Synchrony in the onset of mental-state reasoning: evidence from five cultures

Over the past 20 years, developmental psychologists have shown considerable interest in the onset of a theory of mind, typically marked by children's ability to pass false-belief tasks. In Western cultures, children pass such tasks around the age of 5 years, with variations of the tasks producing small changes in the age at which they are passed. Knowing whether this age of transition is common across diverse cultures is important to understanding what causes this development. Cross-cultural studies have produced mixed findings, possibly because of varying methods used in different cultures. The present study used a single procedure to measure false-belief understanding in five cultures: Canada, India, Peru, Samoa, and Thailand. With a standardized procedure, we found synchrony in the onset of mentalistic reasoning, with children crossing the false-belief milestone at approximately 5 years of age in every culture studied. The meaning of this synchrony for the origins of mental-state understanding is discussed.     

Effects of a negative social experience on the emotional and social-cognitive responses of aggressive-rejected children

Social problem-solving skills of aggressive-rejected children are usually assessed through hypothetical situations in a neutral setting where little or no reference is made to the emotional aspects. The aim of this study was to evaluate the social problem-solving skills of 57 aggressive-rejected (Group 1) and 57 prosocial-popular (Group 2) children of both sexes in Grades 1 and 2 by using as problem situations what happened in standardized provocations involving them with a trained peer-accomplice. An individual interview, aimed at disclosing emotions felt during the provocations, intentions attributed to the accomplice and possible reactions if confronted again with the same provocations, was conducted immediately after the session for half the subjects of each group. The other subjects were interviewed after a 10-min. delay. Analysis showed that Group 1 subjects would be less verbally assertive than Group 2 subjects if confronted again with the same provocations. The first graders from Group 1 also attributed fewer positive intents to the author of the provocations than Group 2 classmates. Second graders of both groups attributed more negative and fewer positive intents to the peer-accomplice when the interview immediately followed the provocations than when it was delayed. Similarly, second grade boys interviewed right away were more prone to use physical and verbal retaliation if the provocations were to happen again. These results highlight the influence of emotions on the social reasoning skills of aggressive-rejected and nonaggressive-nonrejected children.     

Infant-mother attachment and children's friendship quality: maternal mental-state talk as an intervening mechanism

Utilizing data from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development's Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development, we investigated mothers' talk about mental states during play with their 24-month-old children as a mechanism though which infant-mother attachment was associated with children's later friendship quality. A series of repeated measures analyses of covariance indicated that a secure versus avoidant or disorganized infant-mother attachment was associated with more maternal talk about cognitions (but not emotions or desires) at 24 months. Latent growth curve models tested within a structural equation modeling framework revealed indirect effects of infant-mother attachment on observed and mother-reported positive friendship interaction at 54 months and decreases in mother-reported negative friendship interaction from 54 months to 1st grade via maternal cognitive talk at 24 months.     

Pragmatic use of stereotyping in teamwork: social loafing and compensation as a function of inferred partner-situation fit

Using 4 experiments, the authors examined how stereotypic information about teammates influences social loafing and compensation during collective tasks. In each experiment, participants performed better on cognitive tasks when there was a poor (vs. good) fit between the stereotypic strengths of their partner and the requirements of the task. This pattern occurred whether participants used gender stereotypes (Experiment 1) or occupational stereotypes (Experiments 2 to 4) and occurred even when participants only anticipated working on a collective task (Experiment 4). In Experiment 3, the pattern occurred only in the collective (not in the coactive) condition, providing direct evidence for social loafing. Together, these results suggest that people use stereotypes to tune their motivation to optimize the ratio of their own individual effort to the team's expected output.     

