The De‐biasing Effect of Incidental Anger on Other‐provided Anchors

The current research investigates the effect of incidental anger on anchoring bias. We hypothesized that feeling angry will make people less influenced by other‐provided anchors because of the moving against action tendency associated with anger. That is, individuals in an angry state will be likely to perceive a given anchor as a viable target for their desire to attack and actively seek out anchor‐inconsistent information, thereby committing less anchoring bias. To examine our hypothesis, in Study 1, we manipulated emotions using film clips and administered a general knowledge task with other‐provided anchors. As predicted, participants in the anger condition showed less anchoring bias to the other‐provided anchors than those in the sad or neutral condition. Study 2 replicated the finding with a different emotion manipulation technique and different anchoring questions. More important, consistent with the moving against action tendency explanation, we also found that people in an angry state committed more anchoring bias for self‐generated anchors, compared with people in a sad or neutral state. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

锚定判断中的心理刻度效应：来自ERP的证据

当前主要有两种理论解释锚定效应的发生机制：锚定调整启发模型和选择通达模型。同样,锚值可能是自发产生的,也可能是外部提供的。本研究用两个ERP实验分别探讨了不同精细程度的心理刻度对自发锚定加工和外部锚定加工的影响。结果表明,只有在自发锚引起的锚定加工中才出现心理刻度效应：在目标呈现后250~800ms之间,精细心理刻度比粗糙心理刻度诱发一个更大的波形正走向,支持锚定调整启发模型。在外部锚引起的锚定加工中,没有出现心理刻度效应,却出现了一个与通达有关的N300成分,支持选择通达加工模型。总的结果支持了锚定加工的双重属性：锚定判断是主动调整还是选择通达取决于不同的情境     

锚定效应的产生前提及作用机制

为了探讨锚定效应的产生前提以及基础锚定效应的理论解释,设计了两个实验。实验一选取高、低、无三种锚值,设置了15ms、45ms、75ms、1000ms四种呈现时间,结果发现只有15ms条件下未出现锚定效应,随着呈现时间增加,锚定效应不断增大,低锚下的锚定效应高于高锚下的锚定效应。实验二设置了语意相同但表述形式不同的两种水平的锚值,结果发现两者引发的锚定效应不同。锚定效应的产生前提是注意,数字启动假说可以更好地解释基础锚定效应。     

The More You Ask For,the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts

The ‘anchoring and adjustment’ bias was demonstrated in a personal injury case using mock jurors. In Experiment 1, the ad damnum, or requested compensation, was manipulated across participants. In Experiment 2, anchors were operationalized as the strength of the legal evidence. Both monetary and causal anchors systematically influenced judgments of the probability that the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries, compensation awarded, and perceptions of the litigants. These results indicate that anchoring occurs in legal applications, and that plaintiffs would do well to request large compensation awards. In addition, anchors expressed on one scale affected judgments expressed on another scale. This cross-modality anchoring stands in contrast to previous studies. Finally, these anchoring effects are unlikely to be explained by either demand effects or perceived relevance of the anchor.     

The anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring

Judgments about future memory performance (metamemory judgments) are known to be susceptible to illusions and bias. Here we asked whether metamemory judgments are affected, like many other forms of judgment, by numerical anchors. Experiment 1 confirmed previous research showing an effect of informative anchors (e.g., past peer performance) on metamemory monitoring. In four further experiments, we then explored the effects of uninformative anchors. All of the experiments obtained significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring; in contrast, the anchors had no effect on recall itself. We also explored the anchoring effect on metamemory control (restudy choices) in Experiment 4. The results suggested that anchors can affect metamemory monitoring, which in turn affects metamemory control. The present research reveals that informative and, more importantly, uninformative numbers that have no influence on recall itself can bias metamemory judgments. On the basis of the current theoretical understanding of the anchoring effect and metamemory monitoring, these results offer insight into the processes that trigger metacognitive biases.     

