What doesn't kill me makes me stronger: the effects of resisting persuasion on attitude certainty

The present research proposes a metacognitive framework for understanding resistance to persuasion. It is suggested that when people resist persuasion, they can become more certain of their initial attitudes. Several experiments demonstrated that when participants resisted persuasion, attitude certainty increased, but only when the attack was believed to be strong. For attacks believed to be weak, certainty was unchanged. It was also demonstrated that attitude certainty only increased when people actually perceived that persuasion had been resisted. This increased certainty was shown to have implications for resistance to subsequent attacks and the correspondence between attitudes and behavioral intentions. These findings suggest that when people perceive their own resistance, they form inferences about their attitudes that adjust for situational factors.     

Resistance to persuasion and attitude certainty: the moderating role of elaboration

Recent research has demonstrated that when people resist persuasive attacks, they can under specifiable conditions become more certain of their initial attitudes. The present research explores the role of elaboration in determining when this effect will occur. Using both self-reported differences in situational elaboration (Study 1) and chronic individual differences in the need for cognition (Study 2), it is demonstrated that resisting persuasion increases attitude certainty primarily when elaboration is high. When elaboration is low, resisting persuasion does not appear to impact attitude certainty. These findings shed light on the role of metacognitive factors in resistance to persuasion, pinpointing the conditions under which these factors come into play.     

Source Credibility and Attitude Certainty: A Metacognitive Analysis of Resistance to Persuasion

Recent research (Tormala & Petty, 2002) has demonstrated that when people resist persuasion, they can perceive this resistance and become more certain of their initial attitudes. This research explores the role of source credibility in determining when this effect occurs. In two experiments, participants received a counterattitudinal persuasive message. When participants counterargued this message, they became more certain of their attitudes, but only when it came from a source with high expertise. When the message came from a source with low expertise, resisting it had no impact on attitude certainty. This effect was shown using both a traditional measure of attitude certainty (Experiment 1) and a well‐established consequence of certainty—the correspondence between attitudes and behavioral intentions (Experiment 2). In addition, the effect was confined to high elaboration conditions, and occurred even when participants were not explicitly instructed to counterargue. These results are consistent with a metacognitive framework proposed to understand resistance to persuasion.     

Resisting persuasion by illegitimate means: a metacognitive perspective on minority influence

The present research tests a new metacognitive perspective on resistance in minority influence situations. It is proposed that when people initially resist persuasive messages from sources in the numerical minority, they can lose attitude certainty if they perceive that they have based their attitudes on the source's minority status and also believe this is an illegitimate basis for resistance. In three studies, participants were presented with a message from a minority source. In Study 1, participants became less certain of their attitudes after resisting this message. In Study 2, this effect only emerged when participants were led to believe they had based their attitudes on the source's minority status and this was an illegitimate thing to do. In Study 3, this effect was shown to have implications for persuasion in response to a second message. The implications of these findings for classic minority influence effects are discussed.     

The perceived informational basis of attitudes: implications for subjective ambivalence

Three studies tested the hypothesis that when people receive persuasive messages, their perceptions of the information on which they base their attitudes can determine feelings of subjective ambivalence. Across studies, it is shown that when elaboration (e.g., need for cognition, personal relevance) is high, people have more subjective ambivalence when they perceive that they have based their attitudes on the source of a message rather than the arguments contained in that message. When elaboration is low, this effect is reversed. These findings suggest that people can assess the informational basis of their attitudes and that these assessments influence feelings of attitude ambivalence.     

Contextual contrast and perceived knowledge: Exploring the implications for persuasion

The present research tested the notion that perceived target knowledge can be affected by the amount of information one has about other recently encountered stimuli—whether that information is relevant or not. Furthermore, the present research tested the implications of this effect for persuasion. In 4 experiments, participants were presented with a persuasive message promoting a fictitious department store, but first received another message containing more or less information about something else (e.g., another store, a car, or a person). Regardless of the type or valence of initial information received, the initial message had a contrast effect on perceived target knowledge, which influenced target attitudes. The less information the initial message contained, the more persuasive knowledge participants thought they received from the target message, and the more their attitudes agreed with that message. These findings suggest that the perceived amount of persuasive information one has about a target stimulus can be manipulated to increase persuasion, even when the actual amount of information about the target stimulus does not vary.     