Self-experience as a mechanism for learning about others: a training study in social cognition

Using a gaze-following task, the authors assessed whether self-experience with the view-obstructing properties of blindfolds influenced infants' understanding of this effect in others. In Experiment 1, 12-month-olds provided with blindfold self-experience behaved as though they understood that a person wearing a blindfold cannot see. When a blindfolded adult turned to face an object, these infants gaze followed significantly less than control infants who had either (a) seen and felt the blindfold but whose view had not been obstructed by it or (b) experienced a windowed blindfold through which they could see. In Experiment 2, 18-month-olds experienced either (a) a trick blindfold that looked opaque but could be seen through, (b) an opaque blindfold, or (c) baseline familiarization. Infants receiving trick-blindfold experience now followed a blindfolded adult's gaze significantly more than controls. The authors propose 3 mechanisms underlying infants' capacity to use self-experience as a framework for understanding the visual perception of others.     

Development of social-cognitive and communication skills in children born deaf

Central to the interface of social-cognitive and communicative development is the growth of a theory of mind (ToM). ToM is mastered by most hearing children and deaf children of signing deaf parents by the age of 5 or 6 but is often seriously delayed in deaf children of hearing parents. This paper reviews recently published research on deaf children's ToM development and presents an original study consisting of eight longitudinal case histories that collectively map late-signing deaf children's ToM performance from 44 to 158 months of age. While five tentative conclusions can be posited from the collective research so far, further investigation of each of these possibilities is clearly needed.     

Exploring emotions as social phenomena among Canadian varsity athletes

ObjectivesAthletes are constantly engaging with teammates, coaches, and opponents, and rather than treating emotions as manifested in the individual as is often the case, psychological analyses need to treat emotions as social and relational. The purpose of this research was to explore athletes' accounts of emotions as social phenomena in sport using qualitative inquiry methods.MethodFourteen Canadian varsity athletes (7 males, 7 females, age range: 18–26 years) from a variety of sports participated in two semi-structured interviews. Data were analyzed using inductive coding, categorization, micro-analysis, and abduction (Mayan, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1998).ResultsAthletes reported individual and shared stressors that led to individual, group-based, and collective emotions, and they also reported emotional conflict when they simultaneously experienced individual and group-based or collective emotions. Emotional expressions were perceived to impact team functioning and performance, communicated team values, served affiliative functions among teammates, and prompted communal coping to deal with stressors as a team. Factors which appeared to influence athletes' emotions included athlete identity, teammate relationships, leaders and coaches, and social norms for emotion expression.ConclusionsOur study extends previous research by examining emotions as social phenomena among athletes from a variety of sports, and by elaborating on the role of athletes' social identity with regard to their emotional experiences in sport.     

Agonistic interpersonal striving: social-cognitive mechanism of cardiovascular risk in youth?

The social competence model (SCM) of cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk identifies combinations of goal-oriented strivings, expressive behaviors, and social skill deficits that contribute to persisting interpersonal difficulties and chronic health-damaging stress in youth. SCM hypotheses were tested on 187 Black and White adolescents who completed the Social Competence Interview (SCI) and later underwent ambulatory blood pressure (ABP) monitoring. Cluster analyses of stress narratives assessed via SCI identified 3 predicted stress profiles: agonistic (interpersonally focused), transcendent (self-development focused), and avoidant. Group comparisons using social, hemodynamic, and ABP data supported the SCM hypothesis that youths who exhibit the agonistic striving profile display diminished social competence, negative social impact, and heightened cardiovascular responding during a stress interview, and elevated ABP during normal social interactions, thus suggesting higher risk of CVD.     

Social loafing vs. social enhancement: Public goods provisioning in real-time with irrevocable commitments

Whereas most experimental studies of public goods provisioning require that all players make their decisions simultaneously, in most organizational settings contribution decisions are made in real time. To account for this aspect of the decision process, we introduce a real-time protocol of play in which, at any point in time, players can either withhold or contribute their entire endowment to a step-level public good. Once contributed, the individual endowments—that in the present experiment differ from one group member to another—cannot be withdrawn. Our results show that contribution levels under the real-time protocol with irrevocable commitments significantly exceed those observed in previous studies under the more common simultaneous protocol of play, thereby considerably reducing social loafing (free riding). Consistent with our equilibrium analysis, over multiple iterations of the game play converges to an equilibrium set of players who maximize the sum of their individual benefit-to-contribution ratios.     