Anchoring effects on performance judgments

Three studies were conducted investigating the effects of irrelevant anchors on performance judgments. Both a lab and field study demonstrated that an alternative anchoring manipulation that did not involve an explicit comparative question had effects on performance judgments similar to a traditional anchoring manipulation. The final study examined whether the anchoring effects were more likely when the anchor was highly applicable to the final judgment. The results indicated that both highly applicable and low applicable anchors produced an anchoring effect, but the highly applicable anchors had a larger effect on performance judgments. Evidence was also found for asymmetrical anchoring effects. In two of the three studies, high anchors increased performance judgments relative to the control group, whereas low anchors were not significantly different from the control group.     

Anchoring,Activation, and the Construction of Values

Anchoring is a pervasive judgment bias in which decision makers are systematically influenced by random and uninformative starting points. While anchors have been shown to affect a broad range of judgments including answers to knowledge questions, monetary evaluations, and social judgments, the underlying causes of anchoring have been explored only recently. We suggest that anchors affect judgments by increasing the availability and construction of features that the anchor and target hold in common and reducing the availability of features of the target that differ from the anchor. We test this notion of anchoring as activation in five experiments that examine the effects of several experimental manipulations on judgments of value and belief as well as on measures of cognitive processes. Our results indicate that prompting subjects to consider features of the item that are different from the anchor reduces anchoring, while increasing consideration of similar features has no effect. The anchoring-as-activation approach provides a mechanism for debiasing anchoring and also points to a common mechanism underlying anchoring and a number of other judgment phenomena.     

Anchors aweigh: a demonstration of cross-modality anchoring and magnitude priming

Research has shown that judgments tend to assimilate to irrelevant "anchors." We extend anchoring effects to show that anchors can even operate across modalities by, apparently, priming a general sense of magnitude that is not moored to any unit or scale. An initial study showed that participants drawing long "anchor" lines made higher numerical estimates of target lengths than did those drawing shorter lines. We then replicated this finding, showing that a similar pattern was obtained even when the target estimates were not in the dimension of length. A third study showed that an anchor's length relative to its context, and not its absolute length, is the key to predicting the anchor's impact on judgments. A final study demonstrated that magnitude priming (priming a sense of largeness or smallness) is a plausible mechanism underlying the reported effects. We conclude that the boundary conditions of anchoring effects may be much looser than previously thought, with anchors operating across modalities and dimensions to bias judgment.     

Taking the High (or Low) Road: A Quantifier Priming Perspective on Basic Anchoring Effects

ABSTRACT

Current explanations of basic anchoring effects, defined as the influence of an arbitrary number standard on an uncertain judgment, confound numerical values with vague quantifiers. I show that the consideration of numerical anchors may bias subsequent judgments primarily through the priming of quantifiers, rather than the numbers themselves. Study 1 varied the target of a numerical comparison judgment in a between-participants design, while holding the numerical anchor value constant. This design yielded an anchoring effect consistent with a quantifier priming hypothesis. Study 2 included a direct manipulation of vague quantifiers in the traditional anchoring paradigm. Finally, Study 3 examined the notion that specific associations between quantifiers, reflecting values on separate judgmental dimensions (i.e., the price and height of a target) can affect the direction of anchoring effects. Discussion focuses on the nature of vague quantifier priming in numerically anchored judgments.     

意识锚定加工对潜在锚定加工的影响

潜在锚定效应是指阈限下的启动锚定数字导致的锚定效应现象。本研究通过2个实验探讨了意识锚定加工对潜在锚定加工的影响。实验一考察了意识层面的外在锚对潜在锚定效应产生的影响,实验二则进一步探讨了意识层面的自发锚对潜在锚定效应的影响。实验一发现,在不存在外在锚时高锚与低锚的估计有显著性差异;实验二发现,在不存在自发锚时高锚与低锚的估计有显著性差异。研究结果表明,外在锚定加工和自发锚定加工的效应都强于潜在锚定加工。     

Contextual effects in vowel perception II: Evidence for two processing mechanisms

