The luck argument against event-causal libertarianism: It is here to stay

The luck argument raises a serious challenge for libertarianism about free will. In broad outline, if an action is undetermined, then it appears to be a matter of luck whether or not one performs it. And if it is a matter of luck whether or not one performs an action, then it seems that the action is not performed with free will. This argument is most effective against event-causal accounts of libertarianism. Recently, Franklin (Philosophical Studies 156:199–230, 2011) has defended event-causal libertarianism against four formulations of the luck argument. I will argue that three of Franklin’s responses are unsuccessful and that there are important versions of the luck challenge that his defense has left unaddressed.     

Luck,Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence

There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could find a more restricted notion that captured the core phenomena of luck that are relevant to whether or not someone knows. This essay makes the attempt to delineate such a notion, called “mere coincidence.”     

Epistemic Entitlement and Luck

The aim of this paper is to defend a novel characterization of epistemic luck. Helping myself to the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation, I propose that a true belief suffers from epistemic luck iff an adequate explanation of the fact that the belief acquired is true must appeal to propositions to which the subject herself is not epistemically entitled (in a sense to be made clear below). The burden of the argument is to show that there is a plausible construal of the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation on which the resulting characterization of epistemic luck, though admittedly programmatic, has several important virtues. It avoids difficulties which plague modal accounts of epistemic luck; it can explain the conflicting temptations one can feel in certain alleged cases of epistemic luck; it offers a novel account of the value of knowledge, without committing itself to any particular analysis of knowledge; and it illuminates the significance for epistemology of the phenomenon of epistemic luck itself.     

Good fortune but bad luck? Predictable versus unpredictable gains and losses in risky choice

This study examines the effects of two different types of good and bad experiences on risk‐taking preferences: fortune and luck. We define fortune as a relatively stable positive or negative context within which choices are made and luck as a more unpredictable series of better or worse outcomes. With the use of a lottery‐based paradigm, fortune was operationalized as a preponderance of all‐gain or all‐loss two‐outcome option pairs within a larger set of mixed‐outcome control lotteries. Luck was operationalized as the experienced frequency of better versus worse outcomes when playing the lotteries. We predicted that fortune and luck would lead to opposite risk‐taking tendencies within control lotteries. An assimilation effect of fortune was predicted, with risk‐averse preferences for control lotteries when surrounded by good fortune and risk‐seeking preferences when surrounded by bad fortune. In contrast, we expected that high rates of success with good luck would lead to risk‐seeking preferences, whereas low rates of success with bad luck would yield risk‐averse preferences. Our predictions for fortune were confirmed; however, there was no evidence of any effect on risk taking based on experiencing good versus bad luck. Moreover, we observed a striking disconnect between impressions of the experience and risk‐taking behavior. Both identification and attributions of luck and fortune were highly correlated with the number of gain outcomes that participants experienced but were uncorrelated with risk taking. We review these surprising findings considering several prominent theories of risk‐taking behavior, particularly drawing attention to the differential roles of predecisional and postdecisional information in choice.     

Get lucky: situationism and circumstantial moral luck

Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for our actions in those circumstances. We argue that such situationist moral luck, as a variety of circumstantial moral luck, exemplifies a distinct and interesting type of moral luck. Further, there is a case to be made that situationist moral luck is perhaps more worrying than some other well-discussed cases of (supposed) moral luck.     

Threats,Promises, and Coalitions: A Study of Compliance and Retaliation in a Simulated Organizational Setting1

This research sought to examine the effects of threats and promises on compliance and the formation of subordinate coalitions in a simulated employeremployee conflict situation. It also sought to determine some of the motives underlying coalition decisions-tangible and intangible-and the conditions under which each of these possible motive types would be salient. Coalition motives were examined by manipulating the consequences for coalition members following their use of coalition power (presence vs. absence of monetary gain). A control condition was present in which no such power was available. Ninety male undergraduate business students were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions in a 3 × 2 factorial design. Three Ss engaged in a modified bilateral monopoly bargaining task in which two of them (the “employees”) believed they were exchanging a series of offers and counteroffers with the third (the “employer”) over a hypothetical wage increase for a maximum of eight rounds. Ss were told they would earn a sum of money proportional to the effectiveness of their bargaining. In actuality, all Ss were assigned the employee role and all employer “offers” were pre-programmed. On round six, the Ss were “sent” either a threat or promise message by the employer demanding that they accept his round five offer. Compliance-noncompliance was defined as employee acceptance-rejection of this demand, respectively. In addition to compliance behavior, S s in coalition conditions had the power to form an alliance with the other employee against the employer after the latter used his threat or promise power. Coalitions could confiscate up to 25% of the employer's earnings and, depending on experimental condition, could either keep or not keep any money their coalition acquired. It was hypothesized that threateners would elicit less compliance, and be responded to with more, and more severe subordinate coalitions than would promisers. It was further assumed that there would be less compliance when subordinates had coalition power, and that the effect of monetary reward on the likelihood of coalition formation would be contingent on the type of power (threats vs. promises) the employer used. Specifically, it was assumed that a majority of S s in the Threat condition who had this power would form coalitions against the employer regardless of whether or not they realized any tangible gain for doing so. In the promise condition, however, it was expected that coalition decisions would be based primarily on whether Ss stood to gain monetarily. The hypotheses were supported. These results were discussed in terms of the impact of power acquisition as a variable mediating perception and compliance behavior, and in terms of the role of economic vs. retaliatory motives as factors underlying subordinate coalition decisions. Some of the conditions which influence the relative salience of these two coalition motives were proposed, and the organizational implications of these findings were suggested.     

