解释水平视角下的乐观偏差效应

研究基于解释水平理论,考查心理距离对乐观偏差效应的影响。实验从心理距离的事件概率维度、时间距离维度、空间距离维度入手,采用自编的材料对677名被试进行测量,探讨心理距离的远近对乐观偏差产生的影响。结果表明,被试对未来生活事件的判断存在总体上的乐观偏差。在较远的心理距离条件下,被试表现出更大的乐观偏差;而在较近的心理距离中,乐观偏差效应明显减小。但在时间距离维度以及消极事件的概率维度上,表现出与总体乐观偏差不一致的现象。     

Unrealistic optimism about future life events: a cautionary note

A robust finding in social psychology is that people judge negative events as less likely to happen to themselves than to the average person, a behavior interpreted as showing that people are "unrealistically optimistic" in their judgments of risk concerning future life events. However, we demonstrate how unbiased responses can result in data patterns commonly interpreted as indicative of optimism for purely statistical reasons. Specifically, we show how extant data from unrealistic optimism studies investigating people's comparative risk judgments are plagued by the statistical consequences of sampling constraints and the response scales used, in combination with the comparative rarity of truly negative events. We conclude that the presence of such statistical artifacts raises questions over the very existence of an optimistic bias about risk and implies that to the extent that such a bias exists, we know considerably less about its magnitude, mechanisms, and moderators than previously assumed.     

乐观偏差研究概况

乐观偏差指个体倾向于认为自己更可能经历积极事件而他人更可能遭遇消极事件的现象。对乐观偏差的测量主要有直接比较和间接比较两种方式。事件特征和个体因素是乐观偏差的主要影响因素。产生乐观偏差的心理机制主要有自我中心主义和聚焦主义。乐观偏差对个体既有积极作用也有消极影响。未来研究主要包括:开发科学可行的测量工具;加强对个体水平乐观偏差的研究;把乐观偏差和悲观偏差结合起来进行研究;对乐观偏差进行认知神经心理机制的探讨。     

News of Y2K and Experiencing Y2K: Exploring the Relationship Between the Third-Person Effect and Optimistic Bias

This study gauged Americans' beliefs about predicted Y2K problems during the weeks before New Year 2000. It examined the alleged relationship between the third-person effect and the social psychological theory of optimistic bias. The third-person effect predicts that people judge themselves less influenced than others by media messages. To explain the effect, some media researchers have drawn on optimistic bias, which posits that people judge themselves less likely than others to experience negative life events. Few researchers, however, have directly tested the empirical relationship between the two perceptual approaches. As hypothesized, respondents judged themselves less influenced than others by news reports about Y2K (third-person perception) and less likely than others to experience Y2K problems (optimistic bias). But the study did not find the hypothesized relationship between the approaches. Furthermore, third-person perception and optimistic bias were functions of mirror opposite blocks of predictors. The findings indicate that third-person perception is not merely a media case study of optimistic bias. We suggested that people use different criteria to estimate experiencing events and believing media messages about the events.     

Can probability neglect bias promote social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic?

The effectiveness of a stay-at-home order depends on the speed of behavioral changes that are triggered by risk perception. Probability neglect bias, one of the cognitive biases, may lead people to engage in social distancing. However, there is no empirical evidence of the relationship between probability neglect bias and social distancing. This study aims to examine the relationship between individual differences in susceptibility to probability neglect bias and the level of social distancing practice during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak in Japan. The level of engagement in social distancing was defined as the narrowing of life-space mobility. We conducted a web-based questionnaire survey among 1000 adults living in central Tokyo, Japan, at the beginning of the pandemic outbreak. Our results show that people had a strong fear of infection in the early pandemic stages. Approximately 60% of our subjects were influenced by probability neglect bias. People susceptible to probability neglect bias engaged in social distancing more intensely than those who were not susceptible after the state of emergency was lifted.     