Beyond attitude consensus: The social context of persuasion and resistance

The current research presents a new type of social context effect on attitude certainty. It is proposed that when people receive persuasive messages, they appraise their attitudes not only in terms of whether they are shared or not shared by others, but also in terms of whether they are based on similar or dissimilar assessments of the information presented. In two experiments, participants were presented with persuasive messages. In Experiment 1, they were induced to perceive that they responded favorably (persuasion) or unfavorably (resistance) to the message arguments. In Experiment 2, they were allowed to vary in their actual message responses. In both experiments, message response similarity—the degree to which people perceived that their evaluations of persuasive arguments were shared or unshared by others—moderated the classic effect of attitude similarity on attitude certainty. In particular, attitude similarity only affected attitude certainty under conditions of message response similarity. When message responses were believed to be dissimilar, attitude similarity had no effect on attitude certainty.     

A new look at the consequences of attitude certainty: the amplification hypothesis

It is well established that increasing attitude certainty makes attitudes more resistant to attack and more predictive of behavior. This finding has been interpreted as indicating that attitude certainty crystallizes attitudes, making them more durable and impactful. The current research challenges this crystallization hypothesis and proposes an amplification hypothesis, which suggests that instead of invariably strengthening an attitude, attitude certainty amplifies the dominant effect of the attitude on thought, judgment, and behavior. In 3 experiments, the authors test these competing hypotheses by comparing the effects of attitude certainty manipulations on univalent versus ambivalent attitudes. Across experiments, it is demonstrated that increasing attitude certainty strengthens attitudes (e.g., increases their resistance to persuasion) when attitudes are univalent but weakens attitudes (e.g., decreases their resistance to persuasion) when attitudes are ambivalent. These results are consistent with the amplification hypothesis.     

Resistance can be good or bad: how theories of resistance and dissonance affect attitude certainty

This research investigated how lay theories about resisting persuasion can affect attitude certainty. Specifically, people who believed that resistance was negative (i.e., implies close-mindedness) showed different levels of attitude certainty after resisting persuasive messages than people who believed resistance was positive (i.e., implies intelligence). When people held positive lay theories of resistance and overcame ostensibly strong arguments, they showed increased attitude certainty (compared to those who overcame ostensibly weak arguments). However, individuals who believed that resistance was negative did not show increases in attitude certainty when overcoming strong arguments. Experiment 2 suggests that the effect of lay theories and perceived argument strength on attitude certainty was due to dissonance created by believing that resistance is undesirable but nonetheless resisting persuasion.     

When credibility attacks: The reverse impact of source credibility on persuasion

Recent research on the self-validation hypothesis suggests that source credibility identified after message processing can influence the confidence people have in their own thoughts generated in response to persuasive messages (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). The present research explored the implications of this effect for the possibility that high credibility sources can be associated with more or less persuasion than low credibility sources. In two experiments, it is demonstrated that when people generate primarily positive thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because the message contains strong arguments) and then learn of the source, high source credibility leads to more favorable attitudes than does low source credibility. When people have primarily negative thoughts in response to a message (e.g., because it contains weak arguments), however, this effect is reversed—that is, high source credibility leads to less favorable attitudes than does low source credibility.     

Cognitive and affective matching effects in persuasion: an amplification perspective

Past research suggests that cognitive and affective attitudes are more open to change toward cognitive and affective (i.e., matched) persuasive attacks, respectively. The present research investigates how attitude certainty influences this openness. Although an extensive literature suggests that certainty generally reduces an attitude's openness to change, the authors explore the possibility that certainty might increase an attitude's openness to change in the context of affective or cognitive appeals. Based on the recently proposed amplification hypothesis, the authors posit that high (vs. low) attitude certainty will boost the resistance of attitudes to mismatched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by cognitive messages) but boost the openness of attitudes to matched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by affective messages). Two experiments provide support for this hypothesis. Implications for increasing the openness of attitudes to both matched and mismatched attacks are discussed.     

