Categories of Life: The Status of the Camp in Derrida and Agamben

This essay is an exploration of the relationship between Agamben's 1995 text, Homo Sacer, and Derrida's 1992 “Force of Law” essay. Agamben attempts to show that the camp, as the topological space of the state of exception, has become the biopolitical paradigm for modernity. He draws this conclusion on the basis of a distinction, which he finds in an essay by Walter Benjamin, between categories of life, with the “pro‐tagonist” of the work being what he calls homo sacer, or bare life—life that is stripped of its humanity and value. Five years earlier, in 1990, Derrida had given a lecture at UCLA (later published in its entirety as “The Force of Law”) in which he had analyzed the very same essay by Benjamin and had highlighted the distinction between “base life” and “just life.” The implications of his analysis show a discomforting prox‐imity between Benjaminian messianism and the Nazi “final solution,” a conclusion that Agamben dismisses entirely. In this paper, however, I demonstrate that the structures of the two works are quite similar in many important ways. I argue that, though the broad scope of Agamben's work is original in many respects, and I would not wish to reduce Agamben's work to Derridean repetitions, he nevertheless utilizes much more of Derrida's analysis, specifically with respect to the categori‐zation of life, than he would like the reader to believe.     

Attribution of movement: Potential links between subjective reports of agency and output monitoring

According to agency memory theory, individuals decide whether “I did it” based on a memory trace of “I am doing it”. The purpose of this study was to validate the agency memory theory. To this end, several hand actions were individually presented as samples, and participants were asked to perform the sample action, observe the performance of that action by another person, or imagine performing the action. Online feedback received by the participants during the action was manipulated among the different conditions, and output monitoring, in which participants were asked whether they had performed each hand action, was conducted. The rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action was higher when visual feedback was unaltered than when it was altered (Experiment 1A), and this tendency was observed across all types of altered feedback (Experiment 1B). The observation of an action performed by the hand of another person did not increase the rate at which respondents thought that they themselves had performed the action unless the participants actually did perform the action (Experiments 2A and 2B). In Experiment 3, a relationship was observed between the subjective feeling that “I am the one who is causing an action” and the memory that “I did perform the action”. These experiments support the hypothesis that qualitative information and sense of “self” are tagged in a memory trace and that such tags can be used as cues for judgements when the memory is related to the “self”.     

The measurement of simulated stealing behaviour and moral judgement — a technique

A technique is described which attempts to measure the responses of children in hypothetical stealing dilemmas. A technique embodying two forms, a so-called “did do” version and a “should do” version, was constructed. The “did do” version was an attempt to represent the child in an “actual” though hypothetical stealing dilemma and through the use of the first person pronoun “I”, contrast this with a situation in which the child could respond in terms of how he or she thought he or she should. A series of highly significant differences within the groups on the “did do” and “should do” versions was noted, together with significant differences between the “delinquent” and “normal” populations. It was argued that such differences indicated that the procedure had good validity as well as acceptable reliability.     

The Immigrant Analyst: A Journey From Double Consciousness Toward Hybridity

In this paper I utilize the concept of “double consciousness” as a framework for theorizing the subjectivity of the immigrant analyst. I invite the reader to journey with me as I deconstruct my experiences as an immigrant analyst in North America in order to depict how “double consciousness” shapes subjectivity. I show that I developed a binary, bifurcated analyst self, despite my wish to become a multicultural analyst who could “stand in the spaces.” This subtly clouded my clinical judgment causing me to side with the immigrant boyfriend of an American patient and to ignore significant differences between myself and a French patient because he too was an immigrant. When I named and processed my “double consciousness” I experienced resignification, my subjectivity was reconfigured, I was able to experience a panoply of selves, a hybrid “me-ness,” and I could recognize and address “double consciousness” in my immigrant patients.     