Deontic and epistemic reasoning in children

It is widely accepted that adults show an advantage for deontic over epistemic reasoning. Two published studies (Cummins, 1996b; Harris and Núñez, 1996, Experiment 4) found evidence of this “deontic advantage” in preschool-aged children and are frequently cited as evidence that preschoolers show the same deontic advantage as adults. However, neither study has been replicated, and it is not clear from either study that preschoolers were showing the deontic advantage under the same conditions as adults. The current research investigated these issues. Experiment 1 attempted to replicate both Cummins’s and Harris and Núñez’s studies with 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 56), replicating the former with 4-year-olds and the latter with both 3- and 4-year-olds. Experiment 2 modified Cummins’s task to remove the contextual differences between conditions, making it more similar to adult tasks, finding that 4-year-olds (n = 16) show no evidence of the deontic advantage when no authority figure is present in the deontic condition, whereas both 7-year-olds (n = 16) and adults (n = 28) do. Experiment 3 removed the authority figure from the deontic condition in Harris and Núñez’s task, again finding that 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 28) show no evidence of the deontic advantage under these conditions. These results suggest that for preschoolers, the deontic advantage is reliant on particular contextual cues such as the presence of an authority figure, in the deontic condition. By 7 years of age, however, children are reasoning like adults and show evidence of the advantage when no such contextual cues are present.     

Reducing perceived social loafing in virtual teams: The effect of team feedback with guided reflexivity

The aim of this study was twofold. The first aim was to study the effect of an intervention combining team feedback and guided reflexivity on virtual teams' affective outcomes. The second was to examine the mediating role of perceived social loafing in this relationship. An experimental laboratory study was carried out with 54 teams randomly assigned to an experimental condition or a control condition. Results showed that this intervention had an effect on satisfaction with the result, but not on group cohesion and satisfaction with the team. Moreover, perceived social loafing fully mediated the effect of this intervention on group cohesion and partially mediated its effect on satisfaction with the team and the result.     

Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions. The main focus of theorizing has been why 3-year-olds fail, and only recently have there been any models of how success is achieved in false-belief tasks. Leslie and Polizzi (Inhibitory processing in the false-belief task: Two conjectures. Developmental Science, 1, 247-254, 1998) proposed two competing models of success, which are the focus of the current paper. The models assume that belief-desire reasoning is a process which selects a content for an agent's belief and an action for the agent's desire. In false belief tasks, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) provides plausible candidate belief contents, among which will be a 'true-belief.' A second process reviews these candidates and by default will select the true-belief content for attribution. To succeed in a false-belief task, the default content must be inhibited so that attention shifts to another candidate belief. In traditional false-belief tasks, the protagonist's desire is to approach an object. Here we make use of tasks in which the protagonist has a desire to avoid an object, about which she has a false-belief. Children find such tasks much more difficult than traditional tasks. Our models explain the additional difficulty by assuming that predicting action from an avoidance desire also requires an inhibition. The two processing models differ in the way that belief and desire inhibitory processes combine to achieve successful action prediction. In six experiments we obtain evidence favoring one model, in which parallel inhibitory processes cancel out, over the other model, in which serial inhibitions force attention to a previously inhibited location. These results are discussed in terms of a set of simple proposals for the modus operandi of a domain specific learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is in part modular--the ToMM--and in part penetrable--the Selection Processor (SP). We show how ToMM-SP can account both for competence and for successful and unsuccessful performance on a wide range of belief-desire tasks across the preschool period. Together, ToMM and SP attend to and learn about mental states.     

