On reduced matrices

It is shown that the class of reduced matrices of a logic is a 1 ^st order -class provided the variety associated with has the finite replacement property in the sense of [7]. This applies in particular to all 2-valued logics. For 3-valued logics the class of reduced matrices need not be 1 ^st order.     

Respecting the margins of agency: Alzheimer's patients and the capacity to value

1 Quoted in Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales (New York: Summit Books, 1985), p. 32. Philosophy & Public Affairs 28, no. 2.

     

Mind,Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language

Dreyfus presents Todes's (2001 Todes S 2001 Body and World Cambridge MA MIT Press  ) republished Body and World as an anticipatory response to McDowell (1994 McDowell J 1994 Mind and World Cambridge MA Harvard University Press  ) which shows how preconceptual perception can ground conceptual thought. I argue that Dreyfus is mistaken on this point: Todes's claim that perceptual experience is preconceptual presupposes an untenable account of conceptual thought. I then show that Todes nevertheless makes two important contributions to McDowell's project. First, he develops an account of perception as bodily second nature, and as a practical‐perceptual openness to the world, which constructively develops McDowell's view. Second, and more important, this account highlights the practical and perceptual dimension of linguistic competence. The result is that perception is conceptual “all the way down” only because discursive conceptualization is perceptual and practical “all the way up”. This conjunction of McDowell and Todes on the bodily dimensions of discursive practice also vindicates Davidson's and Brandom's criticisms of McDowell's version of empiricism.     

Don't Predict the Future–Direct it! Comments on the intellectual history,the Logical and Applicative Visibility,and the Underlying Assumptions of Directed Evolution (DE)

The best way to predict the future is to invent it.

—Alan Kay ¹ 1. Alan Kay is one of the inventors of the Smalltalk programming language and one of the originators of the idea of Object Oriented Programming. He is the conceiver of the laptop computer and the architect of the modern windowing GUI.

It is obvious that there are patterns of cultural change—evolution in the neutral sense—and any theory of cultural change worth more than a moment's consideration will have to be Darwinian in the minimal sense of being consistent with the theory of evolution by natural selection of Homo sapiens.

—Daniel Dennett ² 2. Daniel C. Dennett is a Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University. He is the author of several books, including Consciousness Explained (1991), Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), and Kinds of Minds (1996). This quote is taken from his forward to Darwinizing Culture (Aunger 2000 Aunger, R. 2000. Darwinizing culture: The status of memetics as a science, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar], ix).

The future is here. It's just not widely distributed yet.

—William Gibson ³ 3. In the early 1980s William Gibson wrote Neuromancer, coining the term “cyberspace” to describe computer-generated virtual realities long before we saw the similarities with today's Internet.

It is the magician's wand, by means of which he may summon into life whatever form and mould he pleases.

—Charles Darwin commenting on the power of artificial selection ⁴ 4. Here Darwin is explaining the power of artificial selection and its potential for the directed evolution of biological systems (domestication and commercially oriented breeding) in his Origin of Species (1859, 68).      

Locke's theory of classification

In §155 of his New Theory of Vision Berkeley explains that a hypothetical ‘unbodied spirit’ ‘cannot comprehend the manner wherein geometers describe a right line or circle’.1 ¹All references to Berkeley are from, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.), The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1948) The following abbreviations are used: An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision, section x = New Theory x; Philosophical Commentaries, entry x = Commentaries x; Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge, section x = Principles x. All other references to Berkeley's works are of the form The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, volume x, page y = Works, x, y. The reason for this, Berkeley continues, is that ‘the rule and compass with their use being things of which it is impossible he should have any notion.’ This reference to geometrical tools has led virtually all commentators to conclude that at least one reason why the unbodied spirit cannot have knowledge of plane geometry is because it cannot manipulate a ruler or a compass. In this article I will show that such an interpretation is flawed. I will instead argue that Berkeley's understanding of Euclidian geometry was based on Isaac Barrow's account of the foundations of geometry. On this view geometrical objects are conceived in terms of the idealized motion that generates the objects of geometry. Consequently, that what the unbodied spirit cannot do in this context is to form an idea of motion rather than being unable to handle geometrical tools.     