大学生对一般生活事件和意外事故的乐观和悲观偏差估计：直接和间接测量的比较

研究考查了大学生对一般生活事件和意外事故的乐观与悲观偏差,并检验不同测量方法是否会产生不同结果。通过对273名大学生进行问卷研究,结果发现：（1）在直接和间接测量时,被试对一般消极事件、意外事故存在乐观偏差,对幸免于意外事故存在悲观偏差;但对一般积极事件,被试在直接测量时出现乐观偏差,在间接测量时为悲观偏差。（2）在两种方法中,被试对意外事故的乐观偏差皆高于一般消极事件,但一般积极事件与幸免于意外事故的结果在直接测量时有显著差异,而在间接测量中差异不显著。（3）在直接测量时,消极事件的发生频率越低乐观偏差越严重,积极事件的发生频率越低则悲观偏差越严重;在间接测量中事件频率与偏差结果相关不显著。     

Validation of a novel cognitive bias task based on difference in quantity of reinforcement for assessing environmental enrichment

Cognitive bias tasks purport to assess affective states via responses to ambiguous stimuli. We hypothesized that a novel cognitive bias task based on positive reinforcement using quantity differences would detect changes in affect in captive grizzly bears (Ursus arctos horribilis). We trained bears (n = 8) to respond differently (nose or paw touch) to two stimuli (light or dark gray cue cards), with responses counterbalanced across bears. The two cues signaled a small or large food reward, respectively. Responses to ambiguous probe stimuli (i.e., shades of gray) intermediate to the trained stimuli were classified as either ‘optimistic,’ appropriate for the larger reward, or ‘pessimistic,’ appropriate for the smaller reward. In Experiment 1, we explored the contrast in reward size necessary to detect a change in response across probe stimuli (large reward, 3 or 6 apple slices: small reward, 1 slice). We observed a change in response across probe stimuli, with no difference in response between reward-value groups, indicating that a contrast of 3:1 apple slices was sufficient to affect responses. In Experiment 2, we investigated cognitive bias after 2.1 h of exposure to enrichment items varying in attractiveness. Results were unaffected by enrichment type or time spent interacting with enrichments, indicating that the task failed to demonstrate criterion validity for comparing mood following exposure to different enrichment items. However, greater time spent pacing prior to testing was associated with ‘optimistic’ judgments. The data provide some support for use of cognitive bias tasks based on quantity differences in animal welfare assessments involving captive wildlife.     

Perceived Control and the Optimistic Bias: A Meta-Analytic Review

People consistently believe that negative events are less likely to happen to them than to others. Research suggests a relationship between this optimistic bias and perceived control such that the greater control people perceive over future events, the greater their optimistic bias. We conducted a meta-analysis of 27 independent samples to quantify the size of this relationship and examine what variables moderated the relationship. Greater perceived control was significantly related to greater optimistic bias, but this relationship was moderated by participant nationality, student status, risk status, and the type of optimistic bias measure used. We discuss the findings in the context of primary versus secondary control.     

Using forced choice to test belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In deductive reasoning, believable conclusions are more likely to be accepted regardless of their validity. Although many theories argue that this belief bias reflects a change in the quality of reasoning, distinguishing qualitative changes from simple response biases can be difficult (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010). We introduced a novel procedure that controls for response bias. In Experiments 1 and 2, the task required judging which of two simultaneously presented syllogisms was valid. Surprisingly, there was no evidence for belief bias with this forced choice procedure. In Experiment 3, the procedure was modified so that only one set of premises was viewable at a time. An effect of beliefs emerged: unbelievable conclusions were judged more accurately, supporting the claim that beliefs affect the quality of reasoning. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated and extended this finding, showing that the effect was mediated by individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. Although the positive findings of Experiments 3–5 are most relevant to the debate about the mechanisms underlying belief bias, the null findings of Experiments 1 and 2 offer insight into how the presentation of an argument influences the manner in which people reason.     

A Protocol for Improving Loneliness in People with Multiple Sclerosis

Loneliness is a subjective and unpleasant emotional state that occurs when people feel social networks or social relationships are deficient in some way. People with multiple sclerosis are often lonely and frequently withdraw from participating in meaningful social activities. Common symptoms, such as cognitive changes, decreased physical functioning, fatigue, incontinence, visual changes, or depression, may contribute to decreased social participation, which can lead to loneliness. This article presents an intervention protocol for improving loneliness in people with multiple sclerosis. This protocol is based on Bandura’s Social Learning Theory, which focuses on improving self-efficacy to reduce loneliness in people with multiple sclerosis.     

