The plural self

In a sample of 61 psychology students, unity in the subjective structure of the self was associated with having a Taoist orientation.     

The self system

Recent findings of infant research suggest that the self may be regarded as a self-regulating system. The "identity self", that is, the totality of self representations, serves as the internal reference system around which all life-historical identity vacillations revolve.     

The dynamic self

The paper describes various aspects of the dynamic energy of the self, as experienced personally and in clinical work. It discusses the inherent and archetypal force there is in the self, expressed in several ways, for example in some poetry, and in spirituality. The dynamic power of the self is shown at work in the process of individuation, including its vicissitudes of pain and working through doubts, envies and other shadow factors.     

The social self

Pastoral Psychology -     

The essential moral self

It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits—more than any other mental faculty—are considered the most essential part of identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, especially emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that folk notions of personal identity are largely informed by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a particularly keen focus on moral traits.     

The self in prejudice

The self as a psychological construct, and the self in relation to the other has been discussed in psychological and sociological literature for decades, but not much attention has been given to the psychological development of the self in relation to the social construction of prejudice. The primary aim of this article is to explore the self in prejudice and thus the psychological processes involved in the development of self within the social context. Consequently, the aim is to explore the self in the construction and expression of prejudice from both a social and psychological approach, and to explain selfhood influences at the individual, group and community levels. I use the conceptual framework of Kohut's self psychology as a lens to present the development of the self and thus the idea of the development of the self in relation to the other. In such exploration of self in prejudice, I present some of my ideas which include prejudice as an outcome of self-definition in the context of the other, as well as linking self in prejudice and group dynamics to attachment theory and the notion of “selfgroup’ in terms of overidentification with the in-group. While the social and the psychological in terms of the development of the self cannot be separated, I have therefore attempted to merge at some point the two bodies of thought in relation to the self in prejudice.     

The self as phenotype

Self-awareness is viewed here as the phenotypic expression of an interaction between genes and the environment. Brain and behavioral development of fetuses and newborn infants are a rich source of information regarding what might constitute minimal self-awareness. Research indicates that newborns have feeling (subjective) experience. Unlike automata, they do not just sense and respond to proximal stimulations. In light of the explosive brain growth that takes place inside and outside of the womb, first signs of feeling as opposed to sensing experience are discussed. Feeling experience is considered as the necessary condition for having minimal self-awareness. Both would co-emerge in development. However, minimal self-awareness is rapidly supplemented with an awareness that is not just perceptual, but also conceptual and ethical, primarily defined in relation to and by others.     

The self in analysis

This paper develops a theoretical and clinical approach to the self which is non-essentialist and post-modem. Briefly, it offers a framework for theorizing Self based on hermeneutics and psychological constructivism. It then develops a critique of the essentialist Jungian theory of Self in which the Self is frequently described as a human subject with views, intentions and desires of its own. With this is background, a post-modern Jungian framework for Self is advanced, with a brief clinical account of the self in analysis.     

The self in cyberspace

Abstract: Jung's concept of the Self is compared with current theories of identity formation in post‐modern society concerning the question: is the self constituted through experience and cultural influences—as it is argued by current theories in the social sciences—or is it already preformed inside the person, as Jung argues? The impact of communication media on the formation of identity in today's societies is discussed with a focus on internet communication and virtual realities. The resulting types of identities are conceptualized as polycentric which has surprising parallels to Jung's idea of the Self. The epistemology of constructivism and parallels in Jung's thought are demonstrated. Jung's work in this respect often appears contradictory in itself but this can be dealt with by a postmodern approach which accepts a plurality of truths.     

The minimal self hypothesis

For millennia self has been conjectured to be necessary for consciousness. But scant empirical evidence has been adduced to support this hypothesis. Inconsistent explications of “self” and failure to design apt experiments have impeded progress. Advocates of phenomenological psychiatry, however, have helped explicate “self,” and employed it to explain some psychopathological symptoms. In those studies, “self” is understood in a minimalist sense, sheer “for-me-ness.” Unfortunately, explication of the “minimal self” (MS) has relied on conceptual analysis, and applications to psychopathology have been hermeneutic, allowing for many degrees of interpretive latitude. The result is that MS’s current scientific status is analogous to that of the “atom,” at the time when “atom” was just beginning to undergo transformation from a philosophical to a scientific concept. Fortunately, there is now an opportunity to promote a similar transformation for “MS.” Discovery of the brain’s Default Mode Network (DMN) opened the door to neuroimaging investigations of self. Taking the DMN and other forms of intrinsic activity as a starting point, an empirical foothold can be established, one that spurs experimental research and that enables extension of research into multiple phenomena. New experimental protocols that posit “MS” can help explain phenomena hitherto not thought to be related to self, thereby hastening development of a mature science of self. In particular, targeting phenomena wherein consciousness is lost and recovered, as in some cases of Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), allow for design of neuroimaging probes that enable detection of MS during non-conscious states. These probes, as well as other experimental protocols applied to NREM Sleep, General Anesthesia (GA), and the waking state, provide some evidence to suggest that not only can self and consciousness dissociate, MS might be a necessary precondition for conscious experience. Finally, these findings have implications for the science of consciousness: it has been suggested that “levels of consciousness” (LoC) is not a legitimate concept for the science of consciousness. But because we have the conceptual and methodological tools with which to refine investigations of MS, we have the means to identify a possible foundation—a bifurcation point—for consciousness, as well as the means by which to measure degrees of distance from that foundation. These neuroimaging investigations of MS position us to better assess whether LoC has a role to play in a mature science of consciousness.     

