Spatial egocentrism and the effect of an alternate frame of reference

The present study contrasted two possible explanations of spatial egocentrism in spatial perspective tasks. By one account children's judgments in perspectivetaking tasks are based on relations between the self (ego) and the target array. By the second account, children's judgments are based on relations between the target array and the larger spatial field. Sixty children in first, third, and fifth grades (ages 7, 9, and 11 years, respectively) solved both a standard and a modified version of a spatial perspective task. In the modified procedure, subjects observed a model of the experimental room that was rotated to appear as the actual room would appear to a hypothetical viewer. Using the model as an alternative frame of reference improved the performance of subjects in all age groups. In the standard procedure most errors were egocentric. In the modified procedure, subjects showed no systematic egocentric errors for rotations of 90 or 270°. The results supported the hypothesis that systematic egocentric errors are due to subjects realistically maintaining the relation of the array to the immediate spatial field, rather than maintaining the ego-array relation.     

Mental rotation and the perspective problem

Experiment I contrasts the difficulty of problems in which a child must anticipate the appearance of an array of objects that is rotated (rotation problems) to the difficulty of problems in which a child must anticipate the appearance of a fixed array to an observer who has been rotated with respect to it (perspective problems). Perspective problems are much more difficult and show a different error pattern. Experiment II contrasts standard perspective problems, in which a child must anticipate the appearance of the array to an observer whose position differs from his own, to “perspective-move” problems, in which a child must anticipate the appearance of the array from his own new position; i.e., he himself moves. The latter problems are much easier, and the error pattern is much like that for rotation problems. The mental operations involved in solving these various types of problems are discussed.     

Updating displays after imagined object and viewer rotations

Six experiments compared spatial updating of an array after imagined rotations of the array versus viewer. Participants responded faster and made fewer errors in viewer tasks than in array tasks while positioned outside (Experiment 1) or inside (Experiment 2) the array. An apparent array advantage for updating objects rather than locations was attributable to participants imagining translations of single objects rather than rotations of the array (Experiment 3). Superior viewer performance persisted when the array was reduced to 1 object (Experiment 4); however, an object with a familiar configuration improved object performance somewhat (Experiment 5). Object performance reached near-viewer levels when rotations included haptic information for the turning object. The researchers discuss these findings in terms of the relative differences in which the human cognitive system transforms the spatial reference frames corresponding to each imagined rotation.     

ORGANISMIC PROCESSES FOR NEO-PIAGETIAN THEORIES: A DIALECTICAL CAUSAL ACCOUNT OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

The paper criticizes some epistemological presuppositions of Piaget's and of neo-Piagetian's work, in particular, the psycho-Logical principle. This principle is contrasted with a more valid psycho-dialectical one. It is suggested that a dialectical-constructivist (i.e., causal-dynamic) perspective offers a causal theoretical framework for cognitive development that is superior to that of Piaget and many neo-Piagetians. I outline criteria for evaluating causal developmental theories, and point out deficiencies in Piaget's and neo-Piagetian's stage theories vis-à-vis the criteria. An organismic theory of constructive operators - a dialectical/causal theory - is introduced as a remedy for these deficiencies. I focus on a modular model of mental attention that is constituted by four dynamically interacting functional systems. These systems together explain the ‘beam’ of mental attention and its phenomenological/behavioural effects. I claim that the stages of cognitive development are caused by growth of mental attention. The validity of this model is supported by data on a motor performance task (Rho task). The Rho data show: (a) the existence of stage-wise plateaus in children's performance at ages congruent with the redefined Piagetian stages; (b) the psychological structures which, driven by mental attention (M-capacity), are responsible for performance on the task, appear to be located in the left hemisphere of the brain. These findings, predicted by the dialectical theory of mental attention, highlight its causal-predictive power.     