Cognitive sophistication does not attenuate the bias blind spot

The so-called bias blind spot arises when people report that thinking biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves. Bias turns out to be relatively easy to recognize in the behaviors of others, but often difficult to detect in one's own judgments. Most previous research on the bias blind spot has focused on bias in the social domain. In 2 studies, we found replicable bias blind spots with respect to many of the classic cognitive biases studied in the heuristics and biases literature (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, we found that none of these bias blind spots were attenuated by measures of cognitive sophistication such as cognitive ability or thinking dispositions related to bias. If anything, a larger bias blind spot was associated with higher cognitive ability. Additional analyses indicated that being free of the bias blind spot does not help a person avoid the actual classic cognitive biases. We discuss these findings in terms of a generic dual-process theory of cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Analyzing the Relationship Between Social Capital and Subjective Well-Being: The Mediating Role of Social Affiliation

While previous studies have established social capital as an important determinant of subjective well-being (SWB), the broader social context people are living in has not received much attention in terms of SWB. To address this issue, we propose the concept of social affiliation, measuring the feeling of belonging to the social whole, of being a respected and valued member of society. In contrast to standard concepts of social capital, social affiliation is not related to an individual’s direct environment (‘Gemeinschaft’), but concerns one’s relation to society (‘Gesellschaft’). Such a subjective evaluation of how an individual feels within a broader societal context is neither covered by traditional concepts of social capital nor by the concept of social cohesion which focuses on the macro level. A perception of oneself as living on the margins of society, of not being a respected member of society, is very likely to diminish subjective well-being. At the same time, it can be expected to not be completely unrelated to individual resources of social capital. Drawing on unique survey data from Japan, we analyze the triangle relationship between social capital, social affiliation and subjective well-being applying a structural equation model. Our results have two main implications. First, we show that social affiliation has an effect on subjective well-being that is independent from the effect of standard measures of social capital. Second, we find that social capital influences social affiliation, and thereby also has an indirect effect on subjective well-being. In terms of theory building our results suggest that social embeddedness has two elements which should be measured separately: a community dimension usually measured as social capital in terms of trust, personal networks and norms, and a societal dimension of being and feeling part of a ‘Gesellschaft’, measured as social affiliation.     

Theory of Mind Impairments in Social Anxiety Disorder

Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common psychiatric disorder characterized by a persistent, excessive fear and avoidance of social and performance situations. Research on cognitive biases indicates individuals with SAD may lack an accurate view of how they are perceived by others, especially in social situations when they allocate important attentional resources to monitoring their own actions as well as external threat. In the present study, we explored whether socially anxious individuals also have impairments in theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to comprehend others’ mental states, including emotions, beliefs, and intentions. Forty socially anxious and 40 non-socially-anxious comparison participants completed two ToM tasks: the Reading the Mind in the Eyes and the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition. Participants with SAD performed worse on ToM tasks than did non-socially-anxious participants. Relative to comparison participants, those with SAD were more likely to attribute more intense emotions and greater meaning to what others were thinking and feeling. These group differences were not due to interpretation bias. The ToM impairments in people with SAD are in the opposite direction of those in people with autism spectrum conditions whose inferences about the mental states of other people are absent or very limited. This association between SAD and ToM may have important implications for our understanding of both the maintenance and treatment of social anxiety disorder.     

The Influence of Social Interaction on Intuitions of Objectivity and Subjectivity

We present experimental evidence that people's modes of social interaction influence their construal of truth. Participants who engaged in cooperative interactions were less inclined to agree that there was an objective truth about that topic than were those who engaged in a competitive interaction. Follow‐up experiments ruled out alternative explanations and indicated that the changes in objectivity are explained by argumentative mindsets: When people are in cooperative arguments, they see the truth as more subjective. These findings can help inform research on moral objectivism and, more broadly, on the distinctive cognitive consequences of different types of social interaction.     