Recent experiments have indicated that contrast effects can be obtained with vowels by anchoring a test series with one of the endpoint vowels. These contextual effects cannot be attributed to feature detector fatigue or to the induction of an overt response bias. In the present studies, anchored ABX discrimination functions and signal detection analyses of identification data (before and after anchoring) for an [i]-[I] vowel series were used to demonstrate that [i] and [I] anchoring produce contrast effects by affecting different perceptual mechanisms. The effects of [i] anchoring were to increase within-[i] category sensitivity, while [I] anchoring shifted criterion placements. When vowels were placed in CVC syllables to reduce available auditory memory, there was a significant decrease in the size of the [I]-anchor contrast effects. The magnitude of the [i]-anchor effect was unaffected by the reduction in vowel information available in auditory memory. These results suggest that [i] and [I] anchors affect mechanisms at different levels of processing. The [i] anchoring results may reflect normalization processes in speech perception that operate at an early level of perceptual processing, while the [I] anchoring results represent changes in response criterion mediated by auditory memory for vowel information.     

The anchoring bias reflects rational use of cognitive resources

Cognitive biases, such as the anchoring bias, pose a serious challenge to rational accounts of human cognition. We investigate whether rational theories can meet this challenge by taking into account the mind’s bounded cognitive resources. We asked what reasoning under uncertainty would look like if people made rational use of their finite time and limited cognitive resources. To answer this question, we applied a mathematical theory of bounded rationality to the problem of numerical estimation. Our analysis led to a rational process model that can be interpreted in terms of anchoring-and-adjustment. This model provided a unifying explanation for ten anchoring phenomena including the differential effect of accuracy motivation on the bias towards provided versus self-generated anchors. Our results illustrate the potential of resource-rational analysis to provide formal theories that can unify a wide range of empirical results and reconcile the impressive capacities of the human mind with its apparently irrational cognitive biases.     

When effortful thinking influences judgmental anchoring: differential effects of forewarning and incentives on self‐generated and externally provided anchors

Two experiments examined the impact of financial incentives and forewarnings on judgmental anchoring effects, or the tendency for judgments of uncertain qualities to be biased in the direction of salient anchor values. Previous research has found no effect of either manipulation on the magnitude of anchoring effects. We argue, however, that anchoring effects are produced by multiple mechanisms—one involving an effortful process of adjustment from “self‐generated” anchors, and another involving the biased recruitment of anchor‐consistent information from “externally provided” anchors—and that only the former should be influenced by incentives and forewarning. Two studies confirmed these predictions, showing that responses to “self‐generated” anchors are influenced by both incentives and forewarnings whereas responses to “externally provided” anchors are not. Discussion focuses on the implications of these effects for debiasing efforts. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Anchoring unbound

An attitudes and persuasion perspective can broaden our understanding of anchoring by highlighting sources of variability in anchoring effects that have been largely overlooked. As the target article suggests, research guided by this perspective can help identify (1) different types of anchors that exert their influence through different underlying mechanisms, 2) important social psychological moderators of anchoring effects, and 3) sources of variability in the consequences of anchoring for judgment and choice. In this commentary, we take an even broader perspective on the types of anchors that are likely to influence judgment, suggesting four potentially distinct types—intuitive approximations, best/worst case scenarios, environmental suggestions, and magnitude priming. We conclude by discussing how an attitudes and persuasion perspective on anchoring may provide novel insights into the moderators and consequences of anchoring effects in everyday life.     

Anchoring in time estimation

In two experiments, an anchoring account of the misestimation of future task duration was tested. This account states that such misestimation occurs because previous task duration serves as an anchor for predictions, leading to underestimation when a longer task follows a shorter one and overestimation when a shorter task follows a longer one. Before estimating the duration of a focal task, participants selected a figure (anchor) of a longer or shorter duration produced by other participants in previous research on the same task (Experiment 1) or a different task (Experiment 2). In both experiments, misestimation differed according to the relative duration of the anchor to the focal task. Underestimation occurred with the shorter anchor and overestimation occurred with the longer one, suggesting that estimates were distorted in the direction of the anchors. This finding is discussed in relation to the role of prior task experience in moderating this anchoring effect.     

