Refutation by Parallel Argument

This paper discusses the method when an argument is refuted by a parallel argument since the flaw of the parallel argument is clearly displayed. The method is explicated, examined and compared with two other general methods.

The Location of Kant's Refutation of Idealism

Many philosophers have been puzzled by Kant's decision to insert the Refutation of Idealism into the second edition of the first Critique at the end of his elucidation of the Second Postulate. This article proposes a solution to the puzzle. It defends an explanation for the location of Kant's Refutation of Idealism that is plausibly expressed by Kant's claim at the end of his elucidation of the Second Postulate that the Refutation of Idealism is ‘here in its right place’ because ‘[a] powerful objection against these rules for proving existence indirectly is made by idealism’ (B274). According to this explanation, the Refutation of Idealism is Kant's response to the objection that the Second Postulate must be false since otherwise idealism is true. This article also considers and rejects a number of alternative explanations for the location of Kant's Refutation of Idealism.     

Refutation systems in modal logic

Complete deductive systems are constructed for the non-valid (refutable) formulae and sequents of some propositional modal logics. Thus, complete syntactic characterizations in the sense of Lukasiewicz are established for these logics and, in particular, purely syntactic decision procedures for them are obtained. The paper also contains some historical remarks and a general discussion on refutation systems.Presented byJan Zygmunt     

A Refutation of Skeptical Theism

Skeptical theists argue that no seemingly unjustified evil (SUE) could ever lower the probability of God's existence at all. Why? Because God might have justifying reasons for allowing such evils (JuffREs) that are undetectable. However, skeptical theists are unclear regarding whether or not God's existence is relevant to the existence of JuffREs, and whether or not God's existence is relevant to their detectability. But I will argue that, no matter how the skeptical theist answers these questions, it is undeniable that the skeptical theist is wrong; SUEs lower the probability of God's existence. To establish this, I will consider the four scenarios regarding the relevance of God's existence to the existence and detectability of JuffREs, and show that in each—after we establish our initial probabilities, and then update them given the evidence of a SUE—the probability of God's existence drops.     

A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism

According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for S to know that p, S must have reasons for believing that p which are such that S can know, by reflection alone, that she has those reasons, and that she could not possibly have those reasons if p is not true. Where Descartes went wrong was in thinking that our ordinary, fallible, non‐theologically grounded sources of belief (e.g., perception, memory, testimony), cannot provide us with such reasons.     

“物理对象”到底存在不存在?——维特根斯坦评论摩尔对怀疑主义者的反驳

摩尔用"我知道这是一只手"来反驳怀疑主义者对外在物理对象存在的怀疑,这在哲学史上是一件饶有趣味的事情,更加有趣的是维特根斯坦对这件事情的评论和处理,它们集中在维特根斯坦最后阶段的著作——《论确定性》中。维特根斯坦对摩尔反驳的前提、结论,以及摩尔与怀疑主义者的共同预设进行了细致的剖析,澄清了人们在搞哲学的时候对"怀疑"和"知道"的误用,这和他希望把词语从形而上学的"使用"下降到日常使用的日常语言分析方法是完全一致的。     

毛奇龄对河图洛书的驳斥

本文剖析了毛奇龄专门考辨与批驳河图、洛书的名著<河图洛书原舛篇>,指出河图、洛书原本书籍之类;陈抟之徒窈取郑玄五行生成数为河图,纬书九宫图为洛书,后人又牵强附会,妄加推演,皆为无稽之谈;黑白点图式乃方外异氏所为,属于丹道一类,不可篡乱经文.那种以图、书为画卦作<易>之本、中国文化源头的观点,是站不住脚的.     

A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism

This paper shows that strict evidentialism about normative reasons for belief is inconsistent with taking truth to be the source of normative reasons for belief. It does so by showing that there are circumstances in which one can know what truth requires one to believe, yet still lack evidence for the contents of that belief.     

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

In this paper, I highlight the significance of practices of refutation in philosophical inquiry, that is, practices of showing that a claim, person or theory is wrong. I present and contrast two prominent approaches to philosophical refutation: refutation in ancient Greek dialectic (elenchus), in its Socratic variant as described in Plato’s dialogues, and as described in Aristotle’s logical texts; and the practice of providing counterexamples to putative definitions familiar from twentieth century analytic philosophy, focusing on the so-called Gettier problem. Moreover, I discuss Lakatos’ method of proofs and refutations, as it offers insightful observations on the dynamics between arguments, refutations, and counterexamples. Overall, I argue that dialectic, in particular in its Socratic variant, is especially suitable for the philosophical purpose of questioning the obvious, as it invites reflection on one’s own doxastic commitments and on the tensions and inconsistencies within one’s set of beliefs. By contrast, the counterexample-based approach to philosophical refutation can give rise to philosophical theorizing that is overly focused on hairsplitting disputes, thus becoming alienated from the relevant human experiences. Insofar as philosophical inquiry treads the fine line between questioning the obvious while still seeking to say something significant about human experiences, perhaps a certain amount of what Lakatos describes as ‘monster-barring’—a rejection of overly fanciful, artificial putative counterexamples—has its place in philosophical argumentation.

     

目标启动对类比问题解决策略迁移的影响

运用实验法和问卷法对小学2年级和5年级学生的类比问题解决策略的迁移进行了研究。结果表明:无论儿童年龄大小,启动掌握目标都可以有效地促进类比问题解决策略的迁移。能力知觉与回避型表现目标存在交互作用,在回避型表现目标启动条件下,能力知觉低的儿童迁移成绩较差。儿童自身的成就目标取向未对迁移产生影响。     

Bochenski on Property Identity and the Refutation of Universals

An argument against multiply instantiable universals is considered in neglected essays by Stanislaw Lesniewski and I.M. Bochenski. Bochenski further applies Lesniewski’s refutation of universals by maintaining that identity principles for individuals must be different than property identity principles. Lesniewski’s argument is formalized for purposes of exact criticism, and shown to involve both a hidden vicious circularity in the form of impredicative definitions and explicit self-defeating consequences. Syntactical restrictions on Leibnizian indiscernibility of identicals are recommended to forestall Lesniewski’s paradox.     

Changing False Beliefs from Repeated Advertising: The Role of Claim‐Refutation Alignment

This research addresses refutation of false beliefs formed on the basis of repeated exposure to advertisements. Experiment 1 explores belief in the refutation as a function of the perceptual details shared (alignment) between the claim and the refutation as manipulated by whether the original claim was direct (assertion) or indirect (implication). Experiment 2 then examines whether this effect will carry through to belief in the original claim after exposure to the refutation. Findings indicate that direct refutations of indirect claims are believed more than refutations of direct claims. However, direct refutations of direct claims are more effective in reducing belief in the original claim. We argue that recollection of the original claim facilitates automatic updating of belief in that claim. Experiment 3 demonstrates that an alternative cue (a logo) in a refutation that facilitates recall of the original claim enables reduction of belief in the original indirect claim; this finding helps to pin down the mechanism—recall of the original claim—underlying belief updating. Further, Experiment 3 finds that multiple cues to recalling the original claim may prevent the automatic updating process. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.