运气特质:将机遇转化为一种可利用的力量

运气在各种文化中都非常普遍,但在心理学界对运气的定义一直存在争议。本文在分析以往三种主要的运气观后,基于中国传统文化的视角将运气定义为“个体在一定时间或期限内由定数和变数组合而成的发展轨迹或发展趋势,其中变数主要是指机遇,定数主要是指运气特质”。运气特质能决定个体幸运与否,并通过产生控制幻觉或者改变个体的自我概念将运气转化为个体可利用的内部力量。未来研究可进一步探讨运气特质的结构及其与幸运感、感恩、幸福感、亲社会行为、赌博行为、腐败行为等变量的关系。     

MORAL AND EPISTEMIC LUCK

Abstract: It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. It is further claimed that once one offers a more developed notion of luck and disambiguates the problem of moral luck from the problem of epistemic luck (especially in its sceptical guise), neither of these papers is able to offer unambiguous grounds for thinking that there is a problem of moral luck. Indeed, it is shown that in so far as these papers succeed in making a prima facie case for the existence of epistemic luck, it is only the familiar sceptical variant of this problem that they identify.     

AGENT CAUSATION AND THE PROBLEM OF LUCK

Abstract: On a standard libertarian account of free will, an agent acts freely on some occasion only if there remains, until the action is performed, some chance that the agent will do something else instead right then. These views face the objection that, in such a case, it is a matter of luck whether the agent does one thing or another. This paper considers the problem of luck as it bears on agent‐causal libertarian accounts. A view of this type is defended against a recent and challenging version of the argument from luck.     

Why Every Theory of Luck is Wrong

There are three theories of luck in the literature, each of which tends to appeal to philosophers pursuing different concerns. These are the probability, modal, and control views. I will argue that all three theories are irreparably defective; not only are there counterexamples to each of the three theories of luck, but there are three previously undiscussed classes of counterexamples against them. These are the problems of lucky necessities, skillful luck, and diachronic luck. I conclude that a serious reevaluation of the role of luck in philosophy is called for.     

Beliefs in moral luck: When and why blame hinges on luck

Belief in moral luck is represented in judgements that offenders should be held accountable for intent to cause harm as well as whether or not harm occurred. Scores on a measure of moral luck beliefs predicted judgements of offenders who varied in intent and the outcomes of their actions, although judgements overall were not consistent with abstract beliefs in moral luck. Prompting participants to consider alternative outcomes, particularly worse outcomes, reduced moral luck beliefs. Findings suggest that some people believe that offenders should be punished based on the outcome of their actions. Furthermore, prompting counterfactuals decreased judgements consistent with moral luck beliefs. The results have implications for theories of moral judgement as well as legal decision making.     

No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology

Current epistemological orthodoxy has it that knowledge is incompatible with luck. More precisely: Knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck (of a certain, interesting kind). This is often treated as a truism which is not even in need of argumentative support. In this paper, I argue that there is lucky knowledge. In the first part, I use an intuitive and not very developed notion of luck to show that there are cases of knowledge which are “lucky” in that sense. In the second part, I look at philosophical conceptions of luck (modal and probabilistic ones) and come to the conclusion that knowledge can be lucky in those senses, too. I also turns out that a probabilistic notion of luck can help us see in what ways a particular piece of knowledge or belief can be lucky or not lucky.     

The role of surprise in the attribution process

Abstract

We report five studies which compared two theories linking surprise to causal attribution. According to the attributional model, surprise is frequently caused by luck attributions, whereas according to the expectancy-disconfirmation model, surprise is caused by expectancy disconfirmation and stimulates causal thinking. Studies 1 to 3 focused on the question of whether surprise is caused by luck attributions or by unexpectedness. In Studies 1 and 2, subjects had to recall success or failure experiences characterised by a particular attribution (Study 1) or by low versus high surprisingness (Study 2), whereas in Study 3, unexpectedness and luck versus skill attributions were independently manipulated within a realistic setting. The main dependent variables were unexpectedness (Studies 1 and 2), degree of surprise (Studies 1 and 3), and causal attributions (Study 2). The results strongly suggest that surprise is caused by expectancy disconfirmation, whereas luck attributions are neither sufficient nor necessary for surprise. Studies 4 and 5 addressed the question of whether surprise stimulates attributional thinking, again using a remembered-incidents technique. The findings of the previous studies were replicated, and it was confirmed that surprising outcomes elicit more attributional search than unsurprising ones. Additional results from Study 5 suggest that causal thinking is also stimulated by outcomes that are both negative and important.     

