The multisensory base of bodily coupling in face-to-face social interactions: Contrasting the case of autism with the Möbius syndrome

The perennial question of how we understand others’ emotions and mental states has undertaken an “interactive turn,” emphasizing the crucial role of low-level bodily coupling and second-personal engagements with others as opposed to the individualistic procedure of mental state attribution or “mindreading.” This raises the important question of what counts as foundational for socio-emotional understanding: high-level mentalistic abilities, low-level bodily coupling, or an integrative combination of both? Recent findings on face-based emotion-recognition in individuals with Möbius syndrome (MS) – a rare form of congenital facial paralysis which prevents facial mimicry – cast doubt on the idea that bodily coupling is the foundational component for socio-emotional understanding. Here we argue that the MS case does not pose a threat to the idea that low-level bodily coupling processes are foundational for social cognition. Rather, despite their lack of automatic facial mirroring, MS patients might benefit from spared multisensory integration processing which allows them to establish alternative channels of bodily coupling via different sensory modalities. We contrast MS- and autistic persons’ lack of automatic facial mimicry and argue that this comparison might help us to shed light on the constitutive and foundational role of low-level bodily coupling for socio-emotional understanding.     

Action, mindreading and embodied social cognition

One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent??s actional processes and states??her goals, needs, intentions, desires, and so on??likely play important roles in and for mindreading processes. If so, a full understanding of mindreading processes and their role in cognition more broadly will require an understanding of how actional mental processes interact with, influence, or take part in mindreading processes.     

Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading

The direct social perception (DSP) thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading serves as a rival to DSP or whether some Type 1 mindreading can be perceptual. I will focus on Apperly and Butterfill’s dual process account of mindreading epistemic states such as perception, knowledge, and belief. This account posits a minimal form of Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states called registrations. I will argue that general dual process theories fit well with a modular view of perception that is considered a kind of Type 1 process. I will show that this modular view of perception challenges and has significant advantages over DSP’s phenomenological and psychological theses. Finally, I will argue that if such a modular view of perception is accepted, there is significant reason for thinking Type 1 mindreading of belief-like states is perceptual in nature. This would mean extending the scope of DSP to at least one type of epistemic state.     

Folk personality psychology: mindreading and mindshaping in trait attribution

Character-trait attribution is an important component of everyday social cognition that has until recently received insufficient attention in traditional accounts of folk psychology. In this paper, I consider how the case of character-trait attribution fits into the debate between mindreading-based and broadly ‘pluralistic’ approaches to folk psychology. Contrary to the arguments of some pluralists, I argue that the evidence on trait understanding does not show that it is a distinct, non-mentalistic mode of folk-psychological reasoning, but rather suggests that traits are ordinarily understood as mentalistic dispositions. I also examine several ways in which trait attribution might also serve regulative, ‘mindshaping’ functions by promoting predictable norm-governed behavior, and argue that mindreading plays several important roles in these cases as well. I conclude that an appreciation of the relationship between trait attribution and mindreading is crucial to understanding the role it plays in our folk psychology.

     

Teleological reasoning in infancy: the nai;ve theory of rational action

Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the 'teleological stance' to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance - a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.     

Testimonial Injustice and Mindreading

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial responsibility is the proper corrective to testimonial injustice. She proposes a perceptual‐like “testimonial sensibility” to explain the transmission of knowledge through testimony. This sensibility is the means by which a hearer perceives an interlocutor's credibility level. When prejudice causes a hearer to inappropriately deflate the credibility attributed to a speaker, the sensibility may have functioned unreliably. Testimonial responsibility, she claims, will make the capacity reliable by reinflating credibility levels to their proper degree. I argue that testimonial sensitivity may be or involve “mindreading,” the cognitive capacity by which we predict human behavior and explain it in terms of mental states. Further, I claim that, if testimonial sensibility is or involves mindreading, and mindreading is a function of brain processes (as claimed by cognitive neuroscientists), testimonial injustice cannot be corrected by testimonial responsibility. This is because 1) it appears to rely on conscious awareness of prejudice, whereas much bias occurs implicitly, and 2) it works at the individual level, whereas testimonial injustice occurs both individually and socially. I argue that the remedy for testimonial injustice is, instead, engaging in social efforts that work below the level of consciousness.     

