects monitor their own learning procedure, allowing strategy manipulation (study time and rehearsal) to be measured. Age differences were observed in metamemory control performance. Younger adults were found to be better at adjusting study time and rehearsal to the task. Moreover, to determine whether age-related differences in strategy manipulation may mediate age-related differences in memory performance, performance on the readiness-recall task was compared to performance on an experimenter-paced task. Results indicated that younger adults recalled significantly more words in the readiness-recall task than in the experimenter test. This was not the case for older adults. Furthermore, a hierarchical regression analysis revealed that age-related differences in strategy manipulation mediate some age-related differences in memory performance. Our aim was also to determine whether metacognitive control is related to executive functions. Thus, all participants were administered standard neuropsychological tests used to assess executive functioning. Significant partial correlation appeared between metamemory control and executive functioning. Finally, a hierarchical regression analysis indicated that age-related decline in metamemory control may be largely the result of executive limitations associated with aging.     

Thinking outside the box: a metacognitive / theory of mind perspective on concrete thinking

Concrete thinking, an extraordinarily difficult condition to treat, has been psychoanalytically theorized to result from failures of symbolization-problems forming, linking, or fathoming the meaning of symbols-and/or failures of differentiation, resulting in difficulties distinguishing symbols from the thing being symbolized, fantasy from reality, self from other. Though difficulties symbolizing and differentiating are clearly evident in patients whose thinking is concrete, these may be a manifestation of concrete thinking rather than a root cause. Childhood thinking is characteristically concrete, and a persistence of such thinking into adulthood can be adequately explained as a failure to develop a more sophisticated theory of mind. Given that patients who exhibit such thinking tend to respond poorly to classic psychoanalytic interpretations, alternative technical approaches have been proposed. One such approach, "metacognitive" in nature, draws on a mode of thought used by gifted individuals that helps them "think outside the box" by dispensing with a typical pattern-recognition search so that novel meanings might be discovered. Metacognition, thoughts about one's thoughts and thought processes, facilitates symbolic thinking by creating sufficient distance from one's thoughts to allow the consideration of alternative meanings.     

Improving sleep with mindfulness and acceptance: A metacognitive model of insomnia

While there is an accumulating evidence to suggest that therapies using mindfulness and acceptance-based approaches have benefits for improving the symptoms of insomnia, it is unclear how these treatments work. The goal of this paper is to present a conceptual framework for the cognitive mechanisms of insomnia based upon mindfulness and acceptance approaches. The existing cognitive and behavioral models of insomnia are first reviewed and a two-level model of cognitive (primary) and metacognitive (secondary) arousal is presented in the context of insomnia. We then focus on the role of metacognition in mindfulness and acceptance-based therapies, followed by a review of these therapies in the treatment of insomnia. A conceptual framework is presented detailing the mechanisms of metacognition in the context of insomnia treatments. This model proposes that increasing awareness of the mental and physical states that are present when experiencing insomnia symptoms and then learning how to shift mental processes can promote an adaptive stance to one's response to these symptoms. These metacognitive processes are characterized by balanced appraisals, cognitive flexibility, equanimity, and commitment to values and are posited to reduce sleep-related arousal, leading to remission from insomnia. We hope that this model will further the understanding and impact of mindfulness and acceptance-based approaches to insomnia.