共查询到14条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
2.
George Mandler 《Applied cognitive psychology》1995,9(6):539-541
3.
4.
5.
William R. Woodward 《New Ideas in Psychology》1985,3(2):207-209
6.
7.
8.
Joy Doniger Osofsky 《Infant mental health journal》1991,12(2):136-138
9.
10.
Catriona Mackenzie 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):528-532
Many take the claim that you cannot ‘get’ an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ to imply that non-moral beliefs are by themselves incapable of justifying moral beliefs. I argue that this is a mistake and that the position that moral beliefs are justified exclusively by non-moral beliefs—a view that I call moral inferentialism—presents an attractive non-sceptical moral epistemology. 相似文献
11.
Clayton Crockett 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2012,71(3):251-255
12.
13.