Updating space during imagined self- and array translations

Previous work has demonstrated superior spatial updating performance during imagined viewer rotation versus imagined object/array rotation. Studies have also suggested that rotations are more difficult to process than translations. In three studies, we examined whether the advantage seen for updating during imagined self-rotations would generalize to translations. The participants updated the positions of objects in a line extending either to the front and back of the viewer or to the right and left after imagining viewer or array translation. Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the effects seen in imagined rotation tasks. A response time and accuracy advantage was found for imagined viewer translation versus imagined array translation. In Experiment 3, we directly compared real and imagined self- and array translations and demonstrated an advantage for real versus imagined array translation. The results suggest that the advantage for imagined viewer transformations is not a function of the specific transformation, but rather of the ability to imagine and predict the outcome of a moving frame of reference.     

Intersubjectivity and egocentrism: Insights from the relational perspectives of Piaget, Mead, and Wittgenstein

Beginning with Piaget’s concept of egocentrism, we explicate a view of differentiating and coordination perspectives on which language and cognition are based by also drawing on insights from Mead and Wittgenstein. The concept of egocentrism is linked to Piaget’s view of knowledge and development. In overcoming egocentrism, infants differentiate the world from their action. We extend a Piagetian approach to overcoming egocentrism with regard to children’s social knowledge by drawing on Mead’s view that minds and selves emerge from the social process. Children must take the role of others for selves to emerge, a process that is rooted in interaction, requiring sufficient experience with others to be able to anticipate others’ response or attitude to their act. Then the self can respond to one’s own act as the other would. From Piaget’s perspective, these are schemes or patterns of action that develop with repeated experience. From Wittgenstein’s perspective, these patterns are embedded in forms of life; natural ways of reacting to and interacting with others that are characteristic of our species. Overcoming egocentrism or developing perspective taking is required for understanding and for human forms of cognition.     

Asymmetric learning transfer between imagined viewer- and object-rotations: Evidence of a hierarchical organization of spatial reference frames

Neural resources subserving spatial processing in either egocentric or allocentric reference frames are, at least partly, dissociated. However, it is unclear whether these two types of representations are independent or whether they interact. We investigated this question using a learning transfer paradigm. The experiment and material were designed so that they could be used in a clinical setting. Here, we tested healthy subjects in an imagined viewer-rotation task and an imagined object-rotation task. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced across subjects. The results showed that subjects who did the viewer-rotation task first had fewer errors and shorter latencies of response in the object-rotation task, whereas subjects who did the object-rotation task first had little if any advantage in the viewer-rotation task. In other words, the results revealed an asymmetric learning transfer between tasks, which suggests that spatial representations are hierarchically organized. Specifically, the results indicate that the viewer-rotation task engaged allocentric representations and egocentric representations, whereas the object-rotation task engaged only egocentric representations.     

The development of procedures for identifying competitive behavior in children

This study identified events in the competitive process that could be employed to discriminate between competition and individual, non-social behaviors. When children competed they overtly sought out information on how they were doing vis-à-vis their fellow competitor. In addition, their performance was a function of some competitive contingency: a reward for surpassing another. The procedures developed in this study were designed to manipulate competitive contingencies while observing their effects on task performance and social comparisons. The investigator could thus infer that competition was present when (1) subjects sought out information on how they were doing, as well as how another was doing on comparable tasks during competitive contingencies, and (2) their task performance was a function of the competitive contingency.     

Asymmetric learning transfer between imagined viewer- and object-rotations: Evidence of a hierarchical organization of spatial reference frames

Neural resources subserving spatial processing in either egocentric or allocentric reference frames are, at least partly, dissociated. However, it is unclear whether these two types of representations are independent or whether they interact. We investigated this question using a learning transfer paradigm. The experiment and material were designed so that they could be used in a clinical setting. Here, we tested healthy subjects in an imagined viewer-rotation task and an imagined object-rotation task. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced across subjects. The results showed that subjects who did the viewer-rotation task first had fewer errors and shorter latencies of response in the object-rotation task, whereas subjects who did the object-rotation task first had little if any advantage in the viewer-rotation task. In other words, the results revealed an asymmetric learning transfer between tasks, which suggests that spatial representations are hierarchically organized. Specifically, the results indicate that the viewer-rotation task engaged allocentric representations and egocentric representations, whereas the object-rotation task engaged only egocentric representations.     