Yonec: A Poetic Fairytale

Yonec, by Marie de France, is a fairytale-like poem from the 12th century, one of twelve tales in a collection of her work that has become known as Les Lais de Marie de France. ¹ 1. G. S. Burgess & K. Busby, eds. The Lais of Marie de France (London: Penguin Books, 1986). Like many folk tales, it relates to a divine female figure that must be freed from imprisonment. Here a young noble lady is redeemed and, in turn, goes out on the quest for her redeemer. Yonec anticipates the religious problem of modern times, since it arises from a particularly meaningful period of time that produced a whole series of literary manifestations that witnessed the blossoming of the archetype of Eros and the presence of Merlin. The present-day appeal is that we sense the need of the soul for wholeness, and the need of the spirit of nature for redemption, echoing the collective situation of Marie de France's epoch.     

Sense and Simplicity: Wittgenstein's Argument for Simple Objects

This paper puts forward an alternative interpretation of the argument for simple objects advanced in the 2.0s of the Tractatus. In my view, Wittgenstein derives the simplicity of objects directly from his account of possible states, complex objects and senseful propositions. The key to Wittgenstein's argument is the idea that, if there were no simple objects, possible states would not be necessarily possible. If this were the case, however, there would be no senseful language, in Wittgenstein's view. One of the subsidiary aims of this paper is to question the idea that Wittgenstein posits simples because, without them, language would be infinitely analysable. ¹ 1 I am grateful to Malcolm Budd, Jane Heal and Jim Hopkins for their help in the development of this paper.     

Self-Modeling and Competitive Beam Performance Enhancement Examined Within a Self-Regulation Perspective

The observation of oneself on video that has been edited to show a performance level higher than one can actually perform is a feedforward form of modeling, termed self-modeling (SM; Dowrick, 1999 Dowrick, P. W. 1999. A review of self-modeling and related interventions. Applied and Preventive Psychology, 8: 23–29. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). In this research, gymnasts alternated between viewing and not viewing a SM video during their competitive season. Results showed that gymnasts attained significantly higher beam scores when they viewed the video versus when they did not. No differences in self-efficacy were observed using a quantitative measure; however, a qualitative analysis of interviews based on Zimmerman's (2000) Ram, N. and McCullagh, P. 2003. Self-modeling: Influences on psychological responses and physical performance. The Sport Psychologist, 17(2): 220–241.  [Google Scholar] model, indicated that a number of self-regulatory processes, including self-efficacy, were employed.     

Algebraic study of Sette's maximal paraconsistent logic

The aim of this paper is to study the paraconsistent deductive systemP ¹ within the context of Algebraic Logic. It is well known due to Lewin, Mikenberg and Schwarse thatP ¹ is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, the quasivariety generated by Sette's three-element algebraS being the unique quasivariety semantics forP ¹. In the present paper we prove that the mentioned quasivariety is not a variety by showing that the variety generated byS is not equivalent to any algebraizable deductive system. We also show thatP ¹ has no algebraic semantics in the sense of Czelakowski. Among other results, we study the variety generated by the algebraS. This enables us to prove in a purely algebraic way that the only proper non-trivial axiomatic extension ofP ¹ is the classical deductive systemPC. Throughout the paper we also study those abstract logics which are in a way similar toP ¹, and are called hereabstract Sette logics. We obtain for them results similar to those obtained for distributive abstract logics by Font, Verdú and the author.     

Book Reviews

It is a common complaint that the syllogism commits a petitio principii. This is discussed extensively by John Stuart Mill in ‘A System of Logic’ [1882. Eighth Edition, New York: Harper and Brothers] but is much older, being reported in Sextus Empiricus in chapter 17 of the ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’ [1933 Sextus Empiricus. 1933. ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’, in R. G. Bury, Works, London and New York: Loeb Classical Library. [Google Scholar]. in R. G. Bury, Works, London and New York: Loeb Classical Library]. Current wisdom has it that Mill gives an account of the syllogism that avoids being a petitio by virtue of construing the universal premise as an inference-rule. I will show that both the problem and the role of inference-rules in its solution have been misunderstood. Inference-rules have very little to do with this problem, and I will argue further that nothing is gained with regard to this problem by the introduction of inference-rules in preference to premises.     