The knowing visual self

Like all information-processing systems, biological visual systems are limited by internal and external noise; but this noise never actually impinges on our conscious perception. An article recently published in the Journal of Vision suggests that, at least for orientation judgments, the visual system has access to its own noisiness and sets thresholds accordingly. This could well be a general principle in perception, with important and wide ranging consequences.     

The superordinate self in psychoanalytic theory and in the self psychologies

The concept of the self has been used in several attempts to resolve the epistemological problems of what is subjective and what is objective, what is personal and what is organismic. In addition, it has been used to mediate between the hermeneutic and natural-science approaches to psychoanalytic explanation, between the motivational and causal dimensions of our theory and experience. In the case of Kohut, the self was initially invoked to deal with clinical difficulties associated with the analysis of patients with narcissistic personality disorders more recently, it has become the central article in a "self psychology" that addresses presumed deficiencies in the traditional psychoanalytic picture of psychopathology. But the concept of the self is not suited to be a panacea for resolving theoretical or clinical difficulties. The self as person refers to an entity that is both enduring and changing; it describes continuity in the face of change and change in the face of continuity. Abend (1974) comes closest to capturing this attribute of the self in his image of the tidal beach with a configuration that changes but an essence that remains the same. Eisnitz (1980) evokes something similar in his figure-ground conception of the self-representation. The crux of the matter is that the notion of self-experience includes a variety of phenomena that cannot be contained within a single self-construct--be it normal pathologic, grandiose, or otherwise. As a result of these considerations, I have argued against the use of the self as a superordinate concept in psychoanalytic theory and have focused on the shortcomings of three self psychologies that use the self in this way. I believe that Klein, Gedo, and Kohut all offer the self as a kind of conceptual tranquilizer for the philosophical, theoretical, and clinical dualities that are inherent in psychoanalytic work. Grossman addressed himself to these dualities as far back as 1967 and elaborated on the problems with Simon (1969) in a pathbreaking paper on anthropomorphism in psychoanalysis. Grossman and Simon contended that the controversy about anthropomorphism in psychoanalytic theory pertains to the basic confusion in psychology between meaning and causality. They submitted that until this confusion was dispelled and until some superordinate concept was found that could "encompass both kinds of discourse", attempts to transform psychoanalysis into a general psychology would result in failure.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

The selfobject as immortal self

This paper begins by defining the selfobject and elucidating its role in the structuring of the self for each unique individual. The self becomes a repository of the memory images of emotional experiences with significant others. This process of internalization through which the self is continually nourished, and which enables it to grow, goes on throughout life. However, as a case example illustrates, the ability to internalize a selfobject depends on the ability to receive and to give love. Once the selfobject is incorporated into the self of “an other” it is perpetuated in another, is perpetuated, analogous to the transmission of genetic material. Each individual carries others within himself or herself and has the potentiality for continuing to live within the self of another. This is a kind of immortality. She is the author of many articles and books, most recentlyAppointment in Vienna (St. Martin's Press).     

The self and eating disorders

In our review, we focus on self-related constructs in the context of eating disorders with four aims. First, we examine a variety of self-related constructs that have been theoretically and empirically linked to the development and course of eating disorders. In addition to the more well-researched constructs of self-esteem and self-efficacy, we also report on findings related to selflessness, contingent self-worth, self-objectification, ego-syntonicity, self-concept clarity, self-compassion, social comparison, self-oriented perfectionism/self-criticism, and narcissism. Second, we discuss self-related constructs that may be especially relevant to comorbidities common among those with eating disorders. Third, we review intervention and prevention programs where self-related constructs play a prominent role. Lastly, we share future research directions regarding self-related constructs and eating disorders that we believe will advance a deeper understanding of the role of the self in the eating disorders.