Choosing what to choose from: Preference for inclusion over exclusion when constructing consideration sets from large choice sets

Decision making is a two‐stage process, consisting of, first, consideration set construction and then final choice. Decision makers can form a consideration set from a choice set using one of two strategies: including the options they wish to further consider or excluding those they do not wish to further consider. The authors propose that decision makers have a relative preference for an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when choosing from large choice sets and that this preference is driven primarily by a lay belief that inclusion requires less effort than exclusion, particularly in large choice sets. Study 1 demonstrates that decision makers prefer using an inclusion (vs. exclusion) strategy when faced with large choice sets. Study 2 replicates the effect of choice set size on preference for consideration set construction strategy and demonstrates that the belief that exclusion is more effortful mediates the relative preference for inclusion in large choice sets. Studies 3 and 4 further support the importance of perceived effort, demonstrating a greater preference for inclusion in large choice sets when decision makers are primed to think about effort (vs. accuracy; Study 3) and when the choice set is perceived as requiring more effort because of more information being presented about each alternative (vs. more alternatives in the choice set; Study 4). Finally, Study 5 manipulates consideration set construction strategy, showing that using inclusion (vs. exclusion) in large choice sets leads to smaller consideration sets, greater confidence in the decision process, and a higher quality consideration set.     

The effects of predictive ability information,locus of control,and decision maker involvement on decision aid reliance

This study examines several factors that influence decision makers' willingness to rely on mechanical decision aids. The first experiment examined the effects of predictive ability information and locus of control on decision aid reliance. The results indicate that decision makers were more likely to rely on a decision aid when its predictive validity was not disclosed. Further, decision makers with an external locus of control relied more on the decision aid than those with an internal locus of control. The second experiment expanded upon this result to examine the interactive effects of decision maker involvement and locus of control. The results suggest that involving decision makers in the aid's development enhanced reliance. However, decision makers with an internal locus of control were more strongly influenced by this form of involvement (in terms of increasing their reliance on the decision aid) than decision makers with an external locus of control. Copyright 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Loss aversion,diminishing sensitivity,and the effect of experience on repeated decisions

Three experiments are presented that explore the assertion that loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity drive the effect of experience on choice behavior. The experiments are focused on repeated choice tasks where decision makers choose repeatedly between alternatives and get feedback after each choice. Experiments 1a and 1b show that behavioral tendencies that were previously interpreted as indications of loss aversion in decisions from experience are better described as products of diminishing sensitivity to absolute payoffs. Experiment 2 highlights a nominal magnitude effect: A decrease in the magnitude of the nominal payoffs eliminates the evidence for diminishing sensitivity. These and related previous results can be captured with a model that assumes reliance on small samples of subjective experiences, and an increase in diminishing sensitivity with payoff variability. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No decision‐maker is an Island: integrating expert advice with information acquisition

The present research examined the social context of information acquisition. The main purpose was to examine how decision‐makers' information acquisition processes changed when they were provided access to expert advice. Results indicated that all decision‐makers opted to acquire advice; however, they typically did so only after completing over 75% of their own information search. Decision‐makers agreed more with the advice as task complexity increased, but, in general, searched information in two stages—i.e., a pre‐advice “hypothesis generation” stage and a post‐advice “hypothesis testing” stage. To behave in an adaptive manner, decision‐makers could have used expert advice either to increase their decision accuracy or to reduce their effort expenditure (or both); they chose the former. Implications and further extensions are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of motivation and volition in economic decisions: Evidence from eye movements and pupillometry

Economic decisions usually involve high stakes, real consequences, and some degree of personal risk. This article explores the impact of motivational and volitional states on economic decision processes in an incentivized lottery choice task. We investigated the patterns of decision time, choice, information search, and pupil dilation dependent on an experimental manipulation of motivation and volition, that is, the deliberative and the implemental mindset. The results indicated that choice preferences in economic decisions were robust and remained unaffected by motivational and volitional states, but decision processes were notably impacted. Decision makers in a deliberative state of mind searched for information more extensively and made slower decisions than the baseline. The implemental mindset was associated with more attention paid to the probability attributes of the gambles relative to the deliberative mindset. Furthermore, we observed that gamble outcomes that entailed no win at all (i.e., zero outcomes) played an important role for information search. These outcomes were largely disregarded in terms of predecisional information search but elicited pupillary responses similar to very high outcome lotteries. These results inform the current debate about the zero effect in risky choice. We also discuss the potential of eye-tracking studies of risky choice to dissolve ambiguities concerning the contributions of effort and arousal to modulating pupillary response. Implications for theoretical advances in decision research are discussed.     