The composition of reasons

How do reasons combine? How is it that several reasons taken together can have a combined weight which exceeds the weight of any one alone? I propose an answer in mereological terms: reasons combine by composing a further, complex reason of which they are parts. Their combined weight is the weight of their combination. I develop a mereological framework, and use this to investigate some structural views about reasons. Two of these views I call “Atomism” and “Wholism”. Atomism is the view that atomic reasons are fundamental: all reasons reduce to atomic reasons. Wholism is the view that whole reasons are fundamental. I argue for Wholism, and against Atomism. I also consider whether reasons might be “context-sensitive”.     

The Psychic Life of Fragments: Splitting from Ferenczi to Klein*

The present paper starts from the reflection that there is a curious “phenomenological gap” in psychoanalysis when it comes to processes of splitting and to describing the “life” of psychic fragments resulting from processes of splitting. In simpler terms, we are often in a position to lack a precise understanding of what is being split and how the splitting occurs. I argue that although Melanie Klein’s work is often engaged when talking of splitting (particularly through discussions on identification, projection and projective identification), there are some important phenomenological opacities in her construction. I show that by orchestrating a dialogue between Melanie Klein and Sándor Ferenczi, we arrive at a fuller and more substantive conception of psychic splitting and of the psychic life of fragments which are the result of splitting. This is even more meaningful because there are some unacknowledged genealogical connections between Ferenczian concepts and Kleinian concepts, which I here explore. While with Klein we remain in the domain of “good” and “bad” objects—polarised objects which are constantly split and projected—with Ferenczi we are able to also give an account of complicated forms of imitation producing psychic fragments and with a “dark” side of identification, which he calls “identification with the aggressor”. While attempting to take steps toward imagining a dialogue between Klein and Ferenczi, I note a certain silent “Ferenczian turn” in a late text by Melanie Klein, “On the Development of Mental Functioning”, written in 1958. In particular, I reflect on her reference to some “terrifying figures” of the psyche, which cannot be accounted for simply as the persecutory parts of the super-ego but are instead more adequately read as more enigmatic and more primitive psychic fragments, resulting from processes of splitting.     

The effect of vicarious punishment on prosocial behavior in children

Two experiments are reported dealing with the effects of vicarious punishment on prosocial behavior. In Experiment I, first and second grade females who witnessed a peer model being punished for a refusal to share (“nonsharing, punished”), shared more than an appropriate control group. Sharing was similarly heightened, however, in a group who witnessed punishment to the model which was not contingent upon any specific behavior (“punishment only”). Experiment II tested and confirmed the hypothesis derived from Experiment I that noncontingent vicarious punishment has a generalized inhibitory effect on antisocial behaviors. First, second, and third grade females were shown either the “nonsharing, punished,” “punishment only,” or baseline videotapes used in Experiment I. Subsequent to viewing the tapes, subjects in the “punishment only” condition helped the experimenter significantly more than did subjects in the “nonsharing, punished” and baseline conditions. The ability of existing theoretical treatments of vicarious punishment to account for these results is questioned.     

Going beyond with Bayesian updating

It all started innocently enough. One spring-like winter day, I happened to ask Brendan whether economists ever dealt with escalation. “With what?” he replied. “A phenomenon where people keep investing in the face of continuing losses,” I answered. Then I described how industrial/organizational psychologists had become intrigued with situations in which investors seemed to throw good money after bad, how their explanations for the phenomenon centered on individual characteristics such as commitment, how Sonia Goltz (1992) used a standard bread-and-butter operant procedure—fixed and variable schedules of reinforcement—to explain their persistence, and how Goltz's experiments had shown that during the extinction phase investors even increased their investments for a while when the news was all bad. Without a moment's hesitation, he exclaimed, “I bet I can predict the turning point.” Another arrogant-economist remark, I thought to myself. “How?” “Bayesian updating.” Then we talked at length about Bayesian analysis techniques and how they could be used to predict the shape of extinction curves. I realized that these techniques might be just what psychologists needed as an enticement to study sequences of behavior over time. And that's how this commentary got started.     