Use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by children

Two studies are discussed in which children's use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic was considered. Study one is a modification of the classic multiplication task devised by Kahneman and Tversky (1974). Results indicate that children in grades 4, 6, 8 and adults are affected by the order of numbers provided in an addition task. In addition, younger children display the tendency to over adjust, yielding higher estimates. In the second study, third and fifth grade participants and adults were provided anchors and estimated the number of jellybeans in a glass container. A main effect for condition is indicated, with lower anchors leading to lower estimates. Results of both studies are consistent with the an anchoring and adjustment explanation.     

A neuropsychological dimension for anchoring effects

Previous research has shown that strength of handedness predicts differences in sensory illusions, Stroop interference, episodic memory, and beliefs about body image and the origin of species. Recent evidence also suggests handedness differences in the susceptibility to information framing and persuasion. The present paper extends this line of work to decision anchoring effects. In Experiment 1, 131 introductory psychology students responded to 12 real‐world knowledge questions after being given random, uninformative high or low anchors. Results indicated that “strong‐handers” showed larger anchoring effects than “mixed‐handers.” In Experiment 2, 89 introductory psychology students responded to 6 real‐world knowledge questions in a modified, two‐step anchoring task in which participants were given a credible source for the anchored information and asked to give pre‐ and post‐anchor estimates. In contrast to Experiment 1, results revealed that mixed‐ and strong‐handers were affected similarly by anchoring. In Experiment 3, 158 students were asked to estimate the answer to one of two versions of 8! (8 × 7 × 6 × 5 × 4 × 3 × 2 × 1 or 1 × 2 × 3 × 4 × 5 × 6 × 7 × 8)—a multiplication problem in which the high and low anchors are inherently informative. Here, mixed‐handers showed larger anchoring effects than strong‐handers. A theory centered around the notion of hemispheric specialization and the communication between the two halves of the brain as well as arguments about the informativeness of anchors, metacognition, and recent theorizing in the anchoring literature are used to account for these data. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by children

Two studies are discussed in which children's use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic was considered. Study one is a modification of the classic multiplication task devised by Kahneman and Tversky (1974). Results indicate that children in grades 4, 6, 8 and adults are affected by the order of numbers provided in an addition task. In addition, younger children display the tendency to over adjust, yielding higher estimates. In the second study, third and fifth grade participants and adults were provided anchors and estimated the number of jellybeans in a glass container. A main effect for condition is indicated, with lower anchors leading to lower estimates. Results of both studies are consistent with the an anchoring and adjustment explanation.     

时距估计中的锚定效应

采用两种时距估计方法,检验时距锚定值对时距估计的影响,并探讨了时距信息的心理表征方式。63名在校大学生参加了本次实验。实验1采用口头报告法,表明较大的时距锚定值（5s,5000ms）条件下,被试估对时距的估计值较大,而较小时距锚定值（1s,1000ms）条件下被试估计的时距值较小;语义相同但表述方式不同的锚定值（1s与1000ms,5s与5000ms）条件下的时距估计值没有显著差异。实验2采用产生法,进一步表明时距表述方式对产生时距没有显著影响。以上结果表明,时距估计受时距锚定值的影响,时距信息可能以语义形式进行表征,而不是简单的数字加单位的表层表征形式     

不同形式的锚定值对时距估计决策过程的影响

采用基本锚定范式,以时间词和物理时距分别作为数字锚定值和物理锚定值,探讨了不同形式和大小的锚定值如何影响产生法（实验1）和口头估计法（实验2）中的时距估计的决策过程。55名在校大学生参加了本次实验。实验结果表明,数字锚定值被作为时距估计的调整起始点,对决策过程中的数值估计产生同化影响;物理锚定值则被作为时距估计的比较标准,同化产生法中的决策估计值,对口头估计法中的决策估计值却产生对比影响。