The relationship between indecisiveness and eye movement patterns in a decision making informational search task

Indecisiveness is a trait‐related general tendency to experience decision difficulties across a variety of situations, leading to decision delay, worry, and regret. Indecisiveness is proposed (Rassin, 2007) to be associated with an increase in desire for information acquisition and reliance on compensatory strategies—as evidenced by alternative‐based information search—during decision making. However existing studies provide conflicting findings. We conducted an information board study of indecisiveness, using eye tracking methodology, to test the hypotheses that the relationship between indecisiveness and choice strategy depends on being in the early stage of the decision making process, and that it depends on being in the presence of an opportunity to delay choice. We found strong evidence for the first hypothesis in that indecisive individuals changed shift behavior from the first to the second half of the task, consistent with a move from greater to lesser compensatory processing, while the shift behavior of decisive individuals suggested lesser compensatory processing over the whole task. Indecisiveness was also related to time spent viewing attributes of the selected course, and to time spent looking away from decision information. These findings resolve past discrepancies, suggest an interesting account of how the decision process unfolds for indecisive versus decisive individuals, and contribute to a better understanding of this tendency. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anticipations of Effort and Accuracy in Multiattribute Choice

Research on multiattribute choice strategies suggests that decision makers adapt to variations in task features by switching decision strategies. One perspective is that strategy selection is determined by a trade-off between the goals of minimizing effort and maximizing accuracy. However, since strategy selection is based on anticipated effort and accuracy, empirical evidence is needed on the nature of these anticipations. An experiment examines how well decision makers anticipate the influence of two particular task features, information display organization and number of alternatives, on effort and accuracy. Subjects chose the best alternative from sets of loan applications described by six relevant attributes. Prior to each choice, they prospectively judged the effort required and the accuracy that would result. Results suggest that anticipated consequences deviate substantially from experienced consequences for both effort and accuracy. Neither task experience nor explicit feedback brought anticipations and experiences closer together. These findings underscore the importance of anticipation judgments in multiattribute choice.     

Contingent Weighting in Self-Other Decision Making

Three studies are presented that examine the decision-making processes that lead advisors to have preferences distinct from personal decision makers (Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). Advising and personal decision making were hypothesized to invoke different interpersonal frames, which lead to different weighting of decision attributes. Alternatively, advisors might simply exert less effort in decision making for others than do personal decision makers. In Study 1, the contingent weighting of attributes was examined in two decision-making tasks (choice vs. matching). Advisors were more likely to choose in a manner consistent with "what most people would prefer" than personal decision makers, but no differences in preferences were observed in the matching task. Advisors subsequently reported experiencing less regret and blame and more strongly preferred the chosen alternative than did personal decision makers. In Study 2, advisors considered more decision attributes to be important in the abstract compared to personal decision makers, and the choice pattern of Study 1 was replicated. In Study 3, advisors and personal decision makers generated more considerations when making a decision compared to individuals making decisions in the abstract. Finally, the preferences of personal decision makers were more consistent with their reported attribute importance judgments than were those of advisors. In total, the results suggest advisors incorrectly infer others' preferences, rather than suffer from a deficit of motivation, when giving advice. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

An Optimized Design of Choice Experiments: A New Approach for Studying Decision Behavior in Choice Task Experiments