Egocentrism in moral development: Gibbs, Piaget, Kohlberg

In Gibb’s theory of moral development Piagetian ideas concerning egocentrism play an important role. Based on these ideas Gibbs offers a detailed analysis of transitions in moral development. However, Gibbs still fails to utilize the full potential offered by Piaget’s equilibration theory, because he does not generalize the idea of overcoming egocentrism, as an important mechanism, to all stage transitions. Gibbs seeks a non-relativistic theoretical/ethical justification for his claims about moral development in a difficult to substantiate notion of an underlying reality. Moreover, such objectivist claims are difficult to reconcile with his endorsement of Piaget’s constructivism.Following Piaget’s equilibration theory development can be seen as the march to an ever widening perspective, possible through reflecting abstraction, and implying overcoming egocentric biases that recur at all levels of development. Assuming the widest level in the case of moral development is the moral point of view, an impartial procedure that should guarantee that everybody involved can freely agree as the result of considering arguments reflecting all viewpoints, fits in with a tradition in ethics from Kant, to Rawls, to Habermas which takes the moral point of view as the ultimate moral principle. These so called ‘Procedural Ethics’ theories are not relativistic, but not objectivist either, because they ultimately depend on the characteristics of the procedure.     

When ecology and sociology meet: the contributions of Edward A. Ross

Edward A. Ross, a key figure in the early history of American sociology, developed a conceptualization of natural and social changes of the material environment that is virtually forgotten today. In this paper, these topics are discussed and located vis-à-vis Ross's intellectual contemporaries and their general take on the nature/society relationship. It is argued that ecological and sociological ideas in the early twentieth century influenced one another and, in the case of Ross, produced a perspective of social change that tried to include the dynamics of nature.     

Being Aggrieved,Faith Crises,and Racism

In this article, I depict the notion of being aggrieved and its relation to crises in or struggles of , faith, using racism to illustrate my claims. I begin the discussion by explaining what I mean by being aggrieved and its relation to faith vis-à-vis racism, relying on theological, philosophical, and psychological frameworks. In the second section of the paper, the faith journey of Malcolm X serves to illustrate this hermeneutical perspective. More specifically, I argue that his faith journey, marred by experiences of racism, led him to a faith wherein his experiences of being aggrieved no longer meant that his being was being aggrieved.     

The Social Ladder: A Rank-Based Perspective on Social Class

Scholars across the social sciences have studied social class for centuries. In this review, we suggest that social class is a fundamental means by which individuals are ranked on the social ladder of society. A rank-based perspective on social class shines light on several future areas of research: Specifically, understanding how social class ranks individuals vis-à-vis others leads to predictions about how class is signaled in interactions, influences social cognition and health, is shaped by global economic inequality trends, and changes across the life course. Importantly, our theory highlights the potential of experimental manipulations of social class rank for testing the causal role of social class in shaping basic patterns of cognition, emotion, and behavior. Future predictions regarding the channels of social class rank signals, along with how position on the social ladder shapes political attitudes and interacts with cultural values, are considered.     

Psychotherapy Research and Psychoanalytic Practice: Commentary on Papers by Lester Luborsky and Hans H. Strupp

I discuss the views of Lester Luborsky (quite optimistic) and of Hans H. Strupp (less so) concerning the accumulating evidence for the favorable impact of psychoanalytic therapy research, as it has grown over recent decades, in shaping clinical psychoanalytic activity. I offer my perspectives on their views of the issues of (a) the effectiveness of psychoanalytic (psychodynamic) therapies vis-à-vis the varieties of nonanalytically based therapies; (b) long-term (time-unlimited) vis-à-vis short-term (time-limited) therapy, (c) the call for empirically supported treatments (ESTs), (d) the call for randomized clinical trials (RCTs), (e) the trend toward “manualization” of therapy approaches, and (f) the light that all these considerations can cast on the extent to which, and how, psychoanalytic therapy helps.     

