"FEMINIZATION" OF PSYCHOLOGY

Women are participating in the field of psychology in increasing numbers relative to men. This development has been referred to as the "feminization of psychology," and it carries with it a number of implications. This article reviews statistical data relating to the changing sex ratio and discusses their implications. Participation rates of women in psychology are examined as they pertain to enrollment in doctoral programs, graduation from baccalaureate programs, and career progress within the profession. Implications of changing sex ratios for occupational prestige, income and economics, work structure, education and training, and theory, research, and practice are then discussed. In conclusion, the concept of "feminization" is challenged as questions are raised about whether the increase in the number of women in psychology is a problem, as has been alleged, or a symptom of other problems within the field     

PEIRCE'S "ARCHITECTURE OF THEORIES" AND THE PROBLEM OF PRAGMATISM

The paper begins as a response to Tom Rockmore's thesis that contemporary pragmatism is a healthy “confusion” of disparate views. While Rockmore sees the need of some of today's pragmatists to provide a motivation for what he calls “epistemic optimism,” I contend that the crucial question of pragmatism, the problem of pragmatism, is the ontological status of pragmatic meaning. Thus rather than a mere “epistemic optimism,” I call upon pragmatists to assert a fallible yet unabashedly metaphysical optimism. The argument supporting this claim is made in the context of Peirce's “The Architecture of Theories.” In “The Architecture of Theories” Peirce opens the door to a pragmatic metaphysics while at the same time committing the error of subordinating truths and reality to “the long run of inquiry.” Rockmore suggest that the solution may lie in a return to Kant's notion of the “powers of the mind.” However, it is my contention that a solution to this problem cannot be found within Kant at all. I shall argue here that until contemporary pragmatism decisively extracts itself from the Kantian paradigm, the pragmatic philosophic value of pragmatic meaning will always be qualified, conditional and ontologically subordinated, having the same effect upon the standing of pragmatism as a philosophy as well. Moreover, I shall endeavor to show that when the Kantian paradigm is finally abandoned, pragmatism's classic difficulties with realism and what Peircc called “the long run” of scientific inquiry can also be resolved. Kantian “powers of the mind” and constructivist “epistemological optimism” would then be transformed into what I shall call unrestricted pragmatism. On the other hand if the Kantian impediment is not overcome, these difficulties will continue to form the basis of a more sceptical and traditionally restricted pragmatism, one which lacks the confidence desired by both Rockmore and myself.     

ON THE "USE" OF NEOPRAGMATISM

Abstract. The present article continues an earlier critique of Robbins's and Rorty's neopragmatism. Their skepticism about the traditional concept of correspondence and about the criteria for truth are both unjustified, and their own assertion of meaning as usefulness either presupposes a prior notion of linguistic reference or fails to qualify as a sufficient criterion for knowledge. The difficulties with neopragmatism have implications for two other areas of the religion/science discussion, postmodernism and empirical Theology. Postmodernism shares neopragmatism's mistakes regarding the philosophy of language and can be rejected without endangering one's empiricism, humanism, or naturalism. By contrast, the strengths of empirical Theology, and of religious empiricism in general, can be preserved without Robbins's proposed ban on metaphysics.     

学前儿童对“知道”和“会”的认知

72名3至5岁儿童接受了陈述性知识和程序性知识的学习任务,探查他们在获得新知识前后对自己是否“知道”和 “会”的认知和知识获取方式的认知 。结果显示,有部分学前儿童在不知道或不会的情况下报告自己“知道”或“会”,对自己的判断倾向于作出肯定回答;在学习新知识之后,学前儿童对自己是否“知道”的认识要比是否“会”的认知准确;儿童对陈述性知识的获取方式的认识好于程序性知识,3岁儿童对知识获取方式的认识存在困难。     

WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PICTURE "THEORY" OF MEANING

Recently, commentators such as Kenny and Hacker have disagreed about whether Wittgenstein's early picture theory of meaning is at all compatible with his later theory of "meaning-as-use". Arguing in favor of their compatibility, Kenny finds that meaning-as-use supplements, rather than rivals the earlier conception of meaning:     

线索效度间隔对“采纳最佳”启发式的影响

以Br?觟der的“五线索二择一”任务为研究范式,探讨线索效度间隔对“采纳最佳”启发式的影响。结果发现：当线索效度间隔为0.04时,被试采用“采纳最佳”启发式的次数处于随机水平,随着线索效度间隔的增大,被试采用“采纳最佳”启发式的次数明显高于随机水平;对立线索信息不同,线索效度间隔对“采纳最佳”启发式的影响也不同。     

PROTOTYPICALITY OF SELF AND EVALUATING OTHERS IN TERMS OF "FUZZY" CONSTRUCTS

A repertory grid was administered individually to 39 Canadian undergraduates in which they rated 11 personal acquaintances on a scale from 1 to 5 on each of 12 bipolar constructs (e.g., generous-stingy). The degree of confidence expressed by these participants concerning their own self-ratings across constructs correlated positively with the extent to which they differentiated among their acquaintances in terms of the same constructs ( r s = 0.49, p < 0.005) and also with how definitely they rated them ( r s = 0.42, p < 0.02). It was hypothesized that the contrasting poles of personal constructs represent "fuzzy sets" without distinct logical boundaries and the self can function as a prototype to which information about others is compared in evaluating them on the basis of each construct.     

"IT'S ON THE MIDDLE OF MY TONGUE"

In a previous issue of Philosophical Investigations Professor Radford provides a counterexample to the equation¹: a word is on the tip of a man's tongue IFF (a) he can recognize the word and (b₁) he believes he may be able to produce It (fairly soon).     

THE "RANGE OF CONVENIENCE" OF PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS AND CONFIDENCE IN EVALUATING SELF

In two independent experiments, participants evaluated themselves dichotomously on bipolar constructs, and also indicated on a scale of 1 to 10 their degree of confidence in the validity of each of their own self-evaluations. They also rank-ordered the constructs in terms of their relative "usefulness for understanding people." The same 12 constructs were supplied to all 40 participants in the first experiment (e.g., generous-stingy), whereas 10 constructs were elicited individually from each of 53 participants in the second one. A significant correlation was found between construct rankings and participants' degree of confidence in their own self-evaluations across both elicited (r = 0.76) and supplied (r = 0.80) constructs. Participants using elicited constructs expressed significantly more confidence in their self-evaluations than did participants using supplied constructs. These findings were interpreted within the framework of Kelly's (1955) personal construct theory.