大学生的社会支持、孤独及自尊对主观幸福感的作用机制研究

对389名大学生施测社会支持量表、自尊量表、社会与感情孤独量表及主观幸福感量表,以探讨孤独和自尊在社会支持与主观幸福感的关系中的作用。结果表明：（1）主观幸福感与社会支持、自尊、孤独呈显著相关。（2）路径分析表明,自尊、孤独分别在社会支持与主观幸福感之间起显著的中介作用。社会支持→自尊→孤独→主观幸福感的显著路径表明,这些变量间存在更为复杂的关系。这些结果对于大学生心理健康教育具有重要的意义。     

Social anxiety and cognitive expectancy of aversive outcome in avoidance conditioning

Fear conditioning studies have shown that social anxiety is associated with enhanced expectancy of aversive outcome. However, the relation between cognitive expectancy and social anxiety has never been tested in avoidance conditioning paradigms. We compared 48 low (LSA) and high socially anxious individuals (HSA) on subjective expectancy of aversive outcome during an avoidance conditioning task. Displays of neutral faces were coupled with an aversive outcome (US): a shout and a shock. Participants could avoid the US by pressing a correct button from a button box. First, HSA showed higher US expectancy than LSA during the initial phase of avoidance conditioning, supporting the view that socially anxious individuals have an expectancy bias when social situations are ambiguous. Second, when the avoidance response became unavailable, LSA showed lower US expectancy than HSA, suggesting that low socially anxious individuals are prone to a positive bias when perceived threat is high. A lack of such positive bias in socially anxious individuals may lead to higher susceptibility to safety behavior interpretations. Together, these findings support the role of cognitive processes in avoidance conditioning and underscore the relevance to encounter avoidance learning when studying social anxiety.     

乐观偏差的内隐效应

乐观偏差是一个普遍存在的现象。采用Greenwald的内隐联想测验测验（IAT）方法和Inquisit专业软件,以60名大学生为被试对乐观偏差进行了考察。结果发现：乐观偏差存在内隐效应;乐观偏差的内隐效应在性别上没有差异。     

Planning, personality, and prediction: The role of future focus in optimistic time predictions

The present studies examined cognitive processes underlying the tendency to underestimate project completion times. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that people generate overly optimistic predictions, in part, because they focus narrowly on their future plans for the target task and thus neglect other useful sources of information. Consistent with the hypothesis, instructing participants to adopt a “future focus”—in which they generated concrete, specific plans for the task at hand—led them to make more optimistic predictions about when they would complete their intended Christmas shopping (Study 1) and major school assignments (Study 2). The future focus manipulation did not have a corresponding effect on actual completion times, and thus increased the degree of optimistic bias in prediction. The studies also demonstrated that the optimistic prediction bias generalized across different task domains, relevant individual differences (i.e., trait optimism and procrastination), and other contextual variations.     

Impact of esteem-related feedback on mood, self-efficacy, and attribution of success: Self-enhancement/self-protection

It is suggested that positive ego-enhancing and negative ego-diminishing feedback conditions concerning social perceptiveness can give rise to altered affective states concerning self-esteem that generalize to other areas of cognitive functioning in such a way that this feedback accompanies a systematic self-serving attributional bias of cognitive/intellectual performance. The results of 40 participants in an ego-enhancing and 45 in an ego-diminishing feedback condition indicate more attribution of problem-solving success by the first group to effort and to ease of the task; participants who received ego-diminishing feedback attributed their initial problem-solving success less to ease of the task. Other more direct evidence of self-protective strategies on the part of those in the ego-diminishing feedback condition includes lower success expecta y on retest and reduced volunteering for additional challenge. The results are interpreted as evidence of the impact of generalized esteem-related affect on future success expectancy, on risk-taking, and on the attribution of success when future replication is a boundary condition.     

The Hard–Easy Effect in Subjective Probability Calibration

Four different factors have been used to explain the hard–easy effect in subjective probability judgments, in which calibration goes systematically from over- to underconfidence as task difficulty decreases. The factors are biased judgment, lack of suitable adjustment of response criteria (decision variable partition model), biased choice of stimulus material (ecological model), and random error in judgment (error model). Although there is strong evidence for judgmental bias, it seems unlikely to account fully for the systematic character of the effect. We describe the judgment models that emphasize the other three factors and then present two new experiments and a further analysis of the calibration problem. The findings of these experiments and the analysis support the response criteria approach and indicate that the ecological model, and biased choice of stimulus material, is not correct. Since error by itself cannot fully explain observed underconfidence phenomena, we conclude that the most likely explanation of the hard–easy effect is in terms of response criteria. A simulation of the decision variable partition model shows that its behavior closely matches the observed relation between overconfidence and proportion correct for a large sample of experimental results.