In defence of fact-dependency

G.A. Cohen and David Estlund claim that, because of their fact-dependent nature, constructivist theories of justice do not qualify as moral theories about fundamental values such as justice. In this paper, I defend fact-dependent, constructivist theories of justice against this fact-independency critique. I argue that constructivists can invoke facts among the grounds for accepting fundamental principles of justice while maintaining that the foundation of morality has to be non-empirical. My claim is that constructivists ultimately account for the normativity of fact-dependent principles by referring to a fact-independent, moral conception of the person, which is not a principle of justice.1^?1. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Dutch Conference for Practical Philosophy, the practical philosophy seminar at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and the seminar of the Horizon research group at Utrecht University. I am grateful for the comments and questions I received on these occasions.     

KANTIAN VALUE REALISM

Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. They argue that Kant has an account of the relationship between practical reason and value, known as “Kantian constructivism” that is far superior to the traditional “value realist” theory, and that it is because of this that we should accept his theory. ¹ 1 Korsgaard (1996a, 1996b, 2003 ).
It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant's moral theory stands or falls with Kantian constructivism. ² 2 Gaut (1997 ), Regan (2002 ).
But this is a mistake. In this paper, I sketch a rival Kantian theory of value, which I call Kantian value realism. I argue that there is textual evidence that Kant himself accepted value realism rather than constructivism. Whilst my aim in this paper is to set out the theory clearly rather than to defend it, I will try to show that Kantian value realism is preferable to Kantian constructivism and that it is worthy of further study.     

Reflections on Feminist Scepticism,The “Maleness” of Philosophy and Postmodernism

Bordo is concerned with what she calls apostmodem “theoretics of heterogeneity” that questions the validity of historical and cultural analyses “along gender-tines.” It also challenges the validity of feminist analyses concerning the “maleness” of philosophy. Not surprisingly, this has precipitated debate between postmodernists and those alarmed by its implications for feminist work. At issue is the epistemological and political capacity of feminism to analyze social power and dominance through an analysis of gender. ¹ 1 See Linda Nicholson (1990) .
     

Top-down knowledge modulates onset capture in a feedforward manner

How do we select behaviourally important information from cluttered visual environments? Previous research has shown that both top-down, goal-driven factors and bottom-up, stimulus-driven factors determine which stimuli are selected. However, it is still debated when top-down processes modulate visual selection. According to a feedforward account, top-down processes modulate visual processing even before the appearance of any stimuli, whereas others claim that top-down processes modulate visual selection only at a late stage, via feedback processing. In line with such a dual stage account, some studies found that eye movements to an irrelevant onset distractor are not modulated by its similarity to the target stimulus, especially when eye movements are launched early (within 150-ms post stimulus onset). However, in these studies the target transiently changed colour due to a colour after-effect that occurred during premasking, and the time course analyses were incomplete. The present study tested the feedforward account against the dual stage account in two eye tracking experiments, with and without colour after-effects (Exp. 1), as well when the target colour varied randomly and observers were informed of the target colour with a word cue (Exp. 2). The results showed that top-down processes modulated the earliest eye movements to the onset distractors (<150-ms latencies), without incurring any costs for selection of target matching distractors. These results unambiguously support a feedforward account of top-down modulation.     

How do ordered questions bias eyewitnesses?

ABSTRACT

Background: Suggestive techniques can distort eyewitness memory (Wells & Loftus, 2003, Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic Psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149–160). Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc). Recently, we found that suggestion is unnecessary: Simply reversing the arrangement of questions put to eyewitnesses changed what they believed (Michael & Garry, 2016, Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 601–608. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1). But why? One explanation might be that early questions set an anchor that eyewitnesses then adjust away from insufficiently. Methods: We tracked how eyewitness beliefs changed over the course of questioning. We then investigated the influence of people’s need to engage in and enjoy effortful cognition. This factor, “Need for Cognition,” (NFC) affects the degree to which people adjust (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984, The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13; Epley & Gilovich, 2006, The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311–318. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x). Results: In our first two experiments we found results consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment account. But in Experiments 3 and 4 we found that NFC provided only partial support for that account. Conclusions: Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding how people form beliefs about the accuracy of their memory.     