The Roles of Religion in National Legitimation: Judaism and Zionism's Elusive Quest for Legitimacy

Why and how do nations turn to religion to justify claims for statehood? This article addresses this question in both theory and practice, showing that religion plays multiple legitimating roles that shift dynamically according to the success they yield for national movements. I posit four legitimating models: (1) nationalism instead of religion (“secular nationalism”), (2) nationalism as a religion (“civil religion”), (3) religion as a resource for nationalism (“auxiliary religion”), and (4) religion as a source of nationalism (“chosen people”). Empirically, I analyze the roles of religion in Zionist efforts to legitimate a Jewish state in Palestine. I argue that Zionism has responded to persistent delegitimation by expanding the role of religion in its political legitimation. The right of self‐determination, which stands at the core of the “secular Zionism” legitimation, has given way to leveraging Judaism, which in turn has been eclipsed by constructing a Zionist civil religion and a “chosen people” justification.     

“I am NN”: A Reconstruction of Anscombe's “The First Person”

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”.     

The Wretchedness of Belief

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly “religious man” thinks himself to be, not merely “imperfect” or “ill,” but wholly “wretched.” While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist‐relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of “genuine” religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological‐salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that “ought implies can.” In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense.     

The Cartesian Roots of Berkeley's Account of Sensation

On the old story about early modern philosophy, Descartes is a “rationalist” who devalues the senses, and Berkeley an “empiricist” who rejects this. Berkeley plays into this story in his Notebooks, where he writes: “in vindication of the senses effectually to confute wt Descartes saith in ye last par. of the last Med: viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsly than truely” (794). But when we turn to this “last par.,” we find Descartes maintaining that “my senses report the truth much more frequently than not” (CSM2: 61). In this paper, I draw on recent commentary to outline Descartes' positive account of sensation. I then look carefully at Berkeley's account of the same, in particular, by considering his distinction between human and divine perception and his account of the laws of nature. In so doing, I suggest that there are noteworthy parallels between Descartes' and Berkeley's accounts with respect to the function of sensation and the ways in which sensations can fulfill this function. I conclude by sketching some ways in which this understanding of Berkeley can illuminate some aspects of Berkeley scholarship.     

An emperor without clothes: The Church's views about treatment of domestic violence

Once upon a time there was an emperor who was very vain about his elegant clothing. Two swindlers convinced him that they could make him the finest clothes he ever had, and set to work on an empty loom. Rumors of their fame began to spread, and even the emperor's high officials were convinced that the invisible garments were the finest they had ever seen. One minister even decided, “I know I'm not stupid, so it must be my fine position I'm not fit for. Some people might think that rather funny, but I must take good care they don't get to hear of it.” And then he praised the material which he couldn't see and assured them of his delight in its charming shades and its beautiful design. The emperor finally went on parade with his new garments. Crowds gathered, and they all said how magnificently clad he was. No one dared admit they couldn't see the clothes, and many concluded there was simply something wrong with them that he appeared naked. Finally a little child said, “But he hasn't got anything on!” “Goodness gracious, do you hear what the little innocent says?” one whispered to another, until finally everyone shouted at last, “He hasn't got anything on!” The emperor was embarrassed, but he drew himself up and went on with the procession still more proudly, while his chamberlains walked after him carrying the train that wasn't there.     

The Production of Acceptable Muslim Women in the United States

In this article, I explore some of the elements by which Muslim women who wear the hijab in the United States are managed so as to produce and distinguish “unruly” from “good” Muslim female citizens within the context of American liberalism. Unlike the French state, which has regulated both the hijab and niqab through national legislation, the American liberal framework utilizes a laissez‐faire approach, which relies on a range of public and private institutions to determine acceptable public presentations of the liberal female subject. I refer to this form of management as “neoliberalism.” Neoliberal management works in conjunction with popular political discourses and domestic events in ways that alternately contract and expand the boundaries that allow “suitable Muslim women” in the public sphere.     

The Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice

Many Protestant denominations have or recently had policies that prohibit “self‐avowed practicing homosexuals” from being ordained. By only prohibiting “practicing” homosexuals, proponents of these policies claim that they do not discriminate against homosexuals as a group since, technically, a homosexual can still be ordained as long as she is “non‐practicing.” In other words, a condemnation of homosexual practice is not the same as a condemnation of homosexual persons. I argue that this is not the case; the rhetoric of homosexual practice does, in fact, amount to a condemnation of gays and lesbians. It does so by conflating the two things it claims to keep separate—homosexual conduct and homosexual identity. I demonstrate this conflation by analyzing the history of this rhetoric and how it has been adjudicated in church court decisions from the United Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church (USA).     

Reaction times for a same-different discrimination of vowel-consonant syllables

Reaction times (RTs) were measured for decisions in a same-different discrimination of successive vowel-consonant nonsense syllables. Averaged data showed that “same” RTs were faster than “different” RTs and that the “different” RT decreased as the number of features (Wickelgren, 1966) by which a pair contrasted increased. For individual phonemic comparisons, two of the dependent variables, P(S I d), or probability of responding “same” to a different trial and the mean correct “different” RT, were related in that the RT increased as P(S I d) increased. The size of the difference between “same” and “different” RTs for a given phonemic contrast was directly related to P(S | d). The difficulty of a comparison, as described by P(S I d) and by the difference between correct “same” and “different” RTs, was explained through a markedness classification of phonemes.     

FINDING ROTHKOWITZ: THE JEWISH ROTHKO

While Mark Rothko's canvases are renowned for their rich, monumental expanses of colour, he has insisted that his paintings should be appreciated on more than an aesthetic level. “The people who weep before my pictures,” he commented in 1956, “are having the same religious experience I had when I painted them.” While various critics and scholars have recognized the importance of this remark, just what Rothko meant by “religious experience” has been highly contested. In this article I will argue that Rothko's Jewish identity—informed by his experiences in Russia and New York—influenced his understanding of “religious experience” in subtle but powerful ways. I will not attempt to spot a raft of Jewish symbols and references in Rothko's work, an endeavour that has yielded spurious results in previous studies. Instead, I will examine Rothko's sense of “religious experience” as an evolving concept in his thought and painting; a process which finds its culmination in the Rothko Chapel, a space informed but not defined by the artist's Jewishness.     

That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”     

Psycho-Palliation and the Enlightened Counselor

The counseling process of psycho-palliation is presented as a type of spiritual journey that leads to enlightenment. First, the theory of psycho-palliation is defined. Then, a step-by-step outline is given on how a psycho-palliative attitude produces enlightenment for the counselor. Throughout the exposition, the theory of psycho-palliative counseling is expanded upon through the use of parables and spiritual references from the world's religions. Wosong had learned much and thought that he was ready to enter Heaven. So he went to the doors of Heaven and knocked. A voice said, “Who is there?” “It is Wosong, and I am ready to enter.” The voice replied, “I am sorry Wosong, but there is not room for me and thee.” Dejected, Wosong returned to his place, studied all the prophets and gave all he had to the poor. Once again he returned to the doors of Heaven and knocked. A voice said, “Who is there?” “It is Wosong.” The voice replied, “I am sorry Wosong, but there is not room for me and thee.” In complete confusion, Wosong returned to his place. For 7 years, he meditated on the voice of Heaven. Then, in complete humility, he knocked on the doors of Heaven. A voice said, “Who is there?” Wosong replied, “It is thyself.” So the voice said, “Enter. I always have room for myself.”     

The phenomenologically manifest

Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I suggest two viable methods, of complementary value, which I call “the method of contrast” and “the method of knowability.”