Self-generated persuasion: effects of the target and direction of arguments

Previous research has revealed that self-persuasion can occur either through role-playing (i.e., when arguments are generated to convince another person) or, more directly, through trying to convince oneself (i.e., when arguments are generated with oneself as the target). Combining these 2 traditions in the domain of attitude change, the present research investigated the impact on self-persuasion of the specific target of one's own persuasive attempt (i.e., others vs. oneself). We found that the efficacy of self-persuasion depended on whether people believed that they would have to put more or less effort in convincing the self or others. Specifically, we found opposite effects for self-generated arguments depending on whether the topic of persuasion was proattitudinal or counterattitudinal. Across 4 studies, it was shown that when the topic of the message was counterattitudinal, people were more effective in convincing themselves when the intended target of the arguments was themselves versus another person. However, the opposite was the case when the topic was proattitudinal. These effects were shown to stem from the differential effort perceived as necessary and actually exerted in trying to produce persuasion under these conditions.     

Message sidedness in advertising: the moderating roles of need for cognition and time pressure in persuasion

Persuasion has been extensively researched for decades. Much of this research has focused on different message tactics and their effects on persuasion (e.g., Chang & Chou, 2008; Lafferty, 1999). This research aims to assess whether the persuasion of a specific type of message is influenced by need for cognition (NFC) and time pressure. The 336 undergraduates participated in a 2 (message sidedness: one-sided/two-sided) × 3 (time pressure: low/moderate/high) between-subjects design. Results indicate that two-sided messages tend to elicit more favorable ad attitudes than one-sided messages. As compared with low-NFC individuals, high-NFC individuals are likely to express more favorable ad attitudes, brand attitudes and purchase intention. Moderate time pressure tends to lead to more favorable ad attitudes than low time pressure and high time pressure. In addition, moderate time pressure is likely to elicit more favorable brand attitudes and purchase intentions than high time pressure, but does not elicit more favorable brand attitudes and purchase intentions than low time pressure. Furthermore, when high-NFC individuals are under low or moderate time pressure, two-sided messages are more persuasive than one-sided messages; however, message sidedness does not differentially affect the persuasion when high-NFC individuals are pressed for time. In contrast, one-sided messages are more persuasive than two-sided messages when low-NFC individuals are under low or high time pressure, and two-sided messages are more persuasive than one-sided messages when low-NFC individuals are under moderate time pressure.     

Opening the mind to close it: considering a message in light of important values increases message processing and later resistance to change

Past research showed that considering a persuasive message in light of important rather than unimportant values creates attitudes that resist later attack. The traditional explanation is that the attitudes come to express the value or that a cognitive link between the value and attitude enhances resistance. However, the current research showed that another explanation is plausible. Similar to other sources of involvement, considering important rather than unimportant values increases processing of the message considered in light of those values. This occurs when the values are identified as normatively high or low in importance and when the perceived importance differs across participants for the same values. The increase in processing creates resistance to later attacks, and unlike past research, individual-level measures of initial amount of processing mediate value importance effects on later resistance to change. Important values motivate processing because they increase personal involvement with the issue, rather than creating attitudes that represent or express core values.     

Forewarned is forearmed: Conserving self-control strength to resist social influence

Recent research has shown that resisting persuasion involves active self-regulation. Resisting an influence attempt consumes self-regulatory resources, and in a state of self-regulatory resource depletion, people become more susceptible to (unwanted) influence attempts. However, the present studies show that a forewarning of an impending influence attempt prompts depleted individuals to conserve what is left of their regulatory resources and thus promotes self-regulatory efficiency. As a result, when these individuals are subsequently confronted with a persuasive request, they comply less (Experiments 1 and 3), and generate more counterarguments (Experiment 2) than their depleted counterparts who were not forewarned and thus did not conserve their resources, and they are as able as non-depleted participants to resist persuasion.     

Persuasion: From Single to Multiple to Metacognitive Processes

ABSTRACT— This article provides a brief overview of major developments in the history of contemporary persuasion theory. The first intuitive and empirical approaches to persuasion were guided by main-effect questions (e.g., are experts more persuasive than nonexperts?). Furthermore, researchers focused on only one process by which variables (e.g., emotion, source credibility) would have an impact (e.g., emotion affected attitudes by classical conditioning). As data began to accumulate, so many new theories and effects were uncovered that the discipline faced collapse from the numerous inconsistencies evident. In response to the reigning confusion of the previous era, contemporary multiprocess theories were proposed (e.g., the elaboration likelihood model). According to these more integrative approaches, any one variable could affect attitudes by different processes in different situations and thereby sometimes produce opposite effects. Finally, we describe the role of a recently discovered new contributor to persuasion: self-validation. Unlike previous mechanisms that focus on primary cognition, this new process emphasizes secondary or meta-cognition.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VIOLATIONS OF EXPECTATIONS AND THE INDUCTION OF RESISTANCE TO PERSUASION