Sport,moral interpretivism,and football's voluntary suspension of play norm

In recent years it has become increasingly the norm in football1 1. For North American readers, football here equals soccer. to kick the ball out of play when a player is, or appears to be, inadvertently injured. Kicking the ball out of play in football represents a particular instantiation of a generally understood fair play norm, the voluntary suspension of play (VSP). In the philosophical literature, support for the VSP norm is provided by John Russell (2007 Russell, J. S. 2007. “Broad internalism and the moral foundations of sport”. In Ethics in Sport, 2nd edn, Edited by: Morgan, W. J. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.  [Google Scholar]) who claims that his interpretivist account of sport is helpful for evaluating complex moral issues in sport in general and issues related to injury in football in particular. This paper examines whether Russell's interpretivist-backed account of autonomy can adequately inform football players as to the nuanced and ambiguous moral considerations that arise in relation to the VSP norm. The paper goes on to identify the highly complex dynamic circumstances football players need to consider in order to better discharge their moral responsibilities when faced with inadvertent injuries.     

Intentional transaction

The second person is often set in contrast to the first person. And there is a contrast. It does not reside in a difference of what is thought as I from what is thought as you. For that is not different. The contrast is that of monadic and dyadic predication, action and transaction. It is the contrast, not of I and You, but of I and I–You. The second person does not add a You to an I. It divides the I and makes it a relation. We consider, first, the form of predication that is common to first- and second-person thought. Then, we define the second person as a species of this form of thought. Last, we find the source and condition of this form of thought in a thought of this very form. This thought, being the source of its own form, is one of which one cannot be conscious from outside it. It is a last word, or, better, a first word.¹1. Compare Thomas Nagel's notion of a last word (Nagel 2001 Nagel, Thomas. 2001. The Last Word. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]). Nagel's development of the notion reveals no reason why he should call what is last a word. From what he writes in the book, one would think its title to be “The Last Thought”. (Indeed, chapter 2 bears the title “Why We Can't Understand Thought from the Outside”.) However, if the last thought is I–You, then the last thought is a word; indeed, it is the word. In reaching for “The Last Word”, Nagel may express an inchoate appreciation of this.     

The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (second edition). By Romanus Cessario

The call of the Second Vatican Council for the renewal of moral theology has received very divergent responses. This article identifies and compares three such proposals. The underlying presupposition for this analysis is that each proposal begins with a divergent understanding of where the tradition went awry. Hence, the proposed cures ended up irreconcilable. This article seeks to describe ‘as precisely as possible the nature of the confusion and its sources, showing where attention must be directed if a solution is to be discovered.’ ¹ 1 The anonymous referee of the Heythrop Journal.
     

Religious fundamentalism and primitive projective processes

In her book on the origins, nature and contemporary global significance of religious fundamentalism, Karen Armstrong cites the example of an early twentieth-century, ultra-Orthodox Jewish spirituality1 ¹Such a spirituality may be characterized as ‘fundamentalist’ inasmuch as it appeals to the inerrancy of sacred texts to legitimize conceptions of the purity of the ‘Holy Land’ as exclusively a place for prayer and the study of Scripture and not as a site for the erection of a nation state. For a brief account of the history of ultra-Orthodox, anti-Zionist spirituality from 1900 to the present, see Armstrong 2000 Armstrong K 2000 The Battle for God. Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (London: Harper Collins)  [Google Scholar], pp.?201–217. vehemently opposed to the creation of the state of Israel. Armstrong suggests that

This rejectionist vision is utterly incomprehensible to Jews who regard the Zionist achievement as wondrous and salvific. This is the dilemma that Jews, Christians and Muslims have all had to face in the twentieth century: between the fundamentalists and those who adopt a more positive attitude to the modern world there is an impassable gulf. Rational arguments are of no avail, because the divergence springs from a deeper and more instinctual level of the mind (Armstrong 2000 Armstrong K 2000 The Battle for God. Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (London: Harper Collins)  [Google Scholar], pp.?204–205 [my highlighting]).

This paper will try and show that Melanie Klein's depiction of primitive mental processes serves to elucidate both the nature of this ‘impassable gulf’ and the ‘deeper’ levels of psychic functioning from which it originates. By shedding a specifically Kleinian psychoanalytic and object relations light on what appears to both warrant and inform the discourse on fundamentalism, it hopes to show how individual and group formation, and the interaction between them, are profoundly influenced by unconscious processes. Such processes are shown to be characterized by mechanisms of defence against anxieties – mechanisms induced by changes that threaten existing social relationships (Jaques 1955 The Guardian (2001) (London and Manchester) 13 October  [Google Scholar], p.?479).