THE CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE: PIAGET AND THE BAOULÉ*

There are two aspects of Piaget's theory that can be at least partly distinguished: (1) The stage theory, or the development of particular concepts through a series of hierarchical stages; (2) The metatheory, or the interactionist model of adaptation (assimilation and accommodation) that explains the mechanisms of cognitive development. Most cross-cultural research has been based on the first of these aspects, using and adapting “Piagetian tasks ”in various conceptual areas. Some findings of this line of enquiry, and the methodological problems encountered, are briefly reviewed. It is argued that no specific task, nor a combination of them, can be taken to measure a general cognitive level; the tasks measure the attainment of particular concepts rather than “intelligence”. New evidence is presented on the reliability and validity of Piagetian tasks used in a cross-cultural setting. In the second model, intelligence is broadly defined as adaptation to the environment; in this conception it would be reasonable to expect divergent paths of cognitive development in different cultures. In other words, one might need a different Piagetian psychology in each culture, but based on universal deep mechanisms. As a modest contribution to a more “emic ”study of intelligence, the concept of intelligence as defined by the Baoulé of Ivory Coast, n'glouèlě is presented and discussed. Ratings on n'glouèlě and its different components are related to performance on Piagetian tasks in a sample of 8- to 9-year-old rural Baoulé children. The thrust of the paper is to point out once more the cultural relativity of any conception of intelligence, be it from a Piagetian or any other perspective.     

On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism

The aim of this paper is to articulate, discuss in detail and criticise Reichenbach’s sophisticated and complex argument for scientific realism. Reichenbach’s argument has two parts. The first part aims to show how there can be reasonable belief in unobservable entities, though the truth of claims about them is not given directly in experience. The second part aims to extent the argument of the first part to the case of realism about the external world, conceived of as a world of independently existing entities distinct from sensations. It is argued that the success of the first part depends on a change of perspective, where unobservable entities are viewed as projective complexes vis-à-vis their observable symptoms, or effects. It is also argued that there is an essential difference between the two parts of the argument, which Reichenbach comes (somewhat reluctantly) to accept.     

Aging of attention: Does the ability to divide decline?

Previous research has yielded conflicting results regarding the relationship between adult age and the ability to divide attention between two concurrent tasks. At least some of the inconsistency is probably attributable to methodological variations, such as the manner in which divided-attention ability has been assessed, how single-task performance has been considered, and the degree of control over relative emphasis placed on each task. Two experiments employing procedures sensitive to these concerns were conducted in which a speeded decision task was performed during the retention interval of a letter-memory task. The results of both experiments indicated that there were relatively few age-related influences on dual-task performance vis-à-vis those on single-task performance.     

Is backing grounding?

Separatists are grounding theorists who hold that grounding relations and metaphysical explanations are distinct, yet intimately connected in the sense that grounding relations back metaphysical explanations, just as causal relations back causal explanations. But Separatists have not elaborated on the nature of the ‘backing’ relation. In this paper, I argue that backing is a form of (partial) grounding. In particular, backing has many of the properties commonly attributed to grounding, and taking backing to be partial grounding allows Separatists to make the most of their position vis-à-vis their Unionist opponents.     

Rival Methodologies in Emergence Theory: A Non-Dual Approach

Jason Roberts proposes that Karl Rahner's theology of nature serves as an appropriate dialogue partner for natural scientists like Terrence Deacon in his naturalistic approach to the emergence of higher-order levels of existence and activity within the natural sciences. Yet Rahner and Deacon employ different understandings of formal causality in their respective approaches to evolutionary theory: for Rahner, causal agency vis-à-vis constituents; for Deacon, objective constraint on the agency of constituents. Yet a compromise position may be available based on a modest revision of the relationship between societies and their constituent actual entities in A.N. Whitehead's cosmology.     

Reconstruction from the mental image

In three experiments young children were asked to reconstruct an array of objects after they had imagined its appearance following either a rotation of the array or a change in their own position (Huttenlocher & Presson, 1973). In reconstructing arrays, subjects first positioned that object which would be most prominent to an observer following the imagined transformation. Surprisingly, this occurred even when subjects made an egocentric error by reconstructing a copy of the original array. Hence young children, although apparently egocentric, can imagine themselves in a new position with a new perspective. The mental operations which underlie imagined spatial transformations are discussed in light of the results.