Mirroring versus simulation: on the representational function of simulation

Mirror neurons and systems are often appealed to as mechanisms enabling mindreading, i.e., understanding other people??s mental states. Such neural mirroring processes are often treated as instances of mental simulation rather than folk psychological theorizing. I will call into question this assumed connection between mirroring and simulation, arguing that mirroring does not necessarily constitute mental simulation as specified by the simulation theory of mindreading. I begin by more precisely characterizing ??mirroring?? (Sect. 2) and ??simulation?? (Sect. 3). Mirroring results in a neural process in an observer that resembles a neural process of the same type in the observed agent. Although simulation is often characterized in terms of resemblance (Goldman, Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading, 2006), I argue that simulation requires more than mere interpersonal mental resemblance: A simulation must have the purpose or function of resembling its target (Sect. 3.1). Given that mirroring processes are generated automatically, I focus on what is required for a simulation to possess the function of resembling its target. In Sect. 3.2 I argue that this resemblance function, at least in the case of simulation-based mindreading, requires that a simulation serve as a representation or stand-in of what it resembles. With this revised account of simulation in hand, in Sect. 4 I show that the mirroring processes do not necessarily possess the representational function required of simulation. To do so I describe an account of goal attribution involving a motor mirroring process that should not be characterized as interpersonal mental simulation. I end in Sect. 5 by defending the conceptual distinction between mirroring and simulation, and discussing the implications of this argument for the kind of neuroscientific evidence required by simulation theory.     

Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy

Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at work. In this paper, we show how this argument by analogy is flawed with respect to the case of second‐order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states.     

Simulation,simplicity, and selection: an evolutionary perspective on high-level mindreading

In this paper, I argue that a natural selection-based perspective gives reasons for thinking that the core of the ability to mindread cognitively complex mental states is subserved by a simulationist process—that is, that it relies on non-specialised mechanisms in the attributer’s cognitive architecture whose primary function is the generation of her own decisions and inferences. In more detail, I try to establish three conclusions. First, I try to make clearer what the dispute between simulationist and non-simulationist theories of mindreading fundamentally is about. Second, I try to make more precise an argument that is sometimes hinted at in support of the former: this ‘argument from simplicity’ suggests that, since natural selection disfavours building extra cognitive systems where this can be avoided, simulationist theories of mindreading are more in line with natural selection than their competitors. As stated, though, this argument overlooks the fact that building extra cognitive systems can also yield benefits: in particular, it can allow for the parallel processing of multiple problems and it makes for the existence of backups for important elements of the organism’s mind. I therefore try to make this argument more precise by investigating whether these benefits also apply to the present case—and conclude negatively. My third aim in this paper is to use this discussion of mindreading as a means for exploring the promises and difficulties of evolutionary arguments in philosophy and psychology more generally.     

Embodying the False-Belief Tasks

Embodied approaches to mindreading have tended to define themselves in contrast to cognitive approaches to social mindreading. One side effect of this has been a lack of engagement with key areas in the study of social cognition??in particular the topic of how we gain an understanding of the referential nature of others?? thoughts, and how that understanding develops from infancy. I argue that embodied accounts of mindreading are well equipped to enter into this debate, by making use of the notion of a joint mental state, but that doing so will require taking a less antagonistic attitude towards mainstream cognitive approach.     

The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A developmental hypothesis

In this paper we shall argue that mentalistic action explanations, which form an essential component of a mature theory of mind, are conceptually and developmentally derived from an earlier and purely teleological interpretational system present in infancy. First we summarize our evidence demonstrating teleological action explanations in one-year-olds. Then we shall briefly contrast the structure of teleological vs. causal mentalistic action explanations and outline four logical possibilities concerning the nature of the developmental relationship between them. We shall argue for the view that causal mentalistic action explanations are constructed as useful theoretical extensions of the earlier, purely teleological, nonmentalistic interpretational stance.     

Theory of Mind in Infants and Young Children: A Review

Theory of mind, or mindreading, refers to our uniquely human capacity to infer what is in other people's minds. Recent research suggests that “implicit” elements of this ability can be seen as early as the second year of life, in infants’ spontaneous helping, communicative, and eye‐gaze behaviours. More “explicit” verbally mediated mindreading skills emerge in the preschool period, and these are positively linked to social competence. Research with typically developing children as well as those with autism spectrum disorders suggests that exposure to conversation about mental states promotes theory of mind development.     

RECkoning with representational apriorism in evolutionary cognitive archaeology

In evolutionary cognitive archaeology, the school of thought associated with the traditional framework has been deeply influenced by cognitivist intuitions, which have led to the formulation of mentalistic and disembodied cognitive explanations to address the emergence of artifacts within the archaeological record of ancient hominins. Recently, some approaches in this domain have further enforced this view, by arguing that artifacts are passive means to broadcast/perpetuate meanings that are thoroughly internal to the mind. These meanings are conveyed either in the form of a Language of Thought, constituted by sub-personal, content-bearing mental representations, or in that of a natural language. In both cases, however, material culture stands as the physical derivative of computations run over representations, which include abstract concepts, semantic relationships, and meta-representations about intensional states, a conception hereby indicated as “representational apriorism”. In this paper, I will argue that such mentalistic models are plagued by the fundamental problems of content, substance, and origin, which affect the representational substrates required for the production of artifacts. At the same time, these models fail the criterion of minimalism at the crux of conditional cognitive archaeology, because they propose overly costly explanations which are insufficiently constrained by material evidence. An alternative proposal, based on the principles of radical enactive cognitive science, is hereby introduced in order to counter this mentalistic drift. It is concluded that a radical enactive cognitive archaeology is able to dissolve the deep problems confronting the mentalistic paradigm, while providing minimalistic cognitive explanations about the emergence of Paleolithic artifacts.     