Exploring the forgetting mechanisms in working memory: Evidence from a reasoning span test

In working memory (WM) span tests participants have to maintain to-be-remembered information while processing other, potentially distracting, information. Previous studies have shown that WM span scores are greater when span lists start with a long processing task and end with a short processing task than when these processing tasks are presented in the reverse order (e.g., Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 2000). In Experiment 1, we obtained a similar stimulus order effect in a reasoning span test, using reasoning sentences that were equated for length in terms of the number of constituent words, but which differed in processing complexity; span scores were greater when lists began with a complex sentence and ended with a simple sentence than when this stimulus order was reversed. In Experiment 2, the stimulus order effect was not found when processing duration was held constant while sentence complexity was varied using a computer-paced moving window presentation paradigm. These results suggest that duration-based constraints can affect degree of forgetting independently of the load generated during processing phases in WM span performance and therefore imply that time-related forgetting can occur in WM span tests, particularly when the difficulty of the processing component blocks active maintenance of to-be-remembered material.     

Science as a justification for psychology as a social institution

Psychology seeks to justify its claims to privilege as a social institution largely on the basis of its scientific knowledge claims. These knowledge claims tend to be based on, and to reflect a particular view about the nature of science which is under increasing challenge. This situation is discussed and some of its implications examined.     

Adaptive social reasoning in depressed mood and depressive vulnerability

In this study we evaluate the evolutionary hypothesis that depressed states are associated with more adaptive reasoning about social risks, such as defeat or rejection. A total of 78 women were administered one of two mood inductions (depressed vs. neutral), followed by four Wason selection reasoning tasks (truth-detection, cheater-detection, and two social risk tasks addressing attachment and social competition risks). Those in the depressed mood condition gave significantly more correct responses on a task requiring participants to reason about social competition. There were no significant differences on performance for the other reasoning tasks between the two mood induction conditions. Furthermore, measures of two dimensions of depression prone personality (sociotropy and autonomy) were associated with less adaptive reasoning about social risks. These results suggest that mildly depressed states may indeed facilitate adaptive reasoning within certain domains, whereas vulnerability to depression may be associated with a relative impairment in reasoning about social risks.     

Pragmatic schemas and conditional reasoning in children

Solving problems involving conditional relationships has been postulated to play a central role in the development of deductive reasoning, which itself underpins much cognitive developmental theory. The traditional Piagetian and “natural logic” approaches to this topic have more recently been challenged by findings that are more readily explained in terms of the concept of pragmatic schemas. On this basis it was predicted that even young “pre-formal” children would be able to succeed in a Reduced Array Selection Task if the test statement (referring to a previously told story about bees living in a hive) was couched in such a way as to evoke an authorization or permission schema. This proved to be the case in the present study involving 54 nine- and ten-year-old children: The permission condition elicited 70% globally correct solutions, compared to the 11% elicited by the formal control condition. Moreover, this facilitatory effect of the permission condition carried over to a second trial conducted in a standard way across all the conditions.     

Analogical reasoning as a tool of epidemiological investigation

Few, if any, scientific inquiries are conducted against a background of complete knowledge, a background in which inquirers are in possession of the full facts that relate to a particular question or issue. More often than not, scientists are compelled to conduct their deliberations in contexts of epistemic uncertainty, in which partial knowledge or even a total absence of knowledge characterise inquiry. Nowhere is this epistemic uncertainty more evident, or indeed more successfully controlled, than in the branch of scientific inquiry called epidemiology. In this paper, I examine how epidemiologists overcome the unique challenges to inquiry that are posed by epistemic uncertainty. In specific terms, I contend that epidemiologists employ analogical reasoning strategies in an attempt to advance their inquiries in situations that are epistemically uncertain. The context for my claims will be the early inquiries that were conducted into the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the United States. I argue that early scientific work in relation to HIV/AIDS was directly premised upon epidemiological investigations in which analogical reasoning with hepatitis B had featured significantly. I conclude that epidemiological investigations of AIDS exemplify the capacity of analogical reasoning to advance inquiry under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. To this extent, analogical reasoning should be a concern both to those who address practical problems of uncertainty management and to those who pursue theoretical debates within argumentation studies and epistemology.