In this paper, we present a new approach for the optimal experimental design problem of generating diagnostic choice tasks, where the respondent's decision strategy can be unambiguously deduced from the observed choice. In this new approach, we applied a genetic algorithm that creates a one‐to‐one correspondence between a set of predefined decision strategies and the alternatives of the choice task; it also manipulates the characteristics of the choice tasks. In addition, this new approach takes into account the measurement errors that can occur when the preferences of the decision makers are being measured. The proposed genetic algorithm is capable of generating diagnostic choice tasks even when the search space of possible choice tasks is very large. As proof‐of‐concept, we used this novel approach to generate respondent‐specific choice tasks with either low or high context‐based complexity that we operationalize by the similarity of alternatives and the conflict between alternatives. We find in an experiment that an increase in the similarity of the alternatives and an increase in the number of conflicts within the choice task lead to an increased use of non‐compensatory strategies and a decreased use of compensatory decision strategies. In contrast, the size of the choice tasks, measured by the number of attributes and alternatives, only weakly influences the strategy selection. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The attraction effect in decision making: superior performance by older adults

Previous work showed that older adults' choice performance can be wiser than that of younger adults (Tentori, Osherson, Hasher, & May, 2001). We contrasted two possible interpretations: a general expertise/wisdom view that suggests that older adults are generally more skilled at making decisions than younger adults and a domain-specific expertise view that suggests that older adults are more skilled decision makers only in domains in which they have greater knowledge. These hypotheses were contrasted using attraction effect tasks in two different domains: earning extra credit in a course and grocery shopping, domains presumed to be of different levels of knowledge to younger and older adults. Older adults showed consistent choice for both domains; younger adults showed consistent choice only for the extra credit problem. Several explanations of these findings are considered, including Damasio's somatic marker theory and age differences in reliance on heuristic versus analytic styles.     

Information Displays and Choice Processes: Differential Effects of Organization,Form, and Sequence

This paper examines the differential influence of three features of information display on decision makers′ choice processes: (1) the organization of individual items of information into patterns or structures (matrices or lists), (2) the form of individual items (numbers or words), and (3) the sequence in which items or groups of items appear within the organization (sorted or random). Sixty MBA students chose the best alternative from sets of eight loan applications described on four relevant attributes. Subjects′ decision processes were inferred from verbal protocols and decision times. Each display feature had a distinctive influence on choice processes: Organization strongly influenced information acquisition, while form strongly influenced information combination and evaluation. Sequence had only a limited effect on information acquisition. All three display features influenced the effort expended by decision makers, with the largest effect due to organization. While organization also influenced decision makers′ self-reports of effort, there were inconsistencies between perceived and actual effort expenditure. These results have implications for understanding how decision makers respond adaptively to differences in information displays.     

Future‐biased search: the quest for the ideal

Decision‐makers with ideal candidates already in mind often extend search beyond optimal endpoints when searching for the best option among a sequential list of alternatives. Extended search is investigated here using three laboratory experiments; individuals in these tasks exhibit future‐bias, delaying choice beyond normative benchmarks. Searchers' behavior is consistent with setting high thresholds based on a focal ideal outcome without full attention to its probability or the value of second‐best alternatives; the behavior is partially debiased by manipulating which outcomes are in the searchers' focal set. Documenting future‐bias in sequential search tasks offers new insights for understanding self‐control and intertemporal choice by providing a situation in which thresholds may be set too high and myopic behavior does not prevail. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Confirmatory Search and Asymmetric Dominance

Decision makers use confirmatory search strategies in judgment tasks. As a result of this, their attention towards task‐relevant cues is biased in favor of cues supporting available responses. Changing these responses can alter the cues used in the judgment task and, subsequently, alter beliefs. We use this mechanism to predict and explain the emergence of the asymmetric dominance effect in judgment. In four sets of experiments, we document systematic changes in belief, as dominated options are added to the response set. These effects emerge for a number of naturalistic judgment tasks and are mediated by the increased accessibility of decoy‐supporting cues. Finally, these effects can be eliminated when the decision maker's attention is drawn towards the cues supporting the non‐dominant response. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Doing better but feeling worse. Looking for the "best" job undermines satisfaction

Expanding upon Simon's (1955) seminal theory, this investigation compared the choice-making strategies of maximizers and satisficers, finding that maximizing tendencies, although positively correlated with objectively better decision outcomes, are also associated with more negative subjective evaluations of these decision outcomes. Specifically, in the fall of their final year in school, students were administered a scale that measured maximizing tendencies and were then followed over the course of the year as they searched for jobs. Students with high maximizing tendencies secured jobs with 20% higher starting salaries than did students with low maximizing tendencies. However, maximizers were less satisfied than satisficers with the jobs they obtained, and experienced more negative affect throughout the job-search process. These effects were mediated by maximizers' greater reliance on external sources of information and their fixation on realized and unrealized options during the search and selection process.     