This investigation expanded and refined a model of resistance to persuasion developed by Burgoon, Cohen, Miller, and Montgomery (1978). It is argued that a logical shortcoming of this model of resistance to persuasion is its failure to incorporate the notion of confirmation and disconfirmation of receiver expectations. Support was found for the prediction that violations of induced receiver expectations and the intensity of a persuasive message are mediators of resistance to persuasion. Positive violations of expectations induce counterarguing and lead to reversals of initial positive attitudes after receipt of a second message arguing on the same side of an attitude issue. Negative violations of receiver expectations decrease the probability of counterarguing, and increase the vulnerability of people to subsequent persuasive attacks. Strong support for the predictions was obtained in this investigation. Competing explanations for the results were ruled out through the utilization of a counterbalanced design and control procedures. These results provide a partial replication of the earlier empirical evidence supporting this new model of resistance to persuasion and cannot be explained by other models of resistance to persuasion. Moreover, the findings break new theoretical ground in their explanation of findings that appear counterintuitive without reference to this theoretical rationale.     

Unpacking attitude certainty: attitude clarity and attitude correctness

Attitude certainty has been the subject of considerable attention in the attitudes and persuasion literature. The present research identifies 2 aspects of attitude certainty and provides evidence for the distinctness of the constructs. Specifically, it is proposed that attitude certainty can be conceptualized, and empirically separated, in terms of attitude clarity (the subjective sense that one knows what one's attitude is) and attitude correctness (the subjective sense that one's attitude is correct or valid). Experiment 1 uses factor analysis and correlational data to provide evidence for viewing attitude clarity and attitude correctness as separate constructs. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that attitude clarity and attitude correctness can have distinct antecedents (repeated expression and consensus feedback, respectively). Experiment 4 reveals that these constructs each play an independent role in persuasion and resistance situations. As clarity and correctness increase, attitudes become more resistant to counterattitudinal persuasive messages. These findings are discussed in relation to the existing attitude strength literature.     

Assimilation and contrast in persuasion: the effects of source credibility in multiple message situations

The present research explores a contextual perspective on persuasion in multiple message situations. It is proposed that when people receive persuasive messages, the effects of those messages are influenced by other messages to which people recently have been exposed. In two experiments, participants received a target persuasive message from a moderately credible source. Immediately before this message, participants received another message, on a different topic, from a source with high or low credibility. In Experiment 1, participants' attitudes toward the target issue were more favorable after they had first been exposed to a different message from a low rather than high credibility source (contrast). In Experiment 2, this effect only emerged when a priming manipulation gave participants a dissimilarity mindset. When participants were primed with a similarity mindset, their attitudes toward the target issue were more favorable following a different message from a high rather than low credibility source (assimilation).     

Changing prejudiced attitudes,promoting egalitarianism,and enhancing diversity through fundamental processes of persuasion

ABSTRACT

We review work from persuasion science relevant to reducing prejudiced attitudes. We begin by introducing the idea that the thoughts people generate – their number and valence – are critical for understanding when responding to persuasive attempts will result in egalitarian attitudes. A focus on thinking highlights the importance of understanding short and long-term attitude change in promoting diversity. How much people think is also consequential for spreading of initial change to more distal attitudes and generalization of change to other judgments. The second section describes a process of thought validation that emphasizes the importance of considering what people think and feel about their own thoughts. This meta-cognitive process is shown to make a difference in producing consequential changes in reducing prejudiced attitudes toward African Americans, immigrants, refugees, individuals with disabilities, and beyond. The conditions under which variables such as minority status and stigmatized sources affect elaboration and validation are also specified. The fourth section explores how these two processes are relevant for understanding explicit and implicit ambivalence and change in the domain of prejudiced attitudes. We highlight the utility of a process-oriented approach for designing future research and promoting more inclusive attitudes and actions.