Agent-Basing,Consequences, and Realized Motives

According to agent-based approaches to virtue ethics, the rightness of an action is a function of the motives which prompted that action. If those motives were morally praiseworthy, then the action was right; if they were morally blameworthy, the action was wrong. Many critics find this approach problematically insensitive to an act’s consequences, and claim that agent-basing fails to preserve the intuitive distinction between agent- and act-evaluation. In this article I show how an agent-based account of right action can be made sensitive to an act’s consequences. According to the approach which I defend, an action is right just in case it realizes an agent’s morally praiseworthy motive. Conversely, an action is wrong just in case it realizes a morally blameworthy motive. Specifying act-evaluation in terms of the realization, rather than the expression, of an agent’s motives allows an agent-based approach to distinguish between agent- and act-evaluation. This is because an agent may act from a morally praiseworthy motive, but fail (either through bad luck or poor judgment) to realize that motive. Her action will therefore not have been the right one, despite its being the expression of morally praiseworthy motives.     

Dispositional optimism and luck attributions: Implications for philosophical theories of luck

We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property.     

Causal attributions for success and failure in relation to expectations of success based upon selective or manipulative control

Subjects worked at a 10-item Anagrams Test. In a manipulative control condition the prior performance of subjects on a set of practice anagrams was controlled so that half of these subjects began the test with high expectations of success and half with low expectations of success As a check on the manipulation, subjects provided ratings of how confident they were that they could pass the test (i e, solve five anagrams or more) In a selective control condition subjects were not given practice items but were subsequently assigned to high versus low expectation groups on the basis of their confidence ratings The difficulty level of the items in the Anagrams Test was manipulated so that half the subjects in each condition passed the test and half failed. Subsequently all subjects were required to rate the degree to which they considered ability (or lack of ability), effort (or lack of effort), task difficulty (easy or hard), and luck (good or bad) were causes of their performance outcome (success or failure). It was found that the expected success was attributed more to ability and less to good luck than was the unexpected success The expected failure was attributed more to lack of ability and less to bad luck than was the unexpected failure There was a greater tendency for subjects to appeal to task difficulty and effort as causes of their performance when they succeeded than when they failed. These results were discussed in terms of a structural balance model of attribution behavior and also in relation to Heider's naive analysis of the causes of action     

Power imbalance,its legitimacy,and aggression

Sixty Japanese female students were asked to exchange shocks in electric roulette games with female opponents. The subjects were assigned to either the 80%, 50%, or 20% win conditions. Half of them were then led to judge that the power unbalance was legitimate by being informed that the assignment was based on a prior performance contest, with the good performer being assigned to the advantageous position. The other subjects were led to perceive the power imbalance as illegitimate by being informed that the assignment was randomly decided. The opponents always severely attacked them. The retaliation by the subjects was analyzed by a two-way ANOVA with Power Imbalance and Legitimacy. It was found that the subjects both in the 20% and 50% win conditions set more intense shocks to their opponents than those in the 80% win condition. This is not consistent with the fear of retaliation hypothesis which had predicted that the subjects would refrain from intensely aggressing against the opponent who had a greater aggressive capacity. It was also found that in the 80% win condition, the subjects set more intense shocks when the unbalance had been determined by their performance than when determined by luck, whereas in the 20% win condition, they set more intense shocks when the imbalance had been determined by luck than when determined by their performance. These suggest that retaliation depended upon perceived justifiability of aggression which was predicated on the legitimacy of the power imbalance. Finding in the 50% win condition that the shock settings were higher when the power imbalance had been determined by their performance than when determined by luck was interpreted in terms of their heightened competitiveness.     

Moral Obstinacy in Political Negotiations

Research in behavioral economics finds that moral considerations bear on the offers that people make and accept in negotiations. This finding is relevant for political negotiations, wherein moral concerns are manifold. However, behavioral economics has yet to incorporate a major theme from moral psychology: People differ, sometimes immensely, in which issues they perceive to be a matter of morality. We review research about the measurement and characteristics of moral convictions. We hypothesize that moral conviction leads to uncompromising bargaining strategies and failed negotiations. We test this theory in three incentivized experiments in which participants bargain over political policies with real payoffs at stake. We find that participants' moral convictions are linked with aggressive bargaining strategies, which helps explain why it is harder to forge bargains on some political issues than others. We also find substantial asymmetries between liberals and conservatives in the intensity of their moral convictions about different issues.     

Objective self-awareness,standards of evaluation,and moral behavior

In a performance setting, subjects were given an opportunity to cheat without fear of detection on puzzle problems. Subjects were led to believe that successful performance was due to ability in some conditions, but to luck in other conditions. In fact, most of the problems were insolvable, so that success was impossible without cheating. Self-awareness was induced in half the subjects by having them sit in front of a mirror and listen to a tape recording of their own voice as they worked on the puzzle problems; the remaining subjects were not exposed to a mirror and listened to a tape of someone else's voice as they worked on the problems. It was predicted that cheating frequency would be higher under ability attribution conditions than under luck attribution conditions, and that this effect of performance attribution would be greater among self-aware subjects than among non-self-aware subjects. Results confirmed these hypotheses. Discussion centered on the differential use of morality and competence standards for behavior when in a state of self-awareness.