Differences in risk-defusing behavior in deciding for oneself versus deciding for other people

In naturalistic risky decision-making tasks, risk-defusing behavior plays a central role. A risk-defusing operator (RDO) is an action carried out by the decision maker in order to decrease the risk of an alternative. Post-event RDOs (i.e., applied after the occurrence of a negative event) are more risky, but are associated with lower costs than pre-event RDOs (i.e., applied before the occurrence of a negative event). Two studies examine whether the choice between pre-event and post-event RDOs is influenced by detection probability, by involvement type (i.e., whether the decision has consequences for the decision maker or for other people), and by the interaction between these two variables. The results indicate that the effect of detection probability on choice was stronger if other people were involved than if the decision makers themselves were involved. Thus, in naturalistic risky decision tasks with consequences for themselves, people take detection probabilities into account to a lesser extent than in decisions with consequences for other people.     

The development of numerical estimation: evidence against a representational shift

How do our mental representations of number change over development? The dominant view holds that children (and adults) possess multiple representations of number, and that age and experience lead to a shift from greater reliance upon logarithmically organized number representations to greater reliance upon more accurate, linear representations. Here we present a new theoretically motivated and empirically supported account of the development of numerical estimation, based on the idea that number‐line estimation tasks entail judgments of proportion. We extend existing models of perceptual proportion judgment to the case of abstract numerical magnitude. Two experiments provide support for these models; three likely sources of developmental change in children’s estimation performance are identified and discussed. This work demonstrates that proportion‐judgment models provide a unified account of estimation patterns that have previously been explained in terms of a developmental shift from logarithmic to linear representations of number.     

Age-related differences in switching between cognitive tasks: does internal control ability decline with age?

The present study tested the hypothesis that older adults establish a weaker task set than younger adults and therefore rely more on stimulus-triggered activation of task sets. This hypothesis predicts that older adults should have difficulty with task switches, especially when the stimuli-responses are associated with multiple, competing tasks. Weak task preparation, however, could actually benefit older adults when performing an unexpected task. The authors tested this prediction in Experiment 1 using a repeating AABB task sequence, with univalent and bivalent stimuli intermixed. On some univalent trials, participants received an unexpected task. Contrary to the authors' predictions, expectancy costs were not smaller for older adults. Similar findings were obtained in Experiments 2 and 3, in which the authors used a task-cueing paradigm to more strongly promote deliberate task preparation. The authors found no disproportionate age effects on switch costs but did find age effects on bivalence costs and mixing costs. The authors conclude that older adults do experience extra difficulty dealing with stimuli associated with 2 active tasks but found no evidence that the problem specifically stems from an increased reliance on bottom-up task activation rather than top-down task preparation.     

An effort based analysis of the paradoxical effects of incentives on decision‐aided performance

This study examines the effect of incentives on decision‐aided performance. In particular, the study provides further insight into whether, when, and how incentives affect task performance in the presence of decision aids by (1) replicating previous research showing the negative effects of incentives on performance; (2) investigating whether this effect generalizes to a more realistic scenario in which decision makers have access to additional contextual information not captured by the decision aid; and (3) applying an effort‐based framework to explain the link between incentives and performance. In contrast to the findings of prior research, our study shows that incentives do not necessarily decrease performance in the presence of decision aids. Rather, we demonstrate that the effect of incentives on decision‐aided performance depends on other contextual factors such as the absence or presence of additional contextual information. By further specifying the conditions under which incentives result in increases or decreases to decision‐aided task performance, our results have implications for both future research and the design of incentive systems in practice. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.