The Association Between Reflective Functioning and Parent–Child Relationship Quality

Research consistently links adult and infant attachment styles, yet the means by which attachment is transmitted is relatively elusive. Recently, attention has been directed to the psychological underpinnings of caregiver sensitivity—originally thought to be the mechanism of transmission—as indicated by caregivers’ ability to keep in mind children’s mental states when interpreting children’s behavior, or reflective functioning. Unfortunately for researchers, extant measures of reflective functioning are time-consuming and require extensive observation and coding. A self-report measure could help facilitate the study and assessment of reflective functioning in research and clinical settings. This study investigated the relationship between parental reflective functioning and multiple aspects of the parent–child relationship, by using a new, self-report measure of reflective functioning. Participants were 79 caregivers (M _age = 31.8 years) who completed self-report measures assessing reflective functioning, parent–child relationship characteristics, perceived rejection in early relationships, attachment anxiety and avoidance in current close relationships, depression, and substance use. The results indicated that reflective functioning is a strong predictor of parent–child relationship quality (i.e., parental involvement, communication, parent satisfaction, limit setting, and parental support), independent of other potential indicators. Findings support parental reflective functioning as a contributor to the quality of parent–child relationship and suggest that a parent’s capacity to reflect on the mental states of his or her child in parent–child interactions may provide a key target for interventions that aim to improve parent–child relationships.     

The origins of mindreading: how interpretive socio-cognitive practices get off the ground

Synthese - Recent accounts of mindreading—i.e., the human capacity to attribute mental states to interpret, explain, and predict behavior—have suggested that it has evolved through...     

The Knowledge Argument, Abilities, And Metalinguistic Beliefs

In this paper I discuss a variant of the knowledge argument which is based upon Frank Jackson's Mary thought experiment. Using this argument, Jackson tries to support the thesis that a purely physical – or, put generally: an objectively scientific – perspective upon the world excludes the important domain of `phenomenal' facts, which are only accessible introspectively. Martine Nida-Rümelinhas formulated the epistemological challenge behind the case of Mary especially clearly. I take her formulation of the problem as a starting-point and present a solution which is based solely on the concepts of capability and of metalinguistic beliefs. References to epiphenomenal facts, phenomenal knowledge etc. will be avoided completely. I specify my proposal against the backdrop of Burge's critical reflections about metalinguistic reinterpretation of expressions of belief and the externalist thesis held by Burge, Putnam and others that meanings and mental states are dependent upon the environment. My solution is then compared with Lewis' and Nemirow's ability objection. Finally I argue that the much discussed ``knowing what it is like' has in its ordinary meaning nothing much to do with `phenomenal knowledge' or knowledge of `epiphenomenal' facts.     

Theories,structures and simulations in the research of early mentalizing

The objective of this paper is to propose some new approaches that could be used in the research of the development of mindreading in infancy. I argue that the mentalizing system should be approached as a developing hierarchical structure that acquires the ability to orient attention to the most significant features in the environment. The development of this system could be described by a series of implicit theories that share a common structure which provides continuity over theory change. According to this view, the early stages which have a fundamental role for the development of mindreading would be described by low-level theories, but as infants become increasingly efficient in predicting behavior of observed agents the higher-order entities become prioritized due to their relevance. Infants thus gradually develop the ability to predict the behavior of others in situations involving attribution of mental states. I propose a strategy based on the analysis of attention deployment that could help to decide which of the alternative theories provides the most adequate account of the mentalizing system at a certain developmental stage. I also suggest that computational modeling could contribute to the research in this area. Simulations of looking behavior based on different ontologies could prove to be useful for choosing the most adequate theory as well as for advancing the understanding of mechanisms involved in the development of theory of mind.     

The mentalistic basis of core social cognition: experiments in preverbal infants and a computational model

Evaluating individuals based on their pro‐ and anti‐social behaviors is fundamental to successful human interaction. Recent research suggests that even preverbal infants engage in social evaluation; however, it remains an open question whether infants’ judgments are driven uniquely by an analysis of the mental states that motivate others’ helpful and unhelpful actions, or whether non‐mentalistic inferences are at play. Here we present evidence from 10‐month‐olds, motivated and supported by a Bayesian computational model, for mentalistic social evaluation in the first year of life.A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://youtu.be/rD_Ry5oqCYE     

Mind Misreading

Most people think of themselves as pretty good at understanding others’ beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. Accurate mindreading is an impressive cognitive feat, and for this reason the philosophical literature on mindreading has focused exclusively on explaining such successes. However, as it turns out, we regularly make mindreading mistakes. Understanding when and how mind misreading occurs is crucial for a complete account of mindreading. In this paper, I examine the conditions under which mind misreading occurs. I argue that these patterns of mind misreading shed light on the limits of mindreading, reveal new perspectives on how mindreading works